Gödelian time-travel and anthropic cosmology

This paper looks at Kurt Gödel's causally‐pathological cosmological models (derived from general relativity), in the light of anthropic explanations. If a Gödelian world is a possible world, could anthropic reasoning shed any light on whether or not our world is Gödelian? This paper argues that while there are some good anthropic reasons why our world ought to be Gödelian, too many observations suggest that our world can’t possibly be Gödelian in fact. If Gödel's world is a possible one, anthropic teleology alone cannot explain why it isn’t the world we inhabit. Furthermore, if our world were Gödelian, anthropic arguments against the existence of extraterrestrial intelligences would imply a bleak human future. En route, some general objections to relativistic causal pathologies are addressed and some anthropic arguments to the effect that Gödelian worlds couldn’t sustain life are also addressed and dismissed.     

IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic

This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.     

Transcendental empathy in the therapeutic encounter

Abstract

The experience of many therapists suggest that most contemporary conceptions of empathy underestimate empathic potential. This paper describes deep or transcendental empathy as a more direct knowing of the client's world. The author examines the epistemic process or the activity of knowing of transcendental empathy by considering two broad forms: transcendental countertransference and psychological resonance. Difficulties and distortions are explored as well as characteristics of an individual that correspond with deep empathy.     

Avoiding Circularities on the Empathic Path to Transcendental Intersubjectivity

The foundational status that Edmund Husserl envisages for phenomenology in relation to the sciences would seem to suggest that the successful unfolding of contemporary debates in the field of social cognition will be conditioned by progress in resolving certain central controversies in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, notably in long-standing questions pertaining to the priority of subjectivity in relation to intersubjectivity, and the priority of empathy in relation to other forms of intersubjectivity. That such controversies are long-standing is in no small part attributable to the fact that the debate surrounding Husserl’s seminal attempts to elucidate these problems has placed his account, and certainly his published position, under a certain amount of pressure, pressure which stems from the suspicion that intentionality toward others may be more deeply embedded in subjectivity than the Husserl of Cartesian Meditations seems prepared to admit. Is the primordinally reduced solipsistic subject of the Fifth Meditation really capable of discovering intersubjectivity in the way that Husserl describes, or is such putative discovery (indeed, subjective transformation) already conditioned by a more primitive form of intersubjectivity? This paper investigates two ways in which this kind of “circularity” objection might arise. Firstly, it might be argued that Husserl presupposes an external perspective on one’s own body, a perspective which rationally would have to be correlated with an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Secondly, the view has been advanced (Zahavi in Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique. Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2001b) that horizonal perceptual awareness of another spatio-temporal entity turns out to be essentially intersubjective, on the grounds that awareness of some of an object’s averted aspects commits one to positing the possibility in principle of those averted aspects being available to an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Objections such as these seem to place the phenomenological enquiry into the encounter with another person at something of a crossroads. On the one hand, they have led some to argue that basic empathy, as Husserl conceives it, must indeed be conditioned by the anonymous constituting influence of a more primitive form of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the option remains open to seek to defend Husserl’s published position against the charges of circularity. This paper pursues the latter alternative, and argues that, with appropriate clarification, the objections from circularity can be convincingly answered. It will be argued that the key to understanding why the standard Husserlian position can be sustained lies in recognising the centrality of the activity of the imagination as a condition for the possibility of intersubjectivity.     

Transcendental empiricism: Deleuze''s response to Hegel

Funding for the research leading to this article was generously provided by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellowship. I would like to thank Andrew Irvine and Steve Savitt for criticisms of an earlier version of this paper, as well as the anonymousMan and World referee.     

Speed of reasoning and its relation to reasoning ability

The study investigates empirical properties of reasoning speed which is conceived as the fluency of solving reasoning problems. Responses and response times in reasoning tasks are modeled jointly to clarify the covariance structure of reasoning speed and reasoning ability. To determine underlying abilities, the predictive validities of two cognitive covariates, namely perceptual and executive attention, are investigated. A sample of N = 230 test takers completed a reasoning test, Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), and attention tests indicating perceptual and executive attention. For modeling responses the two-parameter normal ogive model, and for modeling response times the two-parameter lognormal model was applied. Results suggest that reasoning speed is a unidimensional construct representing significant individual differences, and that reasoning speed and ability are negatively correlated but clearly distinguishable constructs. Perceptual and executive attention showed differential effects on reasoning speed and reasoning ability, i.e., reasoning speed is explained by executive attention only, while reasoning ability is explained by both covariates. Implications for the assessment of reasoning are discussed.     

Bergson's and Sartre's Account of the Self in Relation to the Transcendental Ego

The historico-political category of 'Continental philosophy' arose in the United State and includes such figures as Adorno, Arendt, Beauvoir, Cairns, Carr, Cavailles, Deleuze, Derrida, Fink, Foucault, Funke, Gadamer, Gurwitsch, Habermas, Heidegger, Held, Ihde, Jaspers, Jonas, Kersten, Kristeva, Ingarden, Landgrebe, Levinas, Lyotard, Marcel, Marcuse, Marx, Merleau- Ponty, Mohanty, Natanson, Ortega y Gasset, Pato?ka, Reinach, Ricoeur, Sartre, Scheler, Schutz, Seebohm, Sokolowski, Spet, Stein, Stroeker, and Waldenfels. What these diverse figures share is (a) an early but not necessarily continued critical involvement with Husserl's phenomenology and (b) subsequent intellectual interaction with others who also began that way. Some comments on relations with analytic philosophy are also included with this historical sketch.     

Self-understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction

I argue that §§15–20 of the B-Deduction contain two independent arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, the first an argument from above, the second an argument from below. The core of the first argument is §16's explanation of our consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions, while the focus of the second is §18's account of universality and necessity in our experience. I conclude that the B-Deduction comprises powerful strategies for establishing its intended conclusion, and that some assistance from empirical psychology might well have produced a completely successful argument.     

Transcendental realism defended: a response to Allan

It is argued against Allan that Bhaskar's transcendental realism is not self-defeatingly relativist, that his analysis of experiment is supportable and that his philosophical ontology can be defended without returning to a correspondence notion of truth.     

How to use probabilities in reasoning

Conclusions Probabilities are important in belief updating, but probabilistic reasoning does not subsume everything else (as the Bayesian would have it). On the contrary, Bayesian reasoning presupposes knowledge that cannot itself be obtained by Bayesian reasoning, making generic Bayesianism an incoherent theory of belief updating. Instead, it is indefinite probabilities that are of principal importance in belief updating. Knowledge of such indefinite probabilities is obtained by some form of statistical induction, and inferences to non-probabilistic conclusions are carried out in accordance with the statistical syllogism. Such inferences have been the focus of much attention in the nonmonotonic reasoning literature, but the logical complexity of such inference has not been adequately appreciated.     

先验哲学的超验意境——从《夜之颂》看诺瓦利斯的独特精神诉求

《夜之颂》是德国早期浪漫主义作家诺瓦利斯的代表作。在这篇作品中,他将夜的概念引申到哲学和宗教范畴中,通过本体超验,勾画出夜精神不朽的宗教寓意和现实寓意。超验是这部作品的点睛之笔,作者通过体验夜的不同意境,表达了内心世界对完美精神的追求。     

Transcendental idealism among the Jersey metaphysicians

Some questions are posed for van Fraassen, concerning the role and status of metaphysics in his Scientific Representation.