Does the experience of presence restore self-control?

A wide range of research suggests that the exertion of self-control is a limited resource or constrained by a motivational shift. Less attention, however, has been given to the question how self-control capacity can be restored. This study examined whether this restoration can be achieved by “presence,” the perceptual illusion of non-mediation. We suggest that the adoption of the mediated reference systems creates a “holiday from self” and restores self-control capacity. Depleted participants who saw an immersive video clip performed better in a subsequent self-control task than participants who saw a non-immersive video clip or were in a waiting group. But the concrete mechanism remains open: Self reported presence did not serve as a mediator.     

Does affluence impoverish the experience of parenting?

Acquiring greater financial resources before having children seems like an intuitive strategy for people to enhance their well-being during parenthood. However, research suggests that affluence may activate an agentic orientation, propelling people to pursue personal goals and independence from others, creating a conflict with the communal nature of parenting. Coherence between one's goals and actions has been theorized to be essential for the experience of meaning in life. Thus, we hypothesized that affluence would be associated with a diminished sense of meaning during childcare. In Study 1, using the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM), we found that socioeconomic status (SES) was negatively related to the average sense of meaning parents reported across episodes of the day when they were taking care of their children. In Study 2, a reminder of wealth produced a parallel effect; when parents were exposed to a photograph of money, they reported a lower sense of meaning in life while spending time with their kids at a children's festival. These findings contribute to our understanding of the relationship between wealth and well-being by showing that affluence can compromise a central subjective benefit of parenting—a sense of meaning in life.     

Jealousy: a response to infidelity? On the nature and appropriateness conditions of jealousy

This paper critically assesses the widespread claim that jealousy is a response to infidelity. According to this claim, herewith called the entitlement theory (ET), jealousy is only an appropriate response to a relationship between a loved one and a rival if, by entertaining this relationship, the loved one does not treat the jealous person the way she is entitled to be treated. I reconstruct different versions of ET, each of them providing a different answer to the question why we should assume that jealousy is a response to infidelity. I show that even the most plausible versions enjoy less argumentative support than it seems at first sight. The positive aim of this paper is to present a more inclusive account of jealousy as an alternative to ET. According to this account, jealousy serves to disturb the rival relationship and to (re-)gain the attention and affection of the loved person. Jealousy so understood is not only an appropriate response to infidelity but has wider appropriateness conditions. However, it plays a role in the negotiation of norms concerning exclusivity in personal relationships. The inclusive account does justice to the continuity and commonalities between adult and infant protest against rival relationships.     

Applying evidence to support ethical decisions: Is the placebo really powerless?

Using placebos in day-to-day practice is an ethical problem. This paper summarises the available epidemiological evidence to support this difficult decision. Based on these data we propose to differentiate between placebo and “knowledge framing”. While the use of placebo should be confined to experimental settings in clinical trials, knowledge framing — which is only conceptually different from placebo — is a desired, expected and necessary component of any doctor-patient encounter. Examples from daily practice demonstrate both, the need to investigate the effects of knowledge framing and its impact on ethical, medical, economical and legal decisions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 12–13 April, 2003.     

Aging of attention: Does the ability to divide decline?

Previous research has yielded conflicting results regarding the relationship between adult age and the ability to divide attention between two concurrent tasks. At least some of the inconsistency is probably attributable to methodological variations, such as the manner in which divided-attention ability has been assessed, how single-task performance has been considered, and the degree of control over relative emphasis placed on each task. Two experiments employing procedures sensitive to these concerns were conducted in which a speeded decision task was performed during the retention interval of a letter-memory task. The results of both experiments indicated that there were relatively few age-related influences on dual-task performance vis-à-vis those on single-task performance.     

Intentional action processing across the transition to crawling: Does the experience of self-locomotion impact infants’ understanding of intentional actions?

Motor developmental milestones in infancy, such as the transition to self-locomotion, have cascading implications for infants’ social and cognitive development. The current studies aimed to add to this literature by exploring whether and how crawling experience impacts a key social-cognitive milestone achieved in infancy: the development of intentional action understanding. Study 1 used a cross-sectional, age-held-constant design to examine whether locomotor (n = 36) and prelocomotor (n = 36) infants differ in their ability to process a failed intentional reaching action. Study 2 (n = 124) further probed this question by assessing how variability in locomotor infants’ experience maps onto variability in their failed intentional action understanding. Both studies also assessed infants’ tendency to engage in triadic interactions to shed light on whether self-locomotion impacts intentional action understanding directly or indirectly via changes in infants’ interactions with social partners. Altogether, results showed no evidence for the role of self-locomotion in the development of intentional action understanding. Locomotor and prelocomotor infants did not differ in their failed action understanding or levels of triadic engagement (Study 1) and individual differences in days of crawling experience, propensity to crawl during play, and maximum crawling speed failed to predict infants’ intentional action understanding or triadic engagement (Study 2). Explanations for these null findings and alternative influences on the development of intentional action understanding are considered.     

Does visual experience influence the spatial distribution of auditory attention?

Sighted individuals are less accurate and slower to localize sounds coming from the peripheral space than sounds coming from the frontal space. This specific bias in favour of the frontal auditory space seems reduced in early blind individuals, who are particularly better than sighted individuals at localizing sounds coming from the peripheral space. Currently, it is not clear to what extent this bias in the auditory space is a general phenomenon or if it applies only to spatial processing (i.e. sound localization). In our approach we compared the performance of early blind participants with that of sighted subjects during a frequency discrimination task with sounds originating either from frontal or peripheral locations. Results showed that early blind participants discriminated faster than sighted subjects both peripheral and frontal sounds. In addition, sighted subjects were faster at discriminating frontal sounds than peripheral ones, whereas early blind participants showed equal discrimination speed for frontal and peripheral sounds. We conclude that the spatial bias observed in sighted subjects reflects an unbalance in the spatial distribution of auditory attention resources that is induced by visual experience.     

Will the new code help researchers to be more ethical?

A code of ethics has 2 largely incompatible objectives: to set forth enforceable minimal standards of conduct and to teach about or invoke ethical conduct. The section of the new American Psychological Association code dealing with research ethics achieves the former to some degree. However, it neither provides needed education in the ethics of research nor states where the reader might turn for such information. The code is particularly deficient in the following areas: privacy and confidentiality; institutional review boards; deception; debriefing; data sharing; and research on marginal populations, on children and adolescents, and in organizational contexts. Suggestions are offered for providing a bibliographic resource, in hard copy and on-line, that would stimulate independent interest, scholarship, education, and research on research ethics.     

Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?

In most, if not all, forms of epistocracy, we can expect (at least in the near future) that the more advantaged demographic groups would have higher rates of representation than less advantaged groups. The Demographic Objection to Epistocracy holds that this means epistocracy is unjust. One version of the Demographic Objection holds that the unequal representation is inherently unfair. I show that this argument fails, as proceduralist concern for fairness does not get us to universal equal suffrage at all. A second version holds that by giving some kinds of people more power than others, epistocracy will tend to help the advantaged and harm the already disadvantaged. In contrast, I argue that certain forms of epistocracy escape this objection altogether. For the others, though, this version of the objection relies on questionable empirical assumptions. In the end, neither version of the Demographic Objection succeeds. The Demographic Objection to epistocracy is much weaker than it seems.     

Does the Defining Issues Test measure ethical judgment ability or political position?

This article addresses the construct validity of the Defining Issues Test of ethical judgment (DIT/DIT-2). Alleging a political bias in the test, Emler and colleagues (1983, 1998, 1999, 2007), show that conservatives score higher when asked to fake as liberals, implying that they understand the reasoning associated with "higher" moral development but avoid items they see as liberally biased. DIT proponents challenge the internal validity of faking studies, advocating an explained-variance validation. This study takes a new approach: Adult participants complete the DIT-2, then evaluate the raw responses of others to discern political orientation and ethical development. Results show that individuals scoring higher on the DIT-2 rank others' ethical judgment in a way consistent with DIT-2-based rankings. Accuracy at assessing political orientation, however, is low. Results support the DIT-2's validity as a measure of ethical development, not an expression of political position.     

Intraoperative conversion to open technique: is informed consent implied?

This case raises issues regarding the anesthesia and surgical components of preoperative informed consent and the differing views of anesthesiologists and surgeons with regards to informed consent, in the context of conversion to open surgery from a minimally invasive approach.     

Cross-racial psychotherapy with the borderline patient: Should the patient fire the therapist?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of race on the psychotherapy of a white borderline patient treated by a black therapist. Some authors state that effective cross-racial psychotherapy is unattainable because of a marked divergence in the psychological biases of patients and therapists, while others feel that there is a more rapid unfolding of the transference in cross-racial therapy. While racial homogeneity may be desirable for some therapeutic issues, it is clearly not a prerequisite for effective therapy, nor is it realistic to assume that you've got to be one to treat one.     

Better than ever? Employee reactions to ethical failures in organizations,and the ethical recovery paradox

This research examines organizational attempts to recover internally from ethical failures witnessed by employees. Drawing on research on service failure recovery, relationship repair, and behavioral ethics, we investigate how witnessing unethical acts in an organization impacts employees and their relationship with their organization. In two studies—one in the lab and one in the field—we examine the extent to which it is possible for organizations to recover fully from these ethical lapses. Results reveal an ethical recovery paradox, in which exemplary organizational efforts to recover internally from ethical failure may enhance employee perceptions of the organization to a more positive level than if no ethical failure had occurred.     

Social dominance and ethical ideology: the end justifies the means?

Although many social psychological researchers have tried to identify the antecedents of unethical or immoral behavior, investigators have little considered the content of ethical beliefs that associate with important personality variables such as authoritarianism (B. Altemeyer, 1981, 1996) and social dominance orientation (SDO; J. Sidanius, 1993). Previous studies suggest that authoritarianism is associated with the rejection of relativistic standards for moral actions and--to a lesser extent--the idealistic belief that moral actions should not harm others (J. W. McHoskey, 1996). In the present study, 160 New Zealand University students completed measures of SDO (J. Sidanius), Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, B. Altemeyer, 1981), and two subscales of ethical ideology: Relativism and Idealism (D. R. Forsyth, 1980). As expected, SDO showed a negative relationship with Idealism, a belief that actions should not harm others. But, contrary to expectations, SDO showed no consistent association with relativism, a belief that the moralities of actions are not comparable. On the basis of those findings, people with high SDO might be described as "ruthless" in their pursuit of desirable goals and are indifferent about whether the morality of different actions can be compared or even matter.     

Is consent for research genuinely informed? Using decision aid tools to obtain informed consent in the global south

Gaining informed consent among marginalized groups that include decisionally incapacitated individuals and those outside of the researcher's own geo-social and ethnic background still challenges many researchers. We suggest that there is a need for consideration of a different approach to research ethics in international settings. Based on extensive field work in West Africa on medical knowledge transfers and patient–healer relationships, this paper will discuss the challenges posed in obtaining informed individual consent in international settings. It is argued that while being on the whole convincing, the top-down approach of the proposed solutions, which clearly dominates the participative approach, fails in building sustainable capacity, decision-making competency, and empowerment in the communities in which the research is conducted. Using appropriate decision aids can help resolve these issues.     

‘Am I a Ceadas child?’: exploring the nature and experience of shame in the psychotherapy of an adolescent boy

Although shame is a central affect running through all phases of psychosexual and social development, it is usually masked by guilt and therefore it is not readily recognised, explored, and understood within the therapeutic situation. Moreover, there is a tendency to treat all shame manifestations as if they operate at the same level. The author proposes the need to distinguish between two qualitatively discrete manifestations of shame states which, albeit intertwined, operate at different levels and require different understanding and technique: a primary, unconscious kind based on psychobiological survival and triggered by a condition of psychic and physical danger, and a secondary, social shame, mainly conscious, based heavily on vision and evoked in social situations. The natural, primary form of shame becomes pathological after catastrophic chronic exposure of the primitive ego to unthinkable anxieties. Such premature rupture of primary skin containment may result in omnipotence-based pathological organisations impeding or precluding acceptance of guilt and need for reparation. Pathological primary shame predisposes the individual to states of pathological secondary shame. When initial traumatic conditions are re-activated and re-experienced in therapy, they may trigger re-enactments and, possibly, a negative therapeutic reaction. Recognising variations and mixed states of primary and secondary shame states, especially when shame is compounded with guilt, can provide guidance in the assessment of the fragility of the ego, and therefore inform our technique and the therapeutic process. This theoretical position is discussed with the help of clinical material from a twice-weekly psychotherapy of a 16-year-old boy imbued with shame compounded with guilt, related to transgenerational objectification and dehumanising experiences.     

Process as reality: Kierkegaard’s aesthetic approach to the ethical

This paper makes the point that Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning individuality cannot be understood clearly without placing them in the context of what I am calling ontological isolation. This means the radical deprivation by selfhood of every aspect of reality, to the point where not even the possibility or illusion of reality is available to the self. In this context the self is required to become itself, forming itself in and out of its own absolute nothingness, ontological destitution, or wrongness. With this form of isolation as our investigative key, we unlock what Kierkegaard means by his command to become a self, where becoming itself, in absence of prior possibility, constitutes the reality of self, and why Kierkegaard places crucial emphasis, contrary to the tradition, on the priority of negativity. By having the self originate itself in “absolute difficulty,” or that wherein the act itself, or pure doing without result, is primary, Kierkegaard now replaces metaphysics with ethics in order of priority, and places the self inseparably in a world that responds directly to that act. I show here a parallel between Kierkegaard’s approach to ethical action with that of artistic creation of a kind of world, the work of art. In doing so I reveal the inadequacy of interpretations that would impose traditional forms of isolation, social and cosmic, on Kierkegaard, as some of his critics do, or that would place Kierkegaard’s ethics within traditional developmental models, as many of his sympathizers do.