Marking Twain

The first of the following two narratives is a personal reflection by the instructor of “Narrative Approaches to Bioethics,” an elective in the PhD program at the Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics at Saint Louis University. The author argues that perhaps the primary goal of medical ethics education should be to show how to construct plausible and defensible interpretations of human experience and sensibly resolve the problems that these happenings occasion. To that end, the author engaged the sympathetic reading capacities of his students by “thwarting” their expectations for medicalized case studies to “dissect” and instead chose works that invited careful readings of morally-complex literary works. One such reading was Huckleberry Finn, which the class read on the book’s 100^th anniversary. Huckleberry Finn chronicles Huck’s search for truth, goodness and justice on the Mississippi River–a location the class explored on a field trip. The second narrative is the personal reflection of one of the students in this class and attests to the moral pedagogical power of Huck Finn. He relates the insights gleaned from a particular passage where Huck confronts moralistic dogmas.     

The Empirical Argument Against Virtue

The virtues are under fire. Several decades’ worth of social psychological findings establish a correlation between human behavior and the situation moral agents inhabit, from which a cadre of moral philosophers concludes that most moral agents lack the virtues. Mark Alfano and Christian Miller introduce novel versions of this argument, but they are subject to a fatal dilemma. Alfano and Miller wrongly assume that their requirements for virtue apply universally to moral agents, who vary radically in their psychological, physiological, and personal situations; I call this the ‘content problem.’ More troubling, however, the content problem leads to what I call the ‘structural problem:’ Alfano and Miller each structure their argument against the virtues as a modus tollens argument and, owing to the breadth of the content problem, each must constrain their argument with a ceteris paribus clause. But the ceteris paribus clause precludes each argument’s validity. More important, however, the resulting conception of virtue implicitly endorsed by Alfano and Miller holds that virtues are idealized models; but since idealized models do not even purport accurately to describe (much of) the world, neither novel version of EAV gains any empirical traction against the virtues. The upshot is an old story whose moral has yet, within the empirical study of the virtues, adequately to be internalized: it is imperative that the empirical observation of character traits proceed via longitudinal studies.     

Addressing fragmented human–nonhuman interactions through an ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics

In this paper, I address human-induced environmental ills we face using an ubuntu-inspired ethical lens. I follow ubuntu scholars to stress the significance for moral agents to embody virtues. Virtue development is essential to carry out obligations and address human impacts on the environment. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, has drawn attention to how embodying ubuntu virtues of humility and friendliness can prompt moral agents to be other-regarding. The view I developed in this paper differs from his ubuntu-inspired account in at least two significant ways. First, humans cannot be in harmonious relationships with some species such as Black Mambas, Hyenas and sea urchins even if they can interact. Second, we must acknowledge the consequentialist dimension of ubuntu ethics and prioritise the different aspects of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics, ranking them to offer possibilities for a more realistic recommendation to change our moral life. This paper demonstrates that the three dimensions of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics are fundamental because we need to think about moral consequences, right action and our virtue in accounting for our actions.     

‘Aloneness’ and the problem of realism in classical Sākhya and yoga

The concept of kaivalya (literally, ‘aloneness’) is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts—namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogasūtra—and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside.     

Nikāmakarma: how desireless need one be?1

In the Bhagavadgītā K a advises Arjuna to act without desire. He also describes the nikāmakarmin as possessed of perfect equanimity. Some scholars have argued that K a's advice is a contradiction. Because action requires desire, desireless action is impossible. Others have claimed that this fact only suggests that K a's prohibition is against a subset of desires and not desire as a whole. These ‘subset’ positions, however, are not consistent with the equanimity requirement. The conclusion that K a's advice is a contradiction can be avoided however. The word ‘desire’ in English is ambiguous. In one sense it means ‘whatever motivated’, and in another sense it means a ‘desire proper’ in contrast to beliefs and other mental states. If it is possible that not only desires proper motivate, then it is possible to act desirelessly in this sense. This distinction, I will argue, makes the best sense of K a's advice.     

DESCARTES' ‘PROVISIONAL MORALITY’

Discourse on Method part 3 offers une morale par provision, usually translated as ‘a provisional moral code’. Occasionally it has been questioned that this code is temporary and restricted to those engaged in pure inquiry. We argue that Descartes intends the moral code to be his final ethical position universally applicable. Since the moral code is ‘derived from’ the rules of method, it should have their permanence, holding for the time pure inquiry commences and when it completes the sciences. Moreover, the four moral maxims replace the classical cardinal virtues. Thus they are meant to govern the lives of all persons.     

Argumentational Virtues and Incontinent Arguers

Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumentation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I discuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and suggest that they have an instrumental nature, modeled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues. Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, I suggest that a theory of fallacy in argumentation virtue theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’.     

Emotionales Versus Rationales: A Comparison Between Confucius’ and Socrates’ Ethics

Socrates regards rational knowledge as the decisive factor of human life and even ascribes all virtues and moral actions to it, thereby stressing the ‘rationales’ of ethics. In contrast, Confucius regards kinship love as the decisive factor of human life and even grounds all virtues and moral actions on it, thereby stressing the ‘emotionales’ of ethics. Therefore, we should not lump them together by conceiving Confucius’ ethics also as based on ‘moral reason’.     

Socrates,the primary question,and the unity of virtue

For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.     

Moral Emotions,Awareness, and Spiritual Freedom in the Thought of Zhu Xi (1130–1200)

It is well known that the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130–1200) particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life. This paper shows that the four ‘moral emotions’ (e.g. feelings like ‘compassion’ and ‘disdain’ as described in the Mencius) are central to Zhu's thinking, insofar as only their genuine actualization enables the individual to achieve spiritual freedom. Moreover, I discuss the crucial notions of ‘awareness’/‘perception’ (zhījué) and ‘knowledge’/‘wisdom’ (zhī), in order to reveal the complex dynamic that moral emotions are said to create in the moral agent. I also analyse two important passages from the Mencius (1A/7 and 2A/6) and examine how Zhu Xi, in his exegetical glosses, defines the conditions of virtuous agency as based on the moral emotions. Finally, I explain the reasons why Neo-Confucians like Zhu Xi have sometimes been described as Kantian thinkers avant la lettre.     

Moral Obligations: Actualist,Possibilist, or Hybridist?

Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive difference between our two hybrid accounts.     

Grote’s analysis of Ancient Greek political thought: its significance to J. S. Mill’s idea about ‘active character’ in a liberal democracy

ABSTRACT

George Grote (1794–1871) published the History of Greece between 1846 and 1856, thereby providing the first positive evaluation of democratic Athens in the early modern period and a novel interpretation of the roles of the sophists and of Socrates, premised on his understanding of democratic Athens. Grote’s account offered a sociological explanation of the moral psychology cultivated by the constitution of the Athenian polis through the citizens’ active political participation. This participation cultivated civic virtues, emotional and ethical attachment to the polis, and a sense of obligation towards the polis, even at the expense of self-interest. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was familiar with Grote’s historical works and emphasized the parallels between the ancient direct democracy and the modern, representative democracy, which he himself promoted in his Considerations on Representative Government (1861). In this article it is argued that J. S. Mill’s concept of the ‘active character’ of the citizen in a modern representative democracy was inspired by Grote’s understanding and positive evaluation of ancient democratic Athens and its moral psychology. This is one example of the phenomenon mentioned in the editorial to this special issue, namely that accounts of past philosophy may influence philosophy proper.     

Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction to a Filipino Virtue Ethics

This is an introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics which is a relationship-oriented virtue ethics. The concepts to be discussed are the result of the unique history of the Philippines, namely a Southeast Asian tribal and animist tradition mixed with a Spanish Catholic tradition for over 300 years. Filipino virtue ethics is based on two foundational concepts in Filipino culture. The first is loób, which can easily be misunderstood when literally translated into English as ‘inside’ but which is better translated as ‘relational will’, and the second is kapwa, which is literally translated as ‘other person’ but is better understood as ‘together with the person’. These serve as pillars for a special collection of virtues (kagandahang-loób, utang-na-loób, pakikiramdam, hiya, lakas-ng-loób/bahala na) which are not individualistic virtues in the same way as most of the cardinal virtues of the Western tradition (i.e. prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude) but are all directed towards the preservation and strengthening of human relationships. This introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics is articulated and organized through a dialogue with Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics.     

Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.     

Huck Finn the Inverse Akratic: Empathy and Justice

An inverse akratic act is one who believes X, all things considered, is the correct act, and yet performs ~X, where ~X is the correct act. A famous example of such a person is Huck Finn. He believes that he is wrong in helping Jim, and yet continues to do so. In this paper I investigate Huck’s nature to see why he performs such acts contrary to his beliefs. In doing so, I explore the nature of empathy and show how powerful Huck’s empathic feelings are. Drawing from Martin L. Hoffman, I show the relationship between empathy and a principle of justice. This relationship leads to Huck acting virtuously, as Rosalind Hursthouse maintains.

Moral Injury and Definitional Clarity: Betrayal,Spirituality and the Role of Chaplains

This article explores the developing definition of moral injury within the current key literature. Building on the previous literature regarding ‘Moral Injury, Spiritual Care and the role of Chaplains’ (Carey et al. in JORH 55(4):1218–1245, 2016b. doi: 10.1007/s10943-016-0231-x), this article notes the complexity that has developed due to definitional variations regarding moral injury—particularly with respect to the concepts of ‘betrayal’ and ‘spirituality’. Given the increasing recognition of moral injury and noting the relevance and importance of utilizing a bio-psycho-social-spiritual model, this article argues that betrayal and spirituality should be core components for understanding, defining and addressing moral injury. It also supports the role of chaplains being involved in the holistic care and rehabilitation of those affected by moral injury.     

Ibn al-cArab on the Three Conditions of Tawba

Although generally translated as ‘repentance’, tawba, like its Hebrew equivalent, teshuvah, simply means ‘turn’ or ‘return’. It is used in the Qur'an to describe actions of both human beings and God. Even though the idea of tawba subsumes the notion of ‘repentance’ (from the Latin paenitere, ‘to be sorry’, ‘to grieve’, or ‘to regret’), its meaning is not limited to that. The tendency within much of Western scholarship on Islam to understand tawba simply as repentance, and mostly human repentance, may well reflect certain presumptions about repentance and its place in religious life, which, one might argue, are absent in Islam. This article explores the understanding of tawba in the thought of Ibn al-^cArab (1165–1240 CE), whose most extensive reflections on it appear in chapters 74 and 75 of his Meccan Revelations. It focuses on the first of these chapters which concentrates primarily on the conditions set by many of the religious authorities as the fundamental components of human tawba. Ibn al-^cArab's response reflects certain central motifs that permeate his literary oeuvre. These motifs and their wider relation to his views on tawba will be highlighted as our discussion of this important Sufi maqām (station) unfolds.     

The ethics of animal research: a survey of pediatric health care workers

Introduction

Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of AR convincing.

Design

After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, support for AR, and common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses are reported using standard tabulations. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P?<?.05 considered significant.

Results

Response rate was 53/115(46%) (pediatricians), and 73/120(61%) (nurses/RTs). Pediatricians and nurses/RTs are supportive of AR. Most considered ‘benefits arguments’ sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same ‘benefits arguments’ do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened ‘benefits arguments’. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘characteristics of non-human-animals arguments’, including that non-human-animals may not be sentient, or are simply property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘human exceptionalism’ arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special ‘kind’, can enter into social contracts, or face a ‘lifeboat situation’. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities [the argument from species overlap], and that the notion of ‘kind’ is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the kind ‘sentient animal’ or ‘subject-of-a-life’]. Pediatrician and nurse/RT responses were similar.

Conclusions

Most respondents were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR when given common arguments and counterarguments from the literature. HCW should seriously consider arguments on both sides of the AR debate.