Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

Subjective probabilities and betting quotients

This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic form of the Dutch Book argument is valid.Probability is the very guide of life' (Bishop Butler).     

Vagueness,uncertainty and degrees of clarity

In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness. We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s two-dimensional semantics, and the system we call Centered semantics. We then propose a semantics of degrees of clarity, inspired from the signal detection theory model, and outline a view of higher-order vagueness in which the notions of subjective clarity and unclarity are handled asymmetrically at higher orders, namely such that the clarity of clarity is compatible with the unclarity of unclarity.     

Subjective aspects of cognitive control at different stages of processing

Although research on cognitive control has addressed the effects that different forms of cognitive interference have on behavior and the activities of certain brain regions, until recently, the effects of interference on subjective experience have not been addressed. We demonstrate that, at the level of the individual trial, participants can reliably introspect the subjective aspects (e.g., perceptions of difficulty, competition, and control) of responding in interference paradigms. Similar subjective effects were obtained for both expressed and unexpressed (subvocalized) actions. Few participants discerned the source of these effects. These basic findings illuminate aspects of cognitive control and cognitive effort. In addition, these data have implications for the study of response interference in affect and self-control, and they begin to address theories regarding the function of consciousness.     

Assessing probabilities of compound events in a judicial context

Subjects presented with fictitious criminal case material were found to overestimate the probabilities of compound as compared with component events. An analogy to bayesian cascaded inference behaviour was discussed. Results of functional measurement and correlational procedures suggested a three-strategy model of compound probability estimation, applicable where there are two component events. According to the model, subjects base their choice of an information processing strategy on the larger and smaller component probability assessments and on a criterion value for each.     

Variation of the Subjective Vertical on the parallel swing at different body positions

Summary Subjects on a horizontally moving parallel swing perceive a change of the position of the body and of the Subjective Vertical (SV). The magnitude of the SV-change was recorded at different body-positions on the swing. The SV-change was smaller when the vertex-base head-axis was oriented parallel or close to parallel to swing movement than when the vertex-base head axis was oriented perpendicular to this movement. Perpendicular orientation implies either head vertex-up or head vertex-down. The results are discussed with respect to other findings on the various sensory input systems.

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Zusammenfassung Versuchspersonen auf einer horizontal schwingenden Parallel-Schaukel nehmen eine Änderung der Lage des eigenen Körpers und der Stellung der Subjektiven Vertikalen (SV) wahr. Die Größe der im Schwingrhythmus wechselnden SV-Änderung wurde bei verschiedenen Körperstellungen auf der Schaukel untersucht. Sie war kleiner, wenn die Scheitel-Basis-Achse des Kopfes in oder nahe der Schwingungsrichtung und größer, wenn sie senkrecht oder nahezu senkrecht dazu stand; die senkrechte Stellung konnte entweder Scheitel-aufwärts oder Scheitel-abwärts sein. Die Ergebnisse werden im Zusammenhang mit anderen Befunden über die beteiligten sensorischen Systeme diskutiert.

     

The asymptotic values of response probabilities in the Audley-Jonckheere learning model

The asymptotic values of response probabilities in the Audley-Jonckheere learning model, as applied to the two-choice learning situation, are derived for (1) the experimenter-controlled events model, (2) the subject-controlled events model, and (3) the experimenter-subject-controlled events model.     

Subjective well-being and adaptation to life events: a meta-analysis

Previous research has shown that major life events can have short- and long-term effects on subjective well-being (SWB). The present meta-analysis examines (a) whether life events have different effects on affective and cognitive well-being and (b) how the rate of adaptation varies across different life events. Longitudinal data from 188 publications (313 samples, N = 65,911) were integrated to describe the reaction and adaptation to 4 family events (marriage, divorce, bereavement, childbirth) and 4 work events (unemployment, reemployment, retirement, relocation/migration). The findings show that life events have very different effects on affective and cognitive well-being and that for most events the effects of life events on cognitive well-being are stronger and more consistent across samples. Different life events differ in their effects on SWB, but these effects are not a function of the alleged desirability of events. The results are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications, and recommendations for future studies on adaptation are given.     

Subjective uncertainty,the orientation reaction,and the reinforcement of an instrumental response

In Experiment 1, Ss were exposed to slides of intermediate blur for 5, 10, 30, or 60 sec and were asked to guess the identity of the blurred object and to estimate how confident they were of each guess. The S’s task in Experiment 2 was merely to view the blurred slides while S’s EEG waves were being recorded. After being exposed to a blurred slide for a certain duration, in Experiment 3, Ss were required, by means of a key press, to choose to view either a clear version of the blurred slide or an unrelated clear picture. Uncertainty/second, EEG desynchronization/’second, and related choices were all found to be a negatively sloped function of viewing duration.     

Probability estimates of social events as related to values

Abstract.— Differences in estimates of probabilities that certain social events would happen after given alternatives of (political) actions were analysed for individuals with different untrained values about those events. Subjects with extremely positive or extremely negative values had 0.05-0.20 higher probability estimates than subjects with no opinion. Subjects who earlier in the experiment had attached neutral or extreme values to the events showed a tendency to estimate the probabilities higher than those subjects who had had no such activity preceeding the estimation. Awareness of probability estimates did not seem to affect values.     

Attention and brain damage: a clinical study of response latency under various degrees of uncertainty

Wyns and Bruyer in 1988 proposed a visual attention test that is easy to use and sensitive both to the age of the subjects and the level of uncertainty about the response required. This test was designed as a fine gauge of attention deficits in brain-damaged subjects with poorly structured complaints. We present here a preliminary application of the test to a group of 48 such persons. Analysis of response accuracy indicated that 27 subjects were deficient in this respect. Of the 21 remaining subjects whose reaction times were analyzable, only one-third appeared as entirely normal.