Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict

International relations studies have been unable to determine whether realist or liberal theories better fit state behavior in various situations, possibly because these studies have attributed motive and action to the states rather than to the decision-makers within them. This article develops a new, more direct approach to resolving this problem. Hypotheses were tested regarding conditions under which decision-makers are likely to articulate a problem representation consistent with liberal or realist elements of a worldview. This was done by content analysis of statements about 36 foreign conflicts by the governments of three "bystander" nations—the United States, Canada, and India—over a 16-year period. The findings indicate that systemic and situational factors are far more important than domestic factors. States tend to represent wars in congruence with liberalism primarily when their security is already assured by another power or when the conflict does not involve allies, rivals, or fellow democracies. Thus, most of the expectations of realism are supported at the psychological level.     

Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

One of the most pressing concerns in the study of international relations today is to develop a systematic account of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. This paper argues that domestic politics frequently influences foreign policy through a process of decision-making that grows out of the decision-maker's awareness of the requirements for effective action in the political context. It is therefore necessary to develop a theory that can explain how the political context's characteristic features affect decision-makers' thinking. In attempting to combine insights culled from the literature on political decision-making with psychological theories of decision-making processes, this paper offers a first step toward such a theory.     

Culture Is More than a Static Residual: Introduction to the Special Section on Culture and Foreign Policy

The literature on international relations frequently refers to culture in broad, macro-level ways to explain what cannot be explained by economic or military power. The assumptions that culture is simple, uniform and the opposite of power are, in the view of the authors, erroneous. Also, the authors note that there is a lack of scholarly interaction among psychologists interested in cross-cultural phenomena and international relations specialists interested in questions of identity and foreign policy. As an introduction to a special section on culture and foreign policy, this article calls for more communication among these scholarly communities; provides a set of observations about foreign policy and culture understood as a complex, dynamic concept; and calls for specific kinds of studies to better understand foreign policy in the context of cultural complexity and richness.     

Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research

Although the institutional contexts of prime ministers in parliamentary democracies and of U.S. presidents are very different, both types of executive leaders influence the decision-making processes through their leadership styles. Leadership style includes how the leaders relate to those around them, how they like to receive information, and how they make up their minds. While there are numerous empirical studies and theoretical frameworks on the leadership styles of U.S. presidents, few studies of prime ministers are concerned with personality and styles of leadership. This paper reviews the literature on U.S. presidential styles and on organizational leadership in order to construct a framework for the study of prime minister leadership styles. Components of the proposed framework are illustrated with examples of British prime ministers and German chancellors. In addition, categories of dependent variables to be explained by leadership style are discussed. I argue that leadership style has the greatest impact on the decision-making process and that although the direct effect of leadership style on foreign policy behavior is less, leadership style indirectly influences foreign policy through the decision-making process.     

Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security, and Image of the Other

What is the connection between identity and conflict behavior? This article begins by exploring some of the theoretical currents in this area, notably social identity theory, Erikson's work on identity development, Burton's ontological needs, and image theory. The theories differ somewhat in their expectations of the effect of identity development. Two studies were conducted to investigate these differences. The first, a priming experiment, partitioned identity and its effects. The second, a group-based simulation study, measured actual development of ingroup identity and assessed its effect on conflict behavior. Results from the first study show that identity does affect conflict behavior, but only as it is mediated by levels of insecurity. Increased feelings of security correspond to more cooperative behavior. Positive and negative images of the opponent, on the other hand, did not influence conflict behavior. In the second study, higher levels of ingroup identity resulted in more conflictual behavior. As with the first study, image of the other was not significantly related to conflict behavior.     

Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy

Two decades ago, Alexander George observed a growing gap between academic theorists and practitioners in the formulation of foreign policy. The significance of the gap has been debated, but trends in the academy, society, and government suggest it is likely to grow.     

The Effects of Stakes and Threat on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Decision research demonstrates that individuals adapt decision processing strategies according to the characteristics of the decision task. Unfortunately, the literature has neglected task factors specific to foreign policy decisions. This paper presents experimental analyses of the effects of the decisional stakes (i.e., salience of the values at issue) and threat (risk of loss on those issues) on decision-makers' information acquisition patterns and choice rules with respect to one of four hypothetical foreign policy scenarios. Contrary to the notion that normative (rational) decision-making is more likely in less dramatic settings, the results indicate that elevated threat encourages rational decision processing, whereas heuristic processing was more prevalent in less threatening situations. Interestingly, the added presence of high stakes magnified both threat effects. These results, although preliminary, suggest that stakes-threat effects are not direct reflections of stress and/or complexity effects, but should be considered independently in foreign policy analyses.     

Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nations' Foreign Policy Action Templates

One useful conceptualization of culture is that of a preestablished set of behavioral competencies, which in turn form behavioral dispositions. According to this variant of culture theory, decision-makers faced with new situations will rely on established behavioral competencies in forming an initial policy response. This assumption can also be applied at the nation-state level, where established behavioral predispositions may lessen uncertainty and stress in ambiguous yet salient foreign policy situations. Likewise, observers in one nation-state may be able to identify such behavioral dispositions in other nation-states, lending greater transparency and predictability to international interactions. Do such culturally based action templates exist? Are they recognizable even to ordinary citizens? Citizens in Russia, Japan, and the United States were asked to posit the most likely and least likely behavioral responses to a variety of foreign policy situations by their own nation and by the other two nations in the sample. The results indicate that recognition of such templates takes place, and that recognition of one nation's template content by citizens of the other nations typically matches recognition of template content by the nation's own citizens. The research also shows that such action templates can be eroded and become unrecognizable over time, both to insiders and to outsiders.     

Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada

A content analysis of material generated by the 1994–1995 foreign policy review process in Canada was conducted in an effort to understand how culture came to be officially constituted as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy. The analysis showed significant differences among actors in terms of modes of legitimization of cultural diplomacy. State agents, by refusing to consider culture as a referent object in a broadened notion of security and by assimilating it into a system of civic values, resisted pressures from academics and groups that favored introducing societal conceptions of culture as relevant for the making of foreign policy. The result is nevertheless a new, albeit defensive and still ambiguous, form of implication of foreign policy in the cultural mission of the state in Canada.     

Extending the Three- and Four-Headed Eagles: The Foreign Policy Orientations of American Elites During the 80s and 90s

With the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years, there has been a resurgence in examining the beliefs of the public and their role in U.S. foreign policy. The most extensive of these studies has been conducted by Holsti and Rosenau who have found first three and then four competing schools of thought. Our purpose is to build off Holsti and Rosenau's analyses and extend their argument. Research based on the content analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1980 to 1989 demonstrates that there is more diversity and complexity in the range and content of beliefs held by American leaders than Holsti and Rosenau have yet been able to capture through their "three-" and "four-headed eagles." Although the three-headed eagle serves as a useful scheme for categorizing the broad foreign policy perspectives of American leaders, it de-emphasizes important differences in beliefs and ignores at least two foreign policy orientations that exist within their general categories. This is not a mere academic exercise, for it sheds light on the level of diversity and complexity of elite beliefs, which enriches an understanding of the politics of U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam. A preliminary examination of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1990 to 1994 indicates that American elites are changing and adapting while at the same time, they are absorbing profound global changes into their prevailing belief systems, as predicted by the political psychological literature. This suggests that the diversity and complexity present in the 80s is likely to persist and grow throughout the 90s. Our research also suggests the importance of developing alternative methods to complement reliance on survey research in order to capture more fully the diversity and complexity of the foreign policy beliefs of Americans.     

How Americans Perceive Foreign Policy Threats: A Magnitude Scaling Analysis

This paper evaluates three hypotheses about the structure of threat perceptions in the post-Cold War era: the replacement of a military conception of threat by an economic one; fluidity in threat perceptions because of an absence of a polestar nation; and Huntington's clash of civilizations theory. Using psychophysical magnitude measures of threat perception, these findings provide no support for the notion that threats are perceived economically. There is limited support for the theory that threat perceptions are unstable; most countries are clustered around a core of weakly hostile or friendly perceptions, which is suggestive of instability. At the same time, however, there does appear to be stability in perceptions of strong friends and enemies. The hypothesis best supported by these data is Huntington's theory that culture determines threat perceptions. In this study, not a single Western country is perceived as hostile, and all nations that do receive hostile scores are non-Western.     

How Irish Citizens Negotiate Foreign Policy: A Social Representations Approach to Neutrality

The present study investigates the relationship between the foreign policy orientation of Irish neutrality and national identity using a social representations approach (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Moscovici, 1961/76). In four focus groups conducted in the Republic of Ireland, 22 participants discussed vignettes in which hypothetical conflicts were described. The findings pointed towards the dynamic relationship between neutrality and Irish national identity and more generally to the importance of macropolitical phenomena for identity construction. The process of categorization was key to participants' decision making regarding the hypothetical conflicts; the decision to support or oppose the Irish state's involvement in the conflicts frequently revolved around a reconsideration of the boundaries of the ingroup. Furthermore, social representations were laden with the possibility of social change; the construction of neutrality as morally ambivalent, motivated by pragmatism rather than principles, opened up a space for younger participants to resist dominant, pragmatic interpretations of the policy and offer alternatives. Theoretical and empirical implications of the findings are discussed. Taken together, the findings demonstrate the critical potential of extending a social representations approach to issues of political psychological significance.     

浅论《管子》的货币政策和货币思想

本文结合时代背景,简单评述《管子》中的货币、商品、价格理论和政策,分析其货币思想。《管子》的货币经济政策建立在对货币职能和货币数量规律正确认识的基础上,从国家利益出发用价格手段引导生产,调节资源配置,其目的是扩大实物生产,并提高国家对资源的控制力。     

Intransitivity and Vague Preferences

This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom. For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe, Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example.     

Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images

The present study provides an empirical test of international relations image theory and extends the theory by emphasizing that individuals' social identity and social dominance motives contribute to such images. One hundred forty-five Lebanese participants completed a survey that assessed their perceptions of U.S.-Lebanese relations, the images they have of the United States, their social identities, and their social dominance orientations. Participants were more likely to hold the barbarian image of the United States than the enemy, imperialist, or ally images. Participants also tended to perceive the United States as having relatively superior power, inferior cultural status, and goals that are incompatible with those of Lebanon. Consistent with image theory predictions, this constellation of structural perceptions was associated with stronger endorsement of the barbarian image. Furthermore, participants were more likely to endorse the barbarian image of the United States the more they identified with Arabs and Palestinians, the less they identified with Christians and the Western world, and the lower their social dominance orientation. Results highlight the importance of considering both structural characteristics and individual motives underlying international images and demonstrate the need for scholars to move beyond the enemy image of nations when describing international relations.     

All Against All: How Beliefs about Human Nature Shape Foreign Policy Opinions

Although the American public's increasingly cynical views about human nature have drawn considerable attention from scholars, existing research says little about how interpersonal trust shapes mass foreign policy opinions. This study analyzes survey data to test the claim that citizens use their beliefs about human nature to reason about international affairs. The results indicate that cynical citizens are more likely than trusting citizens to endorse the principle of isolationism and to oppose cooperative forms of intervention in other nations' problems. Citizens' use of interpersonal trust as an information shortcut helps them to make inferences regarding a topic about which they typically know little, but such inferences are not necessarily realistic ones.     

"It's Us Against the World": How Distrust in Americans versus People-In-General Shapes Competitive Foreign Policy Preferences

Previous research has uncovered links between generalized distrust and preferences for competitive (vs. cooperative) action. However, based on individuals' tendency to hold consistent attitudes and to believe that their own political preferences are morally legitimate, it was hypothesized that the direction of the relationship between distrust and competitive foreign policy preferences would depend on which category individuals had in mind: Americans or people. Two correlational studies with American participants were consistent with this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that distrust in Americans versus people had qualitatively different relationships with support for competitive policy preferences (i.e., immigration control, militaristic action). Study 2 found that when the covariance between distrust in Americans and people was controlled, distrust in Americans predicted opposition to torture of suspected terrorists, whereas distrust in people predicted support for torture of suspected terrorists. Moreover, individual discrepancies between distrust in Americans versus people uniquely predicted support for torture. Finally, mediational analyses in both studies indicated that political conservatism explained the effects between distrust in Americans versus people and competitive policy preferences. It is argued that distrust in Americans and distrust in people are distinct but complementary bases of Americans' moral-political reasoning.     

Problem Representation,Option Generation,and Poliheuristic Theory: An Experimental Analysis

Poliheuristic (PH) theory has received strong empirical support for its depiction of the option selection process: it explains how leaders evaluate, weigh, and ultimately choose among a set of policy options. But PH theory does not explain how this initial set of options is generated. Foreign policy problem representation (PR) research has shown that the way in which leaders mentally represent decision problems determines which options are generated for consideration. In this article, we develop a hybrid PR‐PH framework in which leaders’ problem representations drive an unconscious screening process that occurs prior to the conscious screening of PH stage 1. We test hypotheses drawn from this framework experimentally and find that key elements of PR (most notably, perceived threat) determine which options consciously occur to decision makers and which options are not generated during a simulated foreign policy crisis.