Unsinnig: A Reply to Hutto∗

Abstract

In the late 1930s Heidegger makes allusions to ‘the wild’ and ‘the mild’ in connection with a human liberation that he understands as a steadfast response to the claim that historical being (Seyn) makes upon us. The following paper elucidates these allusions in terms of the overturning of metaphysics that they entail.     

There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer

Pummer (Philosophical Review 123(1): 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. (Pummer Philosophical Review 123(1):43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly.     

‘A Way Out’ and A Way In: Reply to Commentary

I express my appreciation for Michal Rieck's thoughtful and fully felt reading of my paper. I underline her points that the regression that an unobtrusive yet fully engaged analyst can allow, is not solely a phenomenon in work with more disturbed patients, and that the essence of this position is to be without separateness. I outline a process of the “flow of enactive engagement,” which fosters a narrative unfolding of the field of the treatment. I suggest that the flow of enactive engagement is a contemporary mutual form of enacted free association and that Rieck is correct in saying that from my perspective psychoanalytic cure need not involve the analyst's interpretation. The mutual enactment itself can be the interpretation.     

Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves

According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach.     

“Was It Good for You?”: Reply to Commentaries

In many ways, psychoanalysis revolutionized attitudes about sexuality. Yet by undertheorizing female erotic passion and downplaying the role of the clitoris, psychoanalysis perpetuated a long historical tradition of denying essential aspects of women's sexual experience. Psychoanalysis has at times contributed to women perceiving their own bodily erotic excitement as frightening, dangerous, and out of control. In this reply to the commentaries, the authors continue to explore the ways in which women and women's experience, especially their embodied sexual experience, are so often rendered invisible.     

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.     

Let’s Make Things Better: A Reply to My Readers

This article is a reply to the three reviews of my book What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design (Verbeek 2005) in this symposium. It discusses the remarks made by the reviewers along five lines. The first is methodological and concerns the question of how to develop a philosophical approach to technology. The second line discusses the philosophical orientation of the book, and the relations between analytic and continental approaches. Third, I will discuss the metaphysical aspects of the book, in particular the nature and value of the non-modernist approach it aims to set out. Fourth, I will discuss the social and political relevance of the book. Fifth, this will bring me to some concluding remarks about how the postphenomenological perspective developed in the book relates to liberalism, focusing on its suggestions to deliberately design our material environment in terms of mediation.

Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

“Evidence” on Characteristic Empathy: A Reply to Cross and Slee

This paper addresses a number of issues raised by Cross and Slee (1984) in their comment on Watson (1983). It clarifies the construct of characteristic empathy by comparing this variable with variables derived from interactive empathy. Various aspects of reliability as they relate to popular empathy measures are then discussed ad the particular version of the Indices studied by Watson (1983) is identified. Finally, there is a discussion of the extent to which the literature reviewed by Cross and Slee actually offers conclusive evidence about empathy measures.     

Do Parental Influences Matter? A Reply to Halverson

ABSTRACT Halverson (1988) raises many objections to the retrospective method, but only some of them are applicable to our study (McCrae & Costa, 1988), further, Halverson fails to distinguish between random error and bias in retrospective data We argue that retrospective accounts can provide one useful source of evidence when the probable effects of biases are taken into account The small associations between recalled parent-child relations and adult personality that we reported were probably exaggerated rather than masked by retrospective bias, we took this into account in reaching our conclusions Rather than dismiss the method, psychologists should question the entrenched belief that child-rearing is a major determinant of adult personality
Tram up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it—Proverbs 22 6     

A helpful argument — Reply to K. Eichner

Das von K. Eichner konstruierte Gegenbeispiel ist logisch nicht stichhaltig. Trotzdem ist sein Einwand hilfreich. Er zeigt nämlich, daß die starke Falsifikation, die notwendig ist, um die Vorschrift des Falsifikationismus zu rechtfertigen, daß eine Theorie aufgrund eines einzigen Gegenbeispiels zu verwerfen sei, durch Beobachtungsdaten widerlegt werden kann. Auf diese Weise wird erneut das Scheitern einer deduktiven Begründung für die Falsifikationsmethodologie und damit die Gültigkeit der Symmetriethese erwiesen.     

Hodges’ Theorem Does not Account for Determinacy of Translation. A Reply to Werning

Werning applies a theorem by Hodges in order to put forward an argument against Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation (understood as a thesis on meaning, not on reference) and in favour of what Werning calls ‘semantic realism’. We show that the argument rests on two critical premises both of which are false. The reasons for these failures are explained and the actual place of this application of Hodges’ theorem within Quine’s philosophy of language is outlined.     

Reply to: A comment on and : How to investigate whether personality items form a hierarchical scale?

We reply to the comment by Meijer (2009) on our recent papers investigating the hierarchical properties of personality scale items. We conclude that Mokken scaling is an appropriate method for investigating the existence of hierarchical scales in general and, specifically, addresses the issue of invariant item ordering in polychotomous data.