Overview: Expanding an animal's self-world to include conspecifics

To further the thinking about animal communication, the authors have returned to J. von Uexküll's (1934/1957) original writings on the Umwelt. Applying J. von Uexküll's self-world concept to studies of communication helps to highlight some of the unanswered questions in behavior. The authors illustrate that some researchers have adopted views that complement and expand the ideas outlined in J. von Uexküll's classic concept of an Umwelt by exploring the influence of individual, social, and ontogenetic contexts on communication. The authors maintain that further application of these concepts expands the understanding of animal communication and, more generally, of animal behavior.     

Multiple environmental contexts and communication in pygmy marmosets (Cebuella pygmaea)

There are multiple components to the concept of Umwelt experienced by an organism that may constrain the type and structure of communication signals as well as the usefulness of these signals. To illustrate the impact of these multiple environmental components, the authors used signals of the pygmy marmoset (Cebuella pygmaea), a small primate from the western Amazon. The authors summarize studies to show how the physical effects of the habitat; effects of other species, both predators and nonpredators; anthropogenic effects on the communication environment; within-group and between-groups influences other pygmy marmosets exert; and ontogeny influence the structure and usage of vocal signals. Communication within a species can be understood only in consideration of each of these contexts.     

Auditory communication,meteorology, and the Umwelt

Animal communication is affected by a multitude of environmental factors including meteorological conditions, ground reflection, turbulence, and vegetative attenuation. Evolutionary and behavioral adaptations by animals to these challenges include elephant use of infrasound optimized for long-distance propagation. These adaptations in turn influence the perceptual sphere, or Umwelt, of calling animals.     

Animal Activists,Civil Disobedience and Global Responses to Transnational Injustice

Traditionally, acts of civil disobedience are understood as a mechanism by which citizens may express dissatisfaction with a law of their country. That expression will typically be morally motivated, non-violent and aimed at changing their government’s policy, practice or law. Building on existing work, in this paper we explore the limits of one well-received definition of civil disobedience by considering the challenging case of the actions of animal activists at sea. Drawing on original interviews with advocates associated with Sea Shepherd, Greenpeace and Humane Society International we find that even if animal activists are morally motivated and civil, the transnational nature of their activity makes it difficult to assess their intention to bring about a change in law or public policy. This means that a civil disobedience defence may not be available to activists operating across international borders. This raises important questions about the usefulness of the civil disobedience concept within the context of a globalised world. We conclude that while the actions of some anti-whaling activists may not meet definitions of civil disobedience as conventionally understood, this says more about the narrow way in which that concept has been traditionally defined, than it does about the type of activity some anti-whaling activists have undertaken in the Southern Ocean. Finally, we argue that activists wishing to make a stand against whaling may have no choice but to act as global citizens because policy change within a single nation-state is unlikely to lead to the cessation of this inherently transnational activity.     

Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System

In this article, I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal. I critique and review the formal definition of affordance offered by Turvey (1992). Turvey defined affordances as properties of the environment; I discuss some consequences of this and argue that Turvey's strategy of grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties is problematic. I also suggest that Turvey's definition of affordance may lead to problems for the specification and direct perception of affordances. Motivated by these problems, I propose a new definition of affordance, in which affordances are properties of the animal-environment system. This definition does not rely on the concept of dispositional properties and is consistent with direct perception.     

Reference in human and non-human primate communication: What does it take to refer?

The concept of functional reference has been used to isolate potentially referential vocal signals in animal communication. However, its relatedness to the phenomenon of reference in human language has recently been brought into question. While some researchers have suggested abandoning the concept of functional reference altogether, others advocate a revision of its definition to include contextual cues that play a role in signal production and perception. Empirical and theoretical work on functional reference has also put much emphasis on how the receiver understands the referential signal. However, reference, as defined in the linguistic literature, is an action of the producer, and therefore, any definition describing reference in non-human animals must also focus on the producer. To successfully determine whether a signal is used to refer, we suggest an approach from the field of pragmatics, taking a closer look at specific situations of signal production, specifically at the factors that influence the production of a signal by an individual. We define the concept of signaller’s reference to identify intentional acts of reference produced by a signaller independently of the communicative modality, and illustrate it with a case study of the hoo vocalizations produced by wild chimpanzees during travel. This novel framework introduces an intentional approach to referentiality. It may therefore permit a closer comparison of human and non-human animal referential behaviour and underlying cognitive processes, allowing us to identify what may have emerged solely in the human lineage.     

The production of communication signals at the air-water and water-substrate boundaries

The 2 interfaces of the aquatic environment, the boundary between air-water and water-substrate, have distinctive physical characteristics that facilitate the production of communication signals. Recent evidence suggests that animals living on or near these boundaries use the interface to generate signals in 2 ways: (a) by producing a signal that propagates along the interface or (b) by producing a signal at the interface that is transmitted and detected within 1 of the component media. By examining the diversity of behaviors used to produce signals at these boundaries, the authors illustrate how human perception of these environments may cause researchers to incorrectly assume the environmental context of signal-generating behaviors and overlook modalities of communication pertinent to the animal.     

Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory as a Challenge for Ethics

The author discusses Niklas Luhmann's concept of ethics and morals. Therefore he sketches the main traits of Luhmann's theory of systems (e.g. the terms autopoiesis, system and environment, code and programme). From the system-theoretical point of view, ethics are characterized as the reflexive theory of morals. Morals are described as the communication of regard or disregard. The author shows which consequences follow from this concept by discussing problems concerning several subsystems at the same time. The problems of Luhmann's theory of morals and ethics are demonstrated by analyzing the concepts of risk and responsibility. Finally, the author demands that ethics should be understood even more as social ethics which reflect upon their social foundation in a more consequent way.     

Classification of mental phenomena as the highest integration level of man's relationship to the environment (with remarks on the phenomenon of altered states of consciousness)]

In recent years mystical ideas have been spreading concerning "altered states of consciousness" as "new dimensions of experience and transpersonal communication". An analysis is given of the class-conditioned character of these concepts deriving from the insecure social conditions existing under moribund imperialism. This is contrasted with the dialectical materialist concept of psychic phenomena as the highest integration level of man's relationship to the environment. Psychic phenomena are interpreted not as epiphenomena but as an expression of the new quality attained in the evolution of man as a social being in the central control of all functions of man's organism.     

动物个体差异研究对人格心理学的贡献

动物个体差异的研究与人格心理学的关系已经引起了很多学者的关注。虽然对动物个体差异有许多相关描述,但文章采用一个广泛的工作定义,即动物在不同的情景下一致表现出来的一套相关行为。对动物个体差异的测量需要考虑物种间的可比较性和物种内的充分性。文章从人格结构的探讨,遗传和环境的作用,理解人格与认知、健康的关系,以及个体与环境的匹配等方面讨论和分析了动物个体差异的研究对人格心理学的可能贡献     

Signalization and stimulus-substitution in Pavlov's theory of conditioning

The concept of conditioning as signalization proposed by Ivan P. Pavlov (1927, 1928) is studied in relation to the theory of stimulus-substitution, which is also attributed to him. In the so-called theory of stimulus-substitution a distinction must be made between an empirical principle of substitution and an actual theory of substitution, which can adopt different forms. The Pavlovian theory of substitution--which conceives substitution as a substitution of the unconditioned stimulus (US) by the conditioned stimulus (CS) in the activation of the representation of the former--can be understood as an explanation or model of signalization. Signalization and substitution are answers to different questions, and the level of analysis to which signalization corresponds, is that which concerns the nature of conditioning as an operation of the animal in the environment.     

Animal Welfare and Animal Rights: an Examination of some Ethical Problems

The spectacle of the relentless use and abuse of animals in various human enterprises led some human beings to formulate animal welfare policies and to offer philosophical arguments on the basis of which the humane treatment of animals could be defended rationally. According to the animal welfare concept, animals should be provided some comfort and freedom of movement in the period prior to the moment when they are killed. This concept emphasizes the physiological, psychological, and natural aspects of animal life with the focus on freedom. Ironically, however it is not concerned with the rights of animals; nor is it interested in their remaining alive. So, animals are least benefitted by such provisions, which is the major concern for those who defend animal rights. It seems dubious to demand comfort for a being in life, but not security for its actual life, since rights and freedom are essential for the maintenance of a normal life. This paper aims to (a) critically analyze the animal welfare system, which prioritizes only freedom; (b) to demonstrate how animal welfare is incomplete without animal rights and how they are closely related to each other; and (c) to bridge the gap between animal welfare and animal rights. The underlying principle of animal welfare concept is restricted by its anthropocentric framework with the result that the ethical element is missing. Mere ‘freedom’ is not sufficient for constituting an ideal animal welfare domain. In order to achieve real animal well-being, it is necessary to consider both the rights as well as the welfare of animals.     

La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte<Superscript>1</Superscript>

In spite of their opposite methods, Fichte's deductive process and Husserl's reduction cope with the same challenge: they aim to explain how the sensible world is dependent on reflixivity. As perception is generally linked with natural existence, and pure passivity, the deepest significance of transcendental thought in those philosophies consists in equalizing phenomenon and reflexion. In the heart of bodily life, some spiritual theme has to be found. Fichte defines action as the quantification of freedom, and freedom is effectively achieved in the sensible world. Human perception reveals freedom altogether in corporal movements as in the surrounding world (Umwelt). The Fichtean theory of acknowledgment assumes this goal. In the same way, Husserl's reduction explains how significance proceeds from the body (Leib). The Husserlian analysis of kinesthesis and the radical experience of the hand touching the other hand both introduce to the status of pre-reflection. However the complete resolution of the question is given by Fichte: Intelligibility may exist in the sensible world as the metaphysical concept of phenomenon (Erscheinung) in the last Fichtean philosophy expresses the idea of the Absolute pervading the sensible.

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La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte¹

     

Wittgenstein and the Animal Origins of Linguistic Communication

Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a ‘complete primitive language’ (viz. the builders’ game of the Philosophical Investigations) is often thought to be closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language. Indeed, it has been criticised on precisely these grounds. But such debates make little sense if we take seriously Wittgenstein's idea that language is a family resemblance concept. So, rather than argue that the builders’ game ‘really is a language’ (or not), I propose to turn the debate on its head and welcome the comparison. By changing our perspective in this way, I suggest that we can see that the learning of language is crucially dependent on forms of communication that are animal in nature. I then discuss how these lessons might shed light on empirical research into both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of linguistic communication.     

Measuring Political Thinking: Development and Validation of a Scale for “Deliberation Within”

Compared to the concept of interpersonal deliberation, little is known about the underlying and preceding cognitive processes of citizens' deliberative discussions. The aim of this article is to develop a psychometric measurement for these processes, which—following an idea advanced by Goodin ( 2000, 2003 )—may be called “deliberation within.” The measurement is constructed based on theoretical definitions of the concept and further normative criteria of citizen deliberation. In three empirical studies using independent samples, the psychometric properties of the measurement are assessed, and evidence for its reliability as well as structural and criterion validity is offered. The resulting scale may serve as a useful instrument not only for deliberation research, but also for further communication research related to political processes.     

von Uexküll’s Theory of Meaning and Gibson’s Organism–Environment Reciprocity

Abstract

Jakob von Uexküll is mostly known for his concept of Umwelt—the meaningful surrounding of animals. von Uexküll insisted vehemently on the fact that Umwelt vindicated Kant’s subjectivist epistemology in the biological domain. However, we argue that a crucial yet widely overlooked development in von Uexküll’s theory of meaning implies a more radical vision strikingly germane to J. J. Gibson’s own direct realist epistemology-ontology and in tension with his own subjectivist concept of Umwelt. Gibson argued that organism and environment are complementary and meaning is not constructed via a subjective act but is directly available in the world as opportunities for action, namely, affordances. We show that von Uexküll’s notion of “functional tone” is similar to Gibson’s concept of affordance in that it includes action in perception. More important, von Uexküll introduces the musical metaphor of harmony to characterize the relationship between animal and environment. Like Gibson’s reciprocity, harmony implies an unmediated isomorphism between the dispositions of the animal and those of the environment that allows for direct perceptual contact with the world and action upon it.     

EDUCATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

Various systemic aspects of animal and human minds are explored. Formulation of a replicative evolutionary model of the mind is presented which is based upon the recognition of this entity as a component system. It can be demonstrated that interactions of neurons have replicative organization. It was concluded that intelligent activity of the animal brain manifest itself in producing and maintaining a kind of environmental model. The environmental model is a higher organization above the level of neurons, its basic functional units are called concepts. Each single concept consists of three parts: (1( cue; (2) referential‐structure; and (3) behavioral‐instructions. Interactions among the various concepts of the brain create a concept‐superstructure which behaves as a dynamic replicative component system in controlling animal and human actions. It is assumed that selection operating in the replicative process of concept making which acts as the main factor in creating ontogenetic variability of behavior. The essential process of learning is selection of concepts generated by the brain and in that way the construction of the evolutionary dynamic concept‐superstructures of the brain's environmental model.     

Do dogs get the point? A review of dog–human communication ability

In recent years evidence has accumulated demonstrating that dogs are, to a degree, skilful in using human forms of communication, making them stand out in the animal kingdom. Neither man's closest relative, the chimpanzee, nor dog's closest living relative, the wolf, can use human communication as flexibly as the domestic dog. This has led to the hypothesis that dogs’ skills in this domain may be a result of selection pressures during domestication, which have shaped dogs’ skills tremendously. One hypothesis, the so-called by-product hypothesis, suggests that dogs have been selected against fear and aggression and as a by-product this paved the way for the evolution of generally more flexible social cognitive skills, which surpassed those of their ancestor, the wolf. Another hypothesis, the adaptation hypothesis, has claimed that dogs may have been specifically selected for certain tasks for which using human forms of communication was necessary. As of yet, the mechanism underlying dogs’ understanding of human forms of communication is not fully understood. We argue here that understanding the mechanism involved will also shed light on possible evolutionary scenarios. We argue that the evidence to date suggests that dogs’ understanding of human forms of communication may be more specialized than was predicted by some and may be best explained as the result of a special adaptation of dogs to the specific activities humans have used them for.     

Evolving grounded communication for robots

The computational and robotic synthesis of language evolution is emerging as a new exciting field of research. The objective is to come up with precise operational models of how communities of agents, equipped with a cognitive apparatus, a sensori-motor system, and a body, can arrive at shared grounded communication systems. Such systems may have similar characteristics to animal communication or human language. Apart from its technological interest in building novel applications in the domain of human-robot or robot-robot interaction, this research is of interest to the many disciplines concerned with the origins and evolution of language and communication.