How Does the Difference Principle Make a Difference?

The paper examines the relationship between the two parts of Rawls’ second principle of justice. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the Difference Principle (DP) may constrain the range of acceptable social arrangements in light of the stated lexical priority of the requirement of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) over the DP. The paper discusses two possibilities. First, it examines the role the DP may play within an institutional scheme that satisfies the requirement of FEO. Second, it discusses the role the principle may play in selecting among different institutional schemes that satisfy FEO. The paper argues that the DP has an important role only if there is a range of institutional arrangements that are equivalent from the point of view of FEO but non-equivalent from the point of view of the DP. Next, it explores the possible sources of the variation among the different FEO-equivalent institutional schemes, and argues that on the most satisfactory reading of the requirement of FEO, there will not be much variation that is relevant from the point of view of the DP. The paper concludes that the role of the Difference Principle is at best very limited in constraining the range of social arrangements that are acceptable from the point of view of justice.     

Turning a blind eye: Meritocracy moderates the impacts of social status on corruption perception

Findings on the effect of social status on corruption perception are mixed. To make sense of the mixed results, three studies were conducted to examine whether meritocracy moderates this effect. In Study 1, we measured all variables using a questionnaire-based correlational design. In the preregistered Study 2, we adopted an experimental design in which we manipulated social status using a false feedback paradigm and measured corruption perception and meritocracy. In Study 3, we manipulated meritocracy using a scrambled sentence task and measured its effect on the relationship between social status and corruption perception. The results consistently demonstrated that meritocracy could moderate the influence of social status on corruption perception. Specifically, social status was negatively associated with corruption perception when meritocracy was weak, whereas the association was not significant when meritocracy was strong. Our results suggest that meritocracy critically affects acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of social injustice and even deters the disadvantaged from fighting against corruption.     

Evidence-Responsiveness and Autonomy

It is plausible to think that part of what it is to be an autonomous agent is to adequately respond to important changes in one’s circumstances. The agent who has set her own course in life, but is unable to recognize and respond appropriately when evidence arises indicating the need to reconsider and perhaps adjust her plan, lacks an important form of personal autonomy. However, this “evidence-responsiveness” aspect of autonomy has not yet been adequately analyzed. Most autonomy theorists ignore it altogether and the few who have addressed it have failed to give a satisfactory account. In this paper, I first examine an evidence-responsiveness condition proposed by Arneson. I argue there that while Arneson’s condition provides a valuable framework in which to examine evidence-responsiveness, there are several crucial issues that it either fails to address at all or else fails to adequately resolve. That condition is therefore in need of further elaboration and refinement. I then examine a recent article in this journal by Blöser, Schöpf, and Willaschek which develops an account of autonomy that I argue can usefully be understood as employing and elaborating upon the general framework offered by Arneson. I argue that while the elaboration Blöser and her co-authors provide Arneson’s condition is instructive, it is inadequate in several important ways which indicate the form a more satisfactory evidence-responsiveness condition will take. I go on to develop such a condition and conclude by highlighting the advantages to be gained by including that condition in a complete theory of autonomy.     

Outing and Virtue Ethics

The paper argues that the two dominant approaches towards the moral issues surrounding outing are too weak to handle the latter's complexity and would benefit from being made part of a broader and richer framework, namely, that of virtue ethics. One dominant approach begins by arguing that people do not have the right to privacy in matters of sexual orientation (not behaviour), and so outing gay people does not violate such a right. It continues by arguing that living a dignified life requires the agent to refuse to keep secret the gay sexual orientation of others. The second dominant approach, opposed to the first, argues that gay people have a right to the privacy of sexual orientation, and so outing them is prima facie wrong. Both approaches, the paper argues, are too weak to handle the complexity of outing: the first suffers from emphasizing only one subset of the virtues (dignity, pride, and so on), while the second is too weak to explain fully why in some cases outing is permissible. Virtue ethics is a much richer framework from which to address the complexity of outing.     

Smilansky, Arneson, and the asymmetry of desert

Desert plays an important role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, but an unimportant role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. Saul Smilansky has recently put forward a defense of this asymmetry. In this study, I argue that it fails. Then, drawing on an argument of Richard Arneson’s, I suggest an alternative consequentialist rationale for the asymmetry. But while this shows that desert cannot be expected to play the same role in distributive justice that it can play in retributive justice, it does not fully vindicate the asymmetry, since desert can still play an important role in the former.     

Weak and global supervenience are strong

Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.

Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Michael Huemer ( 2005 ) argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.     

Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a ??Grand State Space??, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.     

Contiguity and the causal theory of memory

In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering’s requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.     

Reviving Ulysses contracts

Ulysses contracts have faced paternalism objections since they first were proposed. Since the contracts are designed to override a present request from a legally competent patient in favor of a past request made by that patient, enforcement of these contracts was argued to be unjustifiable strong paternalism. Recent legal developments and new theories of practical reasoning suggest that the discussion of Ulysses contracts should be revived. This paper argues that with a proper understanding of the future-directed planning embodied in Ulysses contracts, the charge of strong paternalism can be answered, and the enforcement of some Ulysses contracts may be justified under the rubric of weak paternalism.     

Born in the USA: how immigrant generation shapes meritocracy and its relation to ethnic identity and collective action

Endorsing meritocracy can make low-status group members more accepting of inequality. This study examined whether rejecting meritocracy is related to increased ethnic identification among Latino immigrants, and whether identity in turn is related to increased support for collective action. We hypothesize that these relationships depend upon immigrant generation. A survey was conducted with 184 first- and second-generation Latino immigrants in New York City. Second-generation Latinos endorsed meritocracy less than those in the first generation, at least in part because they perceived that other Americans viewed their group in a less positive light (i.e., lower public regard). Further, meritocracy was negatively linked to ethnic identity and, through it, support for collective action among the second generation. Among the first generation, meritocracy was not related to ethnic identity and was positively related to support for collective action. We discuss the implications of growing up near the bottom of the U.S. social hierarchy for ethnic identity and collective action.     

On the metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Conclusion In what precedes, I have argued that Aristotle does not, in his ethics, commit three metaphysical errors sometimes imputed to him: he does not define the good as a fact; he does not claim that human beings move by nature towards their telos; he does not claim, in the ergon argument, that human beings are fixed rather than versatile. Instead, I have shown, he does the opposite in each case: he argues that the good cannot be defined as a fact; he claims that human beings move towards their telos only if they have virtue and virtue is not by nature; he locates, in the human ergon, that which is responsible for human versatility. Finally, I have shown by example that the metaphysical commitments of Aristotle's account of human happiness are not as controversial as they seem.If all of this is true, then perhaps the disorder that has existed in ethics since the enlightenment has been misdiagnosed. Perhaps it is not due to an unhappy choice between end-neutral emotivism on the one hand and Aristotle's bad metaphysics on the other. Perhaps instead it is due, at least in part, to a too hasty rejection of Aristotle's ethics on the grounds of a rejection of his biology.     

How to tell essence (when you sense one)

How could perceptual experiences reveal matters of essentiality? Answering this question is crucial for vindicating a thesis about the epistemic import of experience, commonly known as Revelation. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong version. Only on the strong one could it make up an authoritative piece of common sense. But this version also seems to demand too much of our experiences, namely that they can reveal essentiality. However, the impression that our experiences are not suited for this turns out to be due to a non-mandatory assumption about how the revelation of essentiality would work.     

Sociopsychological profiles of students that leave the ingroup or engage in social competition

We present a study of the sociopsychological profiles of students who are disposed to engage in social competition on behalf of ingroup interests. Five predictors were selected: the advantageous or unfavourable context for ingroup interests, group identification, meritocracy, just-world beliefs, and social dominance orientation. It was found that those students who were prepared to invest personal resources on behalf of ingroup interests were characterized by a strong group identification and middle or low scores in the meritocracy and social dominance orientation. In contrast, students with the lowest disposition to social competition were defined by their low identification and/or middle-high scores in the meritocracy and social dominance orientation. Against our expectation, the manipulation of the favourable versus unfavourable situation of the ingroup did not have a significant influence. In order of their importance, the variables that showed stronger effects were group identification, followed by meritocracy, social dominance orientation, and world-just beliefs.     

The need for an effective development ethics

Development is entrenched within a Western, hegemonic framework. This can lead one to wonder if development ethics is, in fact, possible. Too many decisions are made and too many policies dominate an international development agenda that are guided by economic forces and national self-interests. Although development ethics has attempted to break through this situation, it has not had the impact that is needed. The current practice of ethics in development is too weak to have the impact needed to generate truly desirable change. In this paper, I offer some reflections and argue for a strong ethical approach in development.     

Revisiting Harmless Discrimination

In a co-authored piece with Adam Slavny, I argued that any promising account of the wrongness of discrimination must focus not only on the harmful outcomes of discriminatory acts but also on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action. In this brief paper, I defend this conclusion against an objection that has recently been pressed against our view by Richard Arneson. This task is important not only because Arneson’s objection is an intriguing one, but also -- and more importantly -- because my response sheds further light on the content and structure of an attractive theory of wrongful discrimination, as well as on more fundamental ideas in moral philosophy.

     

Prenatal Equality of Opportunity

In this article, we defend a normative theory of prenatal equality of opportunity, based on a critical revision of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). We argue that if natural endowments are defined as biological properties possessed at birth and the distribution of natural endowments is seen as beyond the scope of justice, Rawls's FEO allows for inequalities that undermine the social conditions of a property‐owning democracy. We show this by considering the foetal programming of disease and the possibility of germ‐line modifications. If children of lower socioeconomic background are more likely to develop in a poor foetal environment and germ‐line enhancements are available only to the rich, initial inequalities between the rich and the poor would grow, and yet FEO would be satisfied. In order to avoid the problem, we propose a revised FEO principle omitting any reference to the comparison of natural endowments. Our revised FEO requires that institutions mitigate social class effect from reproduction and gestation to the greatest extent compatible with parental freedoms and the value of the family.     

On intelligence education and religious beliefs

A number of authors have suggested that education mediates the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, there is very little direct evidence for this mediation, and the indirect evidence is contradictory. The results of the current paper suggest that, by and large, education does not mediate the effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, the results also suggest that since education has a positive effect on religiosity when religious background is strong and a negative effect when religious background is weak, and since intelligence has a positive effect on education, the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity is stronger when religious background is strong than when it is weak. We examine this mediated moderation model in two large, nationally representative, databases.