The relationship between theory of mind and episodic memory: evidence for the development of autonoetic consciousness

The study investigated a link between theory of mind and episodic memory involving autonoetic consciousness (). Eighty-nine Japanese 4- to 6-year-olds received two versions of a false belief task, a task of aspectuality or knowledge origins, and four memory tests. After controlling for age, most theory of mind abilities showed no interrelations, and own and other's belief understandings in deceptive appearance tasks were solely related to source memory, but not to free recall, temporal ordering, or working memory. Moreover, even when age and verbal intelligence were controlled, the association between representational change and source memory was highly significant in 6-year-olds but not in 4- and 5-year-olds. Results suggest that during development only a particular kind of theory of mind ability is integrated with episodic memory.     

Relations Between the Development of Teaching and Theory of Mind in Early Childhood

The relations among children’s theory of mind (ToM), their understanding of the intentionality of teaching, and their own peer teaching strategies were tested. Seventy-five 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed 11 ToM and understanding-of-teaching tasks. Subsequently, 30 of the children were randomly chosen to teach a peer how to play a board game, and their teaching strategies and levels of contingent teaching were recorded. There were developmental changes in the children’s understanding of teaching as an intentional activity. When teaching their peers, 3-year-olds used demonstration, whereas 4- and 5-year-olds added verbal explanations and began to adapt contingently to the learners’ changing knowledge level. Relations among ToM, understanding of teaching, and teaching level were found. The results suggest that the development of children’s teaching strategies and their contingency are closely tied to the development of ToM.     

学前儿童朴素情绪理论的发展

对情绪的心理层面的理解是幼儿心理理论发展中出现得相对较迟的能力, 他们如何通过愿望和信念等不同的心理状态对人们的情绪做出判断？随着年龄的增长, 他们采用不同策略推测情绪的能力又发生了什么变化？本研究结合主人公愿望是否得到满足的状态, 通过利用图片故事个别测查的方法探查了90名3~5岁学前儿童在“内容错误信念”任务中对他人情绪的推测。结果显示, 年幼儿童、尤其是3岁幼儿的高兴情绪理解受其对情境是否满足愿望的认知的影响, 呈现出显著的“积极情绪偏差效应”; 学前儿童对情绪的认知表现出从不能采用信念—愿望策略到错误地采用信念—愿望策略、到正确采用信念—愿望策略的发展模式, 且其基于信念的情绪理解在一定程度上呈现出落后于其错误信念理解的“滞后效应”。结果还显示幼儿的惊奇情绪判断不仅由信念成分决定, 也受愿望理解的影响。这些结果突显出心理状态在儿童情绪理解中的重要作用, 揭示出学前儿童相对完整的朴素情绪理论发展模式。     

Children''s Representational Theory of Language:The Problem of Opaque Contexts

Around four years of age, children recognize that action is less a consequence of the way the world is than the way it is represented by the actor. This understanding is characterized as a “theory of mind.” This study examines the possibility of the development of a parallel theory of language; specifically, the understanding that, in opaque contexts, terms do not simply map on to the referent of the expression, but rather indicate how that object is to be represented. 120 3- to 7-year-olds were tested on their theory of mind (using false belief tasks) and sensitivity to opaque contexts. Children who passed false belief tasks performed more successfully on the opacity measure than those who did not, even when age was partialled out (r (117) = .2453, p < .01). It is concluded that children come to realize that language does not refer to the world directly, but rather via one's representation of it. The results are consistent with the view that both abilities are manifestations of a more general understanding of representation, and that children's theories of mind and language follow similar developmental paths.     

Culture and the sequence of steps in theory of mind development

To examine cultural contrasts in the ordered sequence of conceptual developments leading to theory of mind (ToM), we compared 135 3- to 6-year-olds (77 Australians; 58 Iranians) on an established 5-step ToM scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004). There was a cross-cultural difference in the sequencing of ToM steps but not in overall rates of ToM mastery. In line with our predictions, the children from Iran conformed to a distinctive sequence previously observed only in children in China. In contrast to the case with children from Australia (and the United States), knowledge access was understood earlier than opinion diversity in children from Iran, consistent with this collectivist culture's emphasis on filial respect, dispute avoidance, and acquiring knowledge. Having a sibling was linked with faster overall ToM progress in Australia only and was not related to scale sequences in either culture.     

Children's Level of Participation in a False-Belief Task,Age, and Theory of Mind

The hide-and-seek deception task of M. Chandler, A. S. Fritz, and S. Hala (1989) was modified to provide a more precise estimate of the age at which children acquire and manifest a theory of mind. Two characters (good, bad) and two levels of involvement (pretend play, sociodramatic play) were incorporated into the research design, so that children's representational understanding of deception could be studied. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (N = 90) participated in the study. The results indicated that 4-year-olds used significantly more deceptive strategies than 2- and 3-year-olds in pretend play and in sociodramatic play. There was no difference between 2- and 3-year-olds in the use of deceptive strategies; they used significantly fewer strategies in the bad roles than in the good roles. No significant differences were found in the 3 age groups' performances in the good-character tasks. The reality-masking hypothesis (P. Mitchell, 1994) accounts for the differences in performances on that task; thus, children younger than 4 years old do seem to have a theory of mind.     

Children's level of participation in a false-belief task, age, and theory of mind

The hide-and-seek deception task of M. Chandler, A. S. Fritz, and S. Hala (1989) was modified to provide a more precise estimate of the age at which children acquire and manifest a theory of mind. Two characters (good, bad) and two levels of involvement (pretend play, sociodramatic play) were incorporated into the research design, so that children's representational understanding of deception could be studied. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (N = 90) participated in the study. The results indicated that 4-year-olds used significantly more deceptive strategies than 2- and 3-year-olds in pretend play and in sociodramatic play. There was no difference between 2- and 3-year-olds in the use of deceptive strategies; they used significantly fewer strategies in the bad roles than in the good roles. No significant differences were found in the 3 age groups' performances in the good-character tasks. The reality-masking hypothesis (P. Mitchell, 1994) accounts for the differences in performances on that task; thus, children younger than 4 years old do seem to have a theory of mind.     

Young Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion

Abstract

In three experiments, children aged 3 to 7 years were tested for their understanding of the impact of beliefs and desires on emotion. Children watched while animal characters were offered various types of container and then predicted their emotional reaction. In Experiment 1, the children (but not the characters) knew that the desirable contents of each container had been removed. The majority of 6-year-olds and a minority of 4-year-olds understood that the characters would be happy with the gift, given their mistaken belief about its contents. In Experiment 2, characters were given containers apparently containing an object they wanted but really containing an object they did not want, or vice versa. Predictions of emotion based on both the desire and the mistaken belief of the characters increased with age. In Experiment 3, characters were given closed containers that might or might not contain an item they wanted. Both 3-and 5-year-olds grasped that the characters' emotional reaction would depend on both their (unconfirmed) beliefs and desires about its content.

The experiments show that preschool children deploy a theory-like conception of mind in predicting emotional reactions. They understand that the emotional impact of a situation depends not on its objective features but on the beliefs and desires that are brought to it.     

儿童对观察者预期造成的模糊刺激解释多样性的理解

研究考察6~8岁儿童在由观察者预期造成的对模糊信息有多样解释上的理解.操纵影响观察者预期的因素,包括知觉经验、知识水平、先前经历和偏见,要求儿童预测观察者对局限视野图形或两可动作信息的解释.结果表明,6岁儿童仅对观察者偏见影响其对行动者行为的解释拥有部分理解,他们还不能理解知觉经验和知识水平会影响观察者对视觉刺激的解释,以及先前经历会影响观察者对行动者行为的解释.7岁儿童除了知识水平外,其它三方面的理解都已发展起来.8岁儿童可以理解多种观察者预期造成的解释差异,解释性心理理论比较稳定,但离完全成熟的理解还有一段距离.     

学前儿童心理理论及欺骗发展的关系研究

本文采用两种标准心理理论任务和两种欺骗任务,以3~6岁儿童为被试,探讨了学前儿童心理理论与欺骗发展的关系,得出如下结论:(1)在不同的误信念任务中,学前儿童的表现不一致;但仍存在一般发展趋势:3岁儿童不能通过误信念任务,4、5岁是儿童误信念发展的关键时期.(2)3岁儿童不能拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力,4岁儿童拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力.(3)3岁儿童能说谎,但假装无知的欺骗直到6岁才出现.(4)误信念理解与隐藏意图的欺骗存在相关,但与说谎和假装无知不存在相关.     

幼儿心理理论愿望信念理解与情绪理解关系研究

考察了幼儿心理理论信念愿望理解与情绪理解的发展状况及相互关系.运用实验法对256名3~6岁儿童施测.结果表明:(1)幼儿心理理论愿望-信念理解与情绪理解的发展在3~6岁期间随年龄逐渐提高.4岁是基于信念的情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;4~5岁是幼儿情绪观点采择能力发展的关键年龄.(2)幼儿基于信念的情绪理解能力的发展晚于错误信念理解能力的发展.(3)幼儿心理理论的愿望-信念理解与情绪理解之间相关显著.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

Older children's misunderstanding of uncertain belief after passing the false belief test

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds children who passed the FB test showed difficulty in handling uncertain belief; answering that the puppet would then look for his toy at the current (moved-to) location. Eight-year-old children and adults all recognized that the puppet would look for the toy everywhere, or at random. In Experiment 2, 4- and 6-year-olds were presented two other search tasks; it was shown that preschoolers could use search strategies to solve a similar search problem when FB was not involved. This new aspect of post-FB understanding can be interpreted in terms of limited understanding of uncertainty in a less-knowledgeable individual and of limited ability to infer the consequences of belief-disconfirmation.     

幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。     

Children's memory distortions following social contact with a co-witness: Disentangling social and cognitive mechanisms

This study examined whether recalling an event with a co-witness influences children's recall. Individual 3-5-year-olds (n = 48) watched a film with a co-witness. Unbeknown to participants, the co-witness was watching an alternative version of the film. Afterwards both the co-witness and the participant answered questions about the film together (public recall), and the degree to which children conformed to the co-witness's alternative version of events was measured. Subsequently participants were questioned again individually (private recall). Children also completed false belief and inhibitory control tasks. By separating errors made in public and private, the results indicated that both social conformity (32% of errors) and memory distortion (68% of errors) played a role in co-witness influence. Inhibitory control predicted the likelihood of retracting errors in private, but only for children who failed (r=.66) rather than passed false belief tasks (r=-.10). The results suggest that children with a theory of mind conform in the company of the co-witness to avoid social embarrassment, while those a poor theory of mind conform on the basis of an inability to inhibit the co-witness's response. The findings contribute to our understanding of the motivations responsible for co-witness conformity across early childhood.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

不同任务情境对幼儿心理理论表现的影响

本研究通过在三种不同实验条件下,系统比较60名幼儿在错误信念认识和表征变化任务上的表现。研究表明：ToM能力的表现模式可能随测验程序或被试样本的变化而变化;年龄小的幼儿在任务上的表现更可能受实验条件的影响;不同条件下幼儿关于自己的表征变化和他人的错误信念的认识均没有显著性差异。     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.