Directory of Unpublished Experimental Mental Measures (Book)

Researchers are in sharp disagreement concerning the role of guilt in mental health and prosocial behavior, and on whether guilt is associated with greater religiosity. We sought to resolve diametrically opposed reports by distinguishing chronic guilt, an ongoing condition unattached to immediate events, from predispositional guilt, a personality proclivity for experiencing guilt in reaction to circumscribed precipitating events. We administered a battery of commonly used guilt and shame measures to 101 undergraduates (48 men, 53 women) as well as measures of chronic and predispositional guilt designed to hold content constant. Undergraduates also completed the Beck Depression Inventory and the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised, reported extracurricular activities including volunteer work and religious group participation, and provided other information on religiosity. Chronic guilt invariably showed stronger relations than did predispositional guilt with symptoms of depression and psychopathology. In contrast, predispositional compared to chronic guilt was more strongly associated with lowered hostility and increased volunteerism as well as participation in religious activities and religiosity.     

Feeling guilty as a source of information about threat and performance

OCD patients experience increased feelings of guilt, threat and uncertainty about harm prevention. As to the relation between these phenomena, it was hypothesised that the experience of guilt acts as "information" that increases the sense of threat and decreases the sense that preventive action is effective. We tested whether state guilt is used as information about risk and prevention effects and whether people high in trait guilt do so more than others. Participants high and low in trait guilt were included. Three types of affect were experimentally induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral affect. Then, participants estimated the likelihood and severity of a negative outcome, and the dissatisfaction with preventive performances in two OCD relevant scenarios. Relative to low-trait guilt participants, people high in trait guilt had higher ratings of risk after induction of state guilt. With regards to dissatisfaction with preventive performance, there was only a trend for high-trait guilt participants to respond stronger to state guilt. The results suggest that people with a general inclination to feel guilty use temporary feelings of guilt as information about the threat content of a situation and do so even if the source of state guilt is unrelated to the situation. Implications for the understanding of OCD are discussed.     

Note on guilt appeals in advertising: covariate effects of self-esteem and locus of control.

A 1991 study by Pinto and Priest demonstrated the effectiveness of advertisements employing moderate levels of guilt in inducing guilt responses in subjects. Because individuals' responses to guilt are often influenced by their specific personality characteristics, researchers have pointed to the potential moderating effects of individual difference variables such as level of self-esteem and locus of control on individuals' susceptibility to guilt appeals. A study was conducted to evaluate the possibility that self-esteem and locus of control can act as covariates across three treatment levels of guilt advertising. From a sample of 57 working mothers, advertisements stimulating medium and high levels of guilt elicited significantly greater feelings of guilt in subjects than the control advertisement stimulating low guilt. However, the relationship between susceptibility to guilt appeals and self-esteem and locus of control was not observed to covary.     

Scham und Schuld – Sein und Tun

Shame and guilt are affective experiential dimensions regulating the different forms of being and behaving in a social context. Constructive or even pathologic feelings of guilt are to be distinguished from real guilt. Shame refers to the judgment of ?So-sein” even if being often manifests itself in action. Shame is generated by the ideal ego. Guilt and feelings of guilt are dimensions of acting, real guilt requires the recognition of guilt, guilt is generated by the superego (conscience). The implications of familiar as well as extreme traumatisation for shame and feelings of guilt are discussed. The most frequent wish for a therapy nowadays that offers perspectives of changes by action can be considered as a defence against processing of the being in psychoanalytical therapy.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Initial examination of a multidimensional model of trauma-related guilt: Applications to combat veterans and battered women

Guilt is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct consisting of negative affect and a set of interrelated cognitions. Guilt magnitude is thought to be a function of the magnitudes of six variables posited as primary components of guilt: a negative event, distress, perceptions of responsibility, lack of justification, wrongdoing, and false beliefs about preoutcome knowledge. The model was tested with samples of Vietnam veterans and battered women. Participants rated their reactions to and perceived roles in trauma-related events. Among Vietnam veterans, distress ratings were highly correlated with guilt severity. Cognitive guilt-component variables were significantly correlated with guilt in both groups. In multiple regression, guilt components accounted for 61% of variance in veterans' guilt and 44% of variance in women's guilt. Among veterans, distress ratings were highly correlated with measures of PTSD and depression. In both groups, cognitive guilt-component variables were positively correlated with psychopathology. Results support the view that beliefs about one's role in trauma are important factors in posttrauma adjustment.     

Individual Differences in Experiences of and Responses to Guilt and Shame: Examining the Lenses of Gender and Gender Role

How are experiences of and reactions to guilt and shame a function of gendered views of the self? Individual differences in guilt and shame responses were explored in a sample of 104 young adults, most of whom were European American. Results indicated that, although women reported greater proneness to guilt and shame, men reported more trait guilt. Heightened levels of guilt- and shame-proneness were observed among both men and women with traditionally feminine gender roles, whereas a more traditionally masculine self-concept was associated with decreased shame-proneness for women. Gender schematic women favored verbal responses to ameliorate the experience of guilt, whereas gender schematic men preferred action-oriented responses. These results are discussed as gendered outcomes of schematic versus aschematic gender role socialization.     

White guilt and racial compensation: the benefits and limits of self-focus

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.     

Uses of guilt in the treatment of dehumanization

It is likely that under the impact of impending Nazism, aggression theory in late Freud, as presented in Civilization and its Discontents (1930), left the entirety of guilt to self‐punishment, thus retracting his view that love functions in the superego as remorse and restitution. This change however, essentially withdraws provision for treating victims of abuse, violence and terror. This paper proposes a paradigm shift that reframes Freud's late instinct theory into a theory of dehumanization by recovering reparative and relational components of guilt. This reframe has major implications for the position taken with regard to the role of witnessing and the moral imperative in recovery from dehumanizing experience, which orthodox psychoanalytic theory has essentially bypassed. It is propose that victim treatment, as case examples illustrate, reformulates guilt as drawing on the life instincts to revivify victims’ humanity through analytic witnessing and acknowledgment. Indeed, unless breaches of humanity are confronted by a witness, the life instincts stay merely rhetorical, if not contradictory, by leaving the death instincts to grow unseen and, thus, unopposed. A two‐fold formulation of guilt may better address and redress disorders of dehumanization, whereby ‘death guilt’ (under the sway of aggression) signifies the orthodox, irrevocable guilt of self‐reproach for the bad we may have done, and ‘life guilt’ (under the sway of a moral imperative) the redeemable guilt for the good we have still to do.     

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an “affect-as-information” model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as “information” about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570)     

On the relationship between responsibility and guilt: antecedent appraisal or elaborated appraisal?

Three studies are reported in which we examined the relation between responsibility and guilt. Results from Study 1 suggested that responsibility increased as a function of guilt, but that the reverse relation did not emerge. In the second and third studies we primed either responsibility or guilt and examined how these primes influenced subsequent appraisals for novel events. We also used different manipulations of responsibility and guilt. In Study 2 guilt was operationalized as negative interpersonal consequences as evidenced by the reactions of others. Responsibility was varied by manipulating the controllability of negative outcomes. In Study 3 responsibility was manipulated in terms of the severity of negative consequences for oneself. Results of both studies showed that guilt primes gave rise to perceptions of responsibility but that responsibility primes did not affect perceptions of guilt. We conclude that responsibility is best regarded as an elaborated appraisal generated by guilt, rather than an antecedent of guilt. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are we assessing guilt correctly? An investigation of the psychometric properties of a prominent guilt measure

The construct of trait guilt has played an important role in psychological theory across many fields of psychology (e.g., as a diagnostic criterion in clinical psychology, as an individual difference in personality psychology, and as a motivational antecedent or emotional moderator in social and organizational psychology); however, the measurement of guilt has received comparatively limited attention in the literature. Specifically, existing measures have limited factor analytic support, limited evidence of convergent validity among the measures, and although the theoretical distinction between guilt and shame is well established, there is limited empirical support for the discriminant validity of these constructs as they are currently measured. The current study investigates the psychometric properties of the most commonly used measure of guilt, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; in: Tangney, The Test of Self Conscious Affect-3. George Mason University, Fairfax, 2000), in order to (a) examine the factor structure of the measure, (b) estimate the convergent validity of the measure with other guilt assessment instruments, and (c) examine the discriminant validity of guilt and shame. Results involving a sample of 1760 participants provide support for a multitrait-multimethod model and the discriminant validity of guilt and shame. However, limited evidence of convergent validity between the TOSCA-3 and the Revised Mosher Guilt Inventory (φ?=?.21) and the Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (φ?=?.10) suggested the TOSCA-3 is not assessing guilt in the same manner as more contextualized measures of guilt, highlighting the importance of measurement choice for guilt researchers. Implications for the measurement of trait guilt are discussed.

     

Trauma‐Related Guilt Mediates the Relationship between Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Suicidal Ideation in OEF/OIF/OND Veterans

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and trauma‐related guilt are risk factors for suicidal ideation (SI) in veterans. Components of trauma‐related guilt were examined as serial mediators of the relationship between PTSD and SI. In a sample of 53 OEF/OIF/OND combat veterans, PTSD had an indirect effect on SI through a serial mediation chain of guilt cognitions, distress, and global guilt, suggesting that trauma‐related guilt via cognitions, distress, and global guilt is a pathway from PTSD to SI. Attention should be given to assessing and addressing trauma‐related guilt in veterans experiencing PTSD to prevent SI.     

Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness.     

Cognitive behavioral perspectives on women and guilt

This paper discusses the application of cognitive behavior therapies to the treatment of the guilt difficulties that women experience in Western industrialized societies. Evidence on the relevance of guilt to women is reviewed, including psychological problems common to women that involve high guilt, sex differences in personality traits, and sex-typing in social roles. Cognitive behavioral theories of guilt are summarized. Areas of inquiry in assessment of dysfunctional guilt are discussed. Three cognitive behavioral treatment strategies for women's guilt are presented. In permission-giving, guilt-provoking behavior is reframed as acceptable. Interventions to lessen discrepancies between guilt-provoking behavior and core roles that are central to self-definition can focus on revising core role requirements and on making behavior more consistent with core roles. Rational-emotive therapy focuses on reduction of irrational beliefs that support self-blame and conditional selfworth and developing more adaptive cognitions. Treatment recommendations for specific guilt problems in assertive refusal and in the aftermath of assault are also reviewed.Ellen Tobey Klass, PhD, associate professor of psychology at Hunter College, City University of New York, and has a private practice in New York City.     

The psychologic of forgiving

Psychologic is an attempt to systematize the commonsense psychology embedded in ordinary language. In this system, the concepts of respect, anger, and guilt, are directly linked, since messages of disrespect, and only those, create anger in the receiver and guilt in the sender. This paper deals with the process of forgiving, whereby respect is reaffirmed and anger and guilt are alleviated. Forgiving depends on clarification of misunderstanding as well as on apology and atonement. The distinction between forgiving others and forgiving oneself is treated. It is concluded that what goes on inside persons and between persons has the same structure.     

Maternal guilt

The recent emphasis on humans as cooperative breeders invites new research on human family dynamics. In this paper we look at maternal guilt as a consequence of conditional maternal investment. Solicited texts written by Finnish mothers with under school-aged children in 2007 (n = 63) described maternal emotions perceived as difficult and forbidden. Content analysis of guilt-inducing situations showed that guilt arose from diverging interest and negotiations between the mother and child (i.e., classic parent- offspring conflict). Also cultural expectations of extensive and perpetual high-quality maternal investment or the "motherhood myth" induced guilt in mothers. We argue that guilt plays an important role in maternal-investment regulation. Maternal guilt is predicted to vary with social and cultural context but also to show universal characteristics due to parent-offspring conflict and allomaternal manipulation. Results are preliminary and intended to stimulate research into the mechanisms, gender differences and cultural variations of guilt and other social emotions in human parenting.     

TRANSCENDENTAL GUILT: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience

This article considers a central ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as an irreducible moral category, has a constitutive role to play in our ways of conceptualizing our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not be capable of employing the moral concepts and judgments we do employ. Elaborating on this argument, the paper deals with what may be described as the “metaphysics of guilt.” More generally, it is suggested, through a case study on the concept of guilt, that a moral theory avoiding naïve emotivism yet emphasizing the role of emotions in morality can and should pay attention to the transcendental status of emotions such as guilt—emotions constitutive of our concept of moral seriousness. Instead of psychologizing moral emotions, the paper employs Raimond Gaita's Wittgenstein‐inspired way of examining the place of the concepts of guilt and remorse in our ethical language‐use. Finally, some methodological remarks on the possibility of transcendental reflection in moral philosophy are presented. While it is not necessary to commit oneself to any specific religious tradition in order to emphasize the constitutive role of guilt in the way suggested in the paper, it turns out that the moral depth of this concept requires that one is at least open to religiously relevant ways of using moral language. In the fundamental metaphysical sense examined in the paper, guilt is a concept whose home language‐game is religious rather than secular ethics.     

Why Narcissists are Unwilling to Apologize: The Role of Empathy and Guilt

We hypothesized that narcissists would be unwilling to apologize for their interpersonal transgressions, and that reduced levels of self‐reported empathy and guilt would serially mediate this effect. Narcissism is characterized by little empathy for the victim, which reduces guilt about one's transgressions. Low guilt, in turn, is associated with unwillingness to apologize. In Study 1, we assessed dispositional narcissism, empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. In Study 2, we assessed dispositional narcissism and obtained state measures of empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. In Study 3, we manipulated narcissism and collected state measures of empathy, guilt, and willingness to apologize. Narcissism was negatively associated with (Studies 1–2) and decreased (Study 3) willingness to apologize, with this link being explained (i.e., serially mediated) by low empathy and guilt. Finally, in Study 4, we showed that antagonistic narcissism (i.e., narcissistic rivalry), but not agentic narcissism (i.e., narcissistic admiration), was negatively associated with willingness to apologize and apologizing behaviour. In all, narcissists are unwilling to apologize for their transgressions, as they experience little empathy for their victims and lower guilt. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The Role of Innocent Guilt in Post‐Conflict Work

The phenomenon of ‘innocent guilt’ regards cases where people feel guilty without being responsible for the wrongdoing or suffering at which the guilt is directed. The aim of this article is to develop a consistent account of innocent guilt and show how it may arise in the aftermath of conflicts. In order to do this, innocent guilt is contrasted with guilt and collective guilt, and the account is substantiated by drawing on the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas, who both consider the phenomenon of innocent guilt a necessary element in the fundamental structure of the ethical subject. These thinkers, furthermore, show a connection between guilt and possible victims of wrongdoing, rather than between guilt and personal acts of wrongdoing. Innocent guilt may thus appear in the aftermath of conflicts as an ethical and emotional response to the fact of finding oneself in a post‐conflict situation still marked by suffering. It thus reveals a fundamental need to contribute to the relieving of such suffering.