Divine self-testimony and the knowledge of God

A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended by Plantinga. Appropriate causal chains and reliable cognitive processes only seem at best to ensure that a belief proposed for acceptance is the belief the testifier wants accepted; they do not ensure that it is rational to accept the belief. This particularly applies where there is much at stake, where it seems rational to seek some form of evidence, if available. Some brief comments are made on Trinitarian self-testimony. Another model of the ‘inner witness’ is briefly sketched out, based on the analogy with conscience. This model may capture some of the features of Plantinga’s approach, but leaves room for a free rejection of divine self-testimony, in a way that the perceptual analogy does not. A point connected to Plantinga’s aims is then made about the link between evidence, value and divine self-testimony, in relation to religious experience. Finally, it is suggested that the earlier proof may apply in a particular sense to all knowledge of God, including that based on natural theology.     

Divine Self-Invention: Leontius of Jerusalem'S Reinterpretation of the Patristic Model of the Christian God

This article analyses the Trinitarian theology of the seventh-centurytheologian Leontius of Jerusalem. Leontius’ overridingconcern was to demonstrate that the concept of composition,which seemed to entail change in the component parts, couldbe applied to the incarnation of the Word. However, in developinghis argument he radically reinterpreted traditional Trinitariantheology. He not only reorganized the Trinity according to thechristological model so that the relation between Father andSon mirrors the relation between Word and flesh but also turnedit from a timeless framework, within which the event of theincarnation takes place, into the result of a previous act ofdivine self-constitution. Such reasoning became possible becauseLeontius conceived of God not in terms of being but in termsof action and will: God must act in order to be God in the truesense but at the same time he is not constrained by his ownnature and can therefore reinvent himself whenever he wishes.Leontius’ model of God is not a complete innovation: theconceptual framework had existed for a long time. However, onlyafter the radical deconstruction of the Patristic understandingof God with its careful balance between voluntaristic and ontologicalelements could it become the basis of Christian belief.     

Explicatio and Complicatio: On the Understanding of the Relationship between God and the World in the Work of Nicholas Cusanus

Cusanus understands the relationship between God and the world through the concept of participation, which he explores through the twin concepts of explicatio (unfolding) and complicatio (enfolding). In Cusanus' view, the dialectics of explicatio and complicatio even apply concerning the relationship between God and humanity. This is explored concerning the relation between divine providence and human freedom, concerning the problem of worship and idolatry, and concerning the understanding of Christ as unfolded divinity and enfolded humanity. It is argued that this allows for an understanding of salvation through grace without reducing the importance of human involvement.     

Illocutionary Acts and the Uncanny: on Nicholas Wolterstorff's Idea of Divine Discourse

Nicholas Wolterstorff's Divine Discourse attempts to give philosophical warrant to the claim that 'God speaks'. While Wolterstorff's argument depends largely on his appropriation of J.L. Austin's speech act theory, he also uses two narratives that for him demonstrate how 'God speaks'. The first is the story of Augustine's conversion in the Confessions and the second is a story that Wolterstorff recounts about a certain 'Virginia'. This study argues that what Wolterstorff claims to derive from Augustine's narrative for his view of divine discourse is not fully supported by the Confessions , and that Augustine's interpretation of the words 'tolle lege, tolle lege', can be construed as a useful interpretation of an ambiguous sign. This is consistent with Augustine's understanding of the interpretation of texts in both the De doctrina christiana and the Confessions . In short, Augustine is far more open to the ambiguity of signs than Wolterstorffs's account suggests.     

Divine Action in the World of Physics: Response to Nicholas Saunders

Nicholas Saunders claims that, in my view, divine action requires and is confined to indeterminacies at the quantum level. I try to make clear that, in speaking of "gaps" in physical causality, I mean that the existence of intentions entails that determining law explanations alone cannot give a complete account of the natural world. By "indeterminacy" I mean a general (not quantum) lack of determining causality in the physical order. Construing physical causality in terms of dispositional properties variously realized in more or less creative ways in different contexts may be most helpful in developing an account of divine action.     

Divine Energies or Divine Personhood: Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas on conceiving the transcendent and immanent God

This essay explores a debate between two contemporary Orthodox theolo-gians, Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas, over how to adequately conceive the doctrine of the Trinity as an expression of the realism of divine-human communion, and hence, of the God who is transcendent and immanent. The essay critically analyzes the implications of Zizioulas's reworking of the patristic category of hypostasis . Zizioulas's theology is suggesting a paradigm shift in contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology insofar as it prioritizes hypostasis over energies for expressing the realism of divine-human communion. The implications of this study also extend to debates within contemporary trinitarian theologies over the adequacy of the concept of "person" for conceptualizing the Trinity.     

The Divine Essence and the Conception of God in Spinoza

I argue against a prevailing view that the essence of Godis identical with the attributes. I show that given what Spinoza says in 2d2 – Spinoza'spurported definition of the essence of a thing – the attributes cannot be identical withthe essence of God (whether the essence of God is understood as the distinct attributesor as a totality of indistinct attributes). I argue that while the attributes do notsatisfy the stipulations of 2d2 relative to God, absolutely infinite and eternal power does satisfythose stipulations. Hence, I conclude that absolutely infinite and eternal power is God'sessence and that the attributes are expressions of that power.     

Sola Gratia as Divine Attribute: Resurrecting the God of the Gospel

Can we speak of sola gratia as a divine attribute so as to affirm that all that God does is grace? Traditionally, Western Christian theology has answered that question negatively, placing God's justice in opposition with God's grace and presenting a God whose love does not seem to be unconditional. This has been especially evident in the ways in which Scripture, the work of Christ, justification by faith, and the distinction between law and gospel commonly have been interpreted. By rethinking those traditional interpretations on the basis of an understanding of divine grace as unconditional love, we can indeed proclaim a God of sola gratia and a gospel capable of transforming human lives and responding effectively to the crisis of faith we face today.     

Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God: Exploring Divine Ideals

This paper presents a feminist intervention into debates concerning the relation between human subjects and a divine ideal. I turn to what Irigarayan feminists challenge as a masculine conception of ‘the God’s eye view’ of reality. This ideal functions not only in philosophy of religion, but in ethics, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science: it is given various names from ‘the competent judge’ to the ‘the ideal observer’ (IO) whose view is either from nowhere or everywhere. The question is whether, as Taliaferro contends, my own philosophical argument inevitably appeals to the impartiality and omni-attributes of the IO. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

The Divine Triangle: God in the Marital System of Religious Couples

Incoporating both Bowenian and structural approaches, this article offers a constructivist view for dealing with religious belief systems of couples. After exploring the evolving process by which couples mutually define an ongoing triadic relationship with their Deity, different triangular processes from an integrated structural and Bowenian perspective are presented. This view is evaluative in terms of the triangulation process rather than the belief systems themselves, and, as such, it can be useful in marital therapy regardless of the religious beliefs of the therapist. Implications for marital therapy are examined.     

Divine Transcendence, Religious Pluralism and Barth's Doctrine of God

Abstract:  Pluralists such as John Hick frequently argue that the transcendence, mystery and ineffability of 'God' provide the grounds on which a pluralistic interpretation of religion should be embraced. In this article the author explores the possibility that certain contemporary accounts of divine transcendence, consciously indebted to Karl Barth, may implicitly open the door to Hick's line of argument. After identifying four reasons why Barth's own account of transcendence ( Church Dogmatics II/1) resists a pluralist appropriation, the author examines two contemporary proposals: William Placher's The Domestication of Transcendence and Stacy Johnson's The Mystery of God . He contends that, unlike Barth, the accounts of God's transcendence proposed by these two theologians implicitly open the door to Hick's line of argument.     

The Consubstantial Otherness of God: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity in Hans Urs von Balthasar

Martin explores divine simplicity according to the twentieth‐century Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. She grants that Balthasar does not provide a traditional presentation of the attribute of divine simplicity. In his doctrine of the Trinity, Balthasar emphasizes such themes as distance, “hiatus,” and infinite difference, none of which seems to promise a robust doctrine of divine simplicity. Indeed, some have suggested that Balthasar's Trinitarian theology does not allow for traditional claims about divine simplicity. Martin argues, however, that one finds in Balthasar's Trinitarian theology the doctrine of divine simplicity, assumed as an internalized starting point and rooted in his understanding of the analogia entis. This can be seen, for example, in his various engagements with Aquinas as well as with contemporary thinkers such as Gustav Siewerth and Erich Przywara. Likewise, when addressing the issue of whether the Trinitarian Persons can be “counted” according to our normal understanding of number, he insists with Evagrius that God is simple. In the same context, he similarly draws upon Plotinus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Tertullian, Ambrose, and Aquinas. Martin therefore gives particular attention to the Theo‐Logic and to Balthasar's affirmation in his Trinitarian theology of the points that the divine Persons are fully God, the divine attributes are identical with each other in God, and the distinction of Persons has to do not with three parts of God but with opposed subsistent relations.     

Constructing Images of the Divine: Latent Heterogeneity in Americans’ Impressions of God

How do individuals psychologically organize their images of the divine? Most work on this topic is factor‐analytic in nature, finding that God images vary with respect to love, judgment, and engagement. However, few studies look at how individuals spontaneously combine these divine dimensions into composite images of God. To fill this gap, we subject data from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey to latent class analysis and find evidence for five depictions of God: (1) a poorly defined, uninvolved deity; (2) a loving, nonjudgmental deity who is engaged with humanity; (3) a nullity or nonentity; (4) a loving deity who is neither judgmental nor engaged with humanity; and (5) a loving deity who is also both judgmental and engaged. We then present evidence that individuals holding these images vary in their denominational background, religious attitudes and behaviors, and general traits. Our findings suggest that individuals may impose not only a dimensional structure on images of the divine, but a categorical one as well.     

The All‐Seeing: Fraternity and Vision of God in Nicholas of Cusa

“I am because you look upon me.” This phrase from Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione Dei sive De icona is enough to sum up the stakes and originality of this treatise sent in 1453 to the Tegernsee monks. “Speaking in order to see,” “seeing in order to speak,” and “hearing in order to believe” chart the different stages of this unique experience, at once aesthetic, philosophical, spiritual, and mystical. Whereas one might have believed that the mere call to transcendence would be enough to justify gathering together before God, the collective contemplation of Rogier van der Weyden’s painting by the community of monks instead allows one to see and even hear that “the revelation of the witness” (and thus “the revelation of the brother”) validates the truth of this communally shared experience. Reaching the “wall of paradise” does not so much mean “escaping through the wall” or “getting over the wall” as it does “inhabiting the boundary” where opposites “coincide” and man and God meet within a human community.     

What God Cannot Do: Divine Power,the Gratuity of Grace,and Henri De Lubac

When Pius XII promulgated his encyclical Humani generis in 1950, it was widely read as censuring Henri de Lubac’s views on human nature and the desire for God. In recent years, as controversies about nature and grace have revived, this reading of Humani generis has been widely assumed by supporters and critics of de Lubac alike. Henri de Lubac, however, always insisted that the encyclical did not touch his position. This article will argue that, whatever the objectives of the encyclical’s drafters, he was correct. It will make its case by turning to an issue neglected in contemporary debates about nature and grace: divine power. It will first trace the history of Christian reflection on divine power, a story whose twists and turns have only recently been uncovered by medieval historians, and then argue that, with this history in view, interpreting the crucial line in Humani generis as excluding de Lubac’s position becomes untenable. Finally, this article will discuss the implications of this conclusion for contemporary accounts of human nature, the desire for God, and the gratuity of grace.