Learning from text benefits from enactment

Classical studies on enactment have highlighted the beneficial effects of gestures performed in the encoding phase on memory for words and sentences, for both adults and children. In the present investigation, we focused on the role of enactment for learning from scientific texts among primary-school children. We assumed that enactment would favor the construction of a mental model of the text, and we verified the derived predictions that gestures at the time of encoding would result in greater numbers of correct recollections and discourse-based inferences at recall, as compared to no gestures (Exp. 1), and in a bias to confound paraphrases of the original text with the verbatim text in a recognition test (Exp. 2). The predictions were confirmed; hence, we argue in favor of a theoretical framework that accounts for the beneficial effects of enactment on memory for texts.     

Learning faces from photographs

Previous studies examining face learning have mostly used only a single exposure to 1 image of each of the faces to be learned. However, in daily life, faces are usually learned from multiple encounters. These 6 experiments examined the effects on face learning of repeated exposures to single or multiple images of a face. All experiments provided evidence for image-specific picture learning taking place over and above any invariant face learning, with recognition accuracy always highest for the image studied and performance falling across transformations between study and test images. The relative roles of pictorial and structural codes in mediating learning faces from photographs need to be reconsidered.     

Learning about wisdom from Lehrer

The paper discusses Lehrer??s pioneering approach to the topic of wisdom. His pithy proposal, that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error, fits well within the grand philosophical tradition of thinking about wisdom, offering a very clear and original formulation of its target. The first part of the paper puts it on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom (anthropo-, theo- and cosmo-centric ones) and then raises questions about it: does preference have to motivate, what is the relation between factual and evaluative knowledge in the evaluation system, and how is the objectivity of merit secured? The second part briefly develops an alternative proposal inspired by Lehrer??s work. It is a two-level picture. Wisdom combines the virtues of the first-order production of decision and action (reliability and practical validity) with second-order reflective endorsement of the first-order picture. The first-order production yields phronesis-generated action-guiding desires which constitute practical wisdom in the narrow sense, and the second level the more refined and sophisticated wisdom of philosophers and their kin.     

Learning from Minimal Economic Models

It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world, do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing and analysing the model affects one’s confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering such relevant possibilities may affect one’s confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. Thus, one can learn from minimal economic models.

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Learning of sensory sequences in cerebellar patients

A possible role of the cerebellum in detecting and recognizing event sequences has been proposed. The present study sought to determine whether patients with cerebellar lesions are impaired in the acquisition and discrimination of sequences of sensory stimuli of different modalities. A group of 26 cerebellar patients and 26 controls matched for age, sex, handedness, musicality, and level of education were tested. Auditory and visual sensory sequences were presented out of different sensory pattern categories (tones with different acoustic frequencies and durations, visual stimuli with different spatial locations and colors, sequential vision of irregular shapes) and different ranges of inter-cue time intervals (fast and slow). Motor requirements were small, with vocal responses and no time restrictions. Perception of visual and acoustic stimuli was generally preserved in patients and controls. The number of errors was significantly higher in the faster tempo of sequence presentation in learning of sequences of tones of different frequencies and in learning of sequences of visual stimuli of different spatial locations and different colors. No difference in tempo between the groups was shown. The total number of errors between the two groups was identical in the sequence conditions. No major disturbances in acquisition or discrimination of various sensory sequences were observed in the group of cerebellar patients. Sequence learning may be impaired only in tasks with significant motor demands.     

Learning Plan Schemata from Observation: Explanation-Based Learning for Plan Recognition

This article discusses how explanation-based learning of plan schemata from observation can improve performance of plan recognition. The GENESIS program is presented as an implemented system for narrative text understanding that learns schemata and improves its performance. Learned schemata allow GENESIS to use schema-based understanding techniques when interpreting events and thereby avoid the expensive search associated with plan-based understanding. Learned schemata also function as new concepts that can be used to cluster examples and index events in memory. In addition, experiments are reviewed which demonstrate that human subjects, like GENESIS, con learn a schema by observing, explaining, and generalizing a single specific instance presented in a narrative.     

Learning from Levinas: A Response

In this paper I explore the question of how toapproach the writings of Emmanuel Levinas fromthe point of view of education. I argue thatLevinas has challenged the modern conception ofsubjectivity which underpins modern education.Instead of providing a new conception ofsubjectivity, his work should be understood asan attempt to account for the awakening of theuniqueness of the subject in ethical terms. Thecentral idea is that we come into presencethrough responding, through taking up – or notdenying – the undeniable responsibility whichprecedes our subjectivity. Levinas not onlyprovides us with a new way to `understand'subjectivity. `Responding' also suggests a wayto approach Levinas's writings that goes beyondthe simple application of his `truths' toeducational practice. Levinas's writingschallenge their reader to articulate a unique,unprecedented response. It is argued that thepapers to which this paper is a response alldisplay this approach to Levinas's writings. Itis further argued that `responding' is not onlya way to read Levinas, but ultimately a way tothink about education itself. To learn (fromLevinas) is to respond (to Levinas).     

Learning abstract relations from using categories

When people learn categories, the importance of the features and relations in the category representation reflects both their diagnosticity for classification and their relevance to the use of the category. In earlier work in which the influence of category use on the representation has been shown, only cases in which the features and relations were simple, observable, and very specific were examined. Learners may begin to understand the underlying similarities of category members by using the categories. In the four experiments presented here, learners applied a simple category-specific formula to category members. The test results showed that the learners had incorporated relations among features from this use, including cases in which the relations were abstract. This learning occurred even though the relations were actually not predictive of category membership but just perceived to be so as a function of the use.     

Learning to tell apples from oranges

Recognizing images requires sorting them into the correct perceptual categories. Without categories, apples could not be discriminated from oranges. A fundamental question is whether categories are innate or learned, and if learned, how well such discriminations generalize. A recent finding by Notman et al. demonstrates that certain categorical discriminations are learned fast but vanish for slightly rotated stimuli. Rather than higher "cognitive" learning, this indicates involvement of "early" mechanisms, which cannot generalize across different stimulus orientations.     

Learning geographical information from hypothetical maps

People show biases or distortions in their geographical judgments, such as mistakenly judging Rome to be south of Chicago (the Chicago-Rome illusion). These errors may derive from either perceptual heuristics or categorical organization. However, previous work on geographic knowledge has generally examined people's judgments of real-world locations for which learning history is unknown. This article reports experiments on the learning of hypothetical geographical spaces, in which participants acquired information in a fashion designed to control real-world factors, such as variable travel experiences or stereotypes about other countries, as well as to mimic initial encounters with locations through reading or conventional school-based geography education. Five experiments combine to suggest that biases in judgment based on learning of this kind are different in key regards from those seen with real-world geography and may be based more on the use of perceptual heuristics than on categorical organization.