简析宗教的人性论

宗教人性论是宗教哲学的重要内容.就世界上几个主要宗教来看,宗教人性论是一种善恶二重的人性论,它在认定人的现实本性为恶的同时,也肯定人的先天本质是善的,它认为导致人的本性具有善恶二重的根源是人的肉体情欲和人所具有的神性.宗教人性论思想作为人类对自身的认识和理解具有合理之处,对于人类止恶向善具有一定的积极作用.     

从《商书》看商代的人性思想

商人认为人的天性中包含有欲望,现实中人们的本性容易受到恶人的影响而变坏。此外,个人多行不义,是人性变恶的重要内因。同时,商人认为人性包含有某些不变的因素,例如现实人性中有追求安逸稳定的特点,这本身并无善恶可言,但当这种心理膨胀到妨害国家长治久安的利益时,就变成了恶。君王通过扬善伐恶的政治措施促进人性向善。对于个体的人性修养而言,克制私心、坚持道德学习是人性修养的重要途径。     

老庄善恶观试探

老庄所谓心、性是两个绝对不同的概念.其他事物从于性,而人从于心.人之善与恶在于心之用.圣人、至人代表着老庄所谓善,圣人、至人非由其本性成就,而由心之修养工夫成就,所以道德之根源在于心.人之违背本性与道,代表着老庄所谓恶,人违背本性与道亦由人之心所起,所以恶亦源于心.性源于道,性与道是相通的.心之用合于本性、合于道即为善,违背本性、违背道即为恶,所以性与道是老庄之善恶标准.心合于性与道,是老庄修养工夫之目标.     

什么是善——奥古斯丁论模仿统一的秩序是善

一般认为,创造世界的上帝是绝对的善,他不可能在世界上创造出恶,那么,世界上存在着恶应该怎么解释呢?奥古斯丁的答案是,恶就是善的匮乏,就是非存在.善是模仿统一的秩序.作者以此为起点,梳理了奥古斯丁的一些思想,包括上帝、绝对真理(Veritas,Truth)、真理(verum,truth)、善、恶、理性、感官、本性、秩序和无序,以及它们之间的关系.通过梳理,作者也澄清了一些学者对奥古斯丁善恶形而上学的误解.     

菩提一叶

阐提断修善尽,但性善在;佛断修恶尽,但性恶在。问：性德善,恶何不可断？答：性之善恶,但是善恶之法门。性不可改,历三世无谁能毁。复不可断坏。……佛虽不断性恶,而能达于恶;以达恶故,于恶自在;……以自在故,广用诸恶法门,化度众生。──《观音玄义》卷上「释意］做尽坏事的恶人,断绝了对善的修习,但他本性中的善还存在;佛阳断绝了对恶的修习,但本性中的恶还存在。因此有人发问：既然说本性的德行已达到至善,为什么恶还木能断绝呢？答案是：说到人性的善与恶,只不过是扬善去恶的一种法门。本性是木可改变的,哪怕经历过去…     

《太平经》“善—美”思想刍议

《太平经》认为人的善恶行为是由人的主观意志所决定的,源于行为主体善或恶的本性,所以《太平经》一再强调心性美、行为美的修养是修仙学道的重要内容与内在要求。而"守一"之法是修养崇高人品人格美的重要途径,强调通过修炼"守一"之法,排除心中杂念,保持心神宁静,回归人本性中最朴实的善美。同时,《太平经》的"善—美"思想又是建立在"孝"、"忠"等传统"礼教"化了的伦理—美学的观点基础之上的,因此世俗伦理化的"善—美"又表现为"孝—美"与"忠—美"。此外,《太平经》的"善—美"思想还具有明显的宗教伦理特色,即它是以宗教的"善恶报应"论、"承负"说的形式出现的。利用人们对神灵的敬畏,迫使人们规范自己的行为,具有明显的社会伦理—美学的教化意义。     

康德论人性的善恶

康德关于人性善恶的思想建立在他对人之本性的界定上,就人的自然本性而言,人并不涉及道德上的善恶问题;就人的理性本质而言,人的本性中既有向善的原初禀赋,又有趋恶的倾向,这为人向善或趋恶提供了可能性。康德说人的本性意味着出自自由的行动的根据,由此人性的善或恶取决于自由的任意将道德法则作为动机或将违背道德法则的动机纳入准则的自由。按照康德的严峻主义观点,人的本性天生就存在一种根本恶,这种恶败坏了一切准则的根据,造成了心灵的颠倒,但正因为其源于人的自由本性,也为人改恶向善提供了可能性。     

论科学的人性观及其在教育实践中的意义

一、人性论争何时休日常的生活和工作以及许许多多的科学都涉及人和人的发展。因此,人们常常不可避免地要提到人性。但什么是人性?人性是从哪里来的?中国历史上,许多思想家强调人性天赋。而对这种天赋的人性,有人主张“人性本善”。例如战国时的孟子认为,人生来就有恻(忄急)、羞恶、辞让、是非之心,它们是四个“善端”。在后天环境中,只要将这四个“善端”加以扩充。就会形成美好的道德;如果由于某种原因,“四端泯灭,那么人就失去了天性而趋向邪恶。另一些思想家则相反。主张“人性本恶”。例如,稍后于孟子的荀子,认为人生来就有追求利、欲、声、色和恶劳的本性。而人之为善,是后天习得的。这些后天习得的东西,苟子称为“伪”。他的基本思想是“人之性恶,其善者伪也”(荀子《性恶篇》),因此,教化的任务就是改造本性,去恶为善,即“化性起伪”。还有一些思想家认为,人的本性无所谓善恶,它像大     

康德“人性中的根本恶”与荀子“人性恶”之比较

康德认为作为有限的理性存在者既有“善的秉赋”也有“恶的倾向”,恶源自于质料及经验性杂多对理性的干扰,改恶迁善应当进行“思维方式上的转变”,将基于理性的道德法则置于基于质料的自爱或幸福法则之上,并以道德(宗教)信仰保证德福一致及道德律的践行.与康德认为人的自然本性无所谓善恶不同,荀子认为“生而好利”的基于欲望的自然天性决定了人性本恶,后天“化性起伪”的方式着重于以圣人、师长为主导的礼义教化.康德偏重先验分析的自由意志与苟子着重经验教化的方式都有助于人的道德自律的形成.     

贝施特和智顗论"恶"的宗教价值--兼谈宗教中的"善恶"观念

谈"善"论"恶"是宗教中的永恒话题,但宗教中的"善恶"并非仅仅是伦理学意义上的善恶,而是包括宗教修持意义上的"善恶".一般而言,"善"是有助于宗教修持的,但是贝施特和智顗却分别站在犹太教和中国佛教天台宗的立场揭示了"恶"对于宗教修持的积极作用,阐明了"恶"的宗教价值,尽管他们所说的"恶"的内涵不同.其中贝施特主张"恶"中分有"善"的神性,通过"恶"可以回归上帝;智顗主张"恶"中本具"善"的"实相",通过观"恶"的"烦恼心"可以达到解脱.可以说,在"恶"的宗教价值这个问题上,贝施特和智顗进行了一次跨宗教的对话.     

佛教果报理论与《聊斋志异》伦理思想

佛教果报理论与伦理观念的总原则是 :诸恶莫作 ,众善奉行 ;恶有恶报 ,善有善报 ,不是不报 ,时候未到。而《聊斋志异》叙述得最多的就是善恶之业 ,果报不爽 ,在劫难逃的故事。概言之 ,作者不仅借助佛教善恶报应的因果理论来宣说一定的纲常伦理观念 ,而且也借助佛教的因果规律来展开情节 ,塑造人物 ,交代故事的来龙去脉 ,使之更合乎情理。从而使人们通过阅读这些故事 ,更加明确遵守纲常伦理的重要性 ,增强社会道德的责任感 ,自觉修善积德 ,防恶止非 ,在严格要求自己的同时 ,也建立起良好的社会关系。     

Reaching for Virtue, Stumbling on Sin: Concepts of Good and Evil in a Postmodern Era

Although our culture struggles to understand the origins and nature of good and evil behavior, the disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis contribute to the discourse primarily indirectly. By examining early Judaism and Christianity, the authors seek to clarify the foundation of contemporary understanding of good and evil in Western society. Looking through the multiple filters of religion, philosophy, psychoanalysis and psychology, groundwork is laid for definitions of good and evil, which can be understood subjectively and measured objectively. As we investigate morality, will, and choice in the varied ologies and across time, we note how much emotion and volition are secondary in modern thinking about evil. Moreover, the place of will as a positive force in development is largely ignored, except by prescient thinkers like Otto Rank. To grasp evil's nature we need to integrate past with present, contrast conscious to unconscious desires, and allow that being bad is not necessarily unnatural or pathological, but can be a transitional stage in the growth of one's conscience.     

唯识精进的结构与功能――以对主观幸福感的影响为例

以588名高中生为被试,以《精进问卷》、《生活满意度量表》和《积极与消极情感量表》为工具,先考察唯识精进的结构,然后,以精进对主观幸福感的影响为例,考察精进的功能。结果表明：（1）精进是七因素的结构;（2）对于生活满意度和积极情感而言,最有力的正向预测变量是无下和披甲精进;（3）对于消极情感而言,披甲和加行精进有微弱的负向预测作用。本研究突破了唯识心理学乃至佛教心理学偏重思辨研究而忽略实证研究的局限。     

Indeterminacy and Moral Action in Laozi

There is an apparent tension in Laozi 老子 between his denial of the adequacy of positive theoretical formulations and his concomitant endorsement of certain kinds of practical action over others. Laozi writes, for example, “Where they all know the good as good, there is evil, Therefore Being and non-being produce each other” (Laozi 2.3–5), which suggests that good and evil produce each other the way being and non-being produce each other; in which case to do good will lead to evil and to do evil will lead to good. The result threatens to become moral paralysis. I argue that this destabilization of moral concepts does not amount to a moral relativism, but leaves us with a consistent moral point of view in its own way.     

Deterrence or Appeasement? or,On Trying to be Rational about Nuclear War[1]

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be powerful, if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible.     

六祖惠能的积极心理学思想蕴涵

六祖惠能的禅宗思想中蕴涵着丰富且深邃的积极心理学思想,其旨在解脱心灵、远离尘世烦恼的终极目标及其蕴含的生命的大智慧与当代积极心理学思想高度契合。其积极心理学思想主要包括积极心理品质、积极认知、积极人生态度、积极自我以及积极关系等方面,这些思想对当代社会仍具有很大的现实价值。因此,通过对惠能的积极心理学思想的研究,可加强传统心理学思想与现代主流心理学的融合,既继承与发扬中国传统文化,促使学者关注传统心理学文化; 又推动了积极心理学在中国的发展,使得当代中国人更好地理解和践行积极心理学思想,从而更好地生活。     

东西方文化的人性观差异及其对道德认知的影响

人性观,即认为人性究竟是本善的还是本恶的,不仅是哲学思辨的焦点,也是日常生活中形成的一种常人理论(lay theory)。对于东西方文化传统的检视表明,西方文化占主导地位的是性恶论人性观,东方文化占主导地位的则是性善论人性观。研究通过实证数据支持了这一结论,发现中国被试相对于美国被试,对于人性的主观评定更倾向于性善的一端(研究1)。这种人性观差异导致中国被试在道德方面,尤其是规范性道德(行善)方面,对人提出了更高的要求(研究1),并且这种因果关系得到了启动实验的支持(研究2)。这些研究结果有助于人们更好地理解文化如何塑造了人们对于人性和道德的看法。     

老子的水性人格理论及其现实意义

老子认为,人性是源于道的朴,具有主动性、柔弱性、复归倾向和自我意识。水性兼具人性和道性。圣人的人格是水性人格,其结构包括“食母”需要、质朴的自我意识和柔弱处世三个组成部分。在环境无条件的积极关注之下,个体通过致虚守静和以“重静”规约“轻躁”的努力,就可以形成水性人格。老子的水性人格理论,对于人格理论的构建和健全人格的培养都具有一定的启示价值。     

Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses

This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem that does not require abandoning God's essential goodness.     

Some Things Ought Never Be Done: Moral Absolutes in Clinical Ethics

Moral absolutes have little or no moral standing in our morally diverse modern society. Moral relativism is far more palatable for most ethicists and to the public at large. Yet, when pressed, every moral relativist will finally admit that there are some things which ought never be done. It is the rarest of moral relativists that will take rape, murder, theft, child sacrifice as morally neutral choices. In general ethics, the list of those things that must never be done will vary from person to person. In clinical ethics, however, the nature of the physician–patient relationship is such that certain moral absolutes are essential to the attainment of the good of the patient – the end of the relationship itself. These are all derivatives of the first moral absolute of all morality: Do good and avoid evil. In the clinical encounter, this absolute entails several subsidiary absolutes – act for the good of the patient, do not kill, keep promises, protect the dignity of the patient, do not lie, avoid complicity with evil. Each absolute is intrinsic to the healing and helping ends of the clinical encounter.