Conceptual information on objects' locations

According to traditional views, basic and subordinate concepts elicit perceptual information, superordinate concepts abstract information. Two experiments showed that also superordinate concepts activate perceptual and contextual information. In Experiment 1 participants evaluated the adequacy of Scene- and Object-like locations ascribed to basic and superordinate concepts. Superordinate concepts were judged faster when paired with Scene-like locations, where many exemplars can coexist, than with Object-like locations. The results were replicated and extended in the second experiment with a location production task. Theoretical accounts for the results are discussed.     

Categorizing objects in isolation and in scenes: what a superordinate is good for

Many studies have shown that subjects are faster at categorizing objects into "basic" concepts than into more general superordinate concepts. However, all of these studies have used a categorization task in which single, isolated objects are identified. There is good reason to believe that superordinate concepts are typically used to refer to collections of objects rather than to individual objects. For example, people more often use the term furniture to refer to a number of pieces of furniture rather than to name a single piece. This suggest that superordinate concepts include information about multiple objects and their common relations, particularly the typical scenes in which such objects appear. Four experiments examined this possibility by investigating whether the basic concept advantage will decrease or reverse itself when subjects are asked to categorize an object as part of a scene. The results showed that the basic-superordinate difference did decrease when subjects categorized objects in scenes. Furthermore, when an object was placed in an inappropriate scene, there was more interference for superordinate identifications. The results suggest qualitative differences in the representations of superordinate and basic concepts.     

Inductive Reasoning in Alzheimer''s Disease

We evaluated knowledge of basic level and superordinate semantic relations and the role of cognitive resources during inductive reasoning in probable Alzheimer's disease (AD). Nineteen mildly demented AD patients and 17 healthy control subjects judged the truthfulness of arguments with a premise and a conclusion that contain familiar concepts coupled with "blank" predicates, such as "Spiders contain phosphatidylcholine; therefore all insects contain phosphatidylcholine." Like healthy control subjects, AD patients were relatively insensitive to the typicality of the premise category when judging the strength of arguments with a conclusion containing a basic-level concept, but were relatively sensitive to typicality during judgments of arguments containing a superordinate in the conclusion. Moreover, AD patients resembled control subjects in judging arguments with an immediate superordinate in the conclusion compared to arguments with a distant superordinate. AD patients differed from control subjects because they could not take advantage of two premises in an argument containing basic-level concepts. We conclude that semantic knowledge is sufficiently preserved in AD to support inductive reasoning, but that limited cognitive resources may interfere with AD patients' ability to consider the entire spectrum of information available during semantic challenges.     

Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor Network: Dynamics of Learning and Computations

The structure of people's conceptual knowledge of concrete nouns has traditionally been viewed as hierarchical ( Collins & Quillian, 1969 ). For example, superordinate concepts ( vegetable ) are assumed to reside at a higher level than basic-level concepts ( carrot ). A feature-based attractor network with a single layer of semantic features developed representations of both basic-level and superordinate concepts. No hierarchical structure was built into the network. In Experiment and Simulation 1, the graded structure of categories (typicality ratings) is accounted for by the flat attractor network. Experiment and Simulation 2 show that, as with basic-level concepts, such a network predicts feature verification latencies for superordinate concepts ( vegetable ). In Experiment and Simulation 3, counterintuitive results regarding the temporal dynamics of similarity in semantic priming are explained by the model. By treating both types of concepts the same in terms of representation, learning, and computations, the model provides new insights into semantic memory.     

Concept Appraisal

This paper reports the first empirical investigation of the hypothesis that epistemic appraisals form part of the structure of concepts. To date, studies of concepts have focused on the way concepts encode properties of objects and the way those features are used in categorization and in other cognitive tasks. Philosophical considerations show the importance of also considering how a thinker assesses the epistemic value of beliefs and other cognitive resources and, in particular, concepts. We demonstrate that there are multiple, reliably judged, dimensions of epistemic appraisal of concepts. Four of these dimensions are accounted for by a common underlying factor capturing how well people believe they understand a concept. Further studies show how dimensions of concept appraisal relate to other aspects of concepts. First, they relate directly to the hierarchical organization of concepts, reflecting the increase in specificity from superordinate to basic and subordinate levels. Second, they predict inductive choices in category-based induction. Our results suggest that epistemic appraisals of concepts form a psychologically important yet previously overlooked aspect of the structure of concepts. These findings will be important in understanding why individuals sometimes abandon and replace certain concepts; why social groups do so, for example, during a “scientific revolution”; and how we can facilitate such changes when we engage in deliberate “conceptual engineering” for epistemic, social, and political purposes.     

A connectivity model for semantic processing

Summary A connectivity model for semantic processing, based on two major assumptions, is proposed and tested. The representation assumption states that semantically related features are represented by an interconnected structure of features. A network is termed interconnected if each node is linked to at least two other nodes. According to the processing assumption, indirect activation becomes increasingly effective as the number of interconnected nodes increases. The connectivity model thus predicts that more complex concepts will be processed faster than less complex concepts. Experiment 1 was performed to determine the number of features for a set of 72 words and to show that subordinate concepts share common features with their natural superordinate concept. In Experiments 2 and 3 subjects had to judge whether or not a word belonged to a previously defined natural superordinate concept. The results confirm the connectivity model and show that concepts with many features can be classified faster than concepts with only a few features.This research was supported by a Grant of the Max Kade Foundation     

Concept History and Religious Discourse

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) has made important contributions to the study of political and social thought, as well as to cultural history more generally. Reinhart Koselleck has argued that, during the eighteenth century, basic concept use in Europe experienced widespread trends of (1) democratization, (2) temporalization, (3) ideologization, and (4) politicization. This article will consider the possibility of a conceptual history of religious discourse. While conceptual history has thus far focused primarily on political and social concepts, some research has more recently turned to religious concepts. This work should be expanded and can be improved by the insight of theologians and ethicists who often have a better understanding of religious concept use than conceptual historians whose main focus is political thought. I will summarize how concept history could be applied to religious concepts, how theologians might make a contribution to the theory behind Koselleck's understanding of modern concept use, and offer a critique of a recent methodological introduction to religious concept history.     

Supervenience and Physicalism

Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities uncovered during work over the past two decades. I test my analysis by applying it to the problem of defining physicalism, concluding that the thesis of physicalism is best captured by the conjunction of two supervenience relations. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Semantic organization in the young child: Evidence for the development of semantic feature systems

In two experiments, 5-, 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children and college students were presented on each trial with a sentence followed by a probe word. Their task was to indicate whether the probe was in the sentence or not. Of primary interest were the false recognitions and the correct latencies that occurred when the probe word was a synonym or antonym of one of the words in the sentence (Experiment I) or when the probe was a subordinate, superordinate, part, or whole (Experiment II). The younger children were more affected by synonymy than antonymy, although the older children and adults were not. At all ages, the categorical relationships caused more recognition confusion than the partwhole relationships. Subjects were more affected when the probe was a superordinate than when it was a subordinate, and somewhat more affected when the probe was the whole than when it was the part. These results suggest that children as young as 5 years of age have well-organized conceptual systems based on shared meaning components.     

The effect of hierarchical levels of categories on children's deductive inferences about inclusion

Although the hierarchical levels of categories have been recognized as a major factor of variation in categorical reasoning, few studies have examined its effect on the understanding of inclusion. This issue was approached by varying the levels (subordinate, basic, and superordinate) of categories involved in inference tasks assessing 5‐, 7‐, and 9‐year‐old children's understanding of transitivity and asymmetry of inclusive relations in the dog hierarchy. Children were administered both a qualitative inference task and a quantitative class‐inclusion task, each presenting different hierarchical levels. Results showed that the ability to make qualitative inferences assessing transitivity varied with age. Although children of all ages demonstrated a high rate of success at these inference questions, 7‐ and 9‐year‐olds had better performance than 5‐year‐olds, suggesting that the capacity to understand the transitivity of inclusive relations still develops until at least 7 years. However, the hierarchical levels of categories had no effect on children's performance either in qualitative inferences requiring transitivity understanding or in class‐inclusion problems. In contrast, for qualitative inferences assessing asymmetry, children's performance varied with the hierarchical level of the categories involved. Inferring from a superordinate to a basic level category, inferring from a superordinate to a subordinate level category, and inferring from a basic to a subordinate level category appeared as three levels of increasing difficulty. Our analyses also revealed that 7‐year‐olds were better at grasping the asymmetry in the superordinate‐to‐basic relation than in any other relation between categories of different hierarchical levels, and that their 9‐year‐old peers mastered the asymmetric nature of inclusion in both superordinate‐to‐basic and superordinate‐to‐subordinate relations. This might indicate that the different levels of difficulty observed are developmentally grounded. Though exploratory, these findings help to clarify the steps through which the child comes to grasp the difficult concepts of inclusion and asymmetry and give some indications on the possible constraints that may affect their acquisition.     

Basic level and superordinate level categorization by autistic, mentally retarded, and normal children

Three experiments designed to test autistic children's nonverbal and verbal categorization abilities are reported in this paper. In the first two experiments, 14 autistic children were compared to 14 retarded and 14 normal children matched on verbal mental age. Their ability to categorize pictures from basic level categories and from biological and artifactual superordinate level categories was assessed using a matching-to-sample procedure. The three groups of subjects were similar in their performance. Basic level categorization was easier than more abstract categorization, and for all three groups, prototypicality played a role in categorizing superordinate level concepts; that is, children in all three groups made more errors categorizing peripheral examples. In the third experiment, a subgroup of 7 autistic children showed evidence that their lexicons were well organized and that they appreciated the meaning relationships among words at the superordinate level. These findings suggest that autistic children do not suffer a specific cognitive deficit in the ability to categorize and form abstract concepts, as has been previously suggested in the literature.     

Classifying types of concept and conceptual structure: Some taxonomies

Abstract

The study of concepts can advance further by clarifying the meanings of basic terms such as “prototype” and by constructing a large-scale primary taxonomy of concept types. This paper presents the latter, based on concept structure, two secondary concept taxonomies and one of conceptual structures. The primary taxonomy organises much data and several previous taxonomies into a single framework. It suggests that many concept types exist, and that type determines how a concept is learned, is used and how it develops. As well as enumerating and interrelating some major types, the taxonomy predicts that many individuals' concepts will consist of mixes of information types. The present study suggests that the field will progress faster by ceasing to look for the single way anything is done. A better strategy is to enumerate concept types, ways each can be learned and developmental patterns, and then see what variables affect these and how common each is.     

Representation at different levels in a conceptual hierarchy

The present study examines the influence of hierarchical level on category representation. Three computational models of representation – an exemplar model, a prototype model and an ideal representation model – were evaluated in their ability to account for the typicality gradient of categories at two hierarchical levels in the conceptual domain of clothes. The domain contains 20 subordinate categories (e.g., trousers, stockings and underwear) and an encompassing superordinate category (CLOTHES). The models were evaluated both in terms of their ability to fit the empirical data and their generalizability through marginal likelihood. The hierarchical level was found to clearly influence the type of representation: For concepts at the subordinate level, exemplar representations were supported. At the superordinate level, however, an ideal representation was overwhelmingly preferred over exemplar and prototype representations. This finding contributes to the increasingly dominant view that the human conceptual apparatus adopts both exemplar representations and more abstract representations, contradicting unitary approaches to categorization.     

Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts,Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence*

I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of ‘concept’, it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the potential thoughts produced by recombining her representational abilities apart from a direct confrontation with the states of affairs being represented. Such representational abilities support a cognitive engagement with the world that is flexible, abstract, and active.     

Concept empiricism, content, and compositionality

Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Therefore, concepts are vital to any theory of cognition. However, despite their widely accepted importance, there is little consensus about the nature and origin of concepts. Thanks to the work of Lawrence Barsalou, Jesse Prinz and others concept empiricism has been gaining momentum within the philosophy and psychology literature. Concept empiricism maintains that all concepts are copies, or combinations of copies, of perceptual representations—that is, all concepts are couched in the codes of perceptual representation systems. It is widely agreed that any satisfactory theory of concepts must account for how concepts semantically compose (the compositionality requirement) and explain how their intentional content is determined (the content determination requirement). In this paper, I argue that concept empiricism has serious problems satisfying these two requirements. Therefore, although stored perceptual representations may facilitate some traditionally conceptual tasks, concepts should not be identified with copies of perceptual representations.     

Object identification: The mental representation of physical and conceptual attributes

In two experiments, subjects indicated whether two pictures of familiar objects were equivalent. The picture pairs were identical, showed the same object in various perspectives and states, or showed different objects with varying degrees of conceptual relatedness. In Experiment 1, the equivalence criterion for judging the picture pairs was varied between subjects (identity of pictures; conceptual equivalence of objects at subordinate, basic, or superordinate level). The reaction times of the four subject groups suggest that a pictorial stimulus is not always mentally represented in the same way, and that the instructions given determine which attributes of the stimulus are represented. In Experiment 2, the visual similarity of the picture pairs was varied. The results indicate, at least with a basic-level equivalence instruction, that not only perceptual, but also non-perceptual, functional attributes are represented—namely, those that, according to Rosch et al. (1976), are common to the members of a superordinate category.     

A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content

This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.     

Paleolithic art and cognition.

In this article, I have explored some of the possible relationships between the first appearance of representational art in human history and the early development of human cognition. I argue that most Upper Paleolithic depictions directly represent generalized mental images of their animal subjects rather than percepts or recollected scenes from life and that these images, in turn, are representations of concepts at the basic level of categorization. A common feature of Paleolithic art forms is the salience of parts, and the treatment of parts indicates analytic and synthetic (recombinative) abilities. There are some indications of superordinate categorization. An expansion of conceptual thinking seems to be implied as well as the beginnings of operational thought. The presence and practice of depiction may have had the effect of bringing concepts into consciousness and thus inducing reflection in at least a partially abstract mode.     

Paleolithic Art and Cognition

In this article, I have explored some of the possible relationships between the first appearance of representational art in human history and the early development of human cognition. I argue that most Upper Paleolithic depictions directly represent generalized mental images of their animal subjects rather than percepts or recollected scenes from life and that these images, in turn, are representations of concepts at the basic level of categorization. A common feature of Paleolithic art forms is the salience of parts, and the treatment of parts indicates analytic and synthetic (recombinative) abilities. There are some indications of superordinate categorization. An expansion of conceptual thinking seems to be implied as well as the beginnings of operational thought. The presence and practice of depiction may have had the effect of bringing concepts into consciousness and thus inducing reflection in at least a partially abstract mode.     

The game of the name: An examination of linguistic reference after brain damage

Two aspects of naming have generally been examined in aphasics: the appreciation of a single property of a concept and the ability to use the names of fully elaborated concepts. In applying to aphasics a recently proposed model of semantic organization—one which allows the simultaneous examination of these two aspects—two studies were conducted: Anterior and posterior aphasics were asked (1) to name members of superordinate categories, their responses being converted into prototypicality scores (the degree to which a member of a category resembles an ideal member of that category) and (2) to differentiate between more or less prototypical members of a category and their superordinates. The results revealed that, while anterior and posterior aphasics differ in their use of the names representing fully elaborated concepts, these groups show no differences in terms of the appreciation of a single property of a concept. The implications of these findings for reference were discussed.