生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

论“认知”与“认识”的分界

本论述了“认知”与“认识”的分界以及现在用“认知”取代心理学中“认识”一词的必要性，其意义在于既有助于准确概括认识的心理过程；也有助于心理学概念体系的完善；更有助于我国心理学与世界心理学的联系与统一。     

生成与动力:具身认知研究中的互动观

从方法论上讲,认知研究中的个体主义把研究的焦点放在个体身上,倾向于从个体内部寻求对社会行为的解释。与个体主义取向不同的是,具身认知中的互动观更注重人际和社会互动对于理解他人的重要作用。心理学中的生态学方法最早关注了环境与有机体之间的互动对知觉产生的影响。生成认知在此基础上更进一步,认为互动不仅发生在有机体与环境之间,而且表现为主体与主体的交互影响,两个主体间的交互不是两个笛卡尔式心灵的对话,交互的主体是身体,是一种“肉身间性”的过程。具身认知研究中的互动观强调身心一体论,反对身心二元论,在方法论上表现出反还原论的特色。     

现代认知心理学对态度研究的影响述评

社会学家托马斯认为“社会心理学就是研究态度的科学”,到目前为止,态度仍然是社会心理学研究的重要领域,据统计,近几年关于态度的研究论文每年均超过１０００篇。这与认知心理学的兴起有密切关系,本文以态度为例,浅谈现代认知心理学对它的影响。１态度的认知编码认知心理学家已经提出了多种不同的认知编码类型,如命题单元（ｐｒ０００ｓｉｔｉｏｎａｌｕｎｉｔｓ）｛类似物表征（ａｎａｌｏｇｒｅｎｒｅｓｅｎｔａｔｌｏｎｓ）、情节和语义表征（ｅｎｌｓｏｄｌｃａｎｄｓｅｍａｎｔｉｃｒｅｎｒｅｓｅｎｔａｔｌｏｎｓ）及产生式系…     

论舒斯特曼的身体美学思想——兼论中国古典身体美学研究

舒斯特曼由分析美学转向实用主义美学的宗旨就在于,让关学发挥对日常生活的指导价值,让身体成为我们日常生活的中心。因此,实用主义美学关注身体的目的在于（1）是身体而非理性与语言是我们通达源初世界的途径,通过改善和提高身体意识达到对世界的本真性了解;（2）纠正人们在对待身体现象上偏向外在表面的矫饰行为,而主张建立身心合一的新身体观;（3）反对把身心分离为手段一工具的二元论思想,而主张建立手段与目的相互依寓的身心一体的身体观,重视身体在人类行为中的基础性价值;（4）反对身体的禁欲主义主张,从身体出发对于身体合理性欲望予以充分肯定。舒斯特曼建立身体美学的目的就在于,恢复鲍姆嘉登遗漏的“身体”,重置了“身体”作为美学学科的本体性地位。此外,本文勘比了这一身体关学思想与中国古典身体美学异同及研究意义。     

“具身”涵义的理论辨析

“具身”是当代心理学和认知科学领域的热门话题, 其基本涵义是指认知对身体的依赖性。经典认知科学主张“非具身”, 认为认知是一种信息的表征与加工, 从本质上讲与承载它的身体无关。“弱具身”强调了认知对身体的依赖性, 但是却保留了认知的计算和表征功能。“强具身”则极力主张认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的, 身体的特殊细节造就了认知的特殊性。在怎样理解“具身”方面, 存在着不同的解释。从本文作者的观点来看, 具身的性质和特征表现在4个方面：(1)身体参与了认知, 影响了思维、判断、态度和情绪等心智过程。(2)我们对于客观世界的知觉依赖于身体作用于世界的活动, 身体的活动影响着关于客观世界表象的形成。(3)意义源于身体, 抽象的意义有着身体感觉—运动系统的基础。(4)身体的不同倾向于造就不同的思维和认识方式。有关具身的研究将从理论和实践两个层面对心理学产生冲击。     

试论具身认知科学的典型理论特色

在认知心理学的发展遇到瓶颈时,具身认知科学引领心理学做新的突围。它突破主流心理学和正统认知科学所坚持的镜像论、表征论和容器论,强调交互隐喻;突破认知计算主义,强调认知的非可计算性;突破心理的离身性与对物质基质的非依赖性,强调心智的具身性和对物质基质的依存性;突破普遍理性或普遍形式,重视意向性和认知或智能的个别差异。正是这些突破,促进了包括认知心理学在内的认知科学在广度、深度上发展,形成了独具特色的具身认知理论。     

不确定情境中的决策心理——适应与认知

不确定情境中的决策问题广受经济学家和心理学家关注,但他们对人的决策行为有不同的解释。该简要回顾了经济学和心理学视野中的决策理论,包括预期效用理论、主观预期效用理论和前景理论。主要介绍了“生态理性”观对人的决策心理的研究,着重介绍了研究发现的几种启发式策略,如“一个理由策略”,并探讨了他们在人适应过程中的作用。中最后分析了决策问题的研究现状。     

"学与教"的社会建构主义观点述评

自1960年代以来,认知心理学所取得的丰硕成果对教学心理领域的研究产生了深远的影响,提高了心理学在教育实际领域的可应用价值,也导致以认知主义为主导的研究倾向。然而,认知心理学中的方法论的局限,特别是信息加工观点的关于人是“物理符号系统”(H．A,Simon语)假设的机械主义和科学主义倾向是显而易见的。这种研究的局限和倾向,在当今以人为本、强调学生主体性和创造性的人文主义教育领域中不免显得捉襟见肘,因而限制了这种研究在教育实际领域的适用性。因此,体现了建构主义和社会文化思想的社会建构主义心理学思想,在近十多年来应运而生。了解这种思想的“学与教”的观点及研究,对于教学心理理论和实践研究是大有裨益的。     

团体认知影响数学概念结构表征的实验研究

概念结构表征一直是认知心理学研究的重要内容。本研究以团体及表征理论为基础,通过设计不同的团体认知条什来研究认知交互作用对概念结构表征的影响。实验结果表明不同的团体认知表现出了不同的认知交互,对概念结构表征也产生了不同的影响。     

Situating distributed cognition

We historically and conceptually situate distributed cognition by drawing attention to important similarities in assumptions and methods with those of American “functional psychology” as it emerged in contrast and complement to controlled laboratory study of the structural components and primitive “elements” of consciousness. Functional psychology foregrounded the adaptive features of cognitive processes in environments, and adopted as a unit of analysis the overall situation of organism and environment. A methodological implication of this emphasis was, to the extent possible, the study of cognitive and other processes in the natural (real world) contexts in which they occur. We therefore emphasize commonalities and differences between functional psychology and D-Cog. One purpose of the comparison is to consider the extent to which criticisms directed at functional psychology are relevant to D-Cog. We also examine the relation between functional psychology and philosophical pragmatism and conclude that D-Cog's conceptual framework would be strengthened through more explicit adoption of philosophical pragmatism, consistent with the eventual trajectory of functional psychology.     

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

镜像神经元:认知具身性的神经生物学证据

传统认知心理学认为认知类似于计算机对抽象符号的加工和运算,这种观点支持了身心二元论。但是近年来兴起的具身认知运动却否定了这一观点的合理性。具身认知认为认知是身体与世界互动的结果,是身体的感觉-运动系统作用于世界而塑造出来的。认知是具身的,离不开身体的构造和感觉运动系统的作用。镜像神经元的发现支持了认知的具身特征,为认知的具身性提供了神经生物学的证据。     

PEIRCE'S "ARCHITECTURE OF THEORIES" AND THE PROBLEM OF PRAGMATISM

The paper begins as a response to Tom Rockmore's thesis that contemporary pragmatism is a healthy “confusion” of disparate views. While Rockmore sees the need of some of today's pragmatists to provide a motivation for what he calls “epistemic optimism,” I contend that the crucial question of pragmatism, the problem of pragmatism, is the ontological status of pragmatic meaning. Thus rather than a mere “epistemic optimism,” I call upon pragmatists to assert a fallible yet unabashedly metaphysical optimism. The argument supporting this claim is made in the context of Peirce's “The Architecture of Theories.” In “The Architecture of Theories” Peirce opens the door to a pragmatic metaphysics while at the same time committing the error of subordinating truths and reality to “the long run of inquiry.” Rockmore suggest that the solution may lie in a return to Kant's notion of the “powers of the mind.” However, it is my contention that a solution to this problem cannot be found within Kant at all. I shall argue here that until contemporary pragmatism decisively extracts itself from the Kantian paradigm, the pragmatic philosophic value of pragmatic meaning will always be qualified, conditional and ontologically subordinated, having the same effect upon the standing of pragmatism as a philosophy as well. Moreover, I shall endeavor to show that when the Kantian paradigm is finally abandoned, pragmatism's classic difficulties with realism and what Peircc called “the long run” of scientific inquiry can also be resolved. Kantian “powers of the mind” and constructivist “epistemological optimism” would then be transformed into what I shall call unrestricted pragmatism. On the other hand if the Kantian impediment is not overcome, these difficulties will continue to form the basis of a more sceptical and traditionally restricted pragmatism, one which lacks the confidence desired by both Rockmore and myself.     

Extended music cognition

Discussions of extended cognition have increasingly engaged with the empirical and methodological practices of cognitive science and psychology. One topic that has received increased attention from those interested in the extended mind is music cognition. A number of authors have argued that music not only shapes emotional and cognitive processes, but also that it extends those processes beyond the bodily envelope. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the case for extended music cognition. Two accounts are examined in detail: Joel Krueger’s “musically extended emotional mind” and Tom Cochrane’s “expression and extended cognition.” Each account is evaluated using three “anti-extension” arguments. I argue that Krueger and Cochrane’s accounts offer important steps toward extended music cognition, but that each account remains underdeveloped in various ways. To supplement existing approaches, I propose a complementary extended computational approach to music cognition (ECMC). The claim is that music cognition forms part of an extended system in virtue of involving computational processes that range across environmental and in-the-head elements. The paper concludes by showing how the ECMC deals with each of the three anti-extension challenges and responds to objections.     

The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited

The hypothesis of extended cognition maintains that cognitive processes sometimes span the brain, body, and world. One of the most prominent types of arguments for this hypothesis begins with observations of the role of certain sorts of bodily and environmental influences on cognitive processes, then concludes that these bodily and environmental influences are themselves cognitive processes. This paper will argue that, while it is widely appreciated that the simplest versions of these “coupling arguments” are fallacious, the advocates of extended cognition still seem to underestimate how prevalent even the simplest forms are in the literature, why they are so pervasive, and how these fallacious arguments might be avoided by greater attention to a plausible theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.     

Feminist Philosophy,Pragmatism, and the “Turn to Affect”: A Genealogical Critique

Recent years have witnessed a focus on feeling as a topic of reinvigorated scholarly concern, described by theorists in a range of disciplines in terms of a “turn to affect.” Surprisingly little has been said about this most recent shift in critical theorizing by philosophers, including feminist philosophers, despite the fact that affect theorists situate their work within feminist and related, sometimes intersectional, political projects. In this article, I redress the seeming elision of the “turn to affect” in feminist philosophy, and develop a critique of some of the claims made by affect theorists that builds upon concerns regarding the “newness” of affect and emotion in feminist theory, and the risks of erasure this may entail. To support these concerns, I present a brief genealogy of feminist philosophical work on affect and emotion. Identifying a reductive tendency within affect theory to equate affect with bodily immanence, and to preclude cognition, culture, and representation, I argue that contemporary feminist theorists would do well to follow the more holistic models espoused by the canon of feminist work on emotion. Furthermore, I propose that prominent affect theorist Brian Massumi is right to return to pragmatism as a means of redressing philosophical dualisms, such as emotion/cognition and mind/body, but suggest that such a project is better served by John Dewey's philosophy of emotion than by William James's.