Hierarchical Propositions

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a new hierarchical account that solves the problem.     

Elusive Propositions

Journal of Philosophical Logic - David Kaplan observed in Kaplan (1995) that the principle $\forall p \Diamond \forall q (Qq \leftrightarrow q = p)$ cannot be verified at a world in a standard...     

On Hierarchical Propositions

Journal of Philosophical Logic - There is an apparent dilemma for hierarchical accounts of propositions, raised by Bruno Whittle (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 215–231, 2017): either...     

概率与命题

本文的主题是揭示信念对象。关于信念对象最流行的观点是指称主义的观点,指称主义者或把个体与性质组成的命题视为信念对象,或把可能世界集视为信念对象,但若从贝叶斯的确证理论出发来考察信念对象的话,就会发现指称主义与贝叶斯主义间的冲突,由于贝叶斯主义是一种相当成功的理论,因而指称主义是错误的。贝叶斯主义需要的是一种非指称的信念对象,对贝叶斯理论而言,首内涵可以扮演置信对象这一角色。不过首内涵缺乏结构,缺乏指称信息,前者可以用借助于结构化首内涵来解决,后者可以在前者的基础上借助于丰富化内涵进而借助于丰富化的命题来解决。     

Propositions on the cheap

Philosophical Studies - According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within...     

Propositions pour un positivisme

Summary The author tries to specify a philosophical attitude which could be considered a form of Positivism, but this does not necessarily mean that it coincides with the doctrine of Auguste Comte or with that of the Vienna Circle.In order to facilitate the exposition the author formulates eight theses whose abrupt character is merely a consequence of the manner of presentation and by no means a manifestation of dogmatism.Eachdatum presents itself as finite experience (1) which is organized with the help ofsymbols, either on the level of perception or on the level of language (2). Inside the perception itself a reduction of experience which is essentially pragmatic first constitutes thephenomena (3). Theobject which is constituted by science on the basis of the phenomena is merely structural and always delimited (4). Its constitution is unceasingly revisable and it never corresponds to an alleged essence of reality.What is here called dialectic never consists in a set of rules governing a movement of phenomena, objects, or ideas; it is a general, historical movement of experience itself, taken as a whole, and the specific movement of the symbolic statements which inform it. One should not confuse it with a kind of general logic, nor with a so-called science of totalities (5). Logic explains the rules of the symbolic systems (6), andscience is the mediate determination of objects by means of the symbolism, and is not an immediate determination of reality (7). It constructs coherent and effective models of phenomena.As far asphilosophy is concerned, it wishes to interpret experience as a totality, not-withstanding experience's finitude as datum (8). Thus it is radically distinguished from science in that philosophy does not intend to construct models, but to explain the meanings of the phenomena and, in general, of experience. That is why the category of truth taken in a rigorous sense does not apply to philosophy's statements.     

Propositions as Cognitive Acts

Synthese - The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational...     

Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.