Whose forest? Whose land? Whose Ruins? Ethics and conservation

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

Whose voice are we hearing,really?

This article, written from the position of someone who has lived experience of therapy for ‘psychosis’ and an interest in participation, explores the degree to which qualitative research truly conveys the voice and perspective of research participants. By exploring five papers focused on diverse experiences of psychotherapy, from the perspective of clients and therapists, it draws out some of the tensions inherent in making interpretations and connections within research papers and the impact this may have on the quality of any conclusions drawn. Finally, it makes some suggestions for ways of meaningfully involving research participants in the process and argues for an ongoing dialogue to prevent our own assumptions and theoretical frameworks from obscuring the importance of this involvement to improve the quality of future research.     

Whose harm? Which metaphysic?

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.

     

Whose Evolution? Which Theology?

The importance of scientific conflicts for theology andphilosophy is difficult to judge. In many disputes of significance, prominent scientists can be found on both sides. Profound philosophical and religious implications are sometimes said to be implied by the new theory as well. This article examines the dispute over natural selection between Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould as a contemporary instance of such a conflict. While both claim that profound philosophical conclusions flow from their own alternativeaccount of evolution, I suggest that the implication is not as great as is claimed and that the alleged implications have as much to do with their own perceptions of theology as with the actual theories themselves. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is not irrelevant for theology. Theologians should be aware of the possible implications of evolutionary theory and at the same time theextent and limits of such implications.     

Whose Voices Are Heard? Gender, Sexual Orientation, and Newspaper Sources

A content analysis of 243 U.S. newspaper articles about same-sex marriage from the Boston Globe, the Plain Dealer, the Oklahoman, and the San Francisco Chronicle was conducted. Hypotheses predicted that male sources would outnumber female sources; that gay male sources would outnumber lesbian sources; and that male sources would express more negative views toward same-sex marriage than female sources. Results showed that male sources were over three times as common as female sources. Gay male and lesbian sources were found at near-equal rates in the Boston Globe and the San Francisco Chronicle, but were almost absent from the Plain Dealer and the Oklahoman. Male sources expressed negative views toward same-sex marriage more frequently than female sources.     

Whose Values? Whose Risk? Exploring Decision Making About Trial of Labor After Cesarean

In this article, we discuss decision making during labor and delivery, specifically focusing on decision making around offering women a trial of labor after cesarean section (TOLAC). Many have discussed how humans are notoriously bad at assessing risks and how we often distort the nature of various risks surrounding childbirth. We will build on this discussion by showing that physicians make decisions around TOLAC not only based on distortions of risk, but also based on personal values (i.e. what level of risk are you comfortable with or what types of risks are you willing to take) rather than medical data (or at least medical data alone). As a result of this, we will further suggest that the party who is best epistemically situated to make decisions about TOLAC is the woman herself.     

Whose voice counts? Gender,power, and epistemologies in the seminary classroom

This article wrestles with the question “whose voice counts?” as an entrée into a discussion of the challenges students encounter in learning to value different epistemologies and that professors encounter in attempting to teach for inclusion of voices. The essay reflects on an experience teaching a graduate seminar on gender and epistemology in which students encounter challenges reflecting on readings that present theology in the form of personal narratives, rather than in a more abstract or theoretical form. Course content and genres of writing are both gendered and subject to power dynamics associated with the uneven treatment of different types of knowledge. The paper focuses primarily on the lens of gender but notes as well the intersectional nature of gender – and the ways in which the course dynamics are complicated by the race, sexuality, and even the class of the authors, students, and teacher. The paper makes two substantial arguments. First, it names a pedagogical meta‐question at the intersection of gender and pedagogy: Even when women are on the syllabus, how are educators ensuring that the epistemologies at work in their classrooms allow for equal authorial authority in the classroom? Second, the paper challenges educators to make changes in their classrooms to allow students time to engage and employ epistemologies they discuss and to see the importance of these practices for wider systemic change in institutions and society.     

Whose tradition? Which Enlightenment? What content? Engelhardt, Hauerwas, Capaldo, and the future of Christian bioethics.

The development of a content-full Christian bioethics requires an analysis of the particular contents and traditions which different Christians bring to morality. For Hauerwas, the content of Christian ethics is the speech and practices of the community. For Engelhardt, only a content-full tradition, such as the Orthodox tradition, will be able to arrive at closure on the moral issues presented by the contemporary practice of medicine. Capaldi calls, in contrast, for a Kantian society of autonomous self-legislators whose responsible freedom is grounded in a cosmic order that must be explicated and retrieved in particular practices. The manner in which we view our own traditions and the shortcomings of modernity determine the content that Christianity brings to bioethics.     

Whose Lives? How History,Societies, and Institutions Define and Shape Life Courses

This article outlines how current sociology constructs life courses. First, a set of general heuristics is provided. Second, the development of life course sociology over the last 50 years is traced as an intellectual process whereby the life course has emerged as an analytical construct in addition to such concepts as human development, biography, and aging. A differential life course sociology has gradually developed in which contexts are specified according to time and place. Third, these differential constraints operating on life courses are illustrated from the perspective of 2 research areas. One perspective introduces historical periods as a sequence of regimes that regulate life courses. Another perspective looks at cross-national differences and especially focuses on institutions as the mechanisms by which life courses are shaped. The article concludes with reflections about the relation between the variable social contexts of life courses and human development.     

Whose Line Is It,Anyway? Using Improvisational Exercises to Spark Counselor Development

New counselors often struggle to respond to the unpredictability and ambiguity inherent in clinical interactions. Improvisational acting exercises can be used to help counselors-in-training become more comfortable thinking on their feet. By creating a safe environment for students to engage in extemporaneous expression, educators can model ways of developing rapport while helping students increase their sense of interactional self-efficacy. This article describes the benefits of using improvisational exercises in the classroom to encourage spontaneity, experimentation, and self-reflection. Example exercises that may be incorporated into counselor education courses are provided.     

Whose ideology? A rejoinder to M. Plon

M. Plon commits the same offense that he finds so odious in American social psychology: A confounding of political axioms and scientific reasoning. His desire to demonstrate ideological blindness in Americans leads him to misinterpret some published works on the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm in bargaining research and to ignore the issue of the most useful balance in emphasis between conflict maintenance and conflict resolution when these topics are studied experimentally. Thus, M. Plon's angry attack is not a clarification of the deep issues that he essays but, rather, another data point that will itself need to be understood.     

Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?

Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014 Bain, D. 2014. Pains That Don't Hurt, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92/2: 305–20.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] and Klein [forthcoming Klein, C. forthcoming. What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows, Mind. [Google Scholar]]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain to have motivational force. But does one need to care about one's body qua one's own? Or does one merely need to care about the body that happens to be one's own? In this paper, I will consider various interpretations of the notion of bodily care, in light of a series of pathological cases in which patients report pain in a body part that they do not experience as their own. These cases are problematic if one adopts a first-personal interpretation of bodily care, according to which pain requires one to care about what is represented as one's own body. The objection can run as follows. If the patients experience the body part as alien, then they should not care about it. Therefore, they should be similar to patients with pain asymbolia. But they are not. Hence, bodily care is not necessary to pain. To resist this conclusion, one can try to revise the interpretation of the notion of bodily care and to offer alternative interpretations that are not first-personal. However, I will show that that those alternatives also fail to account for these borderline cases of pain.