Aesthetic Acquaintance

If, as Richard Wollheim says, the Acquaintance Principle is ‘a well-entrenched principle in aesthetics,’ it would be surprising if there were not something true at which those who have asserted it have been aiming. I argue that the Acquaintance Principle cannot be true on any traditional epistemic interpretation, nor on any usability interpretation of the sort Robert Hopkins has recently suggested. I then argue for an interpretation of the principle that treats acquaintance as the end to which judgments of aesthetic value are the means as opposed to the other way around.     

Acquaintance and assurance

I criticize Richard Fumerton??s fallibilist acquaintance theory of noninferential justification.     

Taste and Acquaintance

The analogy between gustatory taste and critical or aesthetic taste plays a recurring role in the history of aesthetics. Our interest in this article is in a particular way in which gustatory judgments are frequently thought to be analogous to critical judgments. It appears obvious to many that to know how a particular object tastes we must have tasted it for ourselves; the proof of the pudding, we are all told, is in the eating. And it has seemed just as obvious to many philosophers that aesthetic judgment requires first‐person experience. In this article we argue that, despite its initial appeal, the claim that gustatory and critical judgments are analogous in this way is mistaken. The two sorts of judgments are, as a matter of fact, similar in their epistemology, but earlier theorists have got things entirely backward—neither gustatory judgment nor aesthetic judgment requires first‐hand acquaintance with their objects. Our particular focus in this article is on arguing that first‐person experience is not required to know how an item of food or drink tastes. In fact, there are a wide variety of ways in which we can acquire this knowledge.     

我与斯特劳森哲学的因缘

斯特劳森的去世引发了我对自己求学道路的回忆,其中的每一步都与斯特劳森有着密切的关系。被誉为“当代最卓越的分析心灵”的斯特劳森,是执著地从事综合而系统的思考和推理的少数几位分析哲学家中的翘楚。斯特劳森的贡献正在于把描述的形而上学对概念图式及其基本结构的探索与对康德关于经验的普遍必然结构的阐发结合起来,在语言哲学的背景下促成了先验论证的复兴,从而变革和扩展了传统的经验概念。如果说康德是用现象与物自身的区分来证成自由的话,那么斯特劳森哲学的总问题实际上就是在一个只有现象没有物自身的世界中人的自由何以可能以及自由的本性为何的问题。正是秉承维特根斯坦的影响,斯特劳森对怀疑主义的反驳和对自然主义的辩护本身已经在某种程度上回答了有关保守主义的置疑。     

Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance

Bertrand Russell [1912] argued that we are acquainted with our experiences. Although this conclusion has generated a lot of discussion, very little has been said about Russell's actual arguments for it. This paper aims to remedy that. I start by spelling out two Russellian arguments for acquaintance. Then I show that these arguments cannot both succeed. For if one is sound, the other isn't. Finally, I weigh our options with respect to these arguments, and defend one option in particular. I argue that we have good reason to believe that we can be, and sometimes are, acquainted with our experiences.     

Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance

I argue against such “Higher-Order Intentionalist” theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the ground that they understand a subject’s awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than “direct”, like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness takes the relation of awareness to be nonintentional.     

Conceptual Art and the Acquaintance Principle

The Acquaintance Principle has been the subject of extensive debate in philosophical aesthetics. In one of the most recent developments, it has become popular to claim that some works of conceptual art are counterexamples to it. It is further claimed that this is a genuinely new problem in the sense that it is a problem even for versions of the Acquaintance Principle modified to deal with previous objections. I argue that this is essentially correct; however, the claim as it stands needs some work. I draw attention to, and defend, two assumptions on which the claim rests but which have so far gone unrecognized. I also address an objection that has recently been made to the claim and threatens to raise further complications for it. In doing this, we arrive at a fuller, more robust version of the initial claim.     

The Acquaintance Predicament of a Rape Victim1

The acquaintance predicament of a rape victim was examined in six experiments with between-subjects designs with samples drawn from the undergraduate student population of the University of Bombay. The experiments used rape vignettes for the manipulation of all independent variables except subject's sex and were done in three pairs such that each pair had the same independent variables and first dependent measure, namely, recommended years of imprisonment for the rapist. The second dependent measure was attributed victim's fault in the first experiment and perceived likelihood of rape in the second experiment of each pair. The first pair of experiments had a 2 (subject's sex) × 2 (acquainted vs. unacquainted rapist) × 3 (rapist's status: manager, stenotypist, or watchman) × 2 (complaint vs. no complaint by victim) design, with the rape victim being described as a stenotypist. The second pair of experiments differed from the first pair in only one respect, with victim's marital status (married vs. divorced victim) replacing the independent variable of complaint of the first pair. The third pair of experiments had a 2 (subject's sex) × 2 (physically hurt vs. not hurt victim) × 5 (rapist's relationship with victim: husband, fiance, friend, acquaintance, or stranger) design. Female subjects, as compared to male subjects, recommended longer imprisonment for the rapist, attributed less fault to the victim, and perceived greater likelihood of rape. The victim was attributed less fault in case of stranger rape versus acquaintance rape and also less fault in the complaint versus the no complaint condition. Longer imprisonment was recommended for the rapist when the victim was physically hurt rather than not hurt.     

Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen

This paper responds to Ernest Sosa’s recent criticism of Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton’s account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa’s criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton’s theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.     

Acquaintance versus stranger rape: Testing the ambiguity reduction hypothesis

After reading a vignette about a hypothetical rape incident, 240 undergraduate students of the University of Bombay recommended imprisonment for the rapist and attributed fault to the rape victim. The experiment had a 2 (subject's sex) 2 (schoolteacher versus callgirl victim) × 2 (acquainted versus stranger rapist) × 2 (victim's physical resistance versus no physical resistance) factorial design with 15 subjects per cell. As predicted, attributed victim's fault was greater and recommended rapist's imprisonment was shorter with male rather than female subjects, with the callgirl rather than schoolteacher victim, and with no physical resistance rather than with physical resistance. Greater fault was also attributed to the acquainted rather than unacquainted victim. These main effects and the interaction effects were discussed primarily in light of the proposition that acquaintance rape is viewed less seriously than stranger rape because of ambiguity regarding the acquainted victim's consent.