Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and Confidence in Choice

Many of us believe that, after writing about a subject, we understand it more deeply. Studies in education indicate that writing does indeed enhance comprehension. Three experiments examined whether similar “exposition effects” exist for decision making. In these experiments, subjects were confronted with standard framing problems. Positive exposition effects would require that the influence of alternative frames on subjects' choices be diminished by exposition demands. Control subjects made choices under customary, non-exposition instructions. Others chose after writing rationales for their selections (exposition), after explicitly planning to write such rationales, or merely in anticipation of writing the rationales. Exposition reduced framing effects in each of the experiments. The magnitudes of the effects were greatest for subjects who wrote before choosing. Also, exposition markedly increased subjects' confidence that their choices were appropriate. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

再探猜谜作业中“顿悟”的ERP效应

采用事件相关电位(ERP)技术探讨顿悟问题（字谜）解决中提供答案后的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现,在250~400 ms内,“有顿悟”和“不理解”比“无顿悟”的ERP波形均有一个更为负向的偏移。在“有顿悟—无顿悟”和“不理解—无顿悟”的差异波中,这个负成分的潜伏期约为320 ms (N320),地形图显示,N320在中后部活动最强。进一步对“有顿悟—无顿悟”差异波作偶极子溯源分析,发现N320主要起源于扣带前回（ACC）附近。这似乎表明,N320可能反映了提供答案瞬间新旧思路之间的认知冲突,但是却不能真正揭示顿悟问题解决中思维定势的成功突破以及“恍然大悟”所对应的独特脑内时程变化     

Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent

Hume's account of belief has been much reviled, especially considered as an account of what it is to assent to or judge a proposition to be true. In fact, given that he thinks that thoughts about existence can be composed of a single idea, and that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. Nonetheless, Hume was extremely proud of his account of belief, discussing it at length in the Abstract, and developing it in the Appendix. Furthermore, he claimed several times that his account was new. It was not just a new answer to an old question, but an answer to a new question as well. Why did Hume think he was raising, and answering, a new question? Is his answer really so appalling? Why did he define belief in terms of a relationship with a present impression? In this paper, I propose answers to these questions. The answers emerge by contrasting Hume with Locke. Locke thought that belief was a pale imitation of knowledge, and that the assent we give to propositions is constituted in the very same act as forming those propositions. Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs. By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to judge something to be true, or to assent to something. This issue had to be solved independently of the question of what it was to conceive something, or understand the content of a proposition. Hume thought this problem was new. He should be looked at, not as giving a bad answer to an important question, but rather as being the first in the early modern period to recognize that there was an important question here to be answered.     

Apractic agraphia in a patient with normal praxis

Most right-handed crossed aphasics are not apractic. They usually have agraphia characterized by misspellings but retain the ability to write well-formed graphemes. We describe a right-handed patient with a right parietal lesion who was aphasic and not apractic. He was unable to write any formed graphemes despite a relatively preserved ability to spell aloud. We postulate that praxis and writing are dissociated in this patient because the motor engrams for praxis were located in his left hemisphere and the engrams for writing were in his right hemisphere. In addition, he comprehended commands for limb motor activities (praxis) far better than he comprehended other speech. This suggests that in this patient the areas used to comprehend limb motor commands may be anatomically distinct from areas important in comprehending other aspects of speech.     

Improving college students’ evaluation of text learning using idea-unit standards

When recalling key definitions from class materials, college students are often overconfident in the quality of their responses. Even with commission errors, they often judge that their response is entirely or partially correct. To further understand this overconfidence, we investigated whether idea-unit judgements would reduce overconfidence (Experiments 1 and 2) and whether students inflated their scores because they believed that they knew answers but just responded incorrectly (Experiment 2). College students studied key-term definitions and later attempted to recall each definition when given the key term (e.g., What is the availability heuristic?). All students judged the quality of their recall, but some were given a full-definition standard to use, whereas other students first judged whether their response included each of the individual ideas within the corresponding correct answer. In Experiment 1, making these idea-unit judgements reduced overconfidence for commission errors. In Experiment 2, some students were given the correct definitions and graded other students’ responses, and some students generated idea units themselves before judging their responses. Students were overconfident even when they graded other students’ responses, and, as important, self-generated idea units for each definition also reduced overconfidence in commission errors. Thus, overconfidence appears to result from difficulties in evaluating the quality of recall responses, and such overconfidence can be reduced by using idea-unit judgements.     

A Comparison of Taped Problems With and Without a Brief Post-Treatment Assessment on Multiplication Fluency

An adapted alternating treatments design was used to compare the effectiveness of a taped-problems (TP) intervention with TP and an additional immediate assessment (TP + AIA) on the multiplication fluency of six fifth-grade students. During TP, the students listened to a tape playing a series of multiplication problems and answers three times. Students were instructed to try to beat the tape by writing each answer before they heard it on the tape. The interval between each problem and answer was varied as the problems were repeated. For the TP + AIA condition, immediately after completing TP, students completed an extra assessment sheet consisting of the same problems heard on the tape. Results showed increases in math-fact fluency across both treatment sets of problems (TP and TP + AIA) and a control set of problems. However, results varied across students and only two of the students showed meaningful gains when the TP was supplemented with the AIA. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

THE EFFECTS OF CONTINGENT AND NONCONTINGENT REWARDS ON THE I.Q. SCORES OF CHILDREN OF ABOVE-AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE1

This study investigated the effects of candy reinforcement on I.Q. test scores in first and second graders of above-average intelligence. Thirty-six subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups and either given candy contingent on correct responses, noncontingently, or not given candy. After measuring all subjects on Form L of the revised Stanford Binet, each subject in the contingent group was given an M & M immediately following each correct answer on Form M, while a yoked-comparison subject received the same number of M & M's before responding to a question and therefore without regard to correctness of answers. It was expected that both types of candy administration would produce higher I.Q. change scores than the no-candy control group, but there were no statistically significant differences among the three treatments. The differences between the first and second test scores were 4.17 (contingent), 4.67 (noncontingent), and 1.00 (no reinforcement). Reasons for this failure to replicate previous findings were discussed.     

Effects of models and demonstrations of personal narratives on the use of lexical ties by writers with mental retardation

A single subject reversal design was used to investigate the effects of two methods for teaching writing to eight adolescents with mild or moderate mental retardation during a weekly process writing workshop. During each workshop, each student wrote a personal narrative while the teacher circulated among the group and provided positive verbal feedback and spelled words on request. Students' texts were later typed with corrected spelling and punctuation and returned to them with verbal praise before the next writing workshop. During the first experimental condition, the subjects listened to an exemplar text selected by the teacher. In the second phase, the teacher read a narrative she had written as the exemplar text. During the third experimental condition, the teacher orally self-instructed herself through steps in writing a narrative. The subjects' texts were analyzed for number of words written and number and type of lexical ties used to produce cohesion between sentences in a text. The model narrative produced the best gains in the number of words written by the poorer readers, while the demonstration improved the cohesiveness of their texts. The better readers and writers wrote more cohesively during the model narrative and produced longer text during the demonstration condition.     

Perceptual anticipation in handwriting: the role of implicit motor competence

In two experiments, perceptual anticipation--that is, the observer's ability to predict the course of dynamic visual events--in the case of handwriting traces was investigated. Observers were shown the dynamic display of the middle letter l excerpted from two cursive trigrams (lll or lln) handwritten by one individual. The experimental factor was the distribution of the velocity along the trace, which was controlled by a single parameter, beta. Only for one value of this parameter (beta = 2/3) did the display comply with the two-thirds power law, which describes how tangential velocity depends on curvature in writing movements. The task was to indicate the trigram from which the trace was excerpted--that is, to guess the letter that followed the specific instance of the l that had been displayed. In Experiment 1, the no answer option was available. Experiment 2 adopted a forced-choice response rule. Responses were never reinforced. When beta = 2/3, the rate of correct guesses was high (Experiment 1, P?correct? = .69; Experiment 2, P?correct? = .78). The probability of a correct answer decreased significantly for both smaller and larger values of beta, with wrong answers becoming predominant at the extremes of the range of variation of this parameter. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that perceptual anticipation of human movements involves comparing the perceptual stimulus with an internal dynamic representation of the ongoing event.     

Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?

The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism will struggle to answer a challenge readily answered by proponents of a version of IA that does appeal to confirmational holism. This challenge is to explain why mathematics applied in falsified scientific theories is not considered to be falsified along with the rest of the theory. In cases where mathematics seemingly ought to be falsified it is saved from falsification, by a so called ??Euclidean rescue??. I consider a range of possible answers to this challenge and conclude that each answer fails.     

Hertz and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Science

The German physicist Heinrich Hertz played a decisive role for Wittgenstein's use of a unique philosophical method. Wittgenstein applied this method successfully to critical problems in logic and mathematics throughout his life. Logical paradoxes and foundational problems including those of mathematics were seen as pseudo-problems requiring clarity instead of solution. In effect, Wittgenstein's controversial response to David Hilbert and Kurt Gödel was deeply influenced by Hertz and can only be fully understood when seen in this context. To comprehend the arguments against the metamathematical programme, and to appreciate how profoundly the philosophical method employed actually shaped the content of Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is necessary to make an intellectual biographical reconstruction of their philosophical framework, tracing the Hertzian elements in the early as well as in the later writings. In order to write Wittgenstein's biography, we have to take seriously the coherence of his thought throughout his life, and not let convenient philosophical ideologies be our guidance in drawing up a “Wittgensteinian philosophy”. To do so, we have to take a second look upon what he actually wrote, not only in the already published material, but in the entire Nachlass. Clearly, this is not easily done, but it is a necessary task in the historical reconstruction of Wittgenstein's life and work.     

Individual and group choices among solutions of a problem when solution verifiability is moderate or low

Compared choices among solutions of problem by individuals andgroups from two populations: 251 university students, aged 18 to 25 years, and 364 trade school students, aged 15 to 18 years. All subjects gave first their solution of Maiers horsetrading problem. Discussing groups were composed of one individual holding the correct answer while other members held each a different wrong solution. In one of the further individual conditions, single subjects were provided with all solutions without comment, and in the other, together with a brief summary of supportive arguments. As predicted, in the population of university students, the proportion of correct answers increases in all experimental conditions (p < .05). No significant difference is observed between individual and group choices. Group members defending the correct answer are more certain of their solution, talk more and are perceived as more confident than supporters of wrong solutions. In groups of trade school students, the reverse is true, and the proportion of correct answers decreases following both discussion (p < .01) and exposure to all solutions (p < .02). In this population, performance improves only when single subjects are provided with written arguments in favour of various solutions (p < .01). Results are analysed in terms of low solution verifiability depending on task, situational, and population factors.     

A study of 60- to 89-mo.-old children's skill at writing numerals

The skill of writing numerals necessitates a certain developmental maturity. Studying the age at which children start to develop this skill and assessing problems they encounter while writing numerals should give direction to their training. From 8 schools a total of 267 children, ages 60 to 89 mo., were asked to write the numerals 1 to 9. Analysis showed that 80% of the children wrote most of the numerals correctly, 15% wrote inverted numerals, 2.0% wrote some numerals as letters, and 4% did not write certain numerals at all. In addition, 64% of children ages 60 to 65 mo. gave correct responses, and the perception of correct responses increased across age groups until 95% were correct in the group who were 84 to 89 mo. There was no significant difference between girls and boys in these writing skills.     

Does response mode affect amount recalled or the magnitude of the testing effect?

The testing effect is the finding that retrieval practice can enhance recall on future tests. One unanswered question is whether first-test response mode (writing or speaking the answer) affects final-test performance (and whether final-test response mode itself matters). An additional unsettled issue is whether written and oral recall lead to differences in the amount recalled. In three experiments, we examined these issues: whether subjects can recall more via typing or speaking; whether typing or speaking answers on a first test can lead to better final-test performance (and whether an interaction occurs with final-test response mode) and whether any form of overt response leads to better final-test performance as compared to covert retrieval (thinking of the answer but not producing it). Subjects studied paired associates; took a first test by typing, speaking, or thinking about responses; and then took a second test in which the answers were either spoken or typed. The results revealed few differences between typing and speaking during recall, and no difference in the size of the testing effect on the second test. Furthermore, an initial covert retrieval yielded roughly the same benefit to future test performance as did overt retrieval. Thus, the testing effect was quite robust across these manipulations. The practical implication for learning is that covert retrieval provides as much benefit to later retention as does overt retrieval and that both can be effective study strategies.     

Control of selective echolalia via the instatement of a general alternative response

Treatment for echolalic responding has been limited to the training of a small number of correct responses and limited stimulus verbalizations by the experimenter, leaving the possibility that the introduction of novel stimuli could result in the reoccurrence of echolalia. In the present study an 11-year-old severely retarded male's echolalic responding to questions that he could not answer correctly was controlled by instating a general alternative response, “I don't know.” The subject continued to respond correctly to questions that he could answer. indicating that the general alternative response had been appropriately discriminated. A Baseline. Treatment. DRO. Treatment design indicated that the subject's echolalic responding, as well as the appropriate use of the general alternative response, was under experimental control. Generalization of the experimental results to the subject's regular day-care setting was accomplished by having the staff verbally punish all echolalic responses and then restate the question to the subject until a non-echolalic answer had been emitted. Implications of these findings and suggestions for combining previous treatment procedures for echolalia with the general alternative response procedure were offered.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internal Models in Physics Problem Solving

In this paper, we discuss the relations among internal mental models, attentional cues, and knowledge structure in solving elementary physics problems. The notion of semantic sensitivity is introduced as a qualitative measure of problem-solver receptivity to cues for generating, or making a shift to, a new internal model that may lead to the correct answer. Using three physics problems and their variations, the following results were obtained. First, think-aloud protocol data of two experts and one novice, working on those problems, were analyzed to provide empirical examples of internal models, and also to show that generation and shift of internal models generally results from the interplay of two kinds of processes, model construction and model development. Second, protocol data from 15 novices and seven professionals were used to present a more extensive empirical taxonomy of internal models for those problems. Third, seven experiments were used, along with the results from the protocol data, to suggest the following conditions on semantic sensitivity. (1) If the problem solver's present internal model is independent of his knowledge of physics principles underlying the given problem, but if attentional cues are related directly to the knowledge, then his present model is semantically sensitive to the cues, that is, it can be shifted easily to another model that is based on the knowledge. (2) His present model is semantically insensitive, if given cues are encoded based on the same knowledge as used for generating the model. (3) The relevance of cues to knowledge structure is critical for semantic sensitivity of the presently encoded model: Which cues to attend to is guided by the problem solver's knowledge, and if he can focus on those most relevant to the physics principles underlying the problem, then his present model is semantically sensitive to those cues, that is, he is more able to shift the present model to another that would lead to the correct answer.     

Recognizing orally spelled words: an analysis of procedures shared with reading and spelling

Some investigators have suggested that recognizing orally spelled words is dependent on the same procedures ordinarily used in spelling, whereas others have viewed it either as dependent on reading procedures or as an independent ability. In the present study, a single subject with dyslexia and dysgraphia was examined on parallel tests of recognizing orally spelled words, reading, and spelling (writing), and a comparison was made of his performance on the three tasks. On both words and nonwords, the patient's errors in recognizing orally spelled words and in reading were alike, whereas his spelling errors were often different. The distinction between recognizing orally spelled words and spelling was further shown by his inability to recognize a set of orally spelled words that he could write correctly to dictation or on the basis of word meaning. These findings suggest that the procedures normally used for reading can accept sequences of letter identities as input when orally spelled words must be recognized.     

MODIFYING LETTER AND NUMBER REVERSALS IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN1

Children from regular and special-education classes were exposed to tutoring procedures designed to modify letter and number reversals. In Experiment I, two students showed reversals during letter-naming (e.g., saying p for q) and two-digit number (e.g., writing 31 for 13) exercises. In Experiment II, one subject made two-digit reversals, while the other child reversed single-digit numbers (e.g., 9 written with circle on right side of stem). The subject in Experiment III emitted letter reversals under naming, dictation, and copying exercises. The child in Experiment IV showed written letter reversals on both sides of the “body midline” under dictation procedures. Basic treatment procedures during all experiments involved modelling of correct and incorrect symbol formation, and differential experimenter feedback following student responses. During Experiments I and II, subjects were praised for each correct response, and informed when a reversal occurred. Experiment III included a Modelling Only Phase before these feedback procedures. Besides praise, treatment conditions in Experiment IV consisted of additional feedback following correct responses (e.g., charting correct responses), and temporal delays imposed between dictated letters and student responses. Except for occasional letter-naming reversals of one subject (Experiment I), and letter dictation errors of another (Experiment IV), reversals were eliminated when all experiments terminated. The Modelling Only Phase in Experiment III also reduced reversals to a low level. These findings suggest that a variety of reversal problems may be effectively assessed and remediated via simple modelling and reinforcement procedures. In addition, postcheck observations indicated that the effects were enduring. The present procedures should be easily implemented by school personnel.