CONSCIOUS OBJECTIONS: GOD AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS DEBATES

Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field.     

EXPLANATION AND REFERENCE

I argue that the importance of reference for scientific explanation has been overlooked, and that actual referential stability itself is more important in the success of scientific theories than many apparently believe. Citing the work of Van Fraassen and Lipton, I delineate cases of referential failure, both intratheoretically and intertheoretically, and remind us of the role played by reference in theories both realist and non-realist. I conclude that work on such areas as contrastive explanation cannot move forward without a better account of reference, and cite previously published material on the relationship between reference and epistemic access.     

THE REALPOLITIK OF REFERENCE

Abstract: What are the conditions for fixing the reference of a proper name? Debate on this point has recently been rekindled by Scott Soames, Robin Jeshion, and others. In this paper, I sketch a new pragmatic approach to the justification of reference‐fixing procedures, in opposition to accounts that insist on an invariant set of conditions for fixing reference across environments and linguistic communities. Comparing reference to other relations whose instances are introduced through “initiation” procedures, I outline a picture in which the procedures that are successful for fixing the reference of proper names depend in part on regularities in the actual environment.     

MONITORING CONSCIOUS RECOLLECTION VIA THE ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY OF THE BRAIN

Abstract— Although another person's experience of recollection cannot be observed directly, we have found that the underlying operations can be monitored using noninvasive electrophysiological techniques. Results from two experiments showed that brain potentials elicited 500 to 900 ms after the onset of visually presented words vary systematically in amplitude with manipulations that influence the extent to which subjects engage in recollective processing. These brain potentials can thus be construed as correlates of the subjective experience of recollection     

意识和无意识知觉:注意和刺激特性间的相互补偿

该研究基于Exclusion任务,利用质的差异的研究范式,不仅确立了意识和无意识知觉在行为结果上的质的差异,而且发现刺激特性和注意在决定知觉意识时存在相互补偿的现象。在实验一中,当靶字短暂呈现时。被试用靶字补笔的比率高于基线水平;而当延长靶字呈现时间或提高对靶字的注意水平时,出现反转现象一用靶字补笔的比率低于基线水平。相对应地,在实验二中,分散注意条件下被试用靶字补笔的比率高于基线水平;而当注意集中或在分散注意条件下延长呈现时间时,出现了反转现象。     

PROXY FUNCTIONS,TRUTH AND REFERENCE

Quines ontological relativity is related to Tarskis theory of truth in two ways: Quine repudiates term-by-term-correspondence, as does Tarskis rule of truth; and Quines proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarskis truth definition.Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesnt comply with the rule of truth (Tarskis celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quines express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires.A possible adjustment is to drop (T), retain the satisfaction definition and proxy argument, and appeal to the theory of observation and indeterminacy of reference as grounds of relativity. But as we shall see Quines theories of assent to observation sentences and of reference-learning dont square easily with his naturalism. The first attributes intentional attitudes to observers; and the second assumes a holistic context principle and a concept of individuation which do not withstand scrutiny as empirical notions. Both appear to violate Quines behavorist canon.A saving alternative is a theory of term-reference that appears in Roots of Reference and affords a return to behaviorism, and reinstatement of the proxy argument and relativity in a way compatible with Tarskis (T).