Price‐Matching Guarantees and Consumer Evaluations of Price Information

In 3 experiments, we show that price‐matching guarantees affect the process through which consumers translate price information into subjective judgments. In Experiment 1, we find that price‐matching guarantees appear to change the standard used in price evaluation by raising consumers’ estimates of the lowest and average prices in the market. This leads consumers to perceive products and stores that offer price‐matching guarantees as less expensive. In Experiment 2, we show that evaluations of product price information are affected by the presence of a price‐matching guarantee only when consumers do not know the range of market prices. In Experiment 3, we extend these findings to show that consumer evaluations of the cost of products in a store, inferred on the basis of store characteristics, are also influenced by the presence of a price‐matching guarantee.     

Cognitive processes involved in blame and blame-like judgments and in forgiveness and forgiveness-like judgments

Experiment 1 compared the cognitive processes involved in blame and forgiveness judgments under identical experimental conditions. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with 4 judgment scales: willingness to prosecute, willingness to avenge, resentment level, and willingness to make up. Participants were presented with 32 scenarios in which a doctor made a medical error. These situations contained 5 items: the degree of proximity with the doctor (e.g., a family doctor known since childhood), the degree of negligence, the severity of consequences, apologies or contrition, and cancellation of consequences. Functional cognitive analysis grouped judgments into 2 categories: blame-like judgments (blame, prosecution, and revenge) and forgiveness-like judgments (resentment, forgiveness, and reconciliation). Blame-like judgments were characterized by additive integration rules, with negligence followed by apologies as the 2 main cues. Forgiveness-like judgments were characterized by an interactive integration rule, with apologies followed by negligence as the 2 main cues.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

Confidence-accuracy calibration in absolute and relative face recognition judgments

Confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration was examined for absolute and relative face recognition judgments as well as for recognition judgments from groups of stimuli presented simultaneously or sequentially (i.e., simultaneous or sequential mini-lineups). When the effect of difficulty was controlled, absolute and relative judgments produced negligibly different CA calibration, whereas no significant difference was observed for simultaneous and sequential mini-lineups. Further, the effect of difficulty on CA calibration was equivalent across judgment and mini-lineup types. It is interesting to note that positive (i.e., old) recognition judgments demonstrated strong CA calibration whereas negative (i.e., new) judgments evidenced little or no CA association. Implications for eyewitness identification are discussed.     

Grouping information for judgments

Models of cue weighting in judgment have typically focused on how decision-makers weight cues individually. Here, the authors propose that people might recognize and weight groups of cues. They examine how judgments change when decision-makers focus on cues individually or as parts of groups. Several experiments demonstrate that people can spontaneously pack information into cue groups. Moreover, group-level weighting depends on how people assess similarity or how they think of categorical hierarchies.     

The role of internal reference prices in consumers' willingness to pay judgments: Thaler's Beer Pricing Task revisited

Alternative reference prices, either displayed in the environment (external) or recalled from memory (internal) are known to influence consumer judgments and decisions. In one line of previous research, internal reference prices have been defined in terms of general price expectations. However, Thaler (Marketing Science 4 (1985) 199; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12 (1999) 183) defined them as fair prices expected from specific types of seller. Using a Beer Pricing Task, he found that seller context had a substantial effect on willingness to pay, and concluded that this was due to specific internal reference prices evoked by specific contexts. In a think aloud study using the same task (N = 48), we found only a marginal effect of seller context. In a second study using the Beer Pricing Task and seven analogous ones (N = 144), general internal reference prices were estimated by asking people what they normally paid for various commodities. Both general internal reference prices and seller context influenced willingness to pay, although the effect of the latter was again rather small. We conclude that general internal reference prices have a greater impact in these scenarios than specific ones, because of the lower cognitive load involved in their storage and retrieval.     

Rich contexts do not always enrich the accuracy of personality judgments

We test the common assumption that information ‘rich’ contexts lead to more accurate personality judgments than information ‘lean’ contexts. Pairs of unacquainted students rendered judgments of one another's personalities after interacting in one of three, increasingly rich, contexts: Internet ‘chat’, telephone, or face-to-face. Accuracy was assessed by correlating participants' judgments with a measure of targets' personalities that averaged self and informant ratings. As predicted, the visible traits of extraversion and conscientiousness were judged more accurately than the less visible traits of neuroticism and openness. However, judgment accuracy also depended on context. Judgments of extraversion and neuroticism improved as context richness increased (i.e., from Internet ‘chat’ to face-to-face), whereas judgments of conscientiousness and openness improved as context richness decreased (i.e., from face-to-face to Internet ‘chat’). Our findings suggest that context richness shapes not only the availability of personality cues but also the relevance of cues in any given context.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Effects of social value orientations on fairness judgments

The authors assessed the impact that social value orientations--prosocial (i.e., concerned about outcomes for both oneself and others) versus proself (i.e., concerned about one's own outcome only)--had on fairness judgments in a non-negotiation setting. The results indicated that prosocials generally formed fairness judgments in a manner suggested by equity theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw an equal outcome as fairer than a favorable or unfavorable outcome. The fairness determinations of proselfs, however, tended to follow the tenets of self-interest theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw a favorable outcome as fairer than an unfavorable outcome. Contrary to self-interest theory, proselfs did not find a favorable outcome fairer than an equal outcome. These findings indicate that social value orientations differentially affect the evaluation of outcome information in the formation of fairness judgments.     

Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action.     

Judgments relative to patterns: how temporal sequence patterns affect judgments and memory

Six experiments studied relative frequency judgment and recall of sequentially presented items drawn from 2 distinct categories (i.e., city and animal). The experiments show that judged frequencies of categories of sequentially encountered stimuli are affected by certain properties of the sequence configuration. We found (a) a first-run effect whereby people overestimated the frequency of a given category when that category was the first repeated category to occur in the sequence and (b) a dissociation between judgments and recall; respondents may judge 1 event more likely than the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Specifically, the distribution of recalled items does not correspond to the frequency estimates for the event categories, indicating that participants do not make frequency judgments by sampling their memory for individual items as implied by other accounts such as the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the availability process model (Hastie & Park, 1986). We interpret these findings as reflecting the operation of a judgment heuristic sensitive to sequential patterns and offer an account for the relationship between memory and judged frequencies of sequentially encountered stimuli.     

Direct-comparison judgments: when and why above- and below-average effects reverse

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]).     

Biases in social comparative judgments: the role of nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism effects

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior.     

The Role of Thin‐Slice Judgments in Consumer Psychology

This article examines the potential theoretical and practical contributions that thin‐slice judgments may offer to consumer psychology. We begin by exploring thin‐slice judgments in the context of existing consumer information processing research. Then, we discuss the antecedents of thin‐slice judgments, the type of processing that may underlie and impact thin‐slice judgment formation. Finally, we review the potential consequences of thin‐slice judgments and investigate applications within the consumer domain.     

The impact of domain-specific beliefs on decisions and causal judgments

Extensive evidence suggests that people often rely on their causal beliefs in their decisions and causal judgments. To date, however, there is a dearth of research comparing the impact of causal beliefs in different domains. We conducted two experiments to map the influence of domain-specific causal beliefs on the evaluation of empirical evidence when making decisions and subsequent causal judgments. Participants made 120 decisions in a two-alternative forced-choice task, framed in either a medical or a financial domain. Before each decision, participants could actively search for information about the outcome (“occurrence of a disease” or “decrease in a company's share price”) on the basis of four cues. To analyze the strength of causal beliefs, we set two cues to have a generative relation to the outcome and two to have a preventive relation to the outcome. To examine the influence of empirical evidence, we manipulated the predictive power (i.e., cue validities) of the cues. Both experiments included a validity switch, where the four selectable cues switched from high to low validity or vice versa. Participants had to make a causal judgment about each cue before and after the validity switch. In the medical domain, participants stuck to the causal information in causal judgments, even when evidence was contradictory, while decisions showed an effect of both empirical and causal information. In contrast, in the financial domain, participants mainly adapted their decisions and judgments to the cue validities. We conclude that the strength of causal beliefs (1) is shaped by the domain, and (2) has a differential influence on the degree to which empirical evidence is taken into account in causal judgments and decision making.     

Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analytic review compared prospective and retrospective judgments of duration, or duration judgment paradigm. Some theorists have concluded that the two paradigms involve similar cognitive processes, whereas others have found that they involve different processes. A review of 20 experiments revealed that prospective judgments are longer and less variable than are retrospective judgments. Several theoretically important variables moderate these effects, especially those concerned with information processing activities. Therefore, somewhat different cognitive processes subserve experienced and remembered duration. Attentional models are needed to explain prospective judgments, and memory-based models are needed to explain retrospective judgments. These findings clarify models of human duration judgment and suggest directions for future research. Evidence on duration judgments may also influence models of attention and memory.     

Taking the High (or Low) Road: A Quantifier Priming Perspective on Basic Anchoring Effects

ABSTRACT

Current explanations of basic anchoring effects, defined as the influence of an arbitrary number standard on an uncertain judgment, confound numerical values with vague quantifiers. I show that the consideration of numerical anchors may bias subsequent judgments primarily through the priming of quantifiers, rather than the numbers themselves. Study 1 varied the target of a numerical comparison judgment in a between-participants design, while holding the numerical anchor value constant. This design yielded an anchoring effect consistent with a quantifier priming hypothesis. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of vague quantifiers in the traditional anchoring paradigm. Finally, Study 3 examined the notion that specific associations between quantifiers, reflecting values on separate judgmental dimensions (i.e., the price and height of a target) can affect the direction of anchoring effects. Discussion focuses on the nature of vague quantifier priming in numerically anchored judgments.     

Judging confidence influences decision processing in comparative judgments

Current theories of confidence in human judgment assume that confidence and the decision it is based on are inextricably tied to the same process (decisional locus theories) or that confidence processing begins only once the primary decision has been completed (postdecisional locus theories). In the absence of auxiliary assumptions, however, neither class of theory permits the judgment of confidence to affect primary decision processing. In the present study, we examined the effect of rendering confidence judgments on the properties of the decision process in a sensory discrimination task. An examination of the properties of the time taken to determine confidence (i.e., the time taken to render the judgment of confidence) revealed clear evidence of postdecisional confidence processing. Concomitantly, the requirement of confidence judgments was found to substantially increase decisional response times, suggesting that some confidence processing occurs during the primary decision process. We discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary models of confidence in human judgment.     

Elaboration and consequences of anchored estimates: An attitudinal perspective on numerical anchoring

In the standard numerical anchoring paradigm, the influence of externally provided anchors on judgment is typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). In contrast, theories of attitude change suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that last longer over time and better resist future attempts at change. Guided by an attitudinal approach to anchoring, four studies manipulated participants’ level of cognitive load to produce relatively high versus low levels of thinking. These studies show that, although anchoring can occur under both high and low thought conditions, anchoring based on a higher level of thinking involves greater use of judgment-relevant background knowledge, persists longer over time, is more resistant to subsequent attempts at social influence, and is less likely to result from direct numeric priming.     

Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments

When making judgments, one may encounter not only justifiable factors, i.e., attributes which the judge thinks that he/she should take into consideration, but also unjustifiable factors, i.e., attributes which the judge wants to take into consideration but knows he/she should not. It is proposed that the influence of an unjustifiable factor on one's judgment depends on the presence of elasticity (ambiguity) in justifiable factors; the influence will be greater if there is elasticity than if there is not. Two studies involving different contexts demonstrated the proposed elasticity effect and suggested that the effect could be a result of a self-oriented justification process. Implications of this research for decisions involving a should-vs-want conflict are discussed.