Three indications for the existence of God in causal metaphysics

With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree of philosophico-theological relevance and can be taken to indicate (not prove) the existence of God. The paper’s comparatively modest aim is to establish belief in the existence of God as a rational metaphysical option, not as a rational obligation. In its final section, enriched causal considerations lead to an indication (not proof) of God as that which guarantees the unified continuance of the physical world.     

Tutor,salon, convent: the formation of women philosophers in early modern France

ABSTRACT

Excluded from the university, women authors in early modern France acquired their philosophical culture from other venues. The tutorial, the salon, and the convent school are three of the era’s most prominent institutions involved in the development of this philosophical culture for women. The writings of the poet Madame Deshoulières, the salonnière Madame de Sablé, and the abbess Angélique de Saint-Jean Arnauld d’Andilly illustrate how these institutions shaped their respective philosophical interests and imparted a particular style and set of thematic concerns to their philosophical works.     

"形而上"与"形而下"的近代分离--《易》与经学时代中国学者的学术兴趣

近代科学在欧洲的产生,乃得益于"文艺复兴"以来欧洲学术上"形而上"与"形而下"的大规模分离.而汉以来"独尊儒术"的实现,<易>作为儒家主要经籍以其"仰观天文,俯察地理,中知人事"的宏大叙事与终极关怀,影响了经学时代中国学者的学术兴趣,导致他们将绝大多数精力投入到了以史学为主的"人事"中而非自然事物的研究对象与形而下的研究路径.两个相对独立的历史进程与历史体系或无何可比性:近代科学在欧洲产生只有在产生近代科学的欧洲自我历史进程与历史体系中才能得到解释,中国没有产生近代科学亦复如此.至于将中国科学落后的原由单一性地归结于<易>或儒家经学,这未必符合历史的因果真相与思维的有效推理.     

Idealization in unitarian metaphysics

The aim of the paper is to propose an understanding of idealization in terms of Nowak’s unitarian metaphysics. Two natural interpretations of the procedure are critically discussed and rejected as inadequate. The first account of idealization is unable to explain why idealized factors cease to exert influence on the investigated magnitude. The second account of idealization solves this problem but does so at the cost of blurring the distinction between idealization and abstruction. Moreover, it faces the consequence that the process of idealization instead of leading to a sharper understanding of phenomena will normally result in making the picture more and more probabilistic. I propose a third account of idealization in unitarian terms that solves all three problems.     

Substantivity in feminist metaphysics

Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach (from my book Writing the Book of the World) does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics (and social metaphysics generally) are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive because their answers are not sensitive to any alternate, equally good conceptual choices we could have made. I also argue that such questions are substantive regardless of the ontology of social kinds.     

Individualism and the metaphysics of actions

I examine an intuitive property of folk-psychological explanations I call self-sufficiency. I argue that individualism cannot honor this property and work toward distilling an account of psychological explanation that does honor it, given some fairly standard assumptions. In doing so, my preference for an Externalist individuation of intentional state will emerge unambiguously. The assumptions I rely on are fairly standard but not uncontroversial. Yet not always do I attempt to defend them from objections. My goal is an account of folk psychology consistent with our every-day practices rather than the deduction of an idealized psychology from first principles. I conclude with some applications offered as evidence that the goal was achieved.     

The metaphysics of rule-following

This paper proposes a causal–dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal–dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (Philos Perspect 12:283–312, 1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (Philos Stud 140:285–298, 2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.     

The metaphysics of quantity

A formal theory of quantity T _Q is presented which is realist, Platonist, and syntactically second-order (while logically elementary), in contrast with the existing formal theories of quantity developed within the theory of measurement, which are empiricist, nominalist, and syntactically first-order (while logically non-elementary). T _Q is shown to be formally and empirically adequate as a theory of quantity, and is argued to be scientifically superior to the existing first-order theories of quantity in that it does not depend upon empirically unsupported assumptions concerning existence of physical objects (e.g. that any two actual objects have an actual sum). The theory T _Q supports and illustrates a form of naturalistic Platonism, for which claims concerning the existence and properties of universals form part of natural science, and the distinction between accidental generalizations and laws of nature has a basis in the second-order structure of the world.     

The metaphysics of groups

If you are a realist about groups (e.g. religious institutions, football teams, the Mafia etc.) there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories (groups as sui generis entities and groups as mereological fusions) fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them.     

The metaphysics of intersectionality

Philosophical Studies - This paper develops and articulates a metaphysics of intersectionality, the idea that multiple axes of social oppression cross-cut each other. Though intersectionality is...