When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5- and 6-year-old children's reasoning about beliefs and belief reports

Five- and 6-year-olds (N=51) heard stories in which a character sorted items into two locations. Either the character had a false belief about one of the items (e.g., thought a tin contained biscuits, not Lego), or was only partially informed of an item's dual identity (e.g., did not know that a tie was a present). Children found it easier to reject a report of the character's belief that described the true state of affairs when the character had a false belief (e.g., Is Fred's uncle thinking "where shall I put this Lego?"), than to reject one in which an object known to the character was described using a term of which she was ignorant (e.g., Is Mum thinking "where shall I put this present?"). Similarly, children found it easier to predict the character's incorrect sorting of the target items for false belief (with food not toys) than for dual identity (in the wardrobe not with things to take on a visit). Correct reasoning about beliefs and reports of beliefs that misrepresent an object does not imply mastery of the fact that beliefs represent an object in a particular way.     

Prevarication: Reasoning from false assumptions

This paper examines the strategies t~sed in solving prevaricative reasoning problems. The task consisted of a noncontradictory set of propositions followed by an assumption that introduced an inconsistency. Ss were required to restore consistency by assigning truth values to propositions. When reasoning from false assumptions, Ss exhibit a specific strategy in assigning truth values: If forced to choose between the truth of a generality (e.g., All As are Bs) and that of a particular fact (e.g., This Y is a Z), the Ss assign the generality TRUE and the fact FALSE. Affirmative generalities are assigned TRUE more often than are negative ones, and those expressing class inclusion are assigned TRUE more often than those expressing property assignment. The data show that the selection of a “path” through this hypothetical reasoning problem cannot be attributed to either the syntactic form or the preexperimental credibility of the propositions. A generality coding model was discussed in terms of strategies sho~ in prevaricative reasoning problems as well as in other inference tasks.     

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God,the Holy Spirit,and Jesus

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural—such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity—the Holy Spirit and Jesus—but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.     

If the real world were irrelevant, so to speak: The role of propositional truth-value in counterfactual sentence comprehension

Propositional truth-value can be a defining feature of a sentence's relevance to the unfolding discourse, and establishing propositional truth-value in context can be key to successful interpretation. In the current study, we investigate its role in the comprehension of counterfactual conditionals, which describe imaginary consequences of hypothetical events, and are thought to require keeping in mind both what is true and what is false. Pre-stored real-world knowledge may therefore intrude upon and delay counterfactual comprehension, which is predicted by some accounts of discourse comprehension, and has been observed during online comprehension. The impact of propositional truth-value may thus be delayed in counterfactual conditionals, as also claimed for sentences containing other types of logical operators (e.g., negation, scalar quantifiers). In an event-related potential (ERP) experiment, we investigated the impact of propositional truth-value when described consequences are both true and predictable given the counterfactual premise. False words elicited larger N400 ERPs than true words, in negated counterfactual sentences (e.g., "If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon would have been Russia/America") and real-world sentences (e.g., "Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon was America/Russia") alike. These indistinguishable N400 effects of propositional truth-value, elicited by opposite word pairs, argue against disruptions by real-world knowledge during counterfactual comprehension, and suggest that incoming words are mapped onto the counterfactual context without any delay. Thus, provided a sufficiently constraining context, propositional truth-value rapidly impacts ongoing semantic processing, be the proposition factual or counterfactual.     

Children's attention to beliefs in interactive persuasion tasks

Whether and when children can apply their developing understanding of belief to persuasion was examined using interactive puppet tasks. Children selected 1 of 2 arguments to persuade a puppet to do something (e.g., pet a dog) after hearing the puppet's belief (e.g., "I think puppies bite"). Across 2 studies, 132 children (ages 3-7 years) engaged in these persuasion tasks and in false-belief reasoning tasks, presented in puppet and story formats. Belief-relevant argument selection increased with age, as did appropriate reasoning about false beliefs, and occurred more in puppet than story tasks. Results suggest that improvements in belief reasoning in early childhood may be reflected in social interactions such as persuasion.     

Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality?

When children acknowledge false belief they are handling a counterfactual situation. In three experiments 3-and 4-year-old children were given false belief tasks and physical state tasks which required similar handling of counterfactual situations but which did not require understanding about beliefs or representations: Children were asked to report what the state of the world might be now had an earlier event not occurred. The incidence of realist errors in the false belief and physical state tasks was significantly correlated independently of shared correlations with chronological age and receptive verbal ability. In a fourth experiment, children made significantly fewer realist errors when asked to infer a future hypothetical state. These results provide preliminary evidence consistent with the suggestion that pre-school children's difficulty with false belief is symptomatic of a more general difficulty entertaining counterfactual situations.     

Perceptual simulation in property verification

If people represent concepts with perceptual simulations, two predictions follow in the property verification task (e.g., Isface a property of GORILLA?). First, perceptual variables such as property size should predict the performance of neutral subjects, because these variables determine the ease of processing properties in perceptual simulations (i.e., perceptual effort). Second, uninstructed neutral subjects should spontaneously construct simulations to verify properties and therefore perform similarly to imagery subjects asked explicitly to use images (i.e., instructional equivalence). As predicted, neutral subjects exhibited both perceptual effort and instructional equivalence, consistent with the assumption that they construct perceptual simulations spontaneously to verify properties. Notably, however, this pattern occurred only when highly associated false properties prevented the use of a word association strategy. In other conditions that used unassociated false properties, the associative strength between concept and property words became a diagnostic cue for true versus false responses, so that associative strength became a better predictor of verification than simulation. This pattern indicates that conceptual tasks engender mixtures of simulation and word association, and that researchers must deter word association strategies when the goal is to assess conceptual knowledge.     

Counterfactual Evaluation of Outcomes in Social Risk Decision-Making Situations: The Cognitive Developmental Paradox Revisited

We report a study that examined the existence of a cognitive developmental paradox in the counterfactual evaluation of decision-making outcomes. According to this paradox adolescents and young adults could be able to apply counterfactual reasoning and, yet, their counterfactual evaluation of outcomes could be biased in a salient socio-emotional context. To this aim, we analyzed the impact of health and social feedback on the counterfactual evaluation of outcomes in a laboratory decision-making task involving short narratives with the presence of peers. Forty risky (e.g., taking or refusing a drug), forty neutral decisions (e.g., eating a hamburger or a hotdog), and emotions felt following positive or negative outcomes were examined in 256 early, mid- and late adolescents, and young adults, evenly distributed. Results showed that emotional ratings to negative outcomes (regret and disappointment) but not to positive outcomes (relief and elation) were attenuated when feedback was provided. Evidence of development of cognitive decision-making capacities did also exist, as the capacity to perform faster emotional ratings and to differentially allocate more resources to the elaboration of emotional ratings when no feedback information was available increased with age. Overall, we interpret these findings as challenging the traditional cognitive developmental assumption that development necessarily proceeds from lesser to greater capacities, reflecting the impact of socio-emotional processes that could bias the counterfactual evaluation of social decision-making outcomes.     

Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: the curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals

These studies looked at the difficulty that reasoners have in accepting conditional ("If P then Q") major premises that are not necessarily true empirically, as a basis for deductive reasoning. Preliminary results have shown that when reasoners are asked to produce possible alternate antecedents to the major premise ("If A then Q"), they paradoxically tend to deny the modus ponens (MP) inference ("If P is true, then Q is true"). Three studies further explored these results. The first study gave university students paper-and-pencil tests in which instructions to "suppose that the major premise is true" was followed by a request to determine the next number in a sequence, to retrieve information unrelated to the premises, or to retrieve a possible case of "If A then Q." Relative to a control group, reasoners asked to produce an alternative antecedent showed a significant tendency to deny the MP inference, whereas no such tendency was observed for the two other tasks used. A second study compared performance on a condition in which reasoners were asked to produce an alternative antecedent with that when they were given an explicit alternative. Premises used in this study were such that the latter alternative antecedent was also spontaneously produced by over 70% of reasoners. Results showed that the tendency to refuse the MP premise could not be accounted for by the specific nature of the alternative produced. A third study found that the tendency to refuse the MP inference after producing an alternative antecedent was affected by the number of "disabling conditions" (i.e., conditions that allow "P to be true" and "Q to be false") available for the major premise. These results are interpreted as being consistent with a model that supposes that logical reasoning requires selective inhibition of real-world knowledge.     

Associations among false belief understanding,counterfactual reasoning,and executive function

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3‐, 4‐, and 5‐year‐olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed.     

COUNTERFACTUALS WITH TRUE COMPONENTS

One criticism of David Lewis's account of counterfactuals is that it sometimes assigns the wrong truth-value to a counterfactual when both antecedent and consequent happen to be true. Lewis has suggested a possible remedy to this situation, but commentators have found this to be unsatisfactory. I suggest an alternative solution which involves a modification of Lewis's truth conditions, but which confines itself to the resources already present in his account. This modification involves the device of embedding one counterfactual within another. On the revised set of truth conditions, counterfactuals with true components are sometimes true and sometimes false, in a way that is more in keeping with our intuitive judgments about such statements.     

Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

The comprehension and validation of social information

The information one acquires in daily life concerns specific people and events about which one has prior knowledge. A theory of social cognition is proposed to account for the comprehension and verification of such information. The theory views comprehension as a process of constructing situation models of new information on the basis of previously formed models about its referents. The theory specifies the conditions in which statements about familiar people and events (e.g., "Jane Fonda does aerobics") are spontaneously recognized as true or false in the process of comprehending them. It further specifies the conditions in which these spontaneous validity judgments of a statement will influence perceptions of its implications when the statement is made in a social context. The comprehension of both single statements and multiple pieces of information in combination is considered.     

The effect of generic statements on children's causal attributions: questions of mechanism

Generic statements, or generics, express generalizations about entire kinds (e.g., "Girls are good at a game called 'tooki'"). In contrast, nongeneric statements express facts about specific (sets of) individuals (e.g., "Jane is good at tooki"). Aside from simply conveying information, generics and nongenerics also instill different causal perspectives on the facts expressed, implying that these facts stem from deep, inherent causes (e.g., talent) or from external, mechanistic causes (e.g., instruction), respectively. In the present research (with samples of 4- to 7-year-olds and undergraduates, N = 220), we proposed that children's causal attributions for the facts learned through these statements are determined not by the generic/nongeneric format of the statements themselves but rather by the generic/nongeneric format of the beliefs relevant to these statements. This proposal led to two specific predictions. First, the influence of the generic belief induced by a novel generic statement should be detected in any subsequent context that falls under its scope--even in circumstances that involve particular individuals. Confirming this prediction, participants often attributed a fact conveyed in a nongeneric statement (e.g., a particular girl's tooki ability) to deep, inherent causes if they had previously formed a relevant generic belief (e.g., by hearing that girls are good at tooki). Second, we predicted that nongeneric statements such as "Most girls are good at tooki" should also promote attributions to deep causes because they often ultimately give rise to generic beliefs, as suggested by recent evidence. This prediction was confirmed as well. These results clarify and expand our knowledge of the influence of language on children's understanding of the world.     

Source confusion influences the effectiveness of the autobiographical IAT

We examined the claim that the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) can detect concealed memories. Subjects read action statements (e.g., “break the toothpick”) and either performed the action or completed math problems. They then imagined some of these actions and some new actions. Two weeks later, the subjects completed a memory test and then an aIAT in which they categorized true and false statements (e.g., “I am in front of the computer”) and whether they had or had not performed actions from Session 1. For half of the subjects, the nonperformed statements were actions that they saw but did not perform; for the remaining subjects, these statements were actions that they saw and imagined but did not perform. Our results showed that the aIAT can distinguish between true autobiographical events (performed actions) and false events (nonperformed actions), but that it is less effective, the more that subjects remember performing actions that they did not really perform. Thus, the diagnosticity of the aIAT may be limited.     

Beyond Rape Myths: A More Complex View of Perceptions of Rape Victims

This research examined personal beliefs and perceptions of cultural stereotypes surrounding rape victims. Students (ages 18–21) at a primarily Caucasian University listed either their personal beliefs or their perceptions of cultural stereotypes surrounding rape victims and rated a specific rape victim either according to their personal beliefs or their perceptions of cultural stereotypes. Personal beliefs about rape victims tended to focus more on perceptions of victim reactions to the rape (e.g., depression, anxiety, etc.) rather than on rape myths (e.g., she asked for it, was promiscuous, etc.). Perceptions of cultural stereotypes, however, comprised rape myths rather than the victim's reactions to rape. We propose that perceptions of rape victims are more multifaceted than has previously been suggested.     

Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications

Generic statements (e.g., "Birds lay eggs") express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as "Lorches have purple feathers" as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics' meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse.     

"What else could he have done?" Creating false answers in child witnesses by inviting speculation.

In 2 experiments (N = 111 children), a suggestive technique for interviewing child witnesses called "inviting speculation" was examined. Children were presented with atypical actions for common objects in a clown show. One week later, the children were asked to speculate (e.g., "What else could he have done with the knife?") in a between-subjects design on all or none of the items (Experiment 1) and in a within-subjects design on part of the items (Experiment 2), thereby getting highly probable speculations (e.g., "to cut"). After a 3-week delay, the experimenters found more highly probable but not more other false answers for the experimental items (Experiment 2). After a 5-6-month delay, the rate of (unspecified) false answers increased compared with the baseline (Experiments 1 and 2). The short-term effect is explained by a speculation-as-misinformation assumption, whereas the long-term effect is explained by the use of a metastrategy.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.