What is the Good/ Good of the FORM of the GOOD?

‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These ‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’ neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind, ‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental ‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably in any but an aesthetic sense.     

What is Radical Interpretation? Davidson,Fodor, and the Naturalization of Philosophy

Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently criticized Davidson's methodology of radical interpretation because of its apparent failure to reflect how actual interpretation is achieved. Responding to such complaints, Davidson claims that he is not interested in the empirical issues surrounding actual interpretation but instead focuses on the question of what conditions make interpretation possible. It is argued that this exchange between Fodor and Lepore on one side, and Davidson on the other, cannot be viewed simply as a naturalist reaction to non-naturalist philosophical inquiry. Through a careful excavation of the hidden assumptions and commitments underlying this debate, we recognize a more serious disagreement over the intellectual obligations of naturalism; a position with a firm hold on current philosophical imaginations. In the process, we gain a new appreciation for how such commitments shape these naturalist positions, and recognize that any resolution to this specific debate will require careful attention to the divergent commitments that are its real source.     

What is the point of helping?

Philosophical Studies - In some cases, a group of people can bring about a morally bad outcome despite each person’s individual act making no difference with respect to bringing that outcome...     

What is the upper part of the lattice of bimodal logics?

We define an embedding from the lattice of extensions ofT into the lattice of extensions of the bimodal logic with two monomodal operators ₁ and ₂, whose ₂-fragment isS5 and ₁-fragment is the logic of a two-element chain. This embedding reflects the fmp, decidability, completenes and compactness. It follows that the lattice of extension of a bimodal logic can be rather complicated even if the monomodal fragments of the logic belong to the upper part of the lattice of monomodal logics.Presented byWolfgang Rautenberg     

What is the Problem of Non-Existence?

It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say.     

What is the Normativity of Meaning?

There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute among proponents of the claim that meaning is normative, it should be of interest to those who challenge it. After all, before one takes aim, one’s target needs to be in clear view.     

What is the Meaning of Proofs?

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The origins of proof-theoretic semantics lie in the question of what constitutes the meaning of the logical connectives and its response: the rules of inference...     

What is the Philosophy of Information?

Computational and information-theoretic research in philosophy has become increasingly fertile and pervasive, giving rise to a wealth of interesting results. In consequence, a new and vitally important field has emerged, the philosophy of information (PI). This essay is the first attempt to analyse the nature of PI systematically. PI is defined as the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. I argue that PI is a mature discipline for three reasons: it represents an autonomous field of research; it provides an innovative approach to both traditional and new philosophical topics; and it can stand beside other branches of philosophy, offering a systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of the world of information and the information society.     

Attentional dysfunction, social perception, and social competence: what is the nature of the relationship?

The aim of this study was to examine the nature of the relationship between attentional dysfunction and social competence deficits in patients with schizophrenia. Attentional functioning, social perception, and social competence were assessed in 56 inpatients. Measures of vigilance and span of apprehension were administered to assess attentional functioning. Social perception was assessed with an audiovisual measure of affect recognition. Social competence was rated from a role-play task. Span of apprehension and auditory vigilance emerged as specific predictors of social competence. Affect recognition was tested as a mediator and a moderator of the relationship between attentional dysfunction and social competence. Affect recognition was found to moderate the relationship between span of apprehension and social competence.     

What is the nature of the mind's pattern-recognition process?

If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind's pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible.     

What, if anything, is the medial temporal lobe, and how can the amygdala be part of it if there is no such thing?

Should the medial temporal lobe (MTL) of primates--which includes allocortical structures such as the hippocampus, neocortical structures such as the parahippocampal cortex, and nuclear structures such as the basolateral amygdala--be considered a single "thing"? According to the prevailing view, here termed the reification theory, the answer is yes. According to this theory, the MTL functions as an amalgamated entity that provides the neuronal mechanisms for declarative memory; the greater the damage to the MTL or any of its components, the greater the deleterious effects on declarative memory. A countervailing view, here called the balkanization theory, holds that the various components of the MTL process and store different kinds of information. According to this theory, damage to each part of the MTL causes a unique set of behavioral deficits-some involving memory, others involving perception, and yet others involving response selection. The empirical neuropsychological evidence favors the balkanization theory, as do some new concepts in theoretical neuroanatomy.     

What Kind of Normativity is the Normativity of Grammar?

The overall goal of this article is to show that aesthetics plays a major role in a debate at the very center of philosophy. Drawing on the work of David Bell, the article spells out how Kant and Wittgenstein use reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as a key in their respective solutions to the rule‐following problem they share. The more specific goal is to offer a Kantian account of semantic normativity as understood by Wittgenstein. The article argues that Wittgenstein's reason for describing language as a collection of language games is to allow for a perspective that shows those games as internally purposive without any extralinguistic purpose. This perspective also allows for that union of the general rule and its particular application in practice that the original paradox of rule‐following is wanting.     

What is improved if a mental rotation task is repeated – the efficiency of memory access, or the speed of a transformation routine?

The present study contrasts 3 theories which provide explanations for performance improvement in mental rotation tasks. Wallace and Hofelich conjectured that the process as such may be executed more rapidly after training, while Bethell-Fox and Shepard attributed practice effects to the fact that images may be transformed first elementwise, but later as a Gestalt. In contrast, Tarr and Pinker assumed that a transformation of an image will no longer be computed after training but simply be retrieved from memory. Thirty-seven subjects participated in 3 test sessions in which they had to decide on the parity of 3-D block figures presented from different perspectives. Experimental group subjects underwent 4 additional practice sessions in which a subset of the figures and a subset of perspective views were used. Tests adapted to the predictions of the 3 theories revealed specific learning effects but no transfer, neither to old objects presented in new perspectives nor to new objects. This supports an instance-based explanation of practice effects which states that objects are represented in multiple perspective views. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted: 6 August 1997     

What is the Thematic Structure of Science?

The paper justifies the concept of “thematic structure” or “order of knowledge” over the traditional “classification of sciences” due to the uncertainty of many classification criteria. The thematic structure of science has, of course, various levels and various dimensions. Arguments against any forms of separating the humanities from sciences in the traditional sense of the term are presented and discussed. Equally unacceptable are attempts at sharp separation of technical disciplines and humanities. The thematic structure of humanities is not created by some material aspects but rather through the interest — or problem-oriented aspects. In addition to the natural sciences and the humanities there exists an important sphere of sciences on artefacts or, using the term by H. Simon, the sciences of the artificial. For the contemporary research activities is typical what could be denoted as “interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary complex.” The paper traces a set of epistemological criteria for the justification of the relative independence of a scientific discipline. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How is the arrival of things possible?

Ancient Chinese thought inquired primarily into how the achievement of things is possible rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It held that man should participate in the achieving or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. A thing is understood as an event. Because all things and man are united as one, it is possible for man to enter into things by tasting and feeling rather than by relying on the sense of sight. This may provide a possible new means of rescuing things from the numericalization and phenomenalization that sweep over the world today. Translated by Liu Liangjian from Renwen Zazhi 人文杂志 (The Journal of Humanities), 2007, (2): 14–21