Investigating the link between liking versus wanting self-esteem and depression in a nationally representative sample of american adults

The self‐esteem movement has been around since the 1970s, and may have influenced how much value people place on self‐esteem. We predicted a negative relationship between age and the amount of value placed on self‐esteem boosts. We also investigated the correlates of liking versus wanting self‐esteem boosts (and other pleasant rewards) on depression. A nationally representative sample of American adults (N = 867) indicated how much they liked and wanted several pleasant rewards (i.e., sex, food, alcohol, money, friendship, self‐esteem boost). They also completed a standardized measure of depressive symptoms. As expected, there was a negative relationship between age and valuing self‐esteem boosts, sex, and alcohol. People with depressive symptoms wanted self‐esteem boosts, even though they did not like them very much. Similar effects were obtained for depressive symptoms and alcohol and friendship. This is the first research to show that self‐esteem boosts are more valued among a nationally representative sample of younger American adults. It also is the first research to explore the association between depression and the motivation to boost self‐esteem. People with depressive symptoms want self‐esteem, and may pursue it, but this pursuit may feel unrewarding because they do not derive pleasure from it.     

Scaling Satan

The influence on social behavior of beliefs in Satan and the nature of evil has received little empirical study. Elaine Pagels (1995) in her book, The Origin of Satan, argued that Christians' intolerance toward others is due to their belief in an active Satan. In this study, more than 200 college undergraduates completed the Manitoba Prejudice Scale and the Attitudes Toward Homosexuals Scale (B. Altemeyer, 1988), as well as the Belief in an Active Satan Scale, developed by the authors. The Belief in an Active Satan Scale demonstrated good internal consistency and temporal stability. Correlational analyses revealed that for the female participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men and intolerance toward ethnic minorities. For the male participants, belief in an active Satan was directly related to intolerance toward lesbians and gay men but was not significantly related to intolerance toward ethnic minorities. Results of this research showed that it is possible to meaningfully measure belief in an active Satan and that such beliefs may encourage intolerance toward others.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Intentional (Nation‐)States: A Group‐Agency Problem for the State’s Right to Exclude

Most philosophical defences of the state’s right to exclude immigrants derive their strength from the normative importance of self‐determination. If nation‐states are taken to be the political institutions of a people, then the state’s right to exclude is the people’s right to exclude – and a denial of this right constitutes an abridgement of self‐determination. In this article, I argue that this view of self‐determination does not cohere with a group‐agency view of nation‐states. On the group‐agency view that I defend, a nation‐state is the kind of group‐agent that does not supervene on the intentionality of member/citizens. If we think that a nation‐state is an intentional group‐agent in its own right, then we should think that self‐determination resides with the institutions of the state rather than with the citizens. If nation‐states do not supervene on the intentionality of citizens, then it is unclear why citizens might have the right to control membership in the state as a feature of self‐determination.     

The functions of music and their relationship to music preference in India and Germany

Is the use of music in everyday life a culturally universal phenomenon? And do the functions served by music contribute to the development of music preferences regardless of the listener's cultural background? The present study explored similarities and dissimilarities in the functions of music listening and their relationship to music preferences in two countries with different cultural backgrounds: India as an example of a collectivistic society and Germany as an example of an individualistic society. Respondents were asked to what degree their favorite music serves several functions in their life. The functions were summarized in seven main groups: background entertainment, prompt for memories, diversion, emotion regulation, self‐regulation, self‐reflection, and social bonding. Results indicate a strong similarity of the functions of people's favorite music for Indian and German listeners. Among the Indians, all of the seven functions were rated as meaningful; among the Germans, this was the case for all functions except emotion regulation. However, a pronounced dissimilarity was found in the predictive power of the functions of music for the strength of music preference, which was much stronger for Germans than for Indians. In India, the functions of music most predictive for music preference were diversion, self‐reflection, and social bonding. In Germany, the most predictive functions were emotion regulation, diversion, self‐reflection, prompt for memories, and social bonding. It is concluded that potential cultural differences hardly apply to the functional use of music in everyday life, but they do so with respect to the impact of the functions on the development of music preference. The present results are consistent with the assumption that members of a collectivistic society tend to set a higher value on their social and societal integration and their connectedness to each other than do members of individualistic societies.     

Optimism and realism: A review of self‐efficacy from a cross‐cultural perspective

T his review critically examines much of the research investigating self‐efficacy beliefs through cross‐cultural comparisons. Two sets of cross‐cultural comparison groups are examined: Asian (or immigrant Asian) versus Western, and Eastern European versus Western European and American groups. After an introduction to self‐efficacy theory, some cross‐cultural aspects of self and self‐beliefs are discussed, and the cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism are introduced. Analysis of the articles focuses on differences in levels of efficacy beliefs, calibration of beliefs with performance, methodological problems, and implications for practice. Almost all of the 20 studies reviewed found efficacy beliefs to be lower for non‐Western cultural groups, but in some cases these lower beliefs were more predictive of subsequent functioning. There is some evidence that the mean efficacy beliefs of a cultural group are modified through immigration or political changes. For some non‐Western groups, collective efficacy appears to operate in much the same way as self‐efficacy operates for Western groups. Realistic—as opposed to optimistic—efficacy beliefs do not necessarily predict poor performance for all cultural groups, as has been suggested by self‐efficacy theory. Only a minority of the studies included measurement of cultural dimensions such as individualism and collectivism, although most of the studies based conclusions on assumed cultural differences. In some cases, self‐efficacy was poorly defined and bore little resemblance to theoretically derived definitions. Conclusions from this research have implications especially for applied settings in education and business: Efficacy beliefs and performance appear to be enhanced when training approaches are congruent with the individual's sense of self. Lower levels of self‐efficacy beliefs found in some collectivist groups do not always signify lower subsequent performance, but are instead reflective of differing construals of self.     

The effect of self‐identity alongside perceived importance within the theory of planned behaviour

Self‐identity often predicts behavioural intentions after standard theory of planned behaviour (TPB) components are accounted for. However, it has been claimed this is due to conceptual similarity between self‐identity and perceived importance of the behaviour. We examined this claim within the context of recycling food waste. Participants (N = 113) completed questionnaires assessing intentions, attitude, perceived behavioural control, perceived norms, perceived importance, self‐identity, and past behaviour. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that self‐identity and perceived importance were distinct constructs. Further, after accounting for TPB components and perceived importance, self‐identity explained a significant amount of additional variance in intentions. The present findings therefore do not support this particular argument against the predictive utility of self‐identity.     

When Interrogative Self‐talk Improves Task Performance: The Role of Answers to Self‐posed Questions

Nearly all the self‐talk cues studied so far have been self‐statements. However, the findings of Senay, Albarracin, and Noguchi suggest that interrogative self‐talk produces better task performance than declarative one. Two of the experiments reported here were meant to replicate that study, but the expected differences were not confirmed. Experiment 3 showed that if a self‐posed question about future behavior was answered positively, task performance was better than in groups exposed either to the self‐statement ‘I will do it’ or to a negative answer following the question. However, these differences occurred only in those who self‐reported the awareness of the impact of self‐talk on their thought processes. This effect and the possible reasons why between‐group differences were not found in Experiments 1 and 2 are discussed. An alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 3 is also proposed beside that stressing the impact of internal answer. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An exploration of spiritual superiority: The paradox of self‐enhancement

Spiritual training is assumed to reduce self‐enhancement, but may have the paradoxical effect of boosting superiority feelings. It can thus operate like other self‐enhancement tools and contribute to a contingent self‐worth that depends on one's spiritual accomplishments. In three studies (N = 533, N = 2,223, N = 965), a brief measure of spiritual superiority showed good internal consistency and discriminant validity. As predicted, it was distinctly related to spiritual contingency of self‐worth, illustrating that the self‐enhancement function of spirituality is similar to other contingency domains. It was correlated with self‐esteem and, more strongly, with communal narcissism, corroborating the notion of spiritual narcissism. Spiritual Superiority scores were consistently higher among energetically trained participants than mindfulness trainees and were associated with supernatural overconfidence and self‐ascribed spiritual guidance. Our results illustrate that the self‐enhancement motive is powerful and deeply ingrained so that it can hijack methods intended to transcend the ego and, instead, adopt them to its own service.     

Self‐help strategies to reduce emotional distress: What do people do and why? A qualitative study

Background: Some people with psychological distress do not seek professional help but opt instead for self‐help strategies to reduce their symptoms. Little is known about these strategies. Aim: To investigate which self‐help approaches might be employed to reduce the effects of emotional distress, and the reasons for these choices. Method: Semi‐structured interviews with 11 clerical employees generated data analysed using grounded theory. Findings: Managing distress is a complex and multi‐dimensional process unique to each individual. The use of self‐help options is determined by the interconnection between the person's core beliefs, their social networks, and ideas about coping. Such beliefs may hinder help‐seeking. People tend to engage in activities that are familiar to them already, rather than attempt new ones. The purpose of self‐help strategies is to distract the person from their problems and to contribute to physical and mental well‐being. Implications for practice are discussed.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

Assessing Community Participation: Comparing Self‐Reported Participation Data with Organizational Attendance Records

How well do self‐reported levels of community and organizational participation align with recorded acts of community and organizational participation? This study explores this question among participants in social action community organizing initiatives by comparing responses on a community participation scale designed to retrospectively assess community participation (T1, n = 482; T2, n = 220) with individual participants' attendance records in various social action organizing activities over two 1‐year periods. By testing the self‐reported measure's overall and item‐by‐item association with documented participation in various types of organizing activities, we find that the self‐report measure is positively, but weakly correlated with actual participation levels in community organizing activities. Moreover, associations between self‐report and recorded acts of participation differ by types of activity. Examining this unique source of data raises important questions about how community participation is conceptualized and measured in our field. Implications are explored for theory and measurement of participation in community and organizational contexts.     

Self‐regulation as relating to one's ideal possible self

People dream of countless ideal possible selves they hope to become, but they have a difficult time actualizing them. In the present work, we review and integrate prior research regarding possible selves, self‐regulation, and interpersonal relationships. We draw on multiple perspectives to define ideal possible selves and clarify their structure. We suggest that framing self‐regulation of an ideal possible self as relating to one's ideal possible self affords an explanation that ideal possible selves can (but sometimes do not) motivate current self‐regulation. We discuss two ways ideal possible selves motivate current self‐regulatory behavior: through increased vividness of the ideal possible self and through commitment to the ideal possible self. These routes pave the way for future research designed to help people increase their efforts toward becoming their ideal possible selves.     

The Proteus Effect: The Effect of Transformed Self‐Representation on Behavior

Virtual environments, such as online games and web‐based chat rooms, increasingly allow us to alter our digital self‐representations dramatically and easily. But as we change our self‐representations, do our self‐representations change our behavior in turn? In 2 experimental studies, we explore the hypothesis that an individual’s behavior conforms to their digital self‐representation independent of how others perceive them—a process we term the Proteus Effect. In the first study, participants assigned to more attractive avatars in immersive virtual environments were more intimate with confederates in a self‐disclosure and interpersonal distance task than participants assigned to less attractive avatars. In our second study, participants assigned taller avatars behaved more confidently in a negotiation task than participants assigned shorter avatars. We discuss the implications of the Proteus Effect with regards to social interactions in online environments.     

Refining the Prediction of Effort: Brehm's Distinction between Potential Motivation and Motivation Intensity

It is self‐evident that resource allocation is better understood when a distinction is made between what people are willing to do to achieve a purpose and what they will do to achieve the purpose. Yet, motivation theorists have largely ignored this distinction in attempting to understand effort aspects of motivated behavior. An exception is Brehm, who has distinguished potential motivation from motivation intensity. Potential motivation refers to the upper limit of what people would be willing to do to satisfy a motive. It is proposed to vary with factors traditionally thought to determine motive strength (importance). Motivation intensity refers to effort and is proposed to vary proximally with the difficulty of instrumental behavior, first rising and then falling precipitously. In this article, I discuss Brehm's distinction and elaborate on its significance.     

Mental health professionals' support of self‐help groups

Objective. Self‐help groups and other consumer‐led services are viewed as valuable additions to mental health services. This study describes professional support for self‐help groups and examines the hypothesis that professional support of self‐help is influenced by the degree to which professionally‐led groups are viewed as more helpful than self‐help groups. Method. Survey data were obtained from a representative sample of over 900 mental health professionals employed in mental health agencies in a large US State. The survey assessed beliefs, behaviours, attitudes, and intentions toward professional and self‐help groups. Results. Respondents who perceive professionally‐led groups to be significantly more helpful than self‐help groups were less inclined to support self‐help groups through referrals, help in organizing groups, or financially. Conclusion. To the extent that professional support of the self‐help movement is diminished, valuable allies in the struggle to expand the reach of mental health services are lost. It is proposed that mental health professionals should obtain additional information about the benefits of self‐help and the constructive role that self‐help groups can play in expanding the availability and continuum of beneficial mental health services. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority1

Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true attributions of such failures. While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears ioadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude‐types can differ as follows: the self‐knowledge required for an utterance to be a Oing that p is different from the self‐knowledge required for it to be a Ψfing that p.     

Development and Initial Validation of an Implicit Measure of Religiousness‐Spirituality

An implicit measure of religiousness‐spirituality (RS) was constructed and used in two studies. In Study 1, undergraduates completed a Religiousness‐Spirituality Implicit Association Test (RS‐IAT) and several self‐report measures of RS and related constructs (e.g., religious fundamentalism, authoritarianism). Informants rated the participants’ RS. The RS‐IAT was internally consistent. Implicit RS correlated positively with self‐reported RS, spiritual transcendence, spiritual experiences, religious fundamentalism, and intrinsic religiousness. Informant ratings correlated positively with participants’ self‐reported religiousness but not implicit RS. In Study 2, implicit RS accounted for unique variability in self‐reported attitudes toward gay men and lesbian women when controlling for self‐reported religiousness and right‐wing authoritarianism. These findings demonstrate that an implicit measure of trait RS explains some variability in attitudes that self‐report measures do not. An implicit measure of RS could advance the scientific study of religion beyond what is known from self‐report measures.