Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution

Both Husserl and Haugeland develop an account ofconstitution to address the question of howour mental episodes can beabout physical objects and thus, through the intentionalrelation, bridge the gap betweenthe mental and the physical. The respectivetheories of the two philosophers of very differentbackground show not only how mentalepisodes can have empirical content, but also howthis content is shaped by pastexperiences or a holistic background of other mentalepisodes. In this article I first outlineand then contrast their positions in order to showhow the notion of constitution can beadopted to address major problems of contemporaryphilosophy of mind, especially thequestion of how the mind can be related to itsphysical environment.     

Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond

Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.

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Husserl and externalism

It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality.     

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception*

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3‐D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.     

Husserl and Cornelius

I thank Professor Samuel IJsseling for allowing me to utilize unpublished material from the Husserl Archives in Louvain.     

Kant and Husserl

This paper was presented at the Kant-Congress held in Memphis, Tennessee in March, 1995.     

Husserl Bibliography

Husserl Bibliography     

Husserl bibliography

Husserl bibliography