Can people really "laugh at themselves?"--experimental and correlational evidence

Laughing at oneself is considered a core component of the sense of humor in the theories of several authors. In McGhee's (1996) eight-step-training program of the sense of humor, laughing at oneself constitutes one of the most difficult levels. However, until now, only little empirical evidence on laughing at oneself exists. Using a multimethod approach, in the current study, 70 psychology students and a total of 126 peers filled in the Sense of Humor Scale (SHS, McGhee, 1996), containing as a subscale "Laughing at oneself". In addition, the participants answered the Trait and State forms of the State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory (STCI, Ruch, K?hler, & van Thriel, 1996; Ruch, K?hler, & van Thriel, 1997). They then were confronted with six distorted images of themselves. Facial responses of the participants were videotaped and analyzed using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Four indicators of exhilaration were examined: (a) experienced funniness, (b) AU12 smiles, (c) Duchenne displays, and (d) laughter. Furthermore, fake and masking smiles were studied. Results demonstrated that self- and peer reports of "laughing at oneself" converged moderately. All four indicators of exhilaration were shown, but funniness and laughter seemed to be the most strongly related indicators. Trait cheerfulness and (low) seriousness, and a cheerful mood state formed further characteristics of persons who laugh at themselves.     

How do people know?

To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

Who uses services for homeless people? An investigation amongst people sleeping rough in London

From a sample of 389 homeless people in London, the characteristics of those who used services for homeless people are presented and the implications for service planning and delivery explored. Staff providing services for this client group need knowledge about drug use and the confidence to work effectively with homeless drug users. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why believe what people say?

The basic alternatives seem to be either a Humean reductionist view that any particular assertion needs backing with inductive evidence for its reliability before it can retionally be believed, or a Reidian criterial view that testimony is intrinscially, though defeasibly, credible, in the absence of evidence against its reliability.Some recent arguments from the constraints on interpreting any linguistic performances as assertions with propositional content have some force against the reductionist view. We thus have reason to accept the criterial view, at least as applied to eyewitness reports. But these considerations do not establish that any rational enquirer must have the concept of other minds or testimony. The logical possibility of the lone enquirer, who uses symbols and thereby expresses some knowledge of his world, remains open — but it is a question we have no need to pronounce upon.The practice of accepting observation-statements is in fact extended to chains of testimonies believed to start in perception or in some other kind of justification, but the arguments for doing this are not so clear.I am indebted for helpful discussions of earlier versions of this paper to audiences at Macquarie University (where I was kindly given research facilities), at the conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy in Sydney in 1990, at St. Andrews, and also to a referee for this journal.     

How do people order stimuli?

People may find it easier to construct an order after first representing stimuli on a scale or categorizing them, particularly when the number of stimuli to be ordered is large or when some of them must be remembered. Five experiments tested this hypothesis. In two of these experiments (1 and 3), we asked participants to rank line lengths or to rank photographs by artistic value. The participants provided evidence of how they performed these tasks, and this evidence indicated that they often made use of some preliminary representation—either a metric or a categorization. Two further experiments (2 and 4) indicated that people rarely produced rankings when given a choice of assessment measures for either the length of lines or the artistic value of photographs. In Experiment 5, when the number of lines was larger or lines were only visible one at a time, participants were faster at estimating line lengths as a percentage of the card covered than at rank ordering the lengths. Overall, the results indicate that ordering stimuli is not an easy or natural process when the number of stimuli is large or when the stimuli are not all perceptible at once. An implication is that the psychological measures available to individuals are not likely to be purely ordinal when many of the elements being measured must be recalled.     

How do people solve the "weather prediction" task?: individual variability in strategies for probabilistic category learning

Probabilistic category learning is often assumed to be an incrementally learned cognitive skill, dependent on nondeclarative memory systems. One paradigm in particular, the weather prediction task, has been used in over half a dozen neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies to date. Because of the growing interest in using this task and others like it as behavioral tools for studying the cognitive neuroscience of cognitive skill learning, it becomes especially important to understand how subjects solve this kind of task and whether all subjects learn it in the same way. We present here new experimental and theoretical analyses of the weather prediction task that indicate that there are at least three different strategies that describe how subjects learn this task. (1) An optimal multi-cue strategy, in which they respond to each pattern on the basis of associations of all four cues with each outcome; (2) a one-cue strategy, in which they respond on the basis of presence or absence of a single cue, disregarding all other cues; or (3) a singleton strategy, in which they learn only about the four patterns that have only one cue present and all others absent. This variability in how subjects approach this task may have important implications for interpreting how different brain regions are involved in probabilistic category learning.     

Are religious people nicer people? Taking a closer look at the religion–empathy relationship

It has been argued that an empathically mediated, kin-specific, altruistic impulse is part of the human genetic heritage, and that one of the functions of religion is to extend the range of this impulse beyond the kinship circle. However, it is clear that religion does not always succeed in this. The present study reconsiders the religiosity–empathy relation in a Flemish student sample (n?=?375), using the Post-Critical Belief Scale, which allows to distinguish between being religious or not (Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religious contents are processed (Literal versus Symbolic). It is argued that the religiosity–empathy relation should be understood in terms of how people process religious contents rather than in terms of whether or not people are religious. In line with this reasoning, results show that, whereas empathy is unrelated to being religious, it is positively related to processing religious contents in a symbolic way. Social desirability did not influence these relationships.     

Can we explain why some people do and some people do not act on their intentions?

Behavioural theorists have identified attitudes, perceived norms and self-efficacy as the important determinants of people's intentions to engage in a given behaviour. Because intentions predict behaviour, these same variables also account for a considerable amount of the variation in behaviour. Nevertheless, there is often a substantial proportion of the population who do not act on their intentions. While a recently proposed integrative theory of behaviour suggests that these 'failures' are due either to a lack of skills and/or to the presence of environmental constraints, it has also been argued that the determinants of intention may have a direct, as well as in indirect, effect on behaviour. This paper uses data from a longitudinal study (Project RESPECT) to explore the extent to which attitudes, perceived norms and self-efficacy explain why some people do and others do not act on their intentions to engage in a health protective behaviour. Although the data provide further evidence that these three variables account for a significant proportion of the variance in intentions (and behaviour), they perform poorly when predicting behaviour for persons with pre-existing high intentions. It may be reasonable to ask whether a 'new' theory is needed to explain why some people do, and some people do not, act on their intentions.     

What makes depressed people feel worse?

Fifty English-speaking adults were asked in a brief open-ended interview, ‘When you're feeling depressed, what sorts of things can make you feel worse?’ Their responses were subjected to content analysis and frequency counts. The most frequent replies were: being alone (mentioned by 24% of Ss), inactivity (20%) and thinking about the problem that was getting them down (18%). The results are discussed from phenomenological, theoretical, historical, methodological and clinical points of view.     

How much can people really change?

The basic purpose of pastoral counseling, and counseling in general, is to help people change. Therefore, it's critically important to understand the nature of change and to have realistic expectations with respect to how much people can change. To expect too little change can lead to underachievement and despair, whereas to expect too much change can cause needless frustration and an abiding sense of failure. This article discusses behavioral change, its potential and its limits, from the point of view of genetic potential and offers some specific pastoral implications.     

Do tough-minded people hold tough-minded attitudes?

Eysenck originally postulated that extraverts would adopt tough-minded social attitudes, although psychoticism is now considered to be of greater importance than extraversion. Previous research has attempted to relate psychoticism to realism-idealism, a principal factor of the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale, and a measure of tough-mindedness acceptable to Eysenck. Results have proved discrepant; authors have used psychoticism scales of uncertain item content and length. The present study examines the relationship between psychoticism, extraversion and realism-idealism, using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire and the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory. The results provide only weak support for Eysenck’s theory. A more significant relationship was obtained between psychoticism and conservatism, and extraversion and conservatism, although a theoretical rationale for these relationships is lacking.     

Perceived characteristics of “competent” people

The purpose of this research was to determine the specific behaviors and cues which 104 assessors perceived as indicating the presence of psychological variables shown to be related to competent job behavior. The cue systems utilized were found to be reminiscent of theory Y conceptions of effective job behavior. Implications of the lack of correlation of cue utilization with assessor characteristics are discussed.     

How do people apprehend large numerosities?

People discriminate remarkably well among large numerosities. These discriminations, however, need not entail numerical representation of the quantities being compared. This research evaluated the role of both non-numerical and numerical information in adult judgments of relative numerosity for large-numerosity spatial arrays. Results of Experiment 1 indicated that judgments of relative numerosity were affected by the amount of open space in the arrays being compared. Further, the accuracy of verbal estimates of the numerosities of the arrays made upon completion of the comparison task bore little relation to performance on that task. Experiment 2, however, showed that numerical estimates for individually presented arrays were affected in much the same way by open space within or around the edges of the array as were the comparative judgments examined in Experiment 1. The findings suggest that adults heuristically utilize non-numerical cues as well as numerical information in apprehending large numerosities.