Edmund Husserl in Talcott Parsons: Analytical Realism and Phenomenology

This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons’s analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, The Structure of Social Action, Parsons positively referred to Husserl’s Logical Investigations. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established.     

Tackling Three Of Frege's Problems: Edmund Husserl on Sets and Manifolds

Edmund Husserl was one of the very first to experience the directimpact of challenging problems in set theory and his phenomenology first began to takeshape while he was struggling to solve such problems. Here I study three difficultiesassociated with Frege's use of sets that Husserl explicitly addressed: reference to non-existent, impossible, imaginary objects; the introduction of extensions; and ``Russell's' paradox.I do so within the context of Husserl's struggle to overcome the shortcomings of set theory andto develop his own theory of manifolds. I define certain issues involved and discuss howHusserl's theory of manifolds might confront them. In so doing I hope to help bring Husserl'stheories about sets and manifolds out of the realm of abstract theorizing and promptfurther exploration of uncharted philosophical territory rich in philosophical implications.     

Empathy,Insight and Objectivity: Edith Stein & Bernard Lonergan

ABSTRACT

Edith Stein’s study of empathy has much to offer to the current growth of research into empathy. This article first summarizes her phenomenological account of the complex layers involved in empathy. It then identifies certain gaps in her analyses, and proposes that what Bernard Lonergan called “insight” fills the missing gaps. Conversely, it argues that Lonergan’s account of human subjectivity would be enriched by Stein’s insights about empathy. It concludes by explaining how supplementing Stein’s account with analyses of insights provides an answer to the question of how empathy can be objective knowledge.