Dynamic shifts of pigeon local/global attention

It has previously been shown that pigeons can shift attention between parts and wholes of complex stimuli composed of larger, "global" characters constructed from smaller, "local" characters. The base-rate procedure used biased target level within any condition at either the local or global level; targets were more likely at one level than at the other. Biasing of target level in this manner demonstrated shifts of local/global attention over a time span consisting of several days with a fixed base rate. Experiment 1 examined the possibility that pigeons can shift attention between local and global levels of perceptual analysis in seconds rather than days. The experiment used priming cues the color of which predicted on a trial-by-trial basis targets at different perceptual levels. The results confirmed that pigeons, like humans, can display highly dynamic stimulus-driven shifts of local/global attention. Experiment 2 changed spatial relations between features of priming cues and features of targets within a task otherwise similar to that used in experiment 1. It was predicted that this change in cues might affect asymmetry but not the occurrence of a priming effect. A priming effect was again obtained, thereby providing generality to the claim that pigeons can learn that trial-by-trial primes predict targets at different levels of perceptual analysis. Pigeons can display perceptual, stimulus-driven priming of a highly dynamic nature. Electronic Publication     

Base-rate training without case cues reduces base-rate neglect

Base-rate neglect is a persistent phenomenon in which subjects do not place sufficient weight on the probabilities of occurrence of relevant events. Two experiments with college students support the hypothesis that base-rate neglect may be minimized by providing base-rate training in the absence of case, or witness, cues, prior to introducing (or reintroducing) these cues. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis was supported by both within-subjects and between-groups assessments; in Experiment 2, the hypothesis was supported while the effects of instructions and a correction procedure were found to be minimal. In Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2, training with case cues present also reduced base-rate neglect, but this effect was not sufficient to account for the effect of cue-absent base-rate training. Correction trials led some subjects to detect that the task contingencies were random; however, neither this nor actually telling subjects after the experiment that the task was indeed random led invariably to subjects’ describing the optimal strategy (which was to choose the richer alternative exclusively).     

心理距离对基线比例忽略的影响

基线比例忽略是指在不确定情境中, 个体进行判断和决策时不能充分利用或者忽略基线比例的现象。本研究通过系列情境实验探索了三种不同维度的心理距离, 即时间距离、空间距离和社会距离对基线比例忽略的影响。结果发现, 三种心理距离均能够对基线比例忽略产生影响：当时间距离、空间距离和社会距离较近时, 个体更容易表现出基线比例忽略现象; 而当时间距离、空间距离和社会距离较远时, 个体的基线比例忽略倾向减弱。     

I know the rule,but I'll just go with my gut: is there a rational use of intuition?

ABSTRACT

Research has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a “rational” decision process. Results from four experiments show that “base-rate neglecting” occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities (assigned after all relevant information is considered) predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants (suggesting a rational process). However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some participants report to prefer base-rate information, define individuating information as non-diagnostic, and their posterior probabilities suggest otherwise, they still provide individuating-based responses.     

Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.     

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency.     

Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes

The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals.     

Accentuation of information processes and biases in group judgments integrating base-rate and case-specific information

This article investigates differences in the ways that groups and individuals apply information-processing strategies and fall prey to biases in their judgments. Judgments were made on probabilistic inference problems that involved base-rate and case-specific information. Consistent with hypotheses, when individuals neglect base-rate information in their probability judgments, groups accentuate this tendency. Moreover, when the source of case-specific information is inaccurate, individuals neglect the case-specific information, and groups accentuate this tendency with the base-rate information dominating their probability judgments. In addition, groups accentuate the strategies used by individuals to integrate the base-rate and case-specific information. These results provide strong support for a group accentuation tendency for the application of information-processing biases and the strategies used to integrate information. Discussion reflects upon the relationship of the results of this experiment with other research on base-rate neglect and group judgment. Underlying mechanisms and potential moderators of the group accentuation pattern are also discussed.     

行为决策中的基线比例忽略：心理机制与影响因素

基线比例忽略是指个体进行决策和判断时不能充分利用或者忽略基线比例而偏好新信息的现象。该现象普遍存在于日常行为与决策的许多领域,尤其显著表现在临床医疗领域,因此对这一现象的研究具有重要的应用价值。目前,基线比例忽略的心理机制主要有双加工理论和因果贝叶斯框架等。基线比例忽略的影响因素主要包括认知能力、年龄、基线比例的表述形式等。未来的研究需要从基线比例忽略的神经机制、影响因素以及应用研究的拓展等方面着手。     

Frequency illusions and other fallacies

[Cosmides and Tooby, 1996] increased performance using a frequency rather than probability frame on a problem known to elicit base-rate neglect. Analogously, [Gigerenzer, 1994] claimed that the conjunction fallacy disappears when formulated in terms of frequency rather than the more usual single-event probability. These authors conclude that a module or algorithm of mind exists that is able to compute with frequencies but not probabilities. The studies reported here found that base-rate neglect could also be reduced using a clearly stated single-event probability frame and by using a diagram that clarified the critical nested-set relations of the problem; that the frequency advantage could be eliminated in the conjunction fallacy by separating the critical statements so that their nested relation was opaque; and that the large effect of frequency framing on the two problems studied is not stable. Facilitation via frequency is a result of clarifying the probabilistic interpretation of the problem and inducing a representation in terms of instances, a form that makes the nested-set relations amongst the problem components transparent.     

基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用

针对贝叶斯推理研究中基础概率忽略现象的争论,直接操纵基础概率水平,考察被试在贝叶斯推理时是否加工了基础概率信息。结果表明,低基础概率组后验概率估计显著低,无基础概率组后验概率估计反应时显著短于有基础概率组。被试在各种条件下估计的正确率都较低,说明对基础概率在贝叶斯推理中的作用考虑不充分。     

The structure of pigeon multiple-class same-different learning

Three experiments examined the structure of the decision framework used by pigeons in learning a multiple-class same-different task. Using a same-different choice task requiring the discrimination of odd-item different displays (one or more of the display's component elements differed) from same displays (all display components identical), pigeons were concurrently trained with sets of four discriminable display types. In each experiment, the consistent group was tested such that the same and different displays of four display types were consistently mapped onto their choice alternatives. The inconsistent group received a conflicting mapping of the same and different displays and the choice alternatives that differed across the four display types but were consistent within a display type. Experiment 1 tested experienced pigeons, and Experiment 2 tested naive pigeons. In both experiments, the consistent group learned their discrimination faster and to a higher level of choice accuracy than did the inconsistent group, which performed poorly in general. Only in the consistent group was the discrimination transferred to novel stimuli, indicative of concept formation in that group. A third experiment documented that the different display classes were discriminable from one another. These results suggest that pigeons attempt to generate a single discriminative rule when learning this type of task, and that this general rule can cover a large variety of stimulus elements and organizations, consistent with previous evidence suggesting that pigeons may be capable of learning relatively unbounded relational same-different concepts.     

Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals: An instance of the base-rate fallacy

Social stereotypes may be defined as beliefs that various traits or acts are characteristic of particular social groups. As such, stereotypic beliefs represent subjective estimates of the frequencies of attributes within social groups, and so should be expected to “behave like” base-rate information within the context of judgments of individuals: specifically, individuating target case information should induce subjects to disregard their own stereotypic beliefs. Although the results of previous research are consisten with this prediction, no studies have permitted normative evaluation of stereotypic judgments. Because the hypothesis equates base rates and stereotypes, normative evaluation is essential for demonstrating equivalence between the base-rate fallacy and neglect of stereotypes in the presence of individuating case information. Two experiments were conducted, allowing for normative evaluation of effects of stereotypes on judgments of individuals. The results confirmed the hypothesis and established the generalizability of the effect across controversial and uncontroversial, socially desirable and socially underirable stereotypic beliefs. More generally, an examination of the differences between intuitive and normative statistical models of the judgment task suggest that the base-rate fallacy is but one instance of a general characteristic of intuitive judgment processes: namely, the failure to appropriately adjust evaluations of any one cue in the light of concurrent evaluations of other cues.     

“Insight” in pigeons: absence of means–end processing in displacement tests

The understanding of functional relations between action and consequence is a critical component of intelligence. To examine this linkage in pigeons, we investigated their understanding of the relations of the elements tested in an extension of Köhler’s box stacking task to this species. In the experiments, the pigeons had to move a spatially displaced box under an out-of-reach target. Experiment 1 successfully replicated and extended the previous finding showing that when separately trained to move a box and stand on it to peck the target, pigeons can synthesize these behaviors to solve the single-box displacement problem quickly on their first attempt. Experiment 2 tested whether pigeons, when given a simultaneous choice between two boxes with identical reinforcement histories, would selectively choose the box with the correct functional affordance (i.e., permitting standing) to solve the problem rather than a non-functional one. Their extensive, equivalent, and undirected behavior in moving both boxes during these tests suggests the pigeons did not possess a means–end understanding of the functional properties of the boxes. Instead, their results were consistent with an analysis of their earlier synthetic behavior as being due to the temporal and spatial relations of the physical elements in the task and their prior learned behaviors.     

No evidence for rule-based processing in the inverse base-rate effect

The inverse base-rate effect in categorization (Medin & Edelson, 1988) arises when participants assign an ambiguous stimulus to a category that occurred less frequently than an alternative category, against the principles of Bayesian decision making. In the experiment reported in this article, rule-based and attention-shifting accounts of the inverse base-rate effect were evaluated. Participants completed a categorization task, known to produce the inverse base-rate effect, under standard conditions, under time pressure, and with a secondary task load. The inverse base-rate effect persisted under severe time pressure and under secondary task load. The results provided no evidence for the role of rule-based processes in producing the inverse base-rate effect. The data from the experiment are compatible with an attention-shifting account.     

An associative framework for probability judgment: an application to biases

Three experiments show that understanding of biases in probability judgment can be improved by extending the application of the associative-learning framework. In Experiment 1, the authors used M. A. Gluck and G. H. Bower's (1988a) diagnostic-learning task to replicate apparent base-rate neglect and to induce the conjunction fallacy in a later judgment phase as a by-product of the conversion bias. In Experiment 2, the authors found stronger evidence of the conversion bias with the same learning task. In Experiment 3, the authors changed the diagnostic-learning task to induce some conjunction fallacies that were not based on the conversion bias. The authors show that the conjunction fallacies obtained in Experiment 3 can be explained by adding an averaging component to M. A. Gluck and G. H. Bower's model.     

Not only base rates are neglected in the Engineer-Lawyer problem: An investigation of reasoners’ underutilization of complementarity

The standard Engineer-Lawyer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) points to the failure of reasoners to integrate mentioned base-rate information in arriving at likelihood estimates. Research in this area nevertheless has presupposed that participants respect complementarity (i.e., participants ensure that competing estimates add up to 100%). A survey of the literature leads us to doubt this pre-supposition. We propose that the participants' non-normative performance on the standard Engineer-Lawyer problem reflects a reluctance to view the task probabilistically and that normative responses become more prominent as probabilistic aspects of the task do. In the present experiments, we manipulated two kinds of probabilistic cues and determined the extent to which (1) base rates were integrated and (2) the complementarity constraint was respected. In Experiment 1, six versions of an Engineer-Lawyer-type problem (that varied three levels of cue to complementarity and two base rates) were presented. The results showed that base-rate integration increased as cues to complementary did. Experiment 2 confirmed that Gigerenzer, Hell, and Blank's (1988) random-draw paradigm facilitates base-rate integration; a second measure revealed that it also prompts respect for complementarity. In Experiment 3, we replicated two of our main findings in one procedure while controlling for the potential influence of extraneous task features. We discuss approaches that describe how probabilistic cues might prompt normative responding.     

Exemplars in the mist: the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.