Intersexuality and the categories of sex

Operations on intersexuals indicate that the sex of a person is based on more than biology. Expectations about proper gender activities furnish the frameworks through which certain features and combinations of features are understood to be fundamental to bodies and to comprise their sex. Yet, we can ask whether this interpretation is either coherent or consistent with our fuller conceptions of ourselves. Is there a point to interpreting a person as a sex?     

Cognitive categories and memory span: I. Shifting between categories

Broadbent and Gregory's hypothesis that shifting selection between cognitive classes is at least inefficient is tested by varying the number of transitions from consonants to digits and back in a mixed list memory span situation. No orderly decrease is found as a function of the number of transitions, which renders the attention hypothesis unlikely. An alternative position in terms of interference theory could explain the data qualitatively. Tests of further predictions of this theory need first an estimate of the degree of difference between cognitive classes.     

Relational categories are more mutable than entity categories

Across three experiments, we explore differences between relational categories—whose members share common relational patterns—and entity categories, whose members share common intrinsic properties. Specifically, we test the claim that relational concepts are more semantically mutable in context, and therefore less stable in memory, than entity concepts. We compared memory for entity nouns and relational nouns, tested either in the same context as at encoding or in a different context. We found that (a) participants show better recognition accuracy for entity nouns than for relational nouns, and (b) recognition of relational nouns is more impaired by a change in context than is recognition of entity nouns. We replicated these findings even when controlling for factors highly correlated with relationality, such as abstractness–concreteness. This suggests that the contextual mutability of relational concepts is due to the core semantic property of conveying relational structure and not simply to accompanying characteristics such as abstractness. We note parallels with the distinction between nouns and verbs and suggest implications for lexical and conceptual structure. Finally, we relate these patterns to proposals that a deep distinction exists between words with an essentially referential function and those with a predicate function.     

Cody's categories

Of the two main interpretations of Spinoza's theory of the identity of the attributes, in particular those of Thought and Extension, the objective interpretation is now almost universally preferred to the subjective. Rejection of the subjective interpretation, according to which the attributes are merely our ways of cognizing a reality whose real essence remains unknown, is certainly justified, but the objective theory comes too near to replacing the identity by a mere correlation of différents to be quite satisfactory. Is it not better to say that Thought and Extension represent two complementary conceptions of reality which are both correct? Yes, but in saying so some commentators ascribe to mind, as Spinoza conceives it, an unplausibly abstract status. An alternative proposal is made as to a way in which Spinoza might be right in essentials, though it requires that a certain tension in Spinozism as to the nature of body be resolved in a particular direction.     

Spatial categories and the estimation of location

Four experiments are reported in which people organize a space hierarchically when they estimate particular locations in that space. Earlier work showed that people subdivide circles into quadrants bounded at the vertical and horizontal axes, biasing their estimates towards prototypical diagonal locations within those spatial categories (Psychological Review 98 (1991) 352). In this work Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan showed that the use of such spatial categories can increase the accuracy of estimation of inexactly represented locations. The stimulus locations we examined were uniformly distributed across the circle. In the present study we explore whether variation in the distribution of locations affects how the circle is categorized. Other things being equal, categories that capture high density regions in a stimulus space should contribute most to accuracy of estimation. However, precision of boundaries is also important to accuracy; with imprecise boundaries stimuli may be misclassified, leading to large errors in estimation. We found that people use the same spatial categories regardless of the distribution of the locations. We argue that this spatial organization nevertheless can maximize the accuracy of estimates because vertical and horizontal category boundaries are the most exact, minimizing misclassification of stimuli.     

Case-like categories in children: The actor and some related categories

Case categories were investigated using a method in which pictures are presented accompanied by a sentence describing the scene: Preschool children learn to put tokens on the objects in the pictures according to the role each object plays in the scene as described. Generalization trials explore what the children include within the various roles. Children rapidly learn to associate tokens with case-like categories during the training phase, and readily transfer to new stimuli in generalization trials. The experiments demonstrate that children have a broad Actor category. The Actor “does” the action, and Actors are not necessarily animate. However, animacy is a class property of stimuli to which the children were very sensitive. There was evidence that User and Instrument are subcategories of Actor that are differentiated only when a sentence contains both. The data also suggest a Locative category, and Patient as a category of the grammatical object. Finally, the children appeared to treat subjects of predicate adjectives as a separate category, here called the Subject of Attribution, distinct from Actor, and functionally independent of objects of transitive verbs.     

Natural categories

The hypothesis of the study was that the domains of color and form are structured into nonarbitrary, semantic categories which develop around perceptually salient “natural prototypes.” Categories which reflected such an organization (where the presumed natural prototypes were central tendencies of the categories) and categories which violated the organization (natural prototypes peripheral) were taught to a total of 162 members of a Stone Age culture which did not initially have hue or geometric-form concepts. In both domains, the presumed “natural” categories were consistently easier to learn than the “distorted” categories. Even when not central, natural prototype stimuli tended to be more rapidly learned and more often chosen as the most typical example of the category than were other stimuli. Implications for general differences between natural categories and the artificial categories of concept formation research were discussed.     

Tractarian objects and logical categories

It has been much debated whether Tractarian objects are what Russell would have called particulars or whether they include also properties and relations. This paper claims that the debate is misguided: there is no logical category such that Wittgenstein intended the reader of the Tractatus to understand his objects either as providing examples of or as not providing examples of that category. This is not to say that Wittgenstein set himself against the very idea of a logical category: quite the contrary. However, where Russell presents his logical variety of particulars and the various types of universal, and Frege presents his of objects and the various types of function, Wittgenstein denies the propriety of such a priori expositions. Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical types of entity but insists that the nature of these types is something to be discovered only through analysis. This research was conducted whilst holding a Jacobsen Research Fellowship at the University of London.     

Color categories and color appearance

We examined categorical effects in color appearance in two tasks, which in part differed in the extent to which color naming was explicitly required for the response. In one, we measured the effects of color differences on perceptual grouping for hues that spanned the blue-green boundary, to test whether chromatic differences across the boundary were perceptually exaggerated. This task did not require overt judgments of the perceived colors, and the tendency to group showed only a weak and inconsistent categorical bias. In a second case, we analyzed results from two prior studies of hue scaling of chromatic stimuli (De Valois, De Valois, Switkes, & Mahon, 1997; Malkoc, Kay, & Webster, 2005), to test whether color appearance changed more rapidly around the blue-green boundary. In this task observers directly judge the perceived color of the stimuli and these judgments tended to show much stronger categorical effects. The differences between these tasks could arise either because different signals mediate color grouping and color appearance, or because linguistic categories might differentially intrude on the response to color and/or on the perception of color. Our results suggest that the interaction between language and color processing may be highly dependent on the specific task and cognitive demands and strategies of the observer, and also highlight pronounced individual differences in the tendency to exhibit categorical responses.     

Visual classes and natural categories in the pigeon

After being trained on an oak leaf pattern, pigeons responded to other oak leaf patterns but not to leaf patterns of other species. Thus, graphic variation among the instances of a species is "transparent" to the visual system. At this taxonomic level, concept formation is spontaneous rather than inductive. It is argued that such immediate generalization may be critical to the survival of the organism.     

Feature inference and the causal structure of categories

The purpose of this article was to establish how theoretical category knowledge-specifically, knowledge of the causal relations that link the features of categories-supports the ability to infer the presence of unobserved features. Our experiments were designed to test proposals that causal knowledge is represented psychologically as Bayesian networks. In five experiments we found that Bayes' nets generally predicted participants' feature inferences quite well. However, we also observed a pervasive violation of one of the defining principles of Bayes' nets-the causal Markov condition-because the presence of characteristic features invariably led participants to infer yet another characteristic feature. We argue that this effect arises from a domain-general bias to assume the presence of underlying mechanisms associated with the category. Specifically, people take an exemplar to be a "well functioning" category member when it has most or all of the category's characteristic features, and thus are likely to infer a characteristic value on an unobserved dimension.     

Ad hoc categories

People construct ad hoc categories to achieve goals. For example, constructing the category of “things to sell at a garage sale” can be instrumental to achieving the goal of selling unwanted possessions. These categories differ from common categories (e.g., “fruit,” “furniture”) in that ad hoc categories violate the correlational structure of the environment and are not well established in memory. Regarding the latter property, the category concepts, concept-to-instance associations, and instance-to-concept associations structuring ad hoc categories are shown to be much less established in memory than those of common categories. Regardless of these differences, however, ad hoc categories possess graded structures (i.e., typicality gradients) as salient as those structuring common categories. This appears to be the result of a similarity comparison process that imposes graded structure on any category regardless of type.     

Variation within categories

Two aspects of variation within categories, relating to different models of categorization, were investigated — frequency of dimensional values and typicality differences within values. The influence of range of typicality experienced during learning and of informational value of feedback was also studied. Finally, differential forgetting of values was examined.In the experiment subjects learned to categorize faces, and then performed a classification test task and pairwise comparisons of faces. A variety of dependent variables was employed, including the galvanic skin response (GSR).Typicality and frequency of values appeared to influence categorization performance independent of each other. It was concluded that both prototype distance models and frequency models explain different aspects of variation within the same categories, and that models of classification should account for frequency of values in contrasting categories. Results showed furthermore (1) the influence of typicality range on the extension of a category; (2) no influence of specific feedback regarding representativeness of a face; (3) less decay with more important values; and (4) a positive relationship between uncertainty reduction and GSR.     

Inference using categories

How do people use category membership and similarity for making inductive inferences? The authors addressed this question by examining the impact of category labels and category features on inference and classification tasks that were designed to be comparable. In the inference task, participants predicted the value of a missing feature of an item given its category label and other feature values. In the classification task, participants predicted the category label of an item given its feature values. The results from 4 experiments suggest that category membership influences inference even when similarity information contradicts the category label. This tendency was stronger when the category label conveyed class inclusion information than when the label reflected a feature of the category. These findings suggest that category membership affects inference beyond similarity and that category labels and category features are 2 different things.