The rationality of science,critical thinking,and science education

This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning science's rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched.It is notwhat the man of science believes that distinguishes him, buthow andwhy he believes it. His beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority or intuition (Russell 1945, p. 527).I believe ... that all teaching [in science] on the University level (and if possible below) should be training and encouragement in critical thinking (Popper 1970, pp. 52–53).This paper is mainly drawn from other publications. The first section is taken from my (1985); the second from (1988), Chapter 2; and the third from (1988), Chapter 6. Since what appears here are truncated versions of those discussions, I urge interested readers to look to those other works for fuller treatments of the issues here discussed.     

计算机、证明和证据(英文)

有论者认为以电脑辅助进行之数学证明其实包含了经验性之前提,因此要接受此类证明,就得修改传统的"数学证明"的概念。本文审视此说法;以讨论Thomas Tymoczko的一篇关于四色定理得哲学意义的论文为发端,进而论及Tyler Burge等人的相关观点,并由此对上述说法提出质疑。     

Knowledge representation,the World Wide Web,and the evolution of logic

It is almost universally acknowledged that first-order logic (FOL), with its clean, well-understood syntax and semantics, allows for the clear expression of philosophical arguments and ideas. Indeed, an argument or philosophical theory rendered in FOL is perhaps the cleanest example there is of “representing philosophy”. A number of prominent syntactic and semantic properties of FOL reflect metaphysical presuppositions that stem from its Fregean origins, particularly the idea of an inviolable divide between concept and object. These presuppositions, taken at face value, reflect a significant metaphysical viewpoint, one that can in fact hinder or prejudice the representation of philosophical ideas and arguments. Philosophers have of course noticed this and have, accordingly, sought to alter or extend traditional FOL in novel ways to reflect a more flexible and egalitarian metaphysical standpoint. The purpose of this paper, however, is to document and discuss how similar “adaptations” to FOL—culminating in a standardized framework known as Common Logic—have evolved out of the more practical and applied encounter of FOL with the problem of representing, sharing, and reasoning upon information on World Wide Web.     

Human Capital,Education and the Promotion of Social Cooperation: A Philosophical Critique

Although since the 1960s human capital theory has played a major role in guiding educational policy, philosophical issues that stem from this development have rarely been discussed. In this article, I critically examine how the idea that human capital should serve as a guide to educational policy making stands in relation to the role assigned to education in promoting social cooperation. I begin by exploring the conception of human conduct that underlies human capital theory. I then move to examine the conception of social cooperation that tacitly guides human capital theory and maintain that it could not be effectively defended. I, therefore, turn to examine alternative ways to combine between human capital theory and the promotion of social cooperation. My main argument is that under existing conditions there is a deep theoretical incompatibility between the philosophical foundations of human capital theory and the ways in which education seeks to promote social cooperation.     

Anti-Naturalism: The Role of Non-Empirical Methods in Philosophy

Some naturalistic conceptions of philosophical methodologies interpret the doctrine that philosophy is continuous with science to mean that philosophical investigations must implement empirical methods and must not depart from the experimental results that the scientific application of those methods reveal. In this paper, I argue that while our answers to philosophical questions are certainly constrained by empirical considerations, this does not imply that the methods by which these questions are correctly settled are wholly captured by empirical methods. Many historical cases of successful answers to philosophical questions involve strategies and methods that allow the divergence from empirically established results. I develop this idea and then illustrate it with Frege's methodology in his Foundations of Arithmetic.     

Peirce’s Philosophy of Mathematical Education: Fostering Reasoning Abilities for Mathematical Inquiry

I articulate Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education as related to his conception of mathematics, the nature of its method of inquiry, and especially, the reasoning abilities required for mathematical inquiry. The main thesis is that Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education primarily aims at fostering the development of the students’ semeiotic abilities of imagination, concentration, and generalization required for conducting mathematical inquiry by way of experimentation upon diagrams. This involves an emphasis on the relation between theory and practice and between mathematics and other fields including the arts and sciences. For achieving its goals, the article is divided in three sections. First, I expound Peirce’s philosophical account of mathematical reasoning. Second, I illustrate this account by way of a geometrical example, placing special emphasis on its relation to mathematical education. Finally, I put forth some Peircean philosophical principles for mathematical education.     

Agency,Thought, and Language: Analytic Philosophy Goes to School

I take as my starting point recent concerns from within educational psychology about the need to treat the conceptual and philosophical underpinnings of empirical research in the field more seriously, specifically in the context of work on the self, mind and agency. Developing this theme, I find such conceptual support in the writings of P. F. Strawson and Donald Davidson, two giants of analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. Drawing particularly on Davidson’s later work, in which he seeks to integrate key claims about subjectivity, objectivity, belief, truth and knowledge, within what he refers to as a triangular framework of two speakers and a common world, I find support for pedagogic and classroom organizational structures based on collaborative thinking and dialogue. While Davidson did not write about education, I argue that his framework has much to offer, most particularly in view of the priority it affords language and dialogue as the necessary and sufficient conditions for reason, belief and thought—in short, for being a person in the world.     

Religion,psychology, and mental health: The problems of partnership

While a current and increasingly popular trend is toward partnerships between religion and psychology in the area of mental health, and especially toward the use of psychological ideas and techniques by pastoral counselors, modern psychology and traditional religion are divided in significant ways over several normative issues. Too often these issues are minimized or overlooked. But unless these issues—which carry significant sociocultural implications as well as implications for our definitions of individual well-being—are acknowledged and subjected to critical considerations, partnerships between religion and psychology must be far more cautiously constructed and must be subjected to far more systematic thinking about the differences which separate the two.This article is based on a paper delivered at the Seventh Annual Clinical-Community Conference on Psychology and Religion at the University of Maryland in November, 1978.     

Religion in a private igloo? A critical dialogue with Richard Rorty

It is still a popular philosophical position to call for a strict “separationism” concerning the private and the public sphere when it comes to religious convictions. Richard Rorty is one prominent supporter of this claim. The traditional critique against this division is mostly built on a particular characterization of religion that is at odds with Rortian assumptions. In this article, however, Rorty is criticized on his own terms turning pragmatically the objection to a fully internal one. What Rorty values most, namely a tolerant and ironic liberalism as the capacity to describe oneself in new and interesting ways is precisely the role, I argue, that religious faith could play under “neo-liberal” conditions.     

Deferentialism

There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend—deferentialism, as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems can be swiftly and decisively dispatched by appeal to disciplines other than philosophy. In this paper we will argue that such an attitude of uncritical deference to any non-philosophical discipline is badly misguided. With reference to the work of John Burgess and David Lewis, we consider deference to mathematics. We show that deference to mathematics is implausible and that main arguments for it fail. With reference to the work of Michael Blome-Tillmann, we consider deference to linguistics. We show that his arguments appealing to deference to linguistics are unsuccessful. We then show that naturalism does not entail deferentialism and that naturalistic considerations even motivate some anti-deferentialist views. Finally, we set out deferentialism’s failings and present our own anti-deferentialist approach to philosophical inquiry.     

The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them.     

Using lifeworld philosophy in education to intertwine caring and learning: an illustration of ways of learning how to care

Our general purpose is to show how a philosophically oriented theoretical foundation, drawn from a lifeworld perspective can serve as a coherent direction for caring practices in education. We argue that both caring and learning share the same ontological foundation and point to this intertwining from a philosophical perspective. We proceed by illustrating shared epistemological ground through some novel educational practices in the professional preparation of carers. Beginning in a phenomenologically oriented philosophical foundation, we will first unfold what this means in the practice of caring, and secondly what it means for education and learning to care in humanly sensitive ways. We then share some ways that may be valuable in supporting learning and health that provides a basis for an existential understanding. We argue that existential understanding may offer a way to bridge the categorisations in contemporary health care that flow from problematic dualisms such as mind and body, illness and well-being, theory and practice, caring and learning. Ways of overcoming such dualistic splits and new existential understandings are needed to pave the way for a care that is up to the task of responding to both human possibilities and vulnerabilities, within the complexity of existence. As such, we argue that caring and learning are to be understood as an intertwined phenomenon of pivotal importance in education of both sensible and sensitive carers. Lifeworld led didactics and reflection, which are seen as the core of learning, constitute an important educational strategy here.     

The role of the arts and humanities in human flourishing: A conceptual model

There is much debate on the value of the arts and humanities in our society. Each side provides strong arguments, but there has been little empirical research to draw on. A key reason for the lack of scientific evidence is the absence of a conceptual model on which to base investigations of the ways the arts and the humanities might contribute to human flourishing. To address this, we present a model to demarcate the domain of the arts and humanities by means of an extensional definition (e.g. majors, disciplines, and occupations) integrated with a functional analysis (i.e. modes of engagement and activities of involvement). We suggest immersion, embeddedness, socialisation, and reflectiveness as mechanisms by which the arts and humanities may enhance various forms of human flourishing. We conclude with implications of the model and ideas for future research to investigate the effects of the arts and humanities on human flourishing.     

Challenging the Limits of Critique in Education Through Morin’s Paradigm of Complexity

The position adopted in this paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his critique of scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism. This paper is based on research focusing on the diversity of conceptions of critique developed in academic discourses. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of this notion in educational sciences. The reflection begins with the introduction of some of Morin’s assumptions concerning the paradigm of complexity. The next section provides a definition of the idea of critique and explores some limits associated with contemporary references framing this notion. Theories of critique are at the core of several educational theories. Based on the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining the way the idea of critique is reduced in education are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. The position adopted denounces therefore the fact that the current development of theories of critique in education does not provide a framework considering more systematically their conditions of emergence, their own limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships, which connect them to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between “hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging existing theories of critique in education according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them.     

心理科普教育与自我教育结合初探

本文对中国心理科普教育进行了回顾与反思,指出了忽视自育、心育特殊性等问题;根据十六年的教育实验,总结了心理科普教育与自育结合的多种有效途径。     

Heidegger on Ontological Education,or: How We Become What We Are

Heidegger presciently diagnosed the current crisis in higher education. Contemporary theorists like Bill Readings extend and update Heidegger's critique, documenting the increasing instrumentalization, professionalization, vocationalization, corporatization, and technologization of the modern university, the dissolution of its unifying and guiding ideals, and, consequently, the growing hyper-specialization and ruinous fragmentation of its departments. Unlike Heidegger, however, these critics do not recognize such disturbing trends as interlocking symptoms of an underlying ontological problem and so they provide no positive vision for the future of higher education. By understanding our educational crisis 'ontohistorically', Heidegger is able to develop an alternative, ontological conception of education which he hopes will help bring about a renaissance of the university. In a provocative reading of Plato's famous 'allegory of the cave', Heidegger excavates and appropriates the original Western educational ideal of Platonic paideia, outlining the pedagogy of an ontological education capable of directly challenging the 'technological understanding of being' he holds responsible for our contemporary educational crisis. This notion of ontological education can best be understood as a philosophical perfectionism, a re-essentialization of the currently empty ideal of educational 'excellence' by which Heidegger believes we can reconnect teaching to research and, ultimately, reunify and revitalize the university itself.     

Emotion Education without Ontological Commitment?

Emotion education is enjoying new-found popularity. This paper explores the ‘cosy consensus’ that seems to have developed in education circles, according to which approaches to emotion education are immune from metaethical considerations such as contrasting rationalist and sentimentalist views about the moral ontology of emotions. I spell out five common assumptions of recent approaches to emotion education and explore their potential compatibility with four paradigmatic moral ontologies. I argue that three of these ontologies fail to harmonise with the common assumptions. Either those three must therefore be rejected or, if we want to retain one or more of them (for instance, Jesse Prinz’s recent rebranding of hard sentimentalism that I explore in detail), we need to revise our assumptions about the practice of emotion education in ways that are both radical and, I argue, ultimately unacceptable.     

The psychology of memory,extended cognition,and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.     

Perceiving Other Planets: Bodily Experience,Interpretation, and the Mars Orbiter Camera

An emerging philosophical perspective called “postphenomenology,” which offers reflection upon human relations to technology, has the potential to increase our understanding of the functions performed by imaging technologies in scientific practice. In what follows, I review some relevant insights and expand them for use in the concrete analysis of practices of image interpretation in science. As a guiding example, I explore how these insights bear upon a contemporary debate in space science over images of the fossilized remains of a river delta on the surface of Mars. These considerations include an analysis of the ways that the objects of study are transformed by the mediating imaging technologies, such as the Mars Orbiter Camera.