Not evidence for separable controlled and automatic influences in artificial grammar learning: comment on Higham, Vokey, and Pritchard (2000)

P. A. Higham, J. R. Vokey, and J. L. Pritchard (2000) claimed to provide evidence for separable controlled and automatic processes in artificial grammar learning. It is argued that their results are compatible with a single controlled influence: Participants might mistakenly identify more grammatical items than nongrammatical items as belonging to the other grammar, because the grammars are very similar to each other, and the nongrammatical items are relatively highly dissimilar. Participants' knowledge may be ambiguous, rather than automatic. It is further argued that even if Higham et al.'s data do support automatic effects, opposition logic, in this case, cannot be said to have succeeded where dissociation logic has failed, because it is used to address the issue of whether participants have conscious control over the knowledge they acquire, rather than whether they possess conscious awareness of that knowledge.     

Socialization, personality development, and the child's environments: comment on Vandell (2000)

Although many socialization agents influence children's behavior (D. L. Vandell, 2000), the evidence (e.g., from intervention studies) indicates that each exerts its influence only within its own domain. Context effects and genetic effects are among the confounding factors that make it impossible, given current data, to reject the null hypothesis of zero long-term effects of parenting on child outcomes. Problems with the prevailing view of development cannot be solved by invoking within-home environmental differences or gene- environment interactions. Group socialization theory can account for findings that do not fit the prevailing view. The theory attributes outside-the-home socialization to identification with a peer group and assimilation of group norms, but attributes nongenetic variation in personality to differentiation within the group. The latter proposition is still largely untested but other aspects of the theory are well supported by evidence.     

Client concealment and self-presentation in therapy: comment on Kelly (2000)

The authors disagree with A. E. Kelly's (2000) conclusions that clients conceal things from therapists primarily for self-presentational reasons and that client concealment is positively related to positive therapy process and outcome. They also disagree with A. E. Kelly regarding the implications of self-presentation theory for therapy. Their review of the research suggests that clients do not conceal much from therapists, that what they do conceal involves many different kinds of information hidden for many different reasons, that therapists have wide variability in being able to detect hidden client material, and that the relationship of client concealment and therapist awareness of client concealment with therapy process and outcome is not clear. Finally, the authors discuss their views about implications of client concealment and self-presentation for therapy.     

Set size and repetition matter: comment on Caramazza and Costa (2000)

Caramazza and Costa, 2000 (Cognition 75, B51--B64) report three picture-word interference experiments testing the response set mechanism of the WEAVER+ + model of spoken word production. They argue that their findings are problematic for WEAVER+ + and that the model's architecture needs to be changed. I show that there is no need to fundamentally modify the model. Instead, the findings of Caramazza and Costa, and all previous findings, are explained by assuming that only a limited number of responses can be kept in short-term memory and that memory improves with response repetition.     

Capacity limitations and the detection of correlations: comment on Kareev (2000)

Y. Kareev (2000) argued that the limited capacity of working memory may be an adaptive advantage for the early detection of useful correlations. His analysis indeed suggests that the optimal sample size is close to G. A. Miller's (1956) "magical number 7 +/- 2." The authors point out logical and statistical limitations of Y. Kareev's (2000) analysis, including that it neglects that the adaptive value is not determined by the hit rate but by the posterior probability of hit and that only signal trials are considered. The authors' analysis demonstrates that when these limitations are corrected for, the alleged benefit for small samples does not occur, and larger samples imply considerable improvement in the detection of correlations.     

An artificial opposition between grammaticality and frequency: comment on Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, and Friederici (2002)

In a recent Cognition paper (Cognition 85 (2002) B21), Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, and Friederici report ERP data that they claim "show that online processing difficulties induced by word order variations in German cannot be attributed to the relative infrequency of the constructions in question, but rather appear to reflect the application of grammatical principles during parsing" (p. B21). In this commentary we demonstrate that the posited contrast between grammatical principles and construction (in)frequency as sources of parsing problems is artificial because it is based on factually incorrect assumptions about the grammar of German and on inaccurate corpus frequency data concerning the German constructions involved.     

Violence in close relationships--development of a research area: comment on Archer (2000)

A brief history of empirical research on violence in close relationships is presented. Assumptions of and conclusions made by feminist researchers about the problems of battered wives are reviewed. It is argued that their focus on marital violence as a form of aggression against women by men and their concern for severely beaten wives may have caused them to ignore high levels of female violence in marriage and dating. J. Archer's (2000) meta-analysis of studies of marital and dating violence showed that both sexes display violence in these relationships, although women are more likely to be injured. An expansion of Archer's definition of heterosexual violence (or violence in close relationships) to include sexual aggression and stalking is suggested. Reasons for relatively high levels of female violence in close relationships relative to violence toward strangers are briefly discussed. It is argued that more attention needs to be given to male victims of violence from their partners.     

Constructing desirable identities--self-presentation in psychotherapy and daily life: comment on Kelly (2000)

A. E. Kelly's (2000) thesis that psychotherapy clients benefit from withholding negative information is considered in light of current social-psychological theory and research. Positive illusions about oneself are associated with indexes of mental health; this is consistent with treating therapy as positive identity development. Self-presentation can shape self-concept, even apart from the feedback that an audience might provide; the social construction of identity is a powerful process, suggesting that withholding negative and presenting only positive information is adaptive. However, evidence concerning the level of identification of one's actions suggests complexities in understanding ways clients might deal with disclosing negative information; the authors argue that the impact on self-concept is probably more complex than A. E. Kelly's characterization and that the implications are of a broader scope than indicated so far.     

Delay-reduction theory--the case for temporal context: comment on Grace and Savastano (2000)

R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano (2000) have devised a procedure to determine whether the effectiveness of a stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer depends on the temporal context of reinforcement. Although they interpret their results in terms of the contextual choice model, which maintains that value is independent of context, the results also support delay-reduction theory, which maintains that value depends on temporal context. It is argued that the delay-reduction view of the role of temporal context is also intuitively more plausible and more consistent with the way choice responds to changes in conditions.     

Childhood amnesia and distinctions between forms of memory: A comment on Wood, Brown, and Felton

Recently, Wood and his colleagues (1989) presented a case of childhood amnesia as evidence against the distinction between declarative and procedural memory that has sometimes been applied to human amnesia. Their argument was based on the observation that their patient showed some progress in school over the years, i.e., acquired some declarative knowledge, despite severely impaired day-to-day memory ability. We briefly review their case, together with a carefully studied second case of childhood amnesia not mentioned by Wood et al. Their argument is wrong in several ways. First, the utility of the declarative/procedural distinction for amnesia, or the utility of any other distinction between memory systems, depends on whether or not one kind of memory is impaired selectively, not on the severity of the impairment. In particular there is no requirement that one kind of memory be totally absent. Second, they have not provided the data necessary to support their argument; namely, data showing that the amount of declarative knowledge accumulated during years in school was better than would have been expected given the capacity for moment-to-moment or day-to-day memory. Indeed, the patient's moment-to-moment memory ability is better than represented, and the patient's progress in school was abnormally slow. Third, it is not clear that academic achievement scores provide a direct measure of declarative memory abilities (skill learning and recovery of function may also have contributed). We conclude that the evidence from childhood amnesia is fully consistent with the proposal that amnesia reflects a selective impairment in the formation of long-term declarative memory.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: reply to Hill, Gelso, and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000)

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes. She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating.     

Race and self-esteem: meta-analyses comparing whites,blacks, Hispanics,Asians, and American Indians and comment on Gray-Little and Hafdahl (2000)

These meta-analyses examine race differences in self-esteem among 712 datapoints. Blacks scored higher than Whites on self-esteem measures (d = 0.19), but Whites scored higher than other racial minority groups, including Hispanics (d = -0.09), Asians (d = -0.30), and American Indians (d = -0.21). Most of these differences were smallest in childhood and grew larger with age. Blacks' self-esteem increased over time relative to Whites', with the Black advantage not appearing until the 1980s. Black and Hispanic samples scored higher on measures without an academic self-esteem subscale. Relative to Whites, minority males had lower self-esteem than did minority females, and Black and Hispanic self-esteem was higher in groups with high socioeconomic status. The results are most consistent with a cultural interpretation of racial differences in self-esteem.     

Theory development should begin (but not end) with good empirical fits: a comment on Roberts and Pashler (2000)

S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000) argued against using goodness of fit as evidence to support theories. The authors agree with their suggestions for how to go beyond good fits but disagree with their starting point. In this comment, the authors argue that good fits are part and parcel of theory development, that they are part and parcel of the processes suggested by S. Roberts and H. Pashler, and that they must be the starting point (though far from the ending point) in theoretical development. The authors discuss historical examples of scientific theory development, recent examples of psychological theory development, and development of a particular theory (social contagion theory; J. L. Rodgers & D. C. Rowe, 1993) that S. Roberts and H. Pashler criticized.     

Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: a reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000)

The following points are made in reply to critical comments on the author's meta-analysis of partner physical aggression (J. Archer, 2000): (a) The theoretical dichotomy used in the review is one clearly identifiable in published articles, and the distinction between acts (aggression) and consequences (violence) is clearer than alternative definitions involving victims' perceptions; (b) despite the database containing many samples of U.S. students, there were sufficient other samples to draw meaningful conclusions; (c) the Conflict Tactics Scale may be limited, but in contrast to suggested alternatives, it involves clearly defined categories; (d) sexual aggression, although forming an important part of partner violence, cannot legitimately be aggregated with nonsexual physical aggression; and (e) there is a marked contrast between sex differences in physical aggression toward partners and toward same-sex opponents.     

Revisiting the constraint attunement hypothesis: reply to Ericsson, Patel, and Kintsch (2000) and Simon and Gobet (2000)

This article is part of an exchange concerning the contributions of the constraint attunement hypothesis (CAH) to the understanding of expertise effects in memory recall. K. A. Ericsson, V. Patel, and W. Kintsch (2000) and H. A. Simon and F. Gobet (2000) claim that the CAH is not novel and that existing theories of this phenomenon do not have the limitations that were attributed to them. In this reply, the CAH is argued to be the only theory of expertise effects in memory recall to adopt the abstraction hierarchy as a theory of the environment, a feature that has important theoretical implications. Also, other theories focus on psychological mechanisms but have not satisfied the burden of scientific proof required of process theories. Progress can be made by integrating the complementary advantages of existing theories into a unified theory that acknowledges the equally important roles of the organism and the environment.     

Sample size and the detection of correlation--a signal detection account: comment on Kareev (2000) and Juslin and Olsson (2005)

Simulations examined the hypothesis that small samples can provide better grounds for inferring the existence of a population correlation, p, than can large samples. Samples of 5, 7, 10, 15, or 30 data pairs were drawn either from a population with p=0 or from one with p>0. When decision accuracy was assessed independently for each level of the decision criterion, there was a criterion-specific small-sample advantage. For liberal criteria, accuracy was greater for large than for small samples, but for conservative criteria, the opposite result occurred. There was no small-sample advantage when accuracy was measured as the area under a receiver operating characteristic curve or as the posterior probability of a hit. The results show that small-sample advantages can occur, but under limited conditions.     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: reply to Saiki (2000)

J. Saiki (2000) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (1998) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes.