ONTOTHEOLOGICAL TURNINGS? MARION,LACOSTE AND LEVINAS ON THE DECENTRING OF MODERN SUBJECTIVITY

In this article, Schrijvers examines the decentering of the modern subject at issue in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Luc Marion, and Jean‐Yves Lacoste from the perspective of ontotheology. Schrijvers contends that in both Marion's and Lacoste's phenomenology an unexpected return to the subject‐object distinction occurs, and asks whether a simple reversal of the subject‐object distinction suffices to break out of the ontotheological scheme. In a second move, Levinas’ account of a “relation without relation” is developed as a solution to the problem perceived in the works of Marion and Lacoste. Via a critique of Levinas, Schrijvers suggests that what is at stake in reversing the subject‐object distinction entails less an “overcoming” of ontotheology and more a matter of comporting oneself towards it in an appropriate way.     

On Christian Discernment and the Problem of the Theological

This article lays the groundwork for a theology of discernment that seeks to address modern anxieties about the integrity of the theological by showing how Christian believers are sanctified for the identification of true speech about God. It does so by arguing that post‐Kantian understandings of the activity of the human subject in judgement need not be seen as inimical to an account of Christian discernment, that recognition of Paul's understanding of the place of discernment in the Christian life points to alternatives to Barth's attempt to resolve the difficulties of the theological through an exclusive appeal to divine activity, and that Augustine develops a helpful account of the place of a theology of discernment in addressing the problem of the theological by treating the connection between these topics as an element within theologies of sanctification and creaturely vocation.     

KIERKEGAARD AND EVANS ON THE PROBLEM OF ABRAHAM

A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard's ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the “modernized” problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Fear and Trembling: the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent's own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. Against a solution to this problem proposed by C. Stephen Evans in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love, I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never actually resulting in a fully responsible agent's performance of some horrendous action on account of her non‐culpable misinterpretation of God's will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin.     

Re-Reading the Post-Kantian Tradition with Milbank

The essay explores the meaning and implications of Milbank's claim that the post‐Kantian presuppositions of modern theology must be eradicated. After defining and locating the post‐Kantian element in the context of Milbank's broader concerns, the essay employs a comparison between Milbank and Barth to draw out the differences between radical orthodoxy and neo‐orthodoxy with respect to the Kantian ideal of “mediation” between theology and culture. The essay concludes with comparisons of Milbank's metanarrative concerning “modern” thought with those offered by Hans Blumenberg and James Edwards. The effect is not only to suggest the apparent arbitrariness of Milbank's account, but also to indicate the evident futility of arguing with Milbank's theological position on the basis of alternative accounts of the post‐Kantian tradition.     

The Religious Meaning of Culture: Paul Tillich and Beyond

Throughout his theological career Paul Tillich (1886–1965) was fundamentally concerned with the question of the religious meaning of culture. The answers that he gave – initially in the revolutionary ferment of 1920s–1930s Germany and then again in the brave new world of post‐World War II America – were profound and far‐reaching in their importance for twentieth‐century theology. This article will explore the development of Tillich's interpretations of the religious meaning of culture and apply his analyses to our contemporary religious and cultural situation by suggesting a trinitarian enlargement of Tillich's concept of theonomous metaphysics towards a multidimensional theology of culture.     

Expert judgments of hypnosis from subjective state reports.

Suggestibility was assessed in 60 college students after a traditional hypnotic induction, an alert induction, progressive relaxation training, or instruction in goal-directed imagery. Responsiveness to suggestion did not differ between groups. Subjects also generated open-ended reports of their states of awareness and of their experience of 3 hypnotic suggestions. A sample of these reports from 24 moderately to highly suggestible subjects were evaluated by 18 experts in the field of hypnosis. Expert ratings of subjects' open-ended reports indicated that (a) traditional hypnotic inductions produce a state of consciousness that is indistinguishable from nonhypnotic relaxation training, (b) the subjective experience of hypnotic suggestions after imagination training is indistinguishable from that after hypnotic inductions, and (c) suggestibility is unrelated to state of consciousness as assessed by experts.     

The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer

In their article, Is the Brain a Quantum Computer,? Litt, Eliasmith, Kroon, Weinstein, and Thagard (2006) criticize the Penrose–Hameroff “Orch OR” quantum computational model of consciousness, arguing instead for neurocomputation as an explanation for mental phenomena. Here I clarify and defend Orch OR, show how Orch OR and neurocomputation are compatible, and question whether neurocomputation alone can physiologically account for coherent gamma synchrony EEG, a candidate for the neural correlate of consciousness. Orch OR is based on quantum computation in microtubules within dendrites in cortex and other regions linked by dendritic–dendritic gap junctions (“dendritic webs”) acting as laterally connected input layers of the brain's neurocomputational architecture. Within dendritic webs, consciousness is proposed to occur as gamma EEG‐synchronized sequences of discrete quantum computational events acting in integration phases of neurocomputational “integrate‐and‐fire” cycles. Orch OR is a viable approach toward understanding how the brain produces consciousness.     

Envy and us

Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of “hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotions” by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of being ashamed or proud of somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotion by arguing (a) that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion's self‐reflexivity and (b) that the rival impacts the subject's self‐assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in‐group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is esteem recognition: The envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. Because, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a sense of us.     

TEILHARD'S TWO ENERGIES

Abstract. Resolution of the entropy‐evolution problem was a significant issue for Pierre Teilhard de Chardin throughout his scientific career. Although never truly satisfied with his solution, he proposed that all energy must be psychic and contain two components. Tangential energy is related to physical energy. Radial energy in some way accounts for increasing complexity and consciousness in evolution. Analysis of developments in thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, and information theory show that Gibbs free energy contains both calorimetric and noetic components, thus validating Teilhard's intuition.     

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap

Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem - an explanatory gap - but does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative theories of consciousness all fail. Levine's work is best seen as an attempt to firmly establish a definite status for the mind-body problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real, substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical one. Because Levine's work is tightly focused upon contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the broader conceptual background to the mind-body problem. My aim here is to place Levine's work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levine's arguments and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and consciousness.     

THE EMERGENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENESIS 1–3: JUNG'S DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The development of a robust, holistic theological anthropology will require that theology and biblical studies alike enter into genuine interdisciplinary conversations. Depth psychology in particular has the capacity to be an exceedingly fruitful conversation partner for theology because of its commitment to the totality of the human experience (both the conscious and unconscious aspects) as well as its unique ability to interpret archetypal symbols and mythological thinking. By arguing for a psycho‐theological hermeneutic that accounts for depth psychology's conviction that myths about the origin of the world are always simultaneously myths about the origin and emergence of human consciousness, I demonstrate that the presence of numerous Jungian archetypes in Genesis 1–3 suggests that the narrative can be read from a psychological perspective without diminishing or marginalizing the dominant theological themes of exile and return. Furthermore, such a reading fundamentally suggests that the narrative is not about how sin entered into creation, but rather how consciousness emerged in human community.     

Epistemic Warrants and Higher‐Order Theories of Conscious Perception

We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher‐order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first‐order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher‐order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so‐called ‘targetless’ higher‐order states. We explain the key notion of an immediate perceptual warrant and show both that it requires the content of the higher‐order attitude to match that of the first‐order perception, and also that it gives a new perspective on the intimate relationship, rightly emphasised by Rosenthal, between consciousness and a subject's testimony as to ‘how it is with her’.     

Creating false memories of infancy with hypnotic and non‐hypnotic procedures

This study was designed to test the conditions under while false memory reports are likely to be elicited from hypnotic and non‐hypnotic participants. Low, medium and high hypnotizables were administered either a hypnotic or non‐hypnotic suggestion for regression to the day after birth. False memories of infancy were generated in 68 of 78 age‐regressed participants, nearly half of whom reported strong beliefs in the reality of their recovered ‘memories’. Non‐hypnotic participants were slightly but significantly more likely to report infancy experiences than were hypnotic participants. However, hypnotizability did not have a significant effect on the classification of these experiences as memories or as fantasies. Implications for the experimental and clinical contexts are discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Fate of Phenomenology in Deconstruction: Derrida and Husserl∗

This paper begins by presenting Lawlor's Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problems of Philosophy, an account of how deconstruction emerges as Derrida discusses Husserl's phenomenology (I.). It then determines the genre of Lawlor's intellectual history. Lawlor writes a continuist narrative history of ideas and concepts (II.). In the subsequent main section the paper uses Lawlor's material to take a position in the debate between Husserl and Derrida (III.). This is done in three parts. The first part reconstructs Derrida's version of Husserlian time consciousness (III. 1). The second part proposes an alternative and revisionist reading of Husserl's theory of internal temporality. On this reading Husserl is a process theoretician of consciousness (III. 2). The third part juxtaposes Husserl and Derrida's critical views (III. 3), arguing that Husserl's fluxive theory of time consciousness does not suffer from the problems Derrida finds in his Husserl. The final section (IV.) points to relativizing consequences for deconstruction and identifies programmatic consequences for phenomenology.     

A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge

Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge‐how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so‐called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.     

On the early history of male hysteria and psychic trauma

This paper discusses the influence of Jean-Martin Charcot's views on Sigmund Freud's early theory of hysteria and the notion of psychical trauma. We consider the early history of both psychical trauma and male hysteria, for in Charcot's view traumatic hysteria and male hysteria are identical. Freud's two 1886 lectures on male hysteria, delivered after his return from Paris, are crucial to the subject because they present Freud's first impressions of Charcot and his teaching. Some of the ideas presented in the two lectures foreshadow Freud's later generalization of the etiological role of trauma and his theory of the role of psychical trauma in the genesis of hysteria; that is, each hysterical symptom is due to a psychical trauma reviving an earlier traumatic event—the so-called principle of deferred action (Nachtraglichkeit). Several arguments substantiate the thesis that Freud's notion of psychical (sexual) trauma was developed in reference to Charcot's notion of traumatic hysteria, and that the early psychoanalytic theory of psychical trauma is clearly indebted to Freud's encounter with Charcot's male traumatic hysterical patients. The discussed Freudian development points out the major role of (physical) traumata in eliciting psychopathological pictures and in this way is of definite historical relevance for the present-day discussion on the traumatic nature of the so-called multiple personality syndrome and other dissociative disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorders.     

ON WEAK POSTPOSITIVISM: AHISTORICAL REJECTIONS OF THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE

Abstract: Postpositivists have lately joined post‐Husserlians in arguing that the deepest problem with Descartes' legacy is that it fosters the objectivist illusion that philosophers might actually come to think “from Nowhere,” or at least that they can self‐consciously choose whatever presuppositions they do accept. Yet this argument is easier to express than to incorporate into one's own thinking. It is perfectly possible to oppose the View from Nowhere, and even to criticize others for failing to understand its impossibility, and still do so … as if from Nowhere. This article is concerned with such compromised opposition—that is, with critics who reject, in ahistorical terms and from an ahistorical standpoint, an ahistorical conception of philosophy. It focuses on two figures from the empiricist‐positivist side of the Cartesian legacy, Rorty and Taylor, but their story is in important ways typical. Though their criticisms are certainly more radical and considerably more successful than those of many of their analytic colleagues, each retains in his own thinking more of the ahistorical or standpointless ideal than he realizes.