Does Belief Have an Aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.     

Does Hell Still Have a Future?

The vexed and ever‐controversial question of hell and the possibility of its final realization is the subject matter of this article. The current fading of belief, or at least serious interest, in this traditional aspect of Christian teaching is the starting‐point for a brief historical survey of the meaning of the term in general and its meaning within Christianity in particular. The article argues for a retention of the doctrine, albeit shorn of some of its more flamboyant, traditional attributes, as being of lasting significance to the Christian understanding of salvation.     

Where Does Personality Have Its Influence? A Supermatrix of Consistency Concepts

ABSTRACT An understanding of the nature of personality depends on clear conceptions of consistency. Researchers have applied the term consistency in ambiguous and inconsistent ways over the last half century, which has led to a great deal of confusion and debate over the existence of personality. This article seeks to reframe and extend conceptions of consistency and thus proposes three important ways consistency concepts differ from each other. The first way consistency concepts differ from each other is in the competing determinant of behavior that the consistency is across: time, situation content, or behavior content. The second way consistency concepts differ from each other is in the definition of behavior enactment: single enactment, aggregate enactment, contingent enactment, or patterned enactment. When these two dimensions are crossed with a third dimension—definition of similarity (absolute, relative‐position, or ipsative)—they create a supermatrix of 36 consistency concepts. Empirical support for each of these 36 consistency concepts, or its failure, has uniquely different implications for the fundamental nature of personality. This supermatrix can serve as a guide for future research aimed at discovering the nature of personality.     

Do We Have a Theory of Vocational Choice?

A schema for the inductive and deductive functions of theory-building is imposed upon the formulations and research of Roe, the Michigan group, Tiedeman and O'Hara, Super, and Holland, with these results: none of the dominant approaches satisfy the established criteria of theory-building. Many of the efforts suffer from their authors' need to continually relate their data to pre-conceived formulations which do not change with the acquisition of data. For the present, the continuing empirical and longitudinal efforts and the lower-level generalizations that they produce seem to offer the greatest promise for a comprehensive model of vocational development and choice.     

Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe that P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e. the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one's belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification, as well as to defend phenomenal ‘conservatism’ and other views besides. In what follows, I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that, even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal ‘conservatism’. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and I show why this needn't raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification's basing demand seemed to raise.     

Does Forced Sexual Contact Have Criminogenic Effects?

Abstract

According to derailment theory, tactics girls and women use to survive a history of abuse, strategies shaped by their abuse, and societal reactions to it estrange them from non-deviant social networks and situations and increase the likelihood of criminal offending and the application of criminal labels. This process is self-reinforcing, with interactions of substance abuse, sexual deviance, criminal offending, and social control constraining choices through alienation and stigmatization. In short, a dynamic of cumulative disadvantage is set in place that puts some women at greater risk for involvement with the legal system. Empirical evaluation of this theory suggests that alienation from and marginal positions in pro-social networks have parallels in anti-social networks sufficient to decrease the likelihood of criminal offending and contact with crime control agencies.     

Does the Public Intellectual Have Intellectual Integrity?

This article is concerned with the devaluation of the work of public intellectuals within the academic community. The principal reason given for this devaluation is that the work of the public intellectual does not have intellectual integrity as independent thought and original scholarship. I develop three models of public intellectual work: the permanent–critic model, the popularizer model, and the public–theorist model. I then consider each model in relation to the concern with intellectual integrity and conclude that both independent thought and original scholarship are possible within work that is engaged with nonacademic publics.     

A Very Strong Set Theory?

Studia Logica - Using two distinct membership symbols makes possible to base set theory on one general axiom schema of comprehension. Is the resulting system consistent? Can set theory and...     

Theory in Child Psychosocial Treatment Research: Have It or Had It? A Pragmatic Alternative

In the area of child psychosocial intervention research, substantial progress in addressing challenging methodological issues has been made. In this article we suggest that continued movement forward requires maintaining a balance between methodological and theoretical issues, and that it would be advantageous to begin to think about matching advances in methodological sophistication by similar advances in theoretical sophistication. The need to advance our understanding of theoretical issues is especially important in light of the challenges raised by postmodernism, particularly as these challenges relate to knowledge development. We discuss these challenges and describe how a pragmatic orientation may be a useful way to respond to them. We also describe how a pragmatic orientation has been useful in our work in developing, implementing and evaluating psychosocial interventions for children with phobic and anxiety disorders.     

What Does Silicon Valley Have to Do with Jerusalem?

Abstract. Adapted from the introductory chapter of Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Peterson 2003), I here lay out a general approach for a dialogue between theology and cognitive science. Key to this task is an understanding of theology as the science or study of meaning and purpose. I give reasons why theology should be thought of in this sense and the potential fruitfulness of this approach.