Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

Self-deception and selectivity

Philosophical Studies - This article explores the alleged “selectivity problem” for Alfred Mele’s deflationary position on self-deception, a problem that can allegedly be solved...     

Self-deception requires vagueness

The paper sets out to reveal conditions enabling diagnostic self-deception, people’s tendency to deceive themselves about the diagnostic value of their own actions. We characterize different types of self-deception in terms of the distinction between intervention and observation in causal reasoning. One type arises when people intervene but choose to view their actions as observations in order to find support for a self-serving diagnosis. We hypothesized that such self-deception depends on imprecision in the environment that allows leeway to represent one’s own actions as either observations or interventions. Four experiments tested this idea using a dot-tracking task. Participants were told to go as quickly as they could and that going fast indicated either above-average or below-average intelligence. Precision was manipulated by varying the vagueness in feedback about performance. As predicted, self-deception was observed only when feedback on the task used vague terms rather than precise values. The diagnosticity of the feedback did not matter.     

Self-deception and discrepancies in self-evaluation

Self-deception is an intricate psychological construct, grounded in relatively little empirical evidence as an individual difference variable. The present research offers a direct test of one of the central scales of self-deception—the Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE) scale—by comparing explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), participants (N = 150) reported about their implicit self-evaluation. These ratings were compared to explicit self-reports about self-evaluation. Results showed that higher self-deception was associated with a larger discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Specifically, higher self-deception was associated with a more positive explicit self-evaluation but with a more negative implicit self-evaluation. These findings offer one of the first direct tests of the SDE, supporting its viability.     

Self-deception and belief attribution

One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended.     

Self-deception as pseudo-rational regulation of belief

Self-deception is a special kind of motivational dominance in belief-formation. We develop criteria which set paradigmatic self-deception apart from related phenomena of auto-manipulation such as pretense and motivational bias. In self-deception rational subjects defend or develop beliefs of high subjective importance in response to strong counter-evidence. Self-deceivers make or keep these beliefs tenable by putting prima-facie rational defense-strategies to work against their established standards of rational evaluation. In paradigmatic self-deception, target-beliefs are made tenable via reorganizations of those belief-sets that relate relevant data to target-beliefs. This manipulation of the evidential value of relevant data goes beyond phenomena of motivated perception of data. In self-deception belief-defense is pseudo-rational. Self-deceivers will typically apply a dual standard of evaluation that remains intransparent to the subject. The developed model of self-deception as pseudo-rational belief-defense is empirically anchored. So, we hope to put forward a promising candidate.     

自我欺骗的研究现状与展望

西方哲学、心理学等领域对"自我欺骗"开展了有影响力的研究。早期的理论家关注自我欺骗的意识特征。弗洛伊德通过指出意识和无意识可以由动机推动,开创了自我欺骗研究的新阶段。众多研究者采纳了弗洛伊德的思想,解释了为什么自我欺骗在自我服务偏向、社会称许性、进化等行为中起重要作用。自我欺骗作为一种个体普遍经验到的心理现象,其可能是自我服务偏向的本质所在。文章最后分析了心理学界开展自我欺骗研究的意义和未来研究的方向。     

自我欺骗:为了调节个体心理状态

本研究旨在探索自我欺骗的研究方法、产生的原因和认知机制,以及这一领域中有待解决的新问题。近期研究发现:基于自我欺骗产生的动机特点,主要存在三类不同的定义方式,大多数心理学家是基于第三类定义来研究自我欺骗。研究方法上,适用性较强的自欺问卷是自欺性提升量表(SDE),操作性较强的经典实验范式是点追踪任务。在认知过程的任一阶段中,调节心理状态是个体产生自我欺骗的直接动机,改变个体的心理状态或对事物的模糊感知可能阻止个体自我欺骗的产生。未来应从如何调节个体心理状态的角度探讨和研究自我欺骗,能够利用点追踪任务,结合ERPs或fMRI技术为之后研究自欺产生的具体阶段、认知机制以及神经机制提供实证研究基础。     

自传体叙事中的自我欺骗:个体的自我认同策略

自传体叙事中的自我欺骗是一种从个体内角度理解的自我欺骗,是无人际压力情况下个体自我建构过程中所使用的一种认同策略。这种自我欺骗发生在自传体叙事过程中,个体通过叙事语言拉开"新我"和"旧我"的叙事距离,建立新的目标追求并实现,最终构建新的叙事认同。在这个过程中,个体在维持正性自我概念的动机驱动下,采用有偏差的信息加工方式叙述自我故事,满足情绪体验与情绪评价一致性的需要,进而影响个体的自我意识,引发自我改变。未来研究可以探讨自传体叙事中自我欺骗在临床中的行为表现与治疗策略,考察其认知神经机制,并探讨不同社会文化背景下自我欺骗的特点与影响因素。     

Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping.First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.     

Seeing and hearing and space and space and time

A previous experiment had shown spatial location to be judged in terms of the framework provided by the modality in which stimuli were presented. In the present study, digits were either auditorally or visually presented, and in either form the three digits appeared successivly to the left, in the center, and to the right of the S. The digit which occurred temporally in the middle of the sequence was never central from the spatial viewpoint. The S was asked to indicate which digit was the middle one. Ss were blind, deaf, or normal. The deaf and two control groups saw visual displays, and the blind and their controls heard auditory displays. The former groups predominantly chose the spatially middle digit and the latter groups the temporally middle. It was concluded that modality of presentation was the trigger which switched in the coding dimension of time or space.     

Bob and Carol and Tess and Ali

Conflicting religious experiences in different traditions do not necessarily defeat the rationality of conflicting beliefs sustained by those experiences in those traditions. The circularity that protects religious beliefs from such mutual defeat is not vicious. Moreover, the lack of ‘epistemological humility’ exhibited by such believers poses no threat to world peace. In fact, a campaign for compulsory humility would itself constitute a much greater threat.