TEILHARD DE CHARDIN'S EVOLUTIONARY NATURAL THEOLOGY

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin develops, as is well known, a model of evolution as a convergent progression from primordial multiplicity through increasing degrees of complexity toward a final Omega point of spiritual consummation. I explore how Teilhard fuses Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of evolution in developing his own, and in particular his defense of the view that Lamarckism is fundamental to a proper understanding of evolution's human phase. Teilhard's scientific interpretation of evolution is inspired by Christian cosmological insights derived from patristic theology and contemporary Pauline scholarship and cannot be separated from them. His integration of science and theology provides the basis for a renewed evolutionary natural theology that supplants the traditional static models developed by William Paley and others. Teilhard's natural theology also provides a framework for theological ethical reflection on how humanity should act in its capacity as created co‐creator with God. In later work, he considers the implications of his evolutionary theology for the wider universe. Teilhard thus presents an invigorated natural theology grounded in evolution that confirms and completes a dynamic and teleological view of the cosmos.     

Herbert Spencer's contributions to behavior analysis: a retrospective review of principles of psychology

Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (1855, first edition) was regarded by his contemporaries, including William James and John Dewey, as a major contribution to what was then a very new discipline. In this book he first expounded his ideas about both evolution of species and how behavior of the individual organism adapts through interaction with the environment. His formulation of the principle that behavior changes in adaptation to the environment is closely related to the version of the law of effect propounded some years later by Thorndike. He can thus be seen as the first proponent of selectionism, a key tenet of behavior analysis. He also explicitly attacked the then prevailing view of free will as being incompatible with the biologically grounded view of psychological processes that he was advocating, and thus put forward ideas that were precursors of B. F. Skinner's in this important area of debate.     

Encounters with the Religious Imagination and the Emergence of Creativity

Ervin Laszlo's notion of the interrelationship between evolution and creativity as being intrinsic to universal life processes has been influential to the biological and social sciences. Central to Laszlo's thinking is the notion of convergence in biological and social systems that are posited on creative complexity. In this article, I employ Laszlo's concept of creativity in relation to the human religious imagination. Cross-cultural studies of the religious imagination examine the architecture of human consciousness and ways of knowing. These two areas are interlinked and generate new kinds of knowledge and understanding of the self and the world. In this way, the religious imagination is a means of generating new possibilities of mind and consciousness.     

Givenness, complexity, and the Danish dative alternation

In this study, we investigated the interaction between givenness and complexity on the choice of syntactic structure, via two experiments using speeded acceptability judgments. Experiment 1 showed that for the Danish dative alternation, given–new orders are only easier to process for double-object or NP constructions, whereas PP constructions are unaffected. This replicates previous findings for the English dative alternation. Experiment 2 revealed that when a long NP precedes a short NP—a suboptimal complexity relation—the effect of givenness is neutralized, whereas givenness remains influential when the complexity relation between the NPs in the sentence is optimal. This is consistent with the view that in online parsing, the actual syntactic structure-building process is primary, whereas any higher-order computations such as discourse linking are secondary. The relative complexity of the NPs in the double-object construction directly affects the structure-building process, whereas the decoding of the discourse structure is a later and less crucial phenomenon, resulting in neutralization of the givenness effect in cases in which the complexity relation is suboptimal.     

Darwinism Extended: A Survey of How the Idea of Cultural Evolution Evolved

In the past 150 years there have been many attempts to draw parallels between cultural and biological evolution. Most of these attempts were flawed due to lack of knowledge and false ideas about evolution. In recent decades these shortcomings have been cleared away, thus triggering a renewed interest in the subject. This paper offers a critical survey of the main issues and arguments in that discussion. The paper starts with an explication of the Darwinian algorithm of evolution. It is argued that this ‘formula’ is substrate-neutral, which means that biological evolution might not be the only Darwinian process. Other dynamic systems could evolve as well provided that certain conditions are met. In the case of human culture this seems to be the case. The paper then focuses on the notion of niche construction. It is argued that niche construction plays a crucial role in human evolution because it has altered the sources of natural selection and thus the path of evolution. Next two approaches to cultural evolution are discussed: sociobiology and memetics. I will argue that both approaches have flaws because they either underestimate the influence of culture or they stretch analogies too far. Finally two common objections against the idea of cultural evolution are addressed: Lamarckian inheritance and the issue of guided variation. I will argue that although cultural evolution differs from biological evolution in several respects, these discrepancies do not jeopardize the claim that cultural evolution is essentially Darwinian.     

What we must Accomplish in the coming Decades

Abstract. In order to survive as a species and grow in complexity, humanity must adopt a new image of what it means to be human, rediscover a reward system beyond the merely material, and see that young people find joy in challenges and in cooperating with others.     

Evidence of recursion in tool use

We discuss the discovery of technologies involving knotted netting, such as textiles, basketry, and cordage, in the Upper Paleolithic. This evidence, in our view, suggests a new way of connecting toolmaking and syntactic structure in human evolution, because these technologies already exhibit an "infinite use of finite means," which we take to constitute the key transition to human cognition.     

The paradox of evolution

In the second (and expanded) version of Origin of the Species, Darwin introduces the term “advanced progressive development” in an attempt to describe the development of the more complex species from the simpler ones. More than 100 years have passed since Darwin tried to qualify and conceptualize the directional question of evolution, and very little progress has been made regarding the subject. The appearance of the species, from the simple to the more complex, is today an empirical fact, one which is no longer dependent upon any theory, including that of Darwin. This work examines the subject of advanced development in evolution by attempting to answer a few basic questions: What parameters may be used to evaluate complexity? Can any rules or order be identified as to the development of the species? Is the mechanism of “natural selection” sufficient to explain the direction or ‘purpose’ of evolution? Can the human race be included within the “rules” of Darwin's evolutionary theory?

The purpose of this essay is to develop and represent a new conceptual framework. Through this, it will be possible to offer a principle answer to all four questions.     

The New Holism: The Grand Prospect for Science and Society

As we enter the 21st century and the new millennium, our collective evolution reaches a critical threshold. We cannot go on as we did before: our world has become unsustainable. Sooner or later many local ecosystems would collapse, the climate would change adversely for agriculture and habitation, species incompatible with a large and dense human population would profilerate, and resources critical for human health and survival would become scarce, or at least beyond the reach of a critical segment of humanity. We need to shift gears, moving from the kind of evolution that characterized our scientific-technological civilization, to the kind that is compatible with the human condition as it evolves on this planet. This shift requires a corresponding shift in our concept of the world. The dominant mechanistic and atomistic paradigm no longer serves us: it is not only factually incorrect in view of the latest discoveries of the sciences, it also inspires dangerously misguided behaviors. We need to find a deeper and better view of the human condition. We must no longer just see the trees: we must also see the forest. That is, we must learn to see the planetary socio-ecosystem with all its subsystems, diversities, and also its actual and potential unities. What we need is a holistic view, a view of the human being as part of her or his community, which is part of its local environment, which is part of its society and culture, which is part of the system of cultures and societies in the human family-which is part of the global environment: of the biosphere.     

Evolution of Destructive Aggression

Aggression is defined as a mechanism of spacing by means of force or displays. It has evolved independently in different animal groups. The mechanisms underlying it are therefore not homologous throughout the animal kingdom. The phenomenon of aggression is so widespread, however, that strong selection pressures must be responsible for its development along analogous lines. Its most obvious functions are in competition for mates, natural resources, and territories, and in the preservation of group identity in many gregarious species. Aggression is often ritualized so that no damage is done to conspecifics. This ritualization may appear as modification of fighting into a tournament, or as the development of submissive postures which block further aggression in the opponent shortly after the onset of a potentially damaging fight. Animal aggression is preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptation in well-defined ways, but can be modified by experience. The inborn programs involve motor patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, motivating mechanisms, and learning dispositions specific for the species. Aggression on this biological level can be observed in humans as intragroup aggression. Certain motor patterns and signals which lead to the release of aggression are universal. Some can even be found in deaf- and blind-born people, proving their innateness. A number of patterns of aggression in man are highly ritualized and - in a way analogous to that found in many animals - mechanisms of control have evolved inhibiting the killing of a conspecific. There are strong indications of the existence of motivating mechanisms within the brain, e.g., in the form of neuronal circuits, that show a degree of spontaneity. The type of destructive aggression which we call war, is a product of cultural evolution. War takes advantage of the given motivational structure of man, including his fear of strangers, which develops in every baby independently of experience and makes men inclined to form closed groups and causes them to be wary of or hostile to strangers. Based on these tendencies, man underwent a process of cultural subspeciation. Groups demarcated themselves from others by custom, erecting communication barriers. The development of languages demonstrates how fast and efficient this process is. Members of the same group, during this process, were defined as the “real man,” outsiders often were to be valued less -or even considered nonhuman. On the basis of this self-indoctrination, cultural codes of conduct developed, which allowed members of other groups to be killed when groups competed for resources. A cultural fiiter of norms was established which demanded killing under defined conditions, and was superimposed upon the biological filter of norms which inhibits the killing of a human being. This results in a conflict of norms, which is universally felt as guilt, since the biological filter of norms, though superimposed, is nonetheless working, particularly in the circumstance of a personal encounter. The more advanced the technique of armament, which allows fast and distant killing, the less the inhibitions are activated. Nonetheless, ritualizations occur on the cultural level. Warfare is sometimes ritualized and conventions are developed to prevent escalation into massacres, or the wholesale destruction of the subjugated enemy. To a great extent, this is certainly a result of our inborn moral code, If nothing like this were given to man our situation would be disastrous indeed. Whether cultural evolution will, in the future, be guided by moral maxims in accord with our human nature is a deeision men must make rationally. Although a ruthless ethnocentrism may bring advantage to a warring group, this may eventually prove fatal to mankind as a whole. In the escalating competition mankind runs the danger not only of exhausting its resources, but of destroying itself with its new weapons. If the outcome were not selfdestruction but domination by one group it would impoverish the diversity of human cultures, and thus seriously cut down man's spectrum of adaptability. War fulfills certain functions, similar to those found in animals. It is mainly a mechanism for preserving and extending one's territory, and a means of getting access to scarce resources. It is therefore dangerous to consider war merely as a pathological form of human behavior because this may distract our attention from the fact that, h order to overcome war, the functions of war have to be fulfilled by nonviolent means. Cultural evolution phenocopies biological evolution, due to similarities in the selection pressures shaping its course. This allows us to define the point of the evolutionary spiral we are at currently and to predict our future course.     

Incarnation and Semiotics: A Theological and Anthropological Hypothesis Part 2: Semiotics,Anthropology, and Religious Transformation

This is the second in a pair of articles in which we draw on C.S. Peirce's semiotics (theory of signs) to develop a new approach to the Christian concept of Incarnation. In Part 1 we used Peirce's taxonomy of signs to explore what it means to understand the life of Jesus as the embodiment of the quality of God within the fabric of the created order. In this article (Part 2), we explore some ways in which this semiotic approach to the Incarnation offers constructive opportunities in theological anthropology, and suggests some empirically testable hypotheses about human evolution.     

Evolution, Genes, and Behavior

The pseudoscience of evolutionary psychology purports to explain human behaviors by reference to an ancestral environment (essentially, a hunting-gathering way of life) in which we evolved. Contemporary human behaviors are allegedly governed directly by genes that reflect adaptation to this environment by natural selection. However, the evolutionary process is much more complex than this reductionist approach implies, and adaptation cannot involve the fine-tuning of structures or behaviors within individuals or species: natural selection can only affect entire organisms, not their components. Similarly, genetic processes are too complex to admit this simplistic view. Instead, our flexible, complex human behaviors probably represent an emergent acquisition.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Scaling Up the Self,Scaling Down the World: Self-objectification and the Politics of Carbon Offsets and Personalised Genomics

Two global initiatives, the Genographic Project and the Carbon Lottery, share an ambition to make abstract, global processes—human evolution and climate change—comprehensible and engaging to non-specialists. Despite their differences, they both do so by means of self-objectifications that scale up the selves of participants and scale down complex, spatio-temporal models of human–world relations. The author’s auto-ethnographic experiences in both initiatives illustrate how carbon calculators and personalised genomics involve a pragmatics of scale that evaluates and compares users on the basis of their relative expression of, or deviation from, a standard. Furthermore, this is not based on actual resources that participants do or do not possess, but on forms of capitalist exchange that underwrite carbon trading and population genomics, as experts and corporations make intellectual property derived from purportedly rare DNA and sustainable practices, which are typically indigenous and non-western. In fact, the global inequalities that make possible transactions in carbon offsets and genetic ancestry are obscured from view. As a result, though initiatives like the Genographic Project and Carbon Lottery may provide comprehensible self-objectifications, they potentially make the world more unequal in the process.     

Introduction: The Dialogical Self in a Global and Digital Age

In this article, culture and self, like society and identity, are conceived as mutually inclusive. On the basis of this premise, self and identity are discussed in the context of an evolution toward a global and digital society. The core concept is the "dialogical self" that is described as a spatial and temporal process of positioning. Examples of multivoiced and dialogical selves are given in communities and cultures that lack advanced technological means. Apparently, the dialogical self is not an exclusive feature of the present era but a general human condition. Specific to the era is that dialogue is becoming increasingly mediated as a result of technological advances. Closely related to these advances, one can witness an increasing cultural complexity, mobility, and hybridization. It is argued that technological developments and global interconnectedness provide new opportunities for innovation of the self as multivoiced and dialogical. At the same time, such developments evoke counter forces that can close the self off from such opportunities. This article ends with a short introduction to the several contributions in this special issue.     

A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.     

My Psychoanalytic Journey

In this article I describe the evolution of my psychoanalytic thought and my current perspective of psychoanalysis, after almost a half century of professional practice. For the most part, three ideas have guided this evolution: (1) considering the patient’s mind as the major source of knowledge; (2) my firm belief that the patient–analyst dialogue, taken from the Gadamerian point of view, is the best way to have access to the patient’s mind and also to that of the analyst himself; and (3) the notion that the mind constitutes an open, dynamic, and nonlinear system in constant interaction with the environment that surrounds it. In my writings, I have tried to show that the therapeutic action in the psychoanalytic process is formed by the therapist–patient interaction. I also propose that psychoanalysis must endeavor to be a social therapy, even as it treats individuals, and go beyond what is purely instinctual so as to emphasize what is particular to human beings and sets us apart from the other animal species.     

Can desires determine ends?

According to a common view of human agency, desires determine at least some of the ends that agents set for themselves. In this paper, I argue that this view is false. I show that without reason’s ability to determine the means to an end it is impossible to determine ends. Furthermore, even when an end is determined in light of a desire, only reason can make sense of the distinction between an end and merely a means to that end. In fact, in many cases the end which is determined in light of desires is to remove these desires, rather than to “serve and obey” them. Hence, reason is necessary for determining our ends, and thus explaining the teleological aspect of agency.     

God, Freedom, and Evil: Perspectives from Religion and Science

This paper develops analogies concerning the evolution of dissipative structures in nonequilibrium thermodynamics to interpret irrational human behavior in which one finds a lack of correspondence between the invested means and the consequences observed. In an attempt to positively explain the process of cooperation between the free human person and interacting God, I use philosophical categories of Whitehead's process philosophy in an aesthetic model that opposes composition and performance in a musical symphony. Certainly, the essence of human freedom can be expressed in neither thermodynamical nor aesthetic terms. The models proposed can, however, facilitate our understanding of the mutual relations between God's action in the world and the drama of human free choice of moral evil.     

Toward integrating cognitive components with computational models of emotion using software design patterns

Computational models of emotion (CMEs) are software systems designed to imitate particular aspects of human emotions. The main purpose of this type of computational model is to capture the complexity of the human emotion process in a software system that is incorporated into a cognitive agent architecture. However, creating a CME that closely imitates the actual functioning of emotions demands to address some challenges such as (i) sharing information among independently developed cognitive and affective components, and (ii) interconnecting complex cognitive and affective components that must interact with one another in order to generate realistic emotions, which may even affect agents’ decision making. This paper proposes an architectural pattern aimed at cataloging and describing fundamental components of CMEs and their interrelationships with cognitive components. In this architectural pattern, external cognitive components and internal affective components of CMEs do not interact directly but are extended by including message exchange methods in order to use a publish-subscribe channel, which enables their intercommunication, thus attenuating issues such as software heterogeneity. This structural approach centralizes communication management and separates the inherent complexity of the cognitive and affective processes from the complexity of their interaction mechanisms. In so doing, it enables the design of CMEs’ architectures composed of independently developed affective and cognitive components. The proposed architectural pattern attempts to make progress in capturing the complex process of human emotions in a software system that adheres to software engineering best practices and that incorporates quality attributes such as flexibility and interoperability.