Religious fundamentalism and primitive projective processes

In her book on the origins, nature and contemporary global significance of religious fundamentalism, Karen Armstrong cites the example of an early twentieth-century, ultra-Orthodox Jewish spirituality1 ¹Such a spirituality may be characterized as ‘fundamentalist’ inasmuch as it appeals to the inerrancy of sacred texts to legitimize conceptions of the purity of the ‘Holy Land’ as exclusively a place for prayer and the study of Scripture and not as a site for the erection of a nation state. For a brief account of the history of ultra-Orthodox, anti-Zionist spirituality from 1900 to the present, see Armstrong 2000 Armstrong K 2000 The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (London: Harper Collins)  [Google Scholar], pp.?201–217. vehemently opposed to the creation of the state of Israel. Armstrong suggests that

This rejectionist vision is utterly incomprehensible to Jews who regard the Zionist achievement as wondrous and salvific. This is the dilemma that Jews, Christians and Muslims have all had to face in the twentieth century: between the fundamentalists and those who adopt a more positive attitude to the modern world there is an impassable gulf. Rational arguments are of no avail, because the divergence springs from a deeper and more instinctual level of the mind (Armstrong 2000 Armstrong K 2000 The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (London: Harper Collins)  [Google Scholar], pp.?204–205 [my highlighting]).

This paper will try and show that Melanie Klein's depiction of primitive mental processes serves to elucidate both the nature of this ‘impassable gulf’ and the ‘deeper’ levels of psychic functioning from which it originates. By shedding a specifically Kleinian psychoanalytic and object relations light on what appears to both warrant and inform the discourse on fundamentalism, it hopes to show how individual and group formation, and the interaction between them, are profoundly influenced by unconscious processes. Such processes are shown to be characterized by mechanisms of defence against anxieties – mechanisms induced by changes that threaten existing social relationships (Jaques 1955 The Guardian (2001) (London and Manchester) 13 October  [Google Scholar], p.?479).     

Exclusion,intergroup hostility,and religious fundamentalism

The goal of the present study was to examine whether exclusion leads to increased intergroup hostility and stronger fundamentalist religious beliefs. Using Cyberball, we examined how adolescents from different ethnic groups in the Netherlands (of Moroccan, Turkish, and Dutch descent with either Muslim, Christian, or secular beliefs) responded to being included or excluded by ethnic in- and outgroup members. We expected that exclusion by ethnic outgroup members would represent a categorization threat and would result in greater hostility. We hypothesized that exclusion by ethnic ingroup members would represent an acceptance threat and would result in responses that reduce uncertainty and increase one's chances of being accepted by others (e.g., a stronger endorsement of fundamentalist religious beliefs). The results revealed that among all ethnic groups, exclusion by ethnic outgroup members led to more hostility toward the co-players and the co-players' ethnic group than exclusion by ethnic ingroup members. This was mediated by the extent to which people attributed their exclusion to the racist attitudes of their co-players. Among Muslims and Christians, exclusion by ethnic ingroup members led to more support for fundamentalist beliefs. We discuss the theoretical extension that these results provide, and practical issues raised regarding the consequences that may occur through the marginalization of religious and ethnic groups.     

Right-wing authoritarianism,fundamentalism and prejudice revisited: Removing suppression and statistical artefact

This paper challenges a finding reported by several researchers, that fundamentalism could be associated with a reduction in racial prejudice after controlling for authoritarianism (RWA). We argue that the presence of fundamentalism in the construct definition of the conventionalism cluster of RWA leads to higher associations between fundamentalism and conventionalism than with other aspects of RWA. This creates a statistical artefact that distorts the results of multiple regression analyses that include both fundamentalism and RWA as independent variables. To test this hypothesis, 299 participants completed measures of prejudice as well as fundamentalism and the three RWA clusters (conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and submission). In regression analyses using fundamentalism and the combined RWA scale we replicate previous findings that when RWA is controlled, higher fundamentalism leads to lower prejudice. After removing the overlapping method variance in the scales, this pattern is eliminated and the commonly observed positive relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice is found. We describe the statistical artefact, its antecedents, and its theoretical implications, and outline how investigations in this important area should proceed.     

Religious revivalism in nineteenth-century Norway and twentieth-century Egypt: A critique of fundamentalism studies

The aim of this article is to challenge the idea that the current Islamist movements could fruitfully be considered to belong to a global category of fundamentalism. For this purpose it is necessary to criticize the most sophisticated attempts that have been made to argue for the existence of such a general phenomenon, with Islamism as one of its most prominent constituent parts.     

The mettle of moral fundamentalism: a reply to Robert Baker

This article is a reply to Robert Baker's attempt to rebut moral fundamentalism, while grounding international bioethics in a form of contractarianism. Baker is mistaken in several of his interpretations of the alleged moral fundamentalism and findings of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. He also misunderstands moral fundamentalism generally and wrongly categorizes it as morally bankrupt. His negotiated contract model is, in the final analysis, itself a form of the moral fundamentalism he declares bankrupt.     

Burden of the Third Rome: The threat of Russian orthodox fundamentalism and Muslim eurasia

For contemporary Muslim public opinion, anxious to comprehend the revival of Orthodoxy and nostalgia for starina (old times), the growing radical Orthodox fundamentalism seems to indicate the return of anti‐Islamic Pan‐Slavism. The Neo‐Soviet National Liberals and National Communists are both opposed to the self‐determination of Muslims in Tatarstan, Boshkirstan, Chechnya, Crimea and Daghestan. They are also hostile to the Islamic revival ( al‐sahwa al‐islamiyya) in Central Asian Turkestan and Tajikistan. Their misconception of Islam is shaped by the long tradition of Russian messianism which is rejuvenated after every cyclical decline of Russian political authority. The success of Russian messianic nationalism lies neither in its selective historiosophy nor in its dialectic politics, but in the charismatic reasoning of the old geopolitical threats to the existence of Russians, demonized as the Islamic reconquest of Idel‐Ural (Musulmanskiye dvizheny na Volgu) initiated by the restoration of Pan‐Turkic Islamistan and the Muslim Commonwealth in Central Asia. Like other Russian philosophies of the past, modern Russian nationalism draws on a host of European thinkers and their ideas, but its context is governed by the fundamental notion of ‘Holy Mother Russia’ (Sviataya Matushka Rassieya) and its Byzantine paradigm of ‘the True Holy Church of Constantinople’. Influenced by the militant anti‐Islamic and anti‐Western traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, modem All‐Russian nationalism has become a new and dangerous chimera of economically and politically frustrated Russians. Revitalized Russian Orthodox fundamentalism is a real threat to the newly emancipated Islamic East, because the fall of Communist atheist tyranny did not eliminate the old threat of Russian Orthodox hegemony in the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasian independent republics. Invasion, occupation and military interventions in the Chechen Republic of Itchek‐eria, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan, as well as the prospect of armed rebellions by the Russian separatist minorities in Kazakhstan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Crimea and Tatarstan, explicitly demonstrate the nature of All‐Russian hegemonism at the end of the post‐postmodernist age. The geopolitical and cultural continuity of the Tsarist‐Soviet empire, regardless of the political and economic regime in Moscow, still determines Russian Islamophobia and animates an obsession with ‘national security’ among the rulers of the Kremlin, who attempt to improve Russia's strategic status by a re‐annexation of the so‐called ‘near abroad’ ( blizhnee zarubezhye) countries into the Russian‐dominated confederation of Independent States.     

On perceived conflicts between religion and science: the role of fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism

Volunteers from fundamentalist churches and a Psychology of Religion class (N = 77) completed Altemeyer and Hunsberger's 1992 Fundamentalism Scale, Altemeyer's 1988 Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale, and answered questions about science, religion, and their relationship. Scores on the scales were highly positively correlated. Neither orientation correlated with seeing science as improving life, and both correlated with being troubled by newer developments in science such as organ transplants or genetic engineering. Partial correlations showed that both orientations favored religious beliefs over scientific data when there was a perceived conflict. Three subscales of right-wing authoritarianism clarified how authoritarianism correlated with other measures, thereby supporting a multidimensional conceptualization of right-wing authoritarianism.     

Revelation in history and claims to finality: Assumptions underlying fundamentalism in Christianity and Islam

The self‐awareness of both Christianity and Islam is determined by the conviction of each that it is the definitive, irreplaceable and unsurpassable representation of legitimate religion, based on God's definitive word to mankind — in Jesus Christ and the Qur'an respectively. In theological, philosophical, and colloquial language this is widely named as the claim to absoluteness (or even exclusiveness), but these terms are misleading. According to the specific understanding of revelation in the two religions, we would do better to speak of their competing claims to finality and universality. In taking this approach, we discover that both undergo analogous historical disappointments, theoretical irritations, communication difficulties, and identity problems, which both try to overcome in community life as well as in theological reflection. At present the Christian churches and Islam are obviously affected by special forms of fundamentalism resulting from their basic claims.     

A theory of international bioethics: multiculturalism, postmodernism, and the bankruptcy of fundamentalism

The first of two articles analyzing the justifiability of international bioethical codes and of cross-cultural moral judgments reviews "moral fundamentalism," the theory that cross-cultural moral judgments and international bioethical codes are justified by certain "basic" or "fundamental" moral priniciples that are universally accepted in all cultures and eras. Initially propounded by the judges at the 1947 Nuremberg Tribunal, moral fundamentalism has become the received justification of international bioethics, and of cross-temporal and cross-cultural moral judgments. Yet today we are said to live in a multicultural and postmodern world. This article assesses the challenges that multiculturalism and postmodernism pose to fundamentalism and concludes that these challenges render the position philosophically untenable, thereby undermining the received conception of the foundations of international bioethics. The second article, which follows, offers an alternative model -- a model of negotiated moral order -- as a viable justification for international bioethics and for transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments.     

Contemporary Christian analytic philosophy of religion: Biblical fundamentalism,terrible solutions to a horrible problem,and hearing God

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Change in religious beliefs, parental pressure, and attitudes of college students toward higher education as related to religious fundamentalism

Men (n = 55) and women (n = 99) college students (M age = 22.3 yr., SD = 6.1, range 18 to 58 years), from a moderate-sized midwestern university reported attitudes toward the goals and purposes of higher education, perceptions of parental pressure and support, and change in religious beliefs. The Religious Fundamentalist Scale, the Quest Scale, Faith-keeping, and Obedience to Parents Scales were also administered. Students classified as religious fundamentalists had more negative attitudes toward the goals and purposes of higher education goals and toward faculty. An interaction of Sex x Fundamentalist Classification indicated that nonfundamentalist college men reported greater change in their religious beliefs, relative to other groups. Perceptions of parental pressure or support were unrelated to scores on fundamentalism. The implications of students' religious backgrounds in relation to academic success were discussed.     

软实力·巧实力·多学科协作

关于医学的整合,我没有多少专门的研究,我想还是从我们应具备的实力淡谈这方面的问题,我会更有体会和把握.