Preschool children's use of novel predicates to make inductive inferences about people

Preschool children's use of novel predicates to make inferences about people was examined in three studies. In a procedure adapted from Gelman and Markman [Cognition 23 (1986) 183.], participants (ages 3 years 5 months–4 years 11 months) saw line drawings of three different faces. In Study 1 (N=16), the drawings were described as depicting children, and participants were asked to predict whether one of the children would share properties with a child who has the same novel predicate (e.g., “is zav,” which is never defined for participants) but is dissimilar in appearance, or with a child who has a different novel predicate but is similar in appearance. Participants tended to use the novel predicates rather than superficial resemblance to guide their inferences about people. In Study 2 (N=16), in which the line drawings were described as depicting dolls rather than children, participants showed no such emphasis on the novel predicate information. Study 3 (N=38) replicated the results of the first two studies. The results suggest that children have a general assumption that unfamiliar words hold rich inductive potential when applied to people but not when applied to dolls.     

Stroop interference and negative priming: Problems with inferences from null results

The Stroop color-naming effect has often been taken as evidence for the automaticity of word processing (MacLeod, 1991). Recently, Besner, Stolz, and Boutilier (1997) reported that coloring a single letter instead of the whole word eliminated the Stroop effect. From this finding, they concluded that word processing could not be purely automatic, since it can be prevented. We asked whether the elimination of the Stroop effect is sufficient evidence for concluding that the word is not processed. Combining Besner et al.’s manipulation with a negative-priming procedure, we found intact negative priming from the prime color word in the absence of a Stroop effect. This result clearly indicates that the meaning of the prime word was processed. The findings highlight the importance of using converging methods to evaluate lack of processing.     

Self-ratings of positive and negative affect and retrieval of positive and negative affect memories

Abstract

Based on analysis of self-ratings of mood, positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) have been proposed as basic, orthogonal mood dimensions (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The present study asked subjects (N = 61) to not only provide self-ratings of PA and NA terms but also to retrieve personal memories associated with those terms. Self-rated PA was associated with latency to retrieve PA- but not NA-related memories; self-rated NA was associated with latency to retrieve NA- but not PA-related memories. Self-ratings of PA and NA were not significantly correlated, nor were retrieval latencies for PA and NA memories. Individual item correlations also revealed a strong direct relationship between self-ratings and retrieval latency. The dissociations involving a non-self report measure strengthen the distinction between PA and NA, and the individual item correlations are interpreted as showing that self-ratings of affect are based upon the ease of retrieval of personal memories.     

Recovering from negative events by boosting implicit positive affect

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation.     

Recovering from negative events by boosting implicit positive affect

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazen, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation.     

The eyes have it: making positive expressions more positive and negative expressions more negative

Facial expressions frequently involve multiple individual facial actions. How do facial actions combine to create emotionally meaningful expressions? Infants produce positive and negative facial expressions at a range of intensities. It may be that a given facial action can index the intensity of both positive (smiles) and negative (cry-face) expressions. Objective, automated measurements of facial action intensity were paired with continuous ratings of emotional valence to investigate this possibility. Degree of eye constriction (the Duchenne marker) and mouth opening were each uniquely associated with smile intensity and, independently, with cry-face intensity. In addition, degree of eye constriction and mouth opening were each unique predictors of emotion valence ratings. Eye constriction and mouth opening index the intensity of both positive and negative infant facial expressions, suggesting parsimony in the early communication of emotion.     

Varieties of positive and negative priming

Numerous recent investigations have focused on a particular relation between the roles a stimulus plays in successive displays: when a stimulus ignored by a subject on one occasion is to be attended on a succeeding occasion, reaction time to that stimulus is slowed relative to a control condition. But this is but one possible case ofnegative priming. There are other ways in which negative priming might occur, and there are several varieties of positive priming as well. All these possibilities were explored in the present experiment.     

Binocular detection of positive and negative flashes

Binocular forced-choice detection rates were measured under conditions where both eyes received positive flashes, both eyes received negative flashes, and one eye received a positive flash while the other received a negative flash. When both eyes received the same kind of flash, both positive or both negative, detection rates were,greater than probability summation. When one eye received a positive flash while the other received a negative flash, detection rates were near a level expected on the basis of probability summation. It is concluded that, at the level of forced-choice detection. positive and negative flashes are detected as though they were separate, independent events.     

Recognition of positive and negative bandpass-filtered images

A study is reported in which the significance for vision of low- and high-spatial-frequency components of photographic positive and negative images was investigated by measuring recognition of bandpass-filtered photographs of faces. The results show that a 1.5 octave bandpass-filtered image contains sufficient visual information for good recognition performance, provided the filter is centred close to 20 cycles facewidth-1. At low spatial frequencies negatives are more difficult to recognize than positives, but at high spatial frequencies there is no difference in recognition, implying that it is the low-frequency components of negatives which present difficulties for the visual system.     

Timelessness as a positive and negative experience

We create a sense of time, our understanding of time and subjective time in our minds by experiencing memories, images and chains of events in life as consecutive sequences. We also create timelessness within ourselves. If a person powerfully experiences the present moment, linking this feeling of integration to the self the feeling of timelessness and illusion of eternity is reinforced, making both the past and the future seem less significant than the present moment. A negative experience of timelessness is linked both to the fear that life will end as well as to the fear of disintegration, shattering, the loss of the self and corporeality. By contrast, a positive experience of timelessness enriches and integrates the personality, linking experiences together in a highly personal and authentic way with a great feeling of freedom which is not tied to a specific point in time. The author argues that a creative experience is always based on an inner, timeless dialogue, even when it is manifested in the transference of psychoanalysis. Through his attitude, an analyst can influence both the analysand's creativity and his experience of timelessness by reinforcing the role of the analysand's true self in his experiences of the self as a whole. Further, a mystical experience could be an act of sublimation taking place during psychoanalytic transference, while communing with nature, or while being creative. Deeply experiencing something truly representing a personal truth as a timeless experience, in a mystical experience or a dream, is probably linked to the ability to fully experience a moment in and of itself, without external stimuli, and with the ability to objectify the self. During such moments, a person can look into himself truly and openly, without any other immediate aspirations.     

The processing of positive and negative information

An affirmative statement which is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is known to be true, provide the same information, i.e. that something is not the case. Similarly, an affirmative statement which is known to be true and the complementary negative statement which is known to be false, both imply that something is the case. (If P is false, not-P is true and if P is true, not-P is false.) Hence there are four kinds of statement (“conditions”): true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negativee and false negatives, but only two kinds of information: positive and negative.

This experiment investigates the times taken to process information presented in these ways. The task was to select two alternative words which would make affirmative or negative conjunctive statements agree or conflict with given situations. The four conditions were presented six times in different serial orders, so that each occurred once in every block of four trials. The mean response times were: true affirmatives 8-99 sec, false affirmatives 11 19 sec., true negatives 12-58 sec, false negatives 15-17 sec. This order was the same at each of the six presentations of the conditions, the differences being significant at the 0 001 level in each case. There was a pronounced decline in errors (without knowledge of results) for three of the conditions. These results are discussed in relation to (i) the assumption of a positive set, established through a long learning process; (ii) the inferential nature of negative information in relation to experience; and (iii) the possible emotional effects of negative terms.     

Strength in positive and negative political attitudes

The aim of the study was to examine whether positive-negative asymmetry can be found in the strength of political attitudes. Two hundred and eleven subjects participated in the study. Attitudes toward political parties were examined by means of a questionnaire with three strength measures. As was expected, attitude intensity, centrality and behaviour were found to be linked together in positive attitudes but not in negative attitudes.     

Memories of positive and negative emotional events

Women's memories of emotional events differing by both valence and intensity were examined for differences in narrative content and structure, as well as subjective memory ratings. Emotional valence was related to the content of the women's narratives, and emotional intensity was related to the subjective ratings of the memories. Negative narratives contained more negative emotion, cognitive processing words, and passive sentences than positive narratives, and positive narratives contained more positive emotion words and were more complex than negative narratives. Intensely negative narratives were the longest and the least complex, and intensely positive narratives were the most coherent. Women rated both intensely negative and intensely positive events, in general, as more frequently talked/thought about, significant, unique, emotional, and vivid than moderately emotional events, and negative events were rated as more emotional than positive narratives. There was little relation between the objective content of the narratives and the women's subjective ratings of their memory experiences. Finally, researcher‐defined traumatic events did not differ from other intensely negative events. The results of this study have important implications for narrative research in general, methodological issues such as the validity of text analysis programs and subjective memory ratings, and the quality of traumatic memories. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neural decoding of positive and negative self-knowledge

A prevalent explanation for the self-reference effect is that self-knowledge is represented by a set of specific brain regions, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), superior temporal gyrus (STG), precuneus, and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), which enables self-knowledge to be processed in priority than other-knowledge. However, the conventional univariate activation analysis adopted by previous studies could only detect the activation of separate brain regions. The current study mainly investigated the global neural patterns of self-knowledge (relative to other-knowledge) by the multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA). Results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 were highly consistent, indicating that the core self-network (mainly the ACC) and salience network (mainly the insula) could distinguish self-knowledge from other-knowledge. Furthermore, the neural pattern of positive self-knowledge mainly included the ventral part of ACC, while the neural pattern of negative self-knowledge mainly included the ventral and dorsal parts of ACC and cognitive control network (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC). These findings suggest that the core self-network and salience network are specific to the neural process of self-knowledge. Moreover, both positive and negative self-knowledge are separately driven by different cognitive and neural characteristics.