Perceiving causality after the fact: postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception

In simple dynamic events we can easily perceive not only motion, but also higher-level properties such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another. Several researchers have suggested that such causal perception is an automatic and stimulus-driven process, sensitive only to particular sorts of visual information, and a major research project has been to uncover the nature of these visual cues. Here, rather than investigating what information affects causal perception, we instead explore the temporal dynamics of when certain types of information are used. Surprisingly, we find that certain visual events can determine whether we perceive a collision in an ambiguous situation even when those events occur after the moment of potential 'impact' in the putative collision has already passed. This illustrates a type of postdictive perception: our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information presented within short temporal windows, so that new information which is obtained can influence the immediate past in our conscious awareness. Such effects have been previously demonstrated for low-level motion phenomena, but the present results demonstrate that postdictive processes can influence higher-level event perception. These findings help to characterize not only the 'rules' of causal perception, but also the temporal dynamics of how and when those rules operate.     

Amodal causal capture in the tunnel effect

In addition to identifying individual objects in the world, the visual system must also characterize the relationships between objects, for instance when objects occlude one another or cause one another to move. Here we explored the relationship between perceived causality and occlusion. Can one perceive causality in an occluded location? In several experiments, observers judged whether a centrally presented event involved a single object passing behind an occluder, or one object causally launching another (out of view and behind the occluder). With no additional context, the centrally presented event was typically judged as a non-causal pass, even when the occluding and disoccluding objects were different colors--an illusion known as the 'tunnel effect' that results from spatiotemporal continuity. However, when a synchronized context event involved an unambiguous causal launch, participants perceived a causal launch behind the occluder. This percept of an occluded causal interaction could also be driven by grouping and synchrony cues in the absence of any explicitly causal interaction. These results reinforce the hypothesis that causality is an aspect of perception. It is among the interpretations of the world that are independently available to vision when resolving ambiguity, and that the visual system can 'fill in' amodally.     

Causal capture: contextual effects on the perception of collision events

In addition to perceiving the colors, shapes, and motions of objects, observers can perceive higher–level properties of visual events. One such property is causation, as when an observer sees one object cause another object to move by colliding with it. We report a striking new type of contextual effect on the perception of such collision events. Consider an object (A) that moves toward a stationary object (B) until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving along the same path. Such "launches" are perceived in terms beyond these kinematics: As noted in Michotte's classic studies, observers perceive A as being the cause of B's motion. When A and B fully overlap before B's motion, however, observers often see this test event as a completely noncausal "pass": One object remains stationary while another passes over it. When a distinct launch event occurs nearby, however, the test event is "captured": It too is now irresistibly seen as causal. For this causal capture to occur, the context event need be present for only 50 ms surrounding the "impact," but capture is destroyed by only 200 ms of temporal asynchrony between the two events. We report a study of such cases, and others, that help define the rules that the visual system uses to construct percepts of seemingly high–level properties like causation.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

The origins of causal perception: evidence from postdictive processing in infancy

The currency of our visual experience consists not only of visual features such as color and motion, but also seemingly higher-level features such as causality--as when we see two billiard balls collide, with one causing the other to move. One of the most important and controversial questions about causal perception involves its origin: do we learn to see causality, or does this ability derive in part from innately specified aspects of our cognitive architecture? Such questions are difficult to answer, but can be indirectly addressed via experiments with infants. Here we explore causal perception in 7-month-old infants, using a different approach from previous work. Recent work in adult visual cognition has demonstrated a postdictive aspect to causal perception: in certain situations, we can perceive a collision between two objects in an ambiguous display even after the moment of potential 'impact' has already passed. This illustrates one way in which our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information over short temporal windows. Here we demonstrate analogous postdictive processing in infants' causal perception. This result demonstrates that even infants' visual systems process information in temporally extended chunks. Moreover, this work provides a new way of demonstrating causal perception in infants that differs from previous strategies, and is immune to some previous types of critiques.     

Measuring causal perception: connections to representational momentum?

In a collision between two objects, we can perceive not only low-level properties, such as color and motion, but also the seemingly high-level property of causality. It has proven difficult, however, to measure causal perception in a quantitatively rigorous way which goes beyond perceptual reports. Here we focus on the possibility of measuring perceived causality using the phenomenon of representational momentum (RM). Recent studies suggest a relationship between causal perception and RM, based on the fact that RM appears to be attenuated for causally 'launched' objects. This is explained by appeal to the visual expectation that a 'launched' object is inert and thus should eventually cease its movement after a collision, without a source of self-propulsion. We first replicated these demonstrations, and then evaluated this alleged connection by exploring RM for different types of displays, including the contrast between causal launching and non-causal 'passing'. These experiments suggest that the RM-attenuation effect is not a pure measure of causal perception, but rather may reflect lower-level spatiotemporal correlates of only some causal displays. We conclude by discussing the strengths and pitfalls of various methods of measuring causal perception.     

Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality

Beyond perceiving patterns of motion in simple dynamic displays, we can also perceive higher level properties, such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another object. Although causality is a seemingly high-level property, its perception--like the perception of faces or speech--often appears to be automatic, irresistible, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-driven rules. Here, in an exploration of such rules, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping and attention can influence the both perception of causality in ambiguous displays. We first report several types of grouping effects, based on connectedness, proximity, and common motion. We further suggest that such grouping effects are mediated by the allocation of attention, and we directly demonstrate that causal perception can be strengthened or attenuated on the basis of where observers are attending, independent of fixation. Like Michotte, we find that the perception of causality is mediated by strict visual rules. Beyond Michotte, we find that these rules operate not only over discrete objects, but also over perceptual groups, constrained by the allocation of attention.     

Perceived physical and social causality in animated motions: spontaneous reports and ratings

Michotte argued that we perceive cause-and-effect, without contributions from reasoning or learning, even in displays of two-dimensional moving shapes. Two studies extend this line of work from perception of mechanical to social causality. We compared verbal reports with structured ratings of causality to gain a better understanding of the extent to which perceptual causality occurs spontaneously or depends on instruction or context. A total of 120 adult observers (72 in the main experiment, 48 in an initial experiment) saw 12 (or 8) different computer animations of shape A moving up to B, which in turn moved away. Animations factorially varied the temporal and spatial relations of the shapes, and whether they moved rigidly or in a non-rigid, animal-like manner. Impressions of social as well as physical causality appeared in both free reports and ratings. Perception of physical causality was stronger than perception of social causality, particularly in free reports. No differences of this nature appear in infants and children, so the asymmetry may reflect learnt knowledge. Physical causality was relatively unspecific initially, but discrimination of causal and delayed control events improved with exposure to multiple events. Experience seems to affect the causal illusion even over a short timeframe; the idea of 'one-trial causality' may be somewhat misleading. Regardless of such effects on the absolute level of responses, the different measures showed similar patterns of variation with the spatio-temporal configuration and type of motion. The good fit of ratings and reports validates much recent work in this area.     

Launching the effect: Representations of causal movements are influenced by what they lead to

We investigated whether the representation of an observed causal movement is influenced by its observed effect. Subjects watched displays showing collisions between two objects. In this 'launching event' (Michotte, 1946/1963), one of the two objects (Object A) started to move and set a second, initially stationary, object (Object B) into motion, which gave a strong impression of apparent causality. The apparent effectiveness of A's movement was manipulated by varying the velocities of A and B. When the velocity of B was higher than that of A, the effectiveness of the collision was high; when it was smaller it was low. Then, subjects were asked to reproduce the velocity of the causal movement. Reproduced velocity followed the velocity of both Object A and Object B, which supports the hypothesis that the effect of a movement is integrated with its apparent cause. However, when apparent causality was reduced by changing the direction of motion of B or by covering the point of collision, the influence of the effect on the representation of the cause persisted, suggesting that retroactive interference may account for the findings. The interference effect could not be reduced to temporal recency or spatial integration and was not obtained in the reverse temporal order (proactive interference). Rather, the two successive movements were blended in memory.     

Sound induces perceptual reorganization of an ambiguous motion display in human infants

Adults who watch an ambiguous visual event consisting of two identical objects moving toward, through, and away from each other and hear a brief sound when the objects overlap report seeing visual bouncing. We conducted three experiments in which we used the habituation/test method to determine whether these illusory effects might emerge early in development. In Experiments 1 and 3 we tested 4‐, 6‐ and 8‐month‐old infants’ discrimination between an ambiguous visual display presented together with a sound synchronized with the objects’ spatial coincidence and the identical visual display presented together with a sound no longer synchronized with coincidence. Consistent with illusory perception, the 6‐ and 8‐month‐old, but not the 4‐month‐old, infants responded to these events as different. In Experiment 2 infants were habituated to the ambiguous visual display together with a sound synchronized with the objects’ coincidence and tested with a physically bouncing object accompanied by the sound at the bounce. Consistent with illusory perception again, infants treated these two events as equivalent by not exhibiting response recovery. The developmental emergence of this intersensory illusion at 6 months of age is hypothesized to reflect developmental changes in object knowledge and attentional mechanisms.     

Spatiotemporal continuity and the perception of causality in infants

Infant perception of a Michottean launching event in which one object causes another to move through collision is examined in a series of habituation-test experiments. A number of hypotheses concerning how infants aged around 30 weeks might perceive and encode launching and its noncausal variants are identified and tested. The results of the first experiment indicate that infants can perceive direct launching as an event with internal structure, that is, as composed of two temporally ordered movements. The nature of the encoding by the infants is perceptual and not specifically motor-based. The second experiment makes it seem unlikely that the infants encode independent spatial and temporal features (for example, contact and successivity), while the third experiment suggests a spatiotemporal continuity gradient. Some implications for the origins of causality are discussed.     

Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-causalist

The causal theory of perception is opposed by anti-causalists, who claim that the notion of causality is not part of our ordinary concept of perception, and sometimes raise the possibility of deviant causal chain counter-examples in an attempt to undermine the causal theory. I argue that such examples in fact cause more difficulties for anti-causalist accounts of perception. Anti-causalists are unable to explain how the examples can be recognized as deviant, and why such cases are incompatible with perception. They have a general problem in providing a satisfactory account of hallucination. A comparison with certain complex cases of illusion suggests that our grasp of the concept of perception does indeed involve some kind of understanding of the kinds of causal chains appropriate to genuine perception.     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

Infant perception of a manual pick-up event

Manual pick-up of an object is a simple causal event frequently observed by infants. A habituation-recovery of looking technique with filmed stimuli is used in experiments which seek to investigate aspects of the perception and encoding of such events in infants. In the first study with 28-week-olds, it is found that ‘lateral mirror-image’ pick-ups are hardly discriminable, while a change in the contact relation of hand and object is readily discriminable. In the second, again with 28-week-olds, the discriminability of the contact relation appears to be specific to a dynamic context involving a hand (rather than another inanimate object). The results of a further experiment make it appear unlikely that the previous results were simply due to the partial occlusion of the picked-up object produced by the grasping. The implications of these results for infant perception of causality are briefly considered.     

Toward a causal realist account of causal understanding

Within a limited domain, humans can perceive causal relations directly. The term causal realism is used to denote this psychological hypothesis. The domain of causal realism is in actions upon objects and haptic perception of the effects of those actions: When we act upon an object we cannot be mistaken about the fact that we are acting upon it and perceive the causal relation directly through mechanoreceptors. Experiences of actions upon objects give rise to causal knowledge that can be used in the interpretation of perceptual input. Phenomenal causality, the occurrence of causal impressions in visual perception, is a product of the application of acquired causal knowledge in the automatic perceptual interpretation of appropriate stimuli. Causal realism could constitute the foundation on which all causal perception, judgment, inference, attribution, and knowledge develop.     

The cradle of causal reasoning: newborns’ preference for physical causality

Perception of mechanical (i.e. physical) causality, in terms of a cause–effect relationship between two motion events, appears to be a powerful mechanism in our daily experience. In spite of a growing interest in the earliest causal representations, the role of experience in the origin of this sensitivity is still a matter of dispute. Here, we asked the question about the innate origin of causal perception, never tested before at birth. Three experiments were carried out to investigate sensitivity at birth to some visual spatiotemporal cues present in a launching event. Newborn babies, only a few hours old, showed that they significantly preferred a physical causality event (i.e. Michotte's Launching effect) when matched to a delay event (i.e. a delayed launching; Experiment 1) or to a non‐causal event completely identical to the causal one except for the order of the displacements of the two objects involved which was swapped temporally (Experiment 3). This preference for the launching event, moreover, also depended on the continuity of the trajectory between the objects involved in the event (Experiment 2). These results support the hypothesis that the human system possesses an early available, possibly innate basic mechanism to compute causality, such a mechanism being sensitive to the additive effect of certain well‐defined spatiotemporal cues present in the causal event independently of any prior visual experience.     

That’s the way the ball bounces: infants’ and adults’ perception of spatial and temporal contiguity in collisions involving bouncing balls

Three experiments investigated the perception of collisions involving bouncing balls by 7- and 10-month-old infants and adults. In previous research, 10-month-old infants perceived the causality of launching collisions (events in which one object moves along a smooth horizontal trajectory toward a second object, apparently launching it into motion) in relatively simple event contexts. In more complex event contexts, infants failed to discriminate among the events or respond to changes in individual features. Experiments 1 and 2 of the present investigation revealed that 7- and 10-month-old infants attended to spatial and temporal contiguity, but not causality, in collisions involving the movement of bouncing balls. In Experiment 3, both spatiotemporal contiguity and general knowledge about movement trajectories influenced adults’ judgments of causality for these collisions. The present results add to a growing understanding of infants’ event perception as constructive and a function, in part, of the complexity of the event context.     

Visual determinants of a cross-modal illusion

Contrary to the predictions of established theory, Schutz and Lipscomb (2007) have shown that visual information can influence the perceived duration of concurrent sounds. In the present study, we deconstruct the visual component of their illusion, showing that (1) cross-modal influence depends on visible cues signaling an impact event (namely, a sudden change of direction concurrent with tone onset) and (2) the illusion is controlled primarily by the duration of post-impact motion. Other aspects of the post-impact motion—distance traveled, velocity, acceleration, and the rate of its change (i.e., its derivative, jerk)—play a minor role, if any. Together, these results demonstrate that visual event duration can influence the perception of auditory event duration, but only when stimulus cues are sufficient to give rise to the perception of a causal cross-modal relationship. This refined understanding of the illusion’s visual aspects is helpful in comprehending why it contrasts so markedly with previous research on cross-modal integration, demonstrating that vision does not appreciably influence auditory judgments of event duration (Walker & Scott, 1981).