A note on ROC analysis and non-parametric estimate of sensitivity

In the signal detection paradigm, the non-parametric index of sensitivity A′, as first introduced by Pollack and Norman (1964), is a popular alternative to the more traditional d′ measure of sensitivity. Smith (1995) clarified a confusion about the interpretation of A′ in relation to the area beneath proper receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and provided a formula (which he called A′′) for this commonly held interpretation. However, he made an error in his calculations. Here, we rectify this error by providing the correct formula (which we call A) and compare the discrepancy that would have resulted. The corresponding measure for bias b is also provided. Since all such calculations apply to “proper” ROC curves with non-decreasing slopes, we also prove, as a separate result, the slope-monotonicity of ROC curves generated by likelihood-ratio criterion.This revised article was published online in August 2005 with the PDF paginated correctly.     

Socrates on Reason, Appetite and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology

Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the ??standard?? version?? by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith??s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith??s handling of the ??appetites and passions??, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith??s defence of ??Socratic studies?? in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ??the philosophy of Socrates??. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ??Socratic studies??, is how different Brickhouse and Smith??s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-??Socratic?? dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith??s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ??Platonic?? counterpart??as that is currently understood??than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose.     

Meaning,Expression, and the Interpretation of Literature

I argue that when we interpret a literary work, we engage with at least two different kinds of meaning, each requiring a distinct mode of interpretation. These kinds of meaning are literary varieties of what Paul Grice called nonnatural and natural meaning. The long‐standing debate that began with Beardsley and Wimsatt's attack on the intentional fallacy is, I argue, really a debate about nonnatural meaning in literature. I contend that natural meaning has been largely neglected in our theorizing about literary interpretation and that this comes at a serious cost, resulting in an inadequate account of what interpretation involves. I argue, first, that by recognizing that literary meaning includes both nonnatural and natural meaning, we are better placed to understand the interpreter's relationship with the author, and, second, that recognition of the distinction between nonnatural and natural meaning advances the established debate about literary meaning, offering support for actual intentionalism. The more inclusive view of literary meaning helps resolve an apparent difficulty raised by Noël Carroll.     

Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders: Individual Differences,Affect, Interaction,and Outcomes

In this article, we have drawn upon the attachment motivational system (Bowlby, 1988; Lichtenberg, 1989; Shane, Shane, and Gales, 1997) as a guide to providing “positive new experience” as the cornerstone of therapeutic progress. We see positive new experience as paramount, over and above insight and/or interpretation because insight and interpretation are so varied among different theories. The common denominator that is effective in therapy, then, must be something beyond insight and interpretation. We call that therapeutic factor the positive new experience and will draw from attachment theory to understand its components. In addition, using the attachment motivation system and trauma research, we elaborate on why certain types of negative experiences in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis should be avoided. We address, in particular, harmful repetitions of traumatic relational patterns or traumatic events in the transference, overemphasis on “the empathic stance,” and the search for motivation in patients' behaviors where such a search may be based on the false assumption that all behavior is motivated. This latter category addresses aspects of behaving that may not be motivated; that is, they just “are,” and as such, the search for and attribution of meaning in such instances may lead to failed understanding and insight and to faulty correctives. We have illustrated with clinical examples both positive new experience and three types of negative experiences to be avoided in treatment.     

Pilfering ravens, Corvus corax, adjust their behaviour to social context and identity of competitors

Like other corvids, food-storing ravens protect their caches from being pilfered by conspecifics by means of aggression and by re-caching. In the wild and in captivity, potential pilferers rarely approach caches until the storers have left the cache vicinity. When storers are experimentally prevented from leaving, pilferers first search at places other than the cache sites. These behaviours raise the possibility that ravens are capable of withholding intentions and providing false information to avoid provoking the storers' aggression for cache protection. Alternatively, birds may refrain from pilfering to avoid conflicts with dominants. Here we examined whether ravens adjust their pilfer tactics according to social context and type of competitors. We allowed birds that had witnessed a conspecific making caches to pilfer those caches either in private, together with the storer, or together with a conspecific bystander that had not created the caches (non-storer) but had seen them being made. Compared to in-private trials, ravens delayed approaching the caches only in the presence of storers. Furthermore, they quickly engaged in searching away from the caches when together with dominant storers but directly approached the caches when together with dominant non-storers. These findings demonstrate that ravens selectively alter their pilfer behaviour with those individuals that are likely to defend the caches (storers) and support the interpretation that they are deceptively manipulating the others' behaviour.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

Articulation: brightness, apparent illumination, and contrast ratios

Luminance edges in the environment can be due to regions that differ in reflectance or in illumination. In three experiments, we varied the spatial organization of 10 achromatic (simulated) surfaces so that some arrangements were consistent with an ecologically valid and parsimonious interpretation of 5 surfaces under two different illuminants. A constant contrast-ratio along a luminance edge in the scene allows this interpretation. The brightness of patches in this condition was compared to their brightness with minimally different spatial arrangements that fail to maintain the constant contrast-ratio criterion. When the spatial arrangement of the 10 surfaces included a luminance edge satisfying the constant contrast-ratio criterion, brightness changed systematically, compared to arrangements without such a luminance edge. We account for the results by positing that a luminance edge with a constant contrast-ratio segments the scene into regions of lower and higher illumination, with the same effect as a difference in real physical illumination: all else equal, a given surface appears brighter under higher than under lower illumination.     

Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly . However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes'doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity.     

Descartes' Metaphysical Doubts about Clear and Distinct Perception

Descartes' metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this:it is possible that I (the Meditator) am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author (i.e.,an omnipotent God/Deceiver) in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly.The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions.This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception.My analysis shows:(1) the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible;(2) the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded,though its conclusion is partly right,such that we should accept a weaker version of it;(3) the misrepresentation interpretation,the defective-origin interpretation,the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible;(4) all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well.     

On surrender, death, and the sociology of knowledge

Surrender-and-catch is a protest against [... our time] and an attempt at remembrance of what a human being can be. The sociology of knowledge is a protest against its hypocrisy and against unexamined social influences. Like surrender, the sociology of knowledge does not fear but passionately seeks what is true and thus, like surrender, is a remembrance, proclamation, and celebration of the spirit. Both ideas, that of the sociology of knowledge and that of surrender, are critical, polemical, radical [...]; so is the sociology of knowledge also in its practice, while in its practice surrender is cognitive live. Using a [...] distinction developed by Mannheim, we may also say that the sociology of knowledge is an extrinsic interpretation of its time, our time; surrender, an intrinsic one: the former is, advocates, and practices such an extrinsic (sociological) interpretation but needs the latter to overcome the relativism it encounters in its practice by its remembrance, rediscovery, reinvention, the catch, of what is common to all human beings, what is universally human (Wolff, 1982., pp. 265–266).     

Narrative, meaning, interpretation: an enactivist approach

After establishing its roots in basic forms of sensorimotor coupling between an organism and its environment, the new wave in cognitive science known as ??enactivism?? has turned to higher-level cognition, in an attempt to prove that even socioculturally mediated meaning-making processes can be accounted for in enactivist terms. My article tries to bolster this case by focusing on how the production and interpretation of stories can shape the value landscape of those who engage with them. First, it builds on the idea that narrative plays a key role in expressing the values held by a society, in order to argue that the interpretation of stories cannot be understood in abstraction from the background of storytelling in which we are always already involved. Second, it presents interpretation as an example of what Di Paolo et al. (2010) have called in their recent enactivist manifesto a ??joint process of sensemaking??: just like in face-to-face interaction, the recipient of the story collaborates with the authorial point of view, generating meaning. Third, it traces the meaning brought into the world by interpretation to the activation and, potentially, the restructuring of the background of the recipients of the story.     

Inner Harmony and the Human Ideal in Republic IV and IX

This paper presents an interpretation of Plato's moral psychology in two books of the Republic that construes Plato as adopting a strong unity for the moral agent. Within this conception reason influences both emotion and action directly. This view is contrasted with the current prevailing interpretation according to which all three parts of the soul have their own reason, feeling, and desire. The latter construal is shown to be both philosophically weak, and less plausible as a historical reconstruction.     

Depression, nondepression, and cognitive illusions: reply to Schwartz

In his comment, Schwartz argued that the Alloy and Abramson findings call into question the hypothesized causal link between learned helplessness and depression. Schwartz's contention is based on his interpretation of the Alloy and Abramson findings as showing that nondepressives cannot detect noncontingency. Although we argue that Schwartz has misinterpreted our data, we agree with his general contention that nondepressives may be relatively invulnerable to depression. We discuss the implications of our data for the learned helplessness theory as well as for other cognitive theories of depression. In addition, we evaluate Schwartz's intriguing motivational account of depressive accuracy in judging response-outcome contingencies. Finally, in response to Schwartz's question of whether nondepressives' errors in judging contingency are really errors at all, we suggest it is important to distinguish among error, irrationality, and maladaptiveness when discussing cognitive bias.     

Hail the impossible: p-values, evidence, and likelihood

Significance testing based on p-values is standard in psychological research and teaching. Typically, research articles and textbooks present and use p as a measure of statistical evidence against the null hypothesis (the Fisherian interpretation), although using concepts and tools based on a completely different usage of p as a tool for controlling long-term decision errors (the Neyman-Pearson interpretation). There are four major problems with using p as a measure of evidence and these problems are often overlooked in the domain of psychology. First, p is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis and can therefore never indicate evidence for the null. Second, p is conditioned solely on the null hypothesis and is therefore unsuited to quantify evidence, because evidence is always relative in the sense of being evidence for or against a hypothesis relative to another hypothesis. Third, p designates probability of obtaining evidence (given the null), rather than strength of evidence. Fourth, p depends on unobserved data and subjective intentions and therefore implies, given the evidential interpretation, that the evidential strength of observed data depends on things that did not happen and subjective intentions. In sum, using p in the Fisherian sense as a measure of statistical evidence is deeply problematic, both statistically and conceptually, while the Neyman-Pearson interpretation is not about evidence at all. In contrast, the likelihood ratio escapes the above problems and is recommended as a tool for psychologists to represent the statistical evidence conveyed by obtained data relative to two hypotheses.     

Pragmatism,Bohr, and the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are in line with logical positivism, are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism.     

Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the overcoming of nihilism

This paper critically examines Deleuze’s treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s principle that “all determination is negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators indicate that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his “logic of difference” allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective being.” Drawing on recent scholarship and on Nietzsche’s own writings I argue that this is not a tenable interpretation, and also, more importantly, that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstate nihilism at the very point where it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant ethical and political dangers to Deleuze’s position on nihilism.     

At first glance, transparency enhances assimilation

We investigated the role of transparency, perceptual grouping, and presentation time on perceived lightness. Both transparency and perceptual grouping have been found to result in assimilation effects, but only for ambiguous stimulus displays and with specific attentional instructions. By varying the presentation times of displays with two partly overlapping transparent E-shaped objects, we measured assimilation in unambiguous stimulus displays and without specific attentional instructions. The task was to judge which of two simultaneously presented E-shaped objects was darker. With unrestrained presentation times, if a transparency interpretation was possible, assimilation was not found. Inhibiting a transparency interpretation by occluding the local junctions between the two E-shaped objects, did lead to assimilation. With short presentation times, if a transparency interpretation was possible, assimilation was now also found. Thus, we conclude that, although transparency appears to enhance assimilation, with unambiguous stimulus displays and without specific attentional instructions, perceptual grouping is more important for assimilation to occur.     

Bakhtin, Socrates and the carnivalesque in education

In this article, we critically review the application of Bakhtin's literary work to education with the aim of exploring the notion of carnival. We argue that Bakhtin's highly original interpretation of Socrates as a carnivalesque figure has been neglected in the literature. While Bakhtin's references to Socrates are scattered through different texts, he develops an interpretation that extends our modern view of the Socratic ‘method’ of teaching. From his Socratic reading, we argue that Bakhtin develops an epistemology that links authority, carnival and knowledge. As such, we will argue that carnival helps to bridge the gap between ‘authoritative’ and ‘internally persuasive’ discourse in Bakhtin's wider thought and, specifically, application of his ideas to education. In this Bakhtinian interpretation, a Socratic dialogue involves: (1) the subversion of authoritative discourse; (2) the discovery of knowledge through social cross-examination of ideas and (3) educating by personal example. Drawing on empirical educational examples already available in the literature, we will look at the difficulties and benefits involved in applying these aspects of the Socratic dialogue to formal education. Overall, however, we will argue both authority and internally persuasive discourse and carnival gives us an insight into the development of conceptual understanding and enables us to reflect on their application for classroom practice.     

Recognition,Freedom, and the Self in Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right

In this paper I present an interpretation of J. G. Fichte's transcendental argument for the necessity of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) in Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte's argument purports to show that, as a condition of the possibility of self‐consciousness, we must take ourselves to stand in relations of mutual recognition with other agents like ourselves. After reconstructing the steps of Fichte's argument, I present what I call the ‘modal dilemma’, which highlights a serious ambiguity in Fichte's deduction. According to the modal dilemma, the conclusion to Fichte's transcendental argument—that as a condition of the possibility of our self‐consciousness, we must recognize and be recognized by others—expresses either metaphysical or normative necessity. However, no normative conclusion follows from Fichte's premises, and the metaphysical claim that does follow from his argument appears to be implausibly strong. Thus the argument looks like a failure on either interpretation of the conclusion's modality. In the penultimate section of the paper, I propose a new interpretation of the argument that avoids the modal dilemma and provides a normative grounding of Fichte's concept of right.     

Gender,Physical Attractiveness,and Assertiveness

Abstract

This study was an examination of comfortable proxemic distances assumed by the interactants, female Canadian students. Previous studies were consistent with Hall'S (1959, 1966) cultural model only when the interactants were from the same cultural group. When they were from different cultural groups, however, the cultural model was not adequate: The findings were more consistent with a symbolic interactionist interpretation, namely, that a negotiation takes place and the comfortable distance is adjusted to that of both groups. In this study, we held cultural group and sex constant and introduced the problem of the interviewer'S retreat from the original comfortable distance established by the subject. In all cases, the subject re-established a new comfortable distance that was a compromise between the one originally chosen and the distance assumed by the interviewer.