Judgments of salary bias and test bias from statistical evidence

Academics examined correlation scatter plots and made judgments of group bias. Half of the subjects judged bias in salaries from graphs that showed salaries plotted against merit with a separate correlation ellipse for each of two groups. The others judged test bias from graphs that showed job performance vs test scores. Relative positions of the centroids for the two groups and the within-group correlation were systematically varied. Judgments of bias were not consistent with either “forward” or “reverse” regression definitions of bias. Judged bias is not a monotonic function of the group difference in salary between persons of equal merit nor is it a monotonic function of the group difference in merit between persons of equal salary. Instead, judgments in both tasks were consistent with a difference of differences model; for example, when the group difference in standard deviation units is equal on both salary and merit, judges say the situation is unbiased. The results are consistent with a one-mediator model of group equity, which assumes that both measures are imperfectly and equally correlated with the mediator.     

Belief bias and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning

Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. Figural bias is the tendency to be influenced by the order in which the information is presented in the premises when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. When studied simultaneously they enable an investigation of whether participants' reasoning on the syllogistic reasoning task is guided by the conclusion (backward reasoning) or the premises (forward reasoning). Experiments 1 and 2 found evidence of belief bias but not figural bias on the syllogistic evaluation task paradigm. Experiments 3 and 4 found evidence of figural bias but not belief bias on the syllogistic production task paradigm. The findings highlight that different task characteristics influence performance dependent upon the nature of task presentation. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.     

Anticipated outgroup evaluations and intergroup bias

A study is reported that tests the hypothesis that group members exhibit intergroup bias in response to the belief that outsiders will discriminate against them. To this end, two experimental conditions are included in which subjects anticipate either biased evaluations or fair evaluations respectively. In a control condition, subjects do not expect to be evaluated from an external source. Results indicated, as expected, that those who anticipated biased evaluations from an outgroup exhibited bias themselves, while those who anticipated fair evaluations exhibited outgroup favouritism. The fact that control subjects exhibited the same degree of bias as those who anticipated biased evaluations from the outgroup poses some difficulties for the hypothesized connection between anticipated discrimination and intergoup bias. Thus, it appears that intergroup bias is the rule and not the exception in an intergroup context. Nevertheless, it is clear that anticipated evaluations of outgroup members can effect intergroup bias.     

Negative affect and hindsight bias

The relationship between hindsight bias and individual differences in negative affect, or ‘dysphoria’, was investigated in a naturalistic study. In a first session, 76 undergraduates predicted their grades prior to a midterm exam. In a second session, after having received feedback from the exam, they attempted to recall their predictions and predicted their grades on a second exam. Dysphoria was associated with hindsight bias whether initial predictions were overly optimistic or pessimistic. In the former case, the standard hindsight bias was modal for the sample, whereas a ‘reverse hindsight’ bias was modal in the latter. This asymmetry suggests that hindsight bias is influenced by motivational or affective factors. The bias did not hinder the improvement of predictions between the first and second exams, and therefore could not have mediated a hypothesized adaptive learning impairment among dysphoric subjects.     

Expectancy bias mediates the link between social anxiety and memory bias for social evaluation

Social anxiety (SA) involves a multitude of cognitive symptoms related to fear of evaluation, including expectancy and memory biases. We examined whether memory biases are influenced by expectancy biases for social feedback in SA. We hypothesised that, faced with a socially evaluative event, people with higher SA would show a negative expectancy bias for future feedback. Furthermore, we predicted that memory bias for feedback in SA would be mediated by expectancy bias. Ninety-four undergraduate students (55 women, mean age = 19.76 years) underwent a two-visit task that measured expectations about (Visit 1) and memory of (Visit 2) feedback from unknown peers. Results showed that higher levels of SA were associated with negative expectancy bias. An indirect relationship was found between SA and memory bias that was mediated by expectancy bias. The results suggest that expectancy biases are in the causal path from SA to negative memory biases for social evaluation.     

Equity,Intergroup bias and Interpersonal bias in Reward allocation

Decisions to allocate rewards to ingroup and outgroup members are under the dual pressures of equity and intergroup bias. This study examined variations in equity and bias resulting from the incongruity and salience of intergroup status. Incongruity arose from a mismatch between high subjective and low accorded status. Congruity occurred when subjective status and accorded status were both high or both low. By pairing school classes with known subjective and accorded statuses, an incongruous and a congruous status setting were derived naturally. The setting was made either salient or nonsalient experimentally. It was hypothesized that bias would progressively increase, and equity would progressively decrease, with incongruity and salience. Each set of hypotheses was partially supported. Further data analysis showed a robust tendency to under-reward both ingroup and outgroup members. This interpersonal negativity bras was shown by incongruous status allocators either when rewarding superior performance or in the salient condition. Apparently, it served to safeguard personal rather than social identity. The implications for equity and social identity theories were discussed.     

Psychophysics of remembering: to bias or not to bias

Delayed matching to sample is typically a two-alternative forced-choice procedure with two sample stimuli. In this task the effects of varying the probability of reinforcers for correct choices and the resulting receiver operating characteristic are symmetrical. A version of the task where a sample is present on some trials and absent on others is analogous to a yes/no recognition task. We describe data from two experiments where an asymmetry in performance in the yes/no task could be attributed to a change in response bias with increasing retention-interval duration from a matching-law perspective, but not from a signal-detection perspective. Both approaches make explicit assumptions about response bias. The apparent inconsistency between the two approaches to the treatment of response bias is resolved in terms of a model proposed by K. G. White and J. T. Wixted (1999) which predicts asymmetrical matching-law functions and receiver operating characteristics without making any assumptions about response bias.     

敌意解释偏向与攻击的关系

敌意解释偏向是一种认知加工偏向, 指个体将模棱两可信息以敌意的方式进行解释的倾向, 它会对个体的攻击行为产生影响。攻击也会影响个体的敌意解释偏向:作为一种人格特质, 高攻击性使个体更容易产生敌意解释偏向; 作为一种行为反应, 攻击对敌意解释偏向具有发展和强化作用。敌意解释偏向和攻击之间可能存在循环关系。两者关系会受到性别、年龄以及人格特点等因素影响。未来研究需要改进敌意解释偏向与攻击的测量工具, 使测量更为直接、客观; 拓展两者不同亚类之间的交互研究, 以全面系统地了解两者之间的关系; 深入探究情绪在敌意解释偏向与攻击行为关系中的作用; 整合信息加工过程, 探究它们的交互作用对攻击行为的影响等。     

Implicit racial bias and epistemic pessimism

Implicit bias results from living in a society structured by race. Tamar Gendler has drawn attention to several epistemic costs of implicit bias and concludes that paying some costs is unavoidable. In this paper, we reconstruct Gendler’s argument and argue that the epistemic costs she highlights can be avoided. Though epistemic agents encode discriminatory information from the environment, not all encoded information is activated. Agents can construct local epistemic environments that do not activate biasing representations, effectively avoiding the consequences of activation. We conclude that changing our local environments provides a way to avoid paying implicit bias’s epistemic costs.     

The intentionality bias and schizotypy

The “intentionality bias” refers to our automatic tendency to judge other people's actions to be intentional. In this experiment we extended research on this effect in two key ways. First, we developed a novel nonlinguistic task for assessing the intentionality bias. This task used video stimuli of ambiguous movements. Second, we investigated the relationship between the strength of this bias and schizotypy (schizophrenia-like symptoms in healthy individuals). Our results showed that the intentionality bias was replicated for the video stimuli and also that this bias is stronger in those individuals scoring higher on the schizotypy rating scales. Overall these findings lend further support for the existence of the intentionality bias. We also discuss the possible relevance of these findings for our understanding of certain symptoms of schizophrenic illness.     

Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment

Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

Perceptual-attentional and motor-intentional bias in near and far space

Spatial bias demonstrated in tasks such as line-bisection may stem from perceptual-attentional (PA) "where" and motor-intentional (MI) "aiming" influences. We tested normal participants' line bisection performance in the presence of an asymmetric visual distracter with a video apparatus designed to dissociate PA from MI bias. An experimenter stood as a distractor to the left or right of a video monitor positioned in either near or far space, where participants viewed lines and a laser point they directed under (1) natural and (2) mirror-reversed conditions. Each trial started with the pointer positioned at either the top left or top right corner of the screen, and alternated thereafter. Data analysis indicated that participants made primarily PA leftward errors in near space, but not in far space. Furthermore, PA, but not MI, bias increased bilaterally in the direction of distraction. In contrast, MI, but not PA, bias was shifted bilaterally in the direction of startside. Results support the conclusion that a primarily PA left sided bias in near space is consistent with right hemisphere spatial attentional dominance. A bottom-up visual distractor specifically affected PA "where" spatial bias while top-down motor cuing influenced MI "aiming" bias.     

Criterion bias and search sequence bias in word recognition

Six experiments that were designed to test the adequacy of criterion bias explanations of the word frequency effect and the semantic priming effect are reported. It was found that criterion bias models correctly predicted higher error rates in a lexical decision task for nonwords that were misspelled versions of high-frequency words (e.g., MOHTER), rather than low-frequency words (e.g., BOHTER). Also correct was the prediction of increased error rates for misspelled words preceded by a semantically related word (e.g., NURSE-DOTCOR). However, in a misspelling decision task (in which the subject must decide whether the stimulus is a word, a misspelled word, or a nonword), it can be argued that criterion bias should be inoperative, since correct responses must be delayed until all orthographic information has been checked; this should eliminate both frequency and semantic priming effects. This was found not to be the case; clear frequency and priming effects were obtained for both words and misspelled words.     

情绪预测偏差的成因及干预

情绪预测偏差是一种对未来事件发生时情绪反应的预测和实际体验之间的分离现象。梳理该领域最近10年(2009~2019年)研究文献可知, 热点研究主题涉及偏差的现象、成因和干预, 相应呈现为三点主要发现: 情绪预测偏差十分普遍, 情绪预测偏差成因多源, 情绪预测偏差可以干预。未来研究应着力关注情绪预测偏差的发生模式和心理机制, 着力揭示具体偏差的神经心理机制, 并从进化和文化视角综合考察偏差的发生机制。     

Trained interpretive bias and anxiety

The relationship between anxiety and interpretive bias has been studied extensively, but the causal direction of this relationship remains largely unexplored. Do negative interpretations cause anxiety or is anxiety the cause of negative interpretations? Or are the two mutually reinforcing? The present study addressed this issue by experimentally inducing either a negative or a positive interpretive bias using Mathews and Mackintosh' [(2002). Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 604-615] training paradigm and then examining its impact on state anxiety and anxiety vulnerability. In addition, it was investigated as to whether the interpretive bias was trained implicitly. Results indicated that style of interpreting could be manipulated. That is, when confronted with ambiguous information after the training, participants (n=118) interpreted this information congruent with their (positive or negative) training condition. Data on the issue of implicitness showed that participants tended to be explicitly aware of the valence of their training stimuli. Effects of trained interpretive bias on anxiety were only marginal and absent on anxiety vulnerability. It appears that interpretive bias can be trained reliably, but its effects on mood and vulnerability require further explanation.     

Handedness and cognitive bias

2165 Subjects, ranging from nine-year-old schoolchildren to adult students, took Test AH 2/3 which yields subscores on Verbal, Numerical and Perceptual reasoning. The left-handers are compared with the right-handers, differences being found with respect to cognitive bias, sex, age and nationality.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.     

Examining the potential for gender bias in the prediction of symptom validity test failure by MMPI-2 symptom validity scale scores

Using a sample of individuals undergoing medico-legal evaluations (690 men, 519 women), the present study extended past research on potential gender biases for scores of the Symptom Validity (FBS) scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 by examining score- and item-level differences between men and women and determining the extent to which FBS scores were able to correctly identify men and women who were divided into credible responders (n = 837) and noncredible responders (n = 372) on the basis of performance on symptom validity tests. Results indicated that women had slightly higher raw FBS scores than men (d = .29), and significant differences between men and women in item endorsement were demonstrated for 14 FBS items. Step-down hierarchical logistic regression procedures indicated predictive bias (χ2Δ = 23.72, p < .001). Follow-up analyses indicated intercept bias (χ2Δ = 23.51, p < .001) but not slope bias (χ2Δ = 0.22, p = .64). However, using the test publisher's recommended FBS cutoff scores (Ben-Porath, Graham, & Tellegen, 2009), classification accuracies were similar for women and men (T > 80, h = -.02; T > 100, h = -.22, respectively). On the basis of these results, we conclude there is no evidence of clinically meaningful bias in predictions of symptom validity test failure made using FBS scores for men and women. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Genuine memory bias versus response bias in anxiety

Low and high trait anxiety undergraduates were presented with physical‐threat, ego‐threat, positive, and neutral words. Following an orienting task promoting lexical—but not semantic—processing, unexpected free recall or recognition tests were presented. High anxiety participants showed increased correct recall of both types of threat‐related words, but also increased incorrect recall (intrusions) and incorrect recognition (false alarms) of these words. Furthermore, participants high in anxiety had reduced sensitivity (d′) for ego‐threat words, and reduced cautiousness (β) for physical‐threat words. This tendency to report threat‐related information regardless of prior presentation suggests that there is a response bias rather than a memory bias in anxiety. In addition, this bias is likely to be mediated by depression insofar as physical‐threat information is concerned, although the bias can be attributed to trait anxiety insofar as ego‐threat information is concerned.     

Hindsight bias around the world

Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1996). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome ("hypothetical design"), Choi and Nisbett (2000) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome ("memory design"), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000), Heine and Lehman (1996), and our own study.