Interference Effects in the Conservation of Weight

On the assumption that the ability to overcome the effects of interference between the physical properties of an object is a basic component in the acquisition of conservation, we hypothesized that children would tend to negate conservation not only when the form of an object is altered but also when, without deforming the object, one of its properties (e.g., color or temperature) is altered; when variations (e.g., movement or orientation) are introduced into the concrete situation in which weight is exerted; or when other spatial properties (e.g., volume or surface) are made to interact with weight. The results indicate that children up to 8 years of age may have difficulty accepting the conservation of weight even when a transformation does not deform the object and that children up to 13 years may accept the conservation of weight but may find it difficult to explain why an object appears heavier in those instances where weight has to be coordinated with another spatial property. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Conditions under which function information attenuates name extension via shape

Children often extend names to novel artifacts on the basis of overall shape rather than core properties (e.g., function). This bias is claimed to reflect the fact that nonrandom structure is a reliable cue to an object having a specific designed function. In this article, we show that information about an object's design (i.e., about its creator's intentions) is neither necessary nor sufficient for children to override the shape bias. Children extend names on the basis of any information specifying the artifact's function (e.g., information about design, current use, or possible use), especially when this information is made salient when candidate objects for extension are introduced. Possible mechanisms via which children come to rely less on easily observable cues (e.g., shape) and more on core properties (e.g., function) are discussed.     

Color-object interference in young children: A Stroop effect in children 3½-6½ years old

The Stroop color–word task cannot be administered to children who are unable to read. However, our color–object Stroop task can. One hundred and sixty-eight children of 3½–6½ years (50% female; 24 children at each 6-month interval) were shown line drawings of familiar objects in a color that was congruent (e.g., an orange carrot), incongruent (e.g., a green carrot), or neutral (for objects having no canonical color [e.g., a red book]), and abstract shapes, each drawn in one of six colors. Half the children were asked to name the color in which each object was drawn, and half were to name each object. Children's predominant tendency was to say what the object was; when instructed to do otherwise they were slower and less accurate. Children were faster and more accurate at naming the color of a stimulus when the form could not be named (abstract shape) than when it could, even if in its canonical color. The heightened interference to color-naming versus object-naming was not due to lack of familiarity with color names or group differences: Children in the color condition were as fast and accurate at naming the colors of abstract shapes as were children in the form condition at naming familiar objects.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

What Does Children's Spatial Language Reveal About Spatial Concepts? Evidence From the Use of Containment Expressions

Children's overextensions of spatial language are often taken to reveal spatial biases. However, it is unclear whether extension patterns should be attributed to children's overly general spatial concepts or to a narrower notion of conceptual similarity allowing metaphor‐like extensions. We describe a previously unnoticed extension of spatial expressions and use a novel method to determine its origins. English‐ and Greek‐speaking 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds used containment expressions (e.g., English into, Greek mesa) for events where an object moved into another object but extended such expressions to events where the object moved behind or under another object. The pattern emerged in adult speakers of both languages and also in speakers of 10 additional languages. We conclude that learners do not have an overly general concept of Containment. Nevertheless, children (and adults) perceive similarities across Containment and other types of spatial scenes, even when these similarities are obscured by the conventional forms of the language.     

Eye movements during language-mediated visual search reveal a strong link between overt visual attention and lexical processing in 36-month-olds

The nature of children’s early lexical processing was investigated by asking what information 36-month-olds access and use when instructed to find a known but absent referent. Children readily retrieved stored knowledge about characteristic color, i.e., when asked to find an object with a typical color (e.g., strawberry), children tended to fixate more upon an object that had the same (e.g., red plane) as opposed to a different (e.g., yellow plane) color. They did so regardless of the fact that they had plenty of time to recognize the pictures for what they are, i.e., planes and not strawberries. These data represent the first demonstration that language-mediated shifts of overt attention in young children can be driven by individual stored visual attributes of known words that mismatch on most other dimensions. The finding suggests that lexical processing and overt attention are strongly linked from an early age.     

A configural effect in visual short-term memory for features from different parts of an object

Previous studies have shown that change detection performance is improved when the visual display holds features (e.g., a colour and an orientation) that are grouped into different parts of the same object compared to when they are all spatially separated (Xu, 2002a, 2002b). These findings indicate that visual short-term memory (VSTM) encoding can be "object based". Recently, however, it has been demonstrated that changing the orientation of an item could affect the spatial configuration of the display (Jiang, Chun, & Olson, 2004), which may have an important influence on change detection. The perceptual grouping of features into an object obviously reduces the amount of distinct spatial relations in a display and hence the complexity of the spatial configuration. In the present study, we ask whether the object-based encoding benefit observed in previous studies may reflect the use of configural coding rather than the outcome of a true object-based effect. The results show that when configural cues are removed, the object-based encoding benefit remains for features (i.e., colour and orientation) from different parts of an object, but is significantly reduced. These findings support the view that memory for features from different parts of an object can benefit from object-based encoding, but the use of configural coding significantly helps enlarge this effect.     

Clarifying the role of shape in children's taxonomic assumption.

When asked to find a new referent of a novel label children tend to ignore thematic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and its web) and focus instead on taxonomic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and a snake). The precise nature of children's taxonomic assumption has not been clear, however. One possibility is that the taxonomic assumption reduces to a "similar-shape rule": perhaps children tend to select objects of the same taxonomic kind when asked to extend new labels simply because these objects are more similar in shape than objects which are only thematically related. Sixty children between 3 and 5 years of age participated in three studies which examined children's attention to thematic relations, similarity of shape, and taxonomic relations when extending novel object labels. The findings indicated that shape has some primacy in children's expectations about object label reference, yet when shape is not available as a guide, children also take taxonomic kind into consideration when searching for new referents of novel labels. Thus children make use of a relatively rich and somewhat varied set of expectations to guide their inferences about object label reference.     

Word, thought, and deed: the role of object categories in children's inductive inferences and exploratory play

Previous research (e.g., S. A. Gelman & E. M. Markman, 1986; A. Gopnik & D. M. Sobel, 2000) suggests that children can use category labels to make inductive inferences about nonobvious causal properties of objects. However, such inductive generalizations can fail to predict objects' causal properties when (a) the property being projected varies within the category, (b) the category is arbitrary (e.g., things smaller than a bread box), or (c) the property being projected is due to an exogenous intervention rather than intrinsic to the object kind. In 4 studies, the authors showed that preschoolers (M = 48 months; range = 42-57 months) were sensitive to these constraints on induction and selectively engaged in exploration when evidence about objects' causal properties conflicted with inductive generalizations from the objects' kind to their causal powers. This suggests that the exploratory actions children generate in free play could support causal learning.     

Seeing pink elephants: fourteen-month-olds' interpretations of novel nouns and adjectives.

Words from different grammatical categories (e.g., nouns and adjectives) highlight different aspects of the same objects (e.g., object categories and object properties). Two experiments examine the acquisition of this phenomenon in 14-month-olds, asking whether infants can construe the very same set of objects (e.g., four purple animals) either as members of an object category (e.g., animals) or as embodying a salient object property (e.g., four purple things) and whether naming (with either count nouns or adjectives) influences infants' construals. Results suggest (1) that infants have begun to distinguish count nouns from adjectives, (2) that infants share with mature language-users an expectation that different grammatical forms highlight different aspects, and (3) that infants recruit these expectations when extending novel words. Further, these results suggest that an expectation linking count nouns to object categories emerges early in acquisition and supports the emergence of other word-to-world mappings.     

IN SIGHT, OUT OF MIND:

Abstract— Models of human visual memory often presuppose an extraordinary ability to recognize and identify objects, based on evidence for nearly flawless recognition of hundreds or even thousands of pictures after a single presentation. (Ntckerson, 1965, Shepard, 1967, Standing, Conezto, & Haber, 1970) and for storage of tens of thousands of object representations over the course of a lifetime (Biederman, 1987). However, recent evidence suggests that observers often fail to notice dramatic changes occurring during eye movements (e g., Grimes, 1996). The experiments presented here show that immediate memory for object identity is surprisingly poor, especially when verbal labeling is prevented However, memory for the spatial configuration of objects remains excellent even with verbal interferes e suggesting a fundamental difference between representations of spatial configuration and object properties.     

Comparison in the Development of Categories

Recent research on children's word learning has led to a paradox. Although word learning appears to be a deep source of insight into conceptual knowledge for children, preschoolers often categorize objects on the basis of shallow perceptual features such as shape. The current studies seek to resolve this discrepancy. We suggest that comparing multiple instances of a category enables children to extract deeper relational commonalities among category members. We examine 4-year-olds' categorization behaviors when asked to select a match for a target object (e.g., an apple) between a perceptually similar, out-of-kind object (e.g., a balloon) and a perceptually different category match (e.g., a banana). Children who learn a novel word as a label for multiple instances of the category are more likely to select the category match over the perceptual match. Children who learn a label for only one instance are equally likely to select either alternative. This effect is present even when individual target instances are more perceptually similar to the perceptual choice than to the category choice. We conclude that structural alignment processes may be important in the development of category understanding.     

Gesture for generalization: gesture facilitates flexible learning of words for actions on objects

Verb learning is difficult for children (Gentner, 1982 ), partially because children have a bias to associate a novel verb not only with the action it represents, but also with the object on which it is learned (Kersten & Smith, 2002 ). Here we investigate how well 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children (N = 48) generalize novel verbs for actions on objects after doing or seeing the action (e.g., twisting a knob on an object) or after doing or seeing a gesture for the action (e.g., twisting in the air near an object). We find not only that children generalize more effectively through gesture experience, but also that this ability to generalize persists after a 24‐hour delay.     

Turning Believers into Skeptics: 3-Year-Olds' Sensitivity to Cues to Speaker Credibility

Under most circumstances, children (and adults) can safely assume that the testimony they hear is true. In two studies, we investigated whether 3-year-olds (N = 100) would continue to hold this assumption even if the person who provided the testimony behaved in an uncertain, ignorant, and/or distracted manner. In Study 1, children were less likely to trust that, for example, a key-like object was a spoon if the speaker indicated uncertainty about her testimony (e.g., “I think this is a spoon”) than if she simply labeled the object ostensively (e.g., “This is a spoon”). In Study 2, 3-year-olds were also more skeptical about a speaker's testimony when she had earlier made an obvious naming error and seemed distracted, but not when she either made an error or seemed distracted. These results indicate that 3-year-olds can respond differently to the same testimony, depending on the speaker's behavior.     

Shindigs,brunches, and rodeos: The neural basis of event words

Events (e.g., “running” or “eating”) constitute a basic type within human cognition and human language. We asked whether thinking about events, as compared to other conceptual categories, depends on partially independent neural circuits. Indirect evidence for this hypothesis comes from previous studies showing elevated posterior temporal responses to verbs, which typically label events. Neural responses to verbs could, however, be driven either by their grammatical or by their semantic properties. In the present experiment, we separated the effects of grammatical class (verb vs. noun) and semantic category (event vs. object) by measuring neural responses to event nouns (e.g., “the hurricane”). Participants rated the semantic relatedness of event nouns, as well as of two categories of object nouns—animals (e.g., “the alligator”) and plants (e.g., “the acorn”)—and three categories of verbs—manner of motion (e.g., “to roll”), emission (e.g., “to sparkle”), and perception (e.g., “to gaze”). As has previously been observed, we found larger responses to verbs than to object nouns in the left posterior middle (LMTG) and superior (LSTG) temporal gyri. Crucially, we also found that the LMTG responds more to event than to object nouns. These data suggest that part of the posterior lateral temporal response to verbs is driven by their semantic properties. By contrast, a more superior region, at the junction of the temporal and parietal cortices, responded more to verbs than to all nouns, irrespective of their semantic category. We concluded that the neural mechanisms engaged when thinking about event and object categories are partially dissociable.     

Object-based auditory facilitation of visual search for pictures and words with frequent and rare targets

Auditory and visual processes demonstrably enhance each other based on spatial and temporal coincidence. Our recent results on visual search have shown that auditory signals also enhance visual salience of specific objects based on multimodal experience. For example, we tend to see an object (e.g., a cat) and simultaneously hear its characteristic sound (e.g., “meow”), to name an object when we see it, and to vocalize a word when we read it, but we do not tend to see a word (e.g., cat) and simultaneously hear the characteristic sound (e.g., “meow”) of the named object. If auditory–visual enhancements occur based on this pattern of experiential associations, playing a characteristic sound (e.g., “meow”) should facilitate visual search for the corresponding object (e.g., an image of a cat), hearing a name should facilitate visual search for both the corresponding object and corresponding word, but playing a characteristic sound should not facilitate visual search for the name of the corresponding object. Our present and prior results together confirmed these experiential association predictions. We also recently showed that the underlying object-based auditory–visual interactions occur rapidly (within 220 ms) and guide initial saccades towards target objects. If object-based auditory–visual enhancements are automatic and persistent, an interesting application would be to use characteristic sounds to facilitate visual search when targets are rare, such as during baggage screening. Our participants searched for a gun among other objects when a gun was presented on only 10% of the trials. The search time was speeded when a gun sound was played on every trial (primarily on gun-absent trials); importantly, playing gun sounds facilitated both gun-present and gun-absent responses, suggesting that object-based auditory–visual enhancements persistently increase the detectability of guns rather than simply biasing gun-present responses. Thus, object-based auditory–visual interactions that derive from experiential associations rapidly and persistently increase visual salience of corresponding objects.     

Object-specific function,geometry, and the comprehension of in and on

Three experiments are reported which examined the relative effects of geometry and object-specific function on the comprehension of the spatial prepositions in and on. The first experiment manipulated the height of a located object on top of a pile of other objects in containers which were primarily containers of solids (e.g., a suitcase) or liquids (e.g., an aquarium). The association between located object and reference object was also varied (by using different types of objects as located objects). In was found to be more appropriate to describe the same object in containers of solids compared to containers of liquids, although no effects of located object association were found. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated similar variables with supporting surfaces rather than containers, and examined the effects of functional control on the comprehension of on. The studies provide evidence for the importance of functional relations on the comprehension of on. In addition effects of located object association were found, but only when there was no clear evidence for the absence or presence of functional control. The results are discussed in relation to the differential effects of object knowledge on the comprehension of spatial prepositions.     

Negative numbers eliminate,but do not reverse,the attentional SNARC effect

Three experiments are reported examining whether the presentation of irrelevant negative numbers at central fixation interacts with attentional orienting beyond fixation. It has been previously shown that number perception influences spatial attention, with the presentation of spatially nonpredictive numbers resulting in the allocation of attention to the left when the number is low (e.g., 1 or 2) and to the right when the number is high (e.g., 8 or 9). In the present experiment, it is examined whether this attentional spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is influenced by the presentation of negative numbers, which should have spatial properties that are in direct opposition to their positive counterparts (e.g., −1 or −2 would be considered high numbers relative to −8 or −9, which would be considered low numbers). Though the presentation of negative numbers does not lead to a reversal of the attentional SNARC effect, it does lead to an elimination of the effect, providing insight into how the attentional SNARC effect develops.