The role of the sound of tapping for nonvisual judgment of gap crossability

The author investigated the possibility that nonvisual locomotion with a cane depends on the sound of the cane tapping. Blindfolded participants were asked to judge whether a gap in front of them could be crossed by walking. An acoustic analysis suggested that sound could, in theory, distinguish the gaps. Blindfolded sighted participants in Experiments 1 and 2 judged crossability under conditions in which only the sound of tapping was available and in which the sound was minimized; the third and fourth experiments included experienced cane users. Both inexperienced observers and experienced cane users were unaffected by sound reduction and were less able to discriminate gaps when using sound only than when using reduced sound. A fifth experiment indicated that active-passive differences were not responsible for these effects. Results indicate that sound is not necessary or sufficient for judging nonvisible crossability with a probe.     

Crossing without vision of path gaps

Two experiments considered the behavior of subjects who cross gaps in a pathway without benefit of vision. The first experiment contrasted visually and nonvisually guided locomotion, finding a significantly greater number of refusals under nonvisual guidance but no loss of appropriate modulation of step components to the salient dimensions of the actor and layout. Different components of crossing were modified under guidance of different sensory systems; the lengths of the crossing and support spans were primarily altered under nonvisual guidance, and the distance of the support foot to the near edge of the gap was the component of preference under visual guidance. In the second experiment, subjects crossed nonvisually, using probes that varied in length and moment of inertia. The adaptability of the step components to actor and layout dimensions was unchanged, but there was no effect of these mechanical manipulations on the components of crossing identified in Experiment 1.     

Transformation theory of size judgment.

Perception of size is assessed by having observers adjust a comparison target at a fixed distance to match the size of a standard located at different distances. Results depend on instructions, target orientation, and available stimulus cues. A mathematical theory assumes that the brain performs an inverse transformation on the proximal information impinging on the retina to recover the original distal size of the target. Results depend on the target visual angle, and the effective target distance and orientation applied in performing the inverse transformation. Effective values are linked to instructions, target location, and stimulus cues. Two models are developed and successfully fit to empirical data. One emphasizes the distance parameter; the second, the orientation parameter.     

Structural flexibility of moral judgment.

One of the central assumptions of Kohlberg's theory of moral development--that moral judgment is organized in structures of the whole--was examined. Thirty men and 30 women were given 2 dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, a 3rd involving prosocial behavior, and a 4th involving impaired driving. Half the Ss responded to the prosocial and impaired-driving dilemmas from the perspective of a hypothetical character, and half responded from the perspective of the self. No sex or perspective differences in moral maturity were observed. Ss scored highest in moral maturity on Kohlberg's dilemmas, intermediate on the prosocial dilemma, and lowest on the impaired-driving dilemma. In partial support of Kohlberg's contention that his test assesses moral competence, there was a negative linear relationship between scores on his test and the proportion of Stage 2 judgments on the 2 other dilemmas. An interactional model of moral judgment is advanced.     

Incremental validation of situational judgment tests.

Using 3 different samples, the authors assessed the incremental validity of situational judgment inventories (SJIs), relative to job knowledge, cognitive ability, job experience, and conscientiousness, in the prediction of job performance. The SJI was a valid predictor in all 3 samples and incrementally so in 2 samples. Relative to the other predictors, SJI's partial correlation with performance, controlling for the other 4 predictors, was superior in most comparisons. Subgroup differences on the SJI also appear to be less than those for cognitive ability and job knowledge, but greater than differences in conscientiousness. The SJI should prove to be a valuable additional measure in the prediction of job performance, but several additional areas of research are suggested.     

Electrophysiological difference between the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory

Causally related concepts like “virus” and “epidemic” and general associatively related concepts like “ring” and “emerald” are represented and accessed separately. The Evoked Response Potential (ERP) procedure was used to examine the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory. Participants were required to remember a task cue (causal or associative) presented at the beginning of each trial, and assess whether the relationship between subsequently presented words matched the initial task cue. The ERP data showed that an N400 effect (250–450 ms) was more negative for unrelated words than for all related words. Furthermore, the N400 effect elicited by causal relations was more positive than for associative relations in causal cue condition, whereas no significant difference was found in the associative cue condition. The centrally distributed late ERP component (650–750 ms) elicited by the causal cue condition was more positive than for the associative cue condition. These results suggested that the processing of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory recruited different degrees of attentional and executive resources.     

Psychophysical judgment of curvatures

In this study we explored psychophysical judgments (magnitude estimation) of the curvature of visual lines. Prior research has lacked a rigorous definition of curvature, but here it was defined as the reverse of the ray of the osculating circle tangent to the curve in the given point. Four different functions were evaluated: hyperbole, sinusoid, parabola, and a cubic function. Using the method of magnitude estimation to judge 20 exemplar curves from each of the families, three respondents made a total of 1440 estimations each. Responses to all four families of curves were fit well by Stevens' power function with an exponent less than 1. One application of this research is the use of such curves as variables in assessing illusions of curvature.     

Walker on the voluntariness of judgment 1

In his paper ‘The Voluntariness of Judgment’ Mark Thomas Walker claims that judgments are voluntary acts. According to Walker, theoretical reasoning can be seen as an instance of practical reasoning, and the outcomes of practical reasoning are actions. There are two reasons why Walker's argument does not establish this conclusion: (i) There are non‐reflective judgments which cannot reasonably be described as instances of practical reasoning; Walker's argument does not apply to these judgments, (ii) If one judges that p as a result of deliberation, one has had no choice sincerely to judge as well that non‐p instead of p, that is, one cannot judge contrary to one's evidence. Therefore, reflective judgments are not voluntary actions. Walker cannot show that reflective judgments are voluntary, because he fails to give a clear notion of a voluntary action and the role of choice.     

Justification effects on the judgment of analogy

Many of us share a strong intuition that justification forces us to better understand the situations we face. And there is substantial evidence indicating that this is often the case. However, there is a growing body of research showing that, under certain circumstances, explanation and justification can impair performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. In the present research, the effects of justification on judgment of the soundness of analogies were examined. Subjects judged the quality of the match between pairs of stories with varying degrees of superficial and analogical similarity. Experimental subjects either provided reasons for their judgments or wrote recollections of the target stimuli. These subjects rated the match between stimulus pairs as more sound than did control subjects. Also, providing reasons led to poorer discrimination between superficially similar aspects of the stimuli and analogous aspects. Explanations of these findings are proposed, and implications for problem solving and confidence judgment are discussed.     

Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction

Philosophical Studies - Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral...