Human Rights and Human Dignity

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity.     

Theistic or secular grounding of human rights?

The philosophical debate on human rights and their core notion of “human dignity” is marked by controversy, not least regarding the relevance of a religious perspective. This article addresses two markedly different approaches to human rights: Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs (2008) and George Kateb's Human Dignity (2011). While Wolterstorff argues for a theistic grounding of human rights, Kateb is highly critical towards theology and sets out to achieve a strictly secular account of what makes a human being unique. After two sections outlining their respective positions, the article moves into a comparative discussion and concludes that instead of the rigid alternative “theistic” or “secular” what we need in order to understand and defend human dignity and human rights may be a more open and broad-minded perspective on religion.     

CONTESTING THE WORLD AND THE DIVINE: BALTHASAR'S TRINITARIAN "RESPONSE" TO GIANNI VATTIMO'S SECULAR CHRISTIANITY

This essay joins the contemporary debate over the proper theological and philosophical hermeneutic for interpreting the phenomenon of secularism. The first part offers a sustained Balthasar-influenced critique of Gianni Vattimo's secular translation of Christianity. I argue that Vattimo's Heideggerian-Hegelian influenced reading of secularism as Christianity's proper telos is both philosophically and theologically problematic. Part Two of this article reads Balthasar's work as a response to the philosophical and theological underpinnings of Vattimo's thought. Balthasar would argue that it is in a more traditional, yet remarkably daring account of the Trinitarian relations that the "secular" finds both its ground and dignity.     

Death with dignity from the Confucian perspective

Death with dignity is a significant issue in modern bioethics. In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technologies at the end of life has caused heated debate on how to protect human dignity. The key point of contention lies in the different understandings of human dignity and the dignity of death. Human dignity has never been a clear concept in Western ethical explorations, and the dignity of death has given rise to more confusions. Although there is no such term as “dignity” in Confucian ethics, there are discussions of a number of ideas related to human dignity and the dignity of death. Therefore, Confucian bioethics can offer a new perspective for understanding the theoretical difficulties associated with the dignity of death and new methods for solving them. In this article, we attempt to reconstruct Confucian views on human dignity and the dignity of death and, based on those views, to analyze the following issues: the relationship between the dignity of death and biological life, the relationship between the dignity of death and suffering, the relationship between the dignity of death and the autonomy of human beings, and the relationship between the dignity of death and social justice. This article will also compare the Confucian views on these issues with the views of Western philosophers. Confucian ethics can offer distinct answers to the above issues and help resolve some confusions concerning concepts and theories in Western research on the dignity of death.     

Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights.     

Human dignity in Muslim perspective: building bridges

This essay argues that Islam, understood as a historically produced body of knowledge, contains resources from which we can reconstruct a conception of human dignity understood as a human right. This reconstruction requires a critical reinterpretation of some of these resources. Pursued with historical sensitivity and a comparative lens, this interpretative activity can bring about considerable benefits. It can help us overcome the religious/secular and Islam/West binaries which have limited the human rights debate. It can help us envision a human rights agenda that is universal and yet appreciative of cultural difference.     

Pessimism

The problem of pessimism is the secular analogue to the evidential problem of evil facing traditional theism. The traditional theist must argue two things: that the evidence shows that this is on balance a good world and that it is the best possible world. Though the secular optimist who advocates any form of secular moral theory need not argue that the current and future world will likely be the best possible world, she nonetheless must argue that were there a clean solution to the problem of current and future suffering in which all sentient life could be instantly and painlessly eliminated, we would have reasons not to employ the clean solution because the future promises to bring on balance a good world in which the evil of human and animal suffering is outweighed by whatever is good in the world. Pessimism is the view that the evidence argues against secular optimism. It is argued here that it is anything but clear that secular optimism is warranted when viewed from an impersonal point of view. The problem is then evaluated from the personal point of view in which a form of personal optimism is defended even in the face of impersonal pessimism.     

Human Dignity and Assisted Dying

The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in its preamble, affirms ‘the inherent dignity and … the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. However, advocates of assisted dying have proposed that human dignity is not inherent and that individuals should be able to determine their own dignity and quality of life. In response to this, it is suggested that persons who consider that their lives are no longer worth living, or believe that they have lost their ‘dignity’, are discriminating against themselves. Moreover, with assisted dying, as opposed to suicide, another person must also believe that it would be preferable for a person wishing to die not to continue living. In other words, assisted dying is a reflection of the unacceptable belief by a person that human dignity is not inherent and that another person can lose his or her dignity to such an extent that his or her life is no longer worth living and should be ended.     

Human Dignity and the Ethics and Aesthetics of Pain and Suffering

Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering areoften thought to rob human beings of theirdignity, physicians and other care providersincur a special duty to relieve pain andsuffering when they encounter it. When pain andsuffering cannot be controlled it is sometimesthought that human dignity is compromised.Death, it is sometimes argued, would bepreferred to a life without dignity.Reasoning such as this trades on certainpreconceptions of the nature of pain andsuffering, and of their relationships todignity. The purpose of this paper is to laybare these preconceptions. The duties torelieve pain and suffering are clearly mattersof moral obligation, as is the duty to respondappropriately to the dignity of other persons.However, it is argued that our understanding ofthe phenomena of pain and suffering and theirrelationships to human dignity will be expandedwhen we explore the aesthetic dimensions ofthese various concepts. On the view presentedhere the life worth living is both morally goodand aesthetically beautiful. Appropriate``suffering with' another can help to maintainand restore the dignity of the relationshipsinvolved, even as it preserves and enhances thedignity of patient and caregiver alike.     

Sense of Divine Involvement and Sense of Meaning in Life: Religious Tradition as a Contingency

This study examines the association between sense of divine involvement and sense of meaning in life. Then it proceeds to assess how this association varies by religious tradition. Using a random and national sample from the 2007 Baylor Religion Survey, this study finds that sense of divine involvement is associated with greater odds of having a sense of meaning in life. In addition, religious affiliation modifies this association. Specifically, the positive association between sense of divine involvement and the odds of having a sense of meaning in life is observed only among evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics, but not among other religionists and religious nones. I discuss how the results make contributions to knowledge about the link between religious beliefs, religious tradition, and mental health.     

关注晚期癌症患者的生活质量

在强调整体医学的今天,在肿瘤治疗尚未出现理想疗效的前提下,肿瘤治疗目标应遵循生存率与生活质量(QOL)并重的原则。在诊治晚期癌症患者过程中不仅要关心他们的生存期,更要关心他们的生活质量。在诊治过程中要根据他们独特的心理和生理特征给予全方位关怀,减轻痛苦、维持生命质量和保证他们应有的人格尊严。     

Nanotechnologies, bioethics and human dignity

Nanoscale science, research, and technology present a complex set of circumstances. First of all, this field involves many different subjects, including biology, chemistry, physics, and environment sciences. Secondly, although scientists are working increasingly at a molecular level, nanotechnology is about much more than a reduction of scale. Indeed, nanoscience and Nanotechnologies offer an unprecedented ability to control and manipulate nature, offering hope for progress. Ethical perspectives vary considerably in this field, but commentators and researchers share a concern about a specific worrisome issue: the lack of appropriate ethical and legal principles and processes (associated with issues including health risks, human body manipulation, and private life violation), to guide nanotechnological R&D, commercialization, and final use. Some authors partially reject this concern by suggesting that Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies do not constitute an autonomous category, and that they are instead just the operative result of combining other traditional areas of study. However the nanotechnological debate brings up the semantic and content issues of bioethics and foments a contentious discussion emphasizing human dignity. Issues include enhancement versus therapeutic intervention, traceability versus privacy, and societal benefits versus risks. From these preliminary considerations, we will move on to discuss (I) the traditional, although still controversial, relationship between bioethics and human dignity, and (II) return to the subject of nanotechnology. We will discuss how today in Europe, although still indefinite, the principle of respect for human dignity is a welcomed contributor to "ethical vigilance" about the uncertain development of new nano-scale technologies. We will also note how U.S. strategy in this regard is simply lacking and appears only as a purely discursive "key issue in long term ".     

医疗价格过度增长的管制原因分析

医疗服务的准公共产品特征说明医疗价格问题不能完全由市场来解决,政府必须对医疗价格进行管制.造成医疗价格高昂的原因是多样的和复杂的,基于对医疗价格的政府管制现状分析,认为对医疗价格的管制不善,是导致中国高昂医疗价格的原因之一,并且提出了对医疗价格进行管制的制度框架.     

生命的核、质与根——性的哲学、伦理学与神学

性是人类生命的道德伤口。性是生命的核、质与根。人类掩藏性的信息,给生命以最大的神学、美学和伦理学的空间;也同时用潜伏的原理忧挂生命发生的神秘和戏剧性;性爱和情爱的形式改变了忏悔的精神说教,与科学实践、生活实践相结合,面临如何延续生命又如何避免蒙受尊严丧失的屈辱。     

Physician-assisted suicide reconsidered: dying as a Christian in a post-Christian age.

The traditional Christian focus concerning dying is on repentance, not dignity. The goal of a traditional Christian death is not a pleasing, final chapter to life, but union with God: holiness. The pursuit of holiness requires putting on Christ and accepting His cross. In contrast, post-traditional Christian and secular concerns with self-determination, control, dignity, and self-esteem make physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia plausible moral choices. Such is not the case within the context of the traditional Christian experience of God, which throughout its 2000 years has sternly condemned suicide and assisted suicide. The wrongness of such actions cannot adequately be appreciated outside the experience of that Christian life. Traditional Christian appreciations of death involve an epistemology and metaphysics of values in discordance with those of secular morality. This difference in the appreciation of the meaning of dying and death, as well as in the appreciation of the moral significance of suicide, discloses a new battle in the culture wars separating traditional Christian morality from that of the surrounding society.     

Can Life Be Evaluated? The Jewish Halachic Approach vs. The Quality of Life Approach in Medical Ethics: A Critical View

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of requests formercy killings by patients and their relatives. Under certain conditions,the patient may prefer death to a life devoid of quality. In contrast to thosewho uphold this quality of life approach, those who hold the sanctity oflife approach claim that life has intrinsic value and must be preservedregardless of its quality. This essay describes these two approaches,examines their flaws, and offers a golden path between the two extremepositions.We discuss the halachic and the secular views, arguing for a balancebetween the sanctity of life and the quality of life. We argue that, indeed,such a balance exists in practice, and that life is important, but it is not sacred. Life can be evaluated, but quality of life is not the solecriterion.     

Pentecostal Affiliation

Although Pentecostal Protestants are often included under the broad term “evangelical Protestant,” research suggests that Pentecostals are distinct from other evangelical Protestants in their religious and secular beliefs and activities. In this research note, we demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of a religious classification that accounts for differences between affiliates of Pentecostal denominations and affiliates of other Protestant denominations. Analysis of nationally representative survey data shows that affiliates of evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal Protestant denominations differ in their levels of education, religious beliefs, attitudes on social issues, and political ideology. These differences are largely congruent with theoretical expectations of differences among Protestant subgroups. The classification of Pentecostal denominations presented in this research note is an important tool for researchers, which can be applied to a wide range of social scientific inquiries.     

Dignity,Torture, and Human Rights

This paper focuses on a distinct puzzle for understanding the relationship between dignity and human rights. The puzzle is that dignity appears to enter human rights theory in two distinct roles: on the one hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as the foundation of human rights, i.e. that in virtue of which we have human rights. On the other hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as that which is at risk in a subset of human rights, paradigmatically torture. But how can dignity underpin all human rights, and yet only be at stake in very specific human rights violations? And if dignity is lost in torture, how can the tortured retain their human rights? In this paper I offer a solution to these puzzles, in the form of a new theory of dignity. On this new theory, an individual’s dignity can be constituted via either of two pathways: the agent’s own normative competencies, or the authority of her community. The former is what’s typically at stake in practices such as torture; it in virtue of the latter that we have human rights.     

Birth with dignity from the Confucian perspective

The development of biotechnologies has broadly interfered with a number of life processes, including human birth. An important moral question arises from the application of such medical technologies to birth: do biotechnological advancements violate human dignity? Many valid arguments have been raised. Yet bioethicists are still far from reaching a consensus on how best to protect the dignity of human birth. Confucianism is an influential ethical theory in China and presents a distinctive understanding of human dignity. In this paper, we reconstruct the two Confucian concepts of dignity—namely, universal dignity and personal dignity. We then apply these concepts to human birth in the context of biotechnologies involving embryos and genetic enhancement. We conclude that the dual Confucian understanding of dignity contributes a valuable perspective to the question of whether biotechnologies related to human birth violate human dignity.     

A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular‐liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.