“唯识无境”初探

不论是科学、哲学或是宗教,都要对心与物、主体与客体、思维与存在的关系作出回答,关于我们头脑中的印象同现实世界究竟有怎样的关系问题,宗教家也许比科学家和哲学家对这个问题更加饶有兴味。境,唯识学上是指识所认识的对象,但它又与我们日常经验所感知的不同。在日常感觉中,认识对象是独立于认识主体之外的存在,具有客观实在性。然而,在唯识论者看来,认识对象不是指客观存在物,没有独立性和实在性,不能规定为自在之物。世间一切现象的存在,都不过是我人心识所显现的影相而已,这是因为心识具有识变功能,能变现一切境（对象）…     

“以庄济佛”与“以易济佛”——章太炎与熊十力两种“新唯识学”比较初论

章太炎与熊十力都通过改铸佛学唯识学而构建起"新唯识论"哲学体系,分别以庄学和易学对佛学注入相异的内涵。章太炎以庄学对唯识学进行世间法的还原,熊十力则以易学对唯识学进行哲学改造。章太炎承认一切存在皆自心现影,承认唯识学对主体之消解,却否认唯识学对出世间的追求,转识则成智,顺识则成俗,真妄一元,俗真同体,一切障碍即究竟觉,将佛学的出世涅槃改造为庄学式的在世逍遥。熊十力否认唯识学之唯识无境、体用相分学说,承认体用不二、性相一如,重建传统儒家主体论哲学,重建世间真实性。章太炎与熊十力都用内圣外王来表达自己的政治哲学:章太炎按照唯识学和庄学对主体的消解性原则,以依他起自性而否定国家-政府之实在性,从而凸显公民个体性,构建起一个突显个体正义之齐物世界;熊十力则以儒学"人与天地万物一体之仁"改造唯识学,以儒家的恕道、推恩等原则构建起一个突显社会正义之大同社会。     

“五蕴皆空”的研究(下)——佛学的人生观

5.识最后阐释“识”。佛学认为人人都具有八识,每一识又各具见、相二分。见分,是能认识的作用,相分,是所认识的对象。见相二分,是互相依存的,一有俱有,一无俱无。因而识是见相的统一,亦即主客观的统一。八识分四组:一、前五识,约当感性认识。二、第六识,约当理性认识。在认识中,有主观自我,客观世界。三、第七识,即自我形成的根荄。四、第八识,即生活中存在的巨大潜力。兹一一阐释如下:前五识中眼唯缘(攀附义)色,耳唯缘声,鼻唯缘香,舌唯缘味,身唯缘触。在眼、耳、鼻、舌、身——前五识缘于色、声、香、味、触——前五境时,第六意识皆能与之俱起,缘于五境,因而名之五俱意识。能把色、声、香、味、触的零散影像,综合而成为“物”的概念。再层层加以分析整理,最后能接触事物的本质及其活动的规律性。因而前五识是感性认     

唯识与唯了别——“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释

一、问题的缘起对瑜伽行派的唯识学而言 ,“唯识”概念具有首要的意义。对“唯识”概念的不同诠释 ,导致了唯识思想的复杂发展。汉传玄奘唯识学派对“唯识”概念作了“单面化”诠释。其中“识”与眼识等八识的“识”同 ,即梵文的vijnana ;“唯识”相应即vijnana -matra(或vij nana -matrata,简为～ta)。而其“唯识”概念有两方面基本含义 ,一是遮诠义 ,即无离识的 (外 )境 ;二是表诠义 ,又分三 :( 1 )限定识唯有八 ,即眼识、耳识、鼻识、舌识、身识、意识、末那识、阿赖耶识 ;( 2 )识有四分 ,即相分、见分、自证分、证自证分 ;( 3)有不离识…     

窥基法师的五重唯识观

窥基法师是唯识宗的实际创始人，五重唯识观是窥基对唯识学说的重要贡献。唯识宗为了确立宇宙万法都是“唯识所变”的宗旨，提出了观想“唯识”之理的遣虚存实识、舍滥留纯识、摄末归本识、隐劣显胜识、遣相证性识等五个层次或五种观点。唯识五重观之第一观是总观，其余则是别观。     

唯识心法之认识结构论

本文从现代心理学角度考察了唯识学之心法八识所建构的认识结构。     

“想”在生活中的特殊作用——《精神的试析》之三

佛学名词中有“想蕴”、“想心所”。佛教学者多认为想即观念。我在《精神的试析》一文(见本刊1981年第三期)中亦说“想,约当观念”。这实际是不符合原义的。《成唯识论》卷三:“想,谓于境取像为性,施设种种名言为业。”境,外境。佛学认为眼意二识,在接触外境(境为第八识相分,对前六识说,名之为外)时,不能直接认识外境;皆是由与二识相应的想心所,分别以境为质,摄取影像,作为二识认识的内容。“境”是本质相分,疏所缘缘;“像”是影像相分,亲所缘缘。这与我们的生活常识,形成了尖锐的对立,因为生活常识认为识是能直接认识外境的,根本不承认“于境取像”的理论。笔者是学佛学的,想根据佛学的原理发表一些不够成熟的见解。     

论开悟 第六讲 唯识学的开悟(中)

上次讲过,《百法明门论》是唯识学的入门之书。对佛学来讲,也具有极强的概括性。因此,对于学佛者来说,应当先读一下《百法明门论》,这对于以后的学经研教颇有裨益。“百法唯识”是讲一切离不开“识”,而并非象一些唯心学派的直截了当地指一切法就是“心”,就是“识”。百法共分五位。心法,眼等八识都是识之自体;心所与心王同时缘境,且恒与心王相应,为心王起助伴作用,共同构成一个完整的认识,它的全名是“心所有法”;色法是心、心所法的认识对象,它是心、心所所变的影象;心不相应行法是一种假有之法,虽非实有,但绝非不有,它是不离识而存在的心色分位;无为法是识之实性。离开了识,并没有一个独立存在的无为法。总之,“五位百法”从理     

从能所关系看唯识义的本质规定性--兼论唯识学理论体系之建构

何为唯识?唯识者是“只有识”和“不离识”的统一。从存在意义上讲,唯识就是只有识。从认识意义上讲,唯识就是不离识。据《显扬圣教论》云:“阿赖耶识是有情世间生起根本,能生诸根,根所依处,及转识等故,亦是器世间生起根本,能生器世间故,又即此识亦是一切有情互相生起根本,一切     

无为依唯识学在印度的发展

一、无为依唯识学在印度的发展简述无为依唯识学[1]是在瑜伽行派根本唯识学发展时期由弥勒、世亲的著述(如《究竟一乘宝性论》、《辩中边论》、《大乘庄严经论》、《佛性论》等)提出的,与《瑜伽师地论》、《摄大乘论》、《唯识三十颂》等提出的有为依唯识学构成瑜伽行派唯识学的两支。“无为依唯识”作为一个概念描述范型,可以看成是用“无为依”对“唯识”的一个限定。“无为依”意为,无为法心性真如是一切法(万有)之根本所依,这主要从本体论意义上而言。“唯识”则指一切法的唯心(识)性,以及一切法以心为因而缘起,主要从识境论以及缘起论(…     

On the theory of relations based on the theory of objects

Summary The theory of relations presented in this article consists of the general and the special theory of relations. The formulae of the former are meaningful and its laws valid for relations of any type. The meaningfulness of expressions and the validity of laws of the latter are restricted to relations of a certain special type. The special theory of relations is distinguished from the applied theory of relations. The applied theory of relations is the general theory applied to relations of a special type, the difference between the general and the applied being in the form of the variables. The special theory of relations and the applied theory, when concerned with relations of the same special type, may differ with respect to the form of constants without differing with respect to variables.     

On the sampling theory roundations of item response theory models

Item response theory (IT) models are now in common use for the analysis of dichotomous item responses. This paper examines the sampling theory foundations for statistical inference in these models. The discussion includes: some history on the stochastic subject versus the random sampling interpretations of the probability in IRT models; the relationship between three versions of maximum likelihood estimation for IRT models; estimating versus estimating -predictors; IRT models and loglinear models; the identifiability of IRT models; and the role of robustness and Bayesian statistics from the sampling theory perspective.A presidential address can serve many different functions. This one is a report of investigations I started at least ten years ago to understand what IRT was all about. It is a decidedly one-sided view, but I hope it stimulates controversy and further research. I have profited from discussions of this material with many people including: Brian Junker, Charles Lewis, Nicholas Longford, Robert Mislevy, Ivo Molenaar, Donald Rock, Donald Rubin, Lynne Steinberg, Martha Stocking, William Stout, Dorothy Thayer, David Thissen, Wim van der Linden, Howard Wainer, and Marilyn Wingersky. Of course, none of them is responsible for any errors or misstatements in this paper. The research was supported in part by the Cognitive Science Program, Office of Naval Research under Contract No. Nooo14-87-K-0730 and by the Program Statistics Research Project of Educational Testing Service.     

Note on the integration of prototype theory and fuzzy-set theory

Many criticisms of prototype theory and/or fuzzy-set theory are based on the assumption that category representativeness (or typicality) is identical with fuzzy membership. These criticisms also assume that conceptual combination and logical rules (all in the Aristotelian sense) are the appropriate criteria for the adequacy of the above “fuzzy typicality”. The present paper discusses these assumptions following the line of their most explicit and most influential expression by Osheron and Smith (1981). Several arguments are made against the above identification, the most important being that representativeness in prototype theory is exclusively based on element-to-element similarity while fuzzy membership is inherently an element-to-category relationship. Also the above criteria for adequacy are criticized from the viewpoint of both prototype theory and fuzzy-set theory as well as from that of both conceptual and logical combination, and also from that of integration.     

Some remarks on the bearing of model theory on the theory of theories

The present paper offers some remarks on the significance of first order model theory for our understanding of theories, and more generally, for our understanding of the “structuralist” accounts of the nature of theoretical knowledge that we associate with Russell, Ramsey and Carnap. What is unique about the presentation is the prominence it assigns to Craig’s Interpolation Lemma, some of its corollaries, and the manner of their demonstration. They form the underlying logical basis of the analysis.     

On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of concepts

Prototype theory construes membership in a concept's extension as graded, determined by similarity to the concept's “best” exemplar (or by some other measure of central tendency). The present paper is concerned with the compatibility of this view of concept membership with two criteria of adequacy for theories of concepts. The first criterion concerns the relationship between complex concepts and their conceptual constituents. The second concerns the truth conditions for thoughts corresponding to simple inclusions.