Evidence for an explanation advantage in naïve biological reasoning

The present studies compare young children’s explanations and predictions for the biological phenomenon of contamination. In Study 1, 36 preschoolers and 24 adults heard vignettes concerning contamination, and were asked either to make a prediction or to provide an explanation. Even 3-year-olds readily supplied contamination-based explanations, and most children mentioned an unseen mechanism (germs, contact through bodily fluids). Moreover, unlike adults who performed at ceiling across both explanation and prediction tasks, children were significantly more accurate with their explanations than their predictions. In Study 2, we varied the strength of cues regarding the desirability of the contaminated substance (N = 24 preschoolers). Although desirability affected responses, for both levels of desirability participants were significantly more accurate on explanation than prediction questions. Altogether, these studies demonstrate a significant “explanation advantage” for children’s reasoning in the domain of everyday biology.     

Children's conceptions of mental illness: A naïve theory approach

This paper reports two studies that investigated children's conceptions of mental illness using a naïve theory approach, drawing upon a conceptual framework for analysing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of an illness. The studies utilized semi‐structured interviewing and card selection tasks to assess 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children's conceptions of the causes and consequences (Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal–explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of both mental and physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the children's thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood.     

An integrative model of rational imitation in infancy

It has been proposed that infants selectively imitate based on a rational evaluation of an observed action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). This rational-imitation account has been rejected based on findings which suggested that infant imitation depends on: (a) the similarity between the infant's and the model's body posture; and (b) the presence of action effects (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Despite this controversy, we show that both accounts have received empirical support from different fields of research. We propose that both accounts operate on different levels, and we present an integrative model, which combines the two seemingly competing accounts. Motor resonance is perceived as a mechanism that enables infants to imitate, and a rational evaluation of the model's action is conceived as a mechanism that guides infants’ imitative behavior.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.     

System JLZ – rational default reasoning by minimal ranking constructions

We present a powerful quasi-probabilistic default formalism for graded defaults based on a well-motivated canonical ranking construction procedure, System JLZ. It implements the minimal construction paradigm and verifies the major inference principles and inheritance desiderata, including rational monotony for propositions and structured cumulativity for default conditionals. With help from a structured ranking semantics for defaults, it also avoids some drawbacks of semi-qualitative entropy maximization and other competing accounts.     

Pulling out the intentional structure of action: the relation between action processing and action production in infancy

Adults and children readily construct action representations organized with respect to an ultimate goal. These representations allow one to predict the consequences of action, interpret and describe actions, and categorize action sequences. In this paper, we explore the ontogeny of hierarchically organized action representations, and its relation to infants' ability to produce similar sequences. To do so, we examine infants' perception and performance of a means-end sequence: pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we demonstrate that 12-month-old infants understand that the initial step of the cloth-pulling sequence is directed toward the ultimate goal of attaining the toy, and use their knowledge of the causal constraints of the sequence to make this goal attribution. Ten-month-olds, however, appear transitional with respect to this understanding: their ability to identify the goal of the cloth-pulling sequence is related to their own ability to planfully solve a similar sequence. These findings are consistent with a burgeoning body of literature suggesting an intimate link between action production and perception, and suggest that this link is in place by at least 10 months of age.     

Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored

Using older adults and dual-task interference, we examined performance on two social reasoning tasks: theory of mind (ToM) tasks and versions of the deontic selection task involving social contracts and hazardous conditions. In line with performance accounts of social reasoning, evidence from both aging and the dual-task method suggested that domain-general resources contribute to performance of these tasks. Specifically, older adults were impaired relative to younger adults on all types of social reasoning tasks tested; performance varied as a function of the demands these tasks placed on domain-general resources. Moreover, in younger adults, simultaneous performance of a working memory task interfered with younger adults' performance on both types of social reasoning tasks; here too, the magnitude of the interference effect varied with the processing demands of each task. Limits placed on social reasoning by executive functions contribute a great deal to performance, even in old age and in healthy younger adults under conditions of divided attention. The role of potentially non-modular and modular contributions to social reasoning is discussed.     

The preference for symmetry in flower-naïve and not-so-naïve bumblebees

Truly flower-naïve bumblebees, with no prior rewarded experience for visits on any visual patterns outside the colony, were tested for their choice of bilaterally symmetric over asymmetric patterns in a radial-arm maze. No preference for symmetry was found. Prior training with rewarded black and white disks did, however, lead to a significant preference for symmetry. The preference was not specific to symmetry along the vertical axis: a preference for horizontal symmetry was found as well. The results challenge the notion that a preference for bilateral symmetry is unlearned. The preference for symmetry was the product of non-differential conditioning.     

The nature of irrational and rational beliefs: Progress in rational emotive behavior theory

This paper discusses some limitations of Ellis's Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. It is suggested that the present definition of irrational and rational beliefs is inadequate. The present theory is unclear whether irrational beliefs are exaggerated negative evaluations or empirical distortions of reality. It is proposed that irrational beliefs are core schemes, and that the concept of schema replace the present definition of beliefs. Ellis's position that demandingness is at the center of irrational thinking and emotional disturbance is examined. Research has failed to support this theory. It is proposed that demandingness and self-downing may be separate types of core irrational schemes. Research strategies are suggested that could test Ellis's position on the centrality of demandingness and on the nature of irrational beliefs in general.It is also suggested that irrational beliefs differ on their level of abstraction. The present REBT theory fails to identify which level of abstraction is necessary to cause disturbance, at which level of abstraction therapists should seek change, and whether a therapist should intervene first at higher or lower levels of abstract beliefs. It is suggested that a therapist only seek change to the level of abstraction that matches the client's concerns and that therapists begin to intervene at lower levels of abstraction and move up to more abstract cognitions as therapy progresses.The Institute for Rational Emotive Therapy     

Problem solving in infancy: the emergence of an action plan.

Young children's strategies were evaluated as they grasped and used objects. Spoons containing food and toys mounted on handles were presented to 9-, 14-, and 19-month-old children with the handle alternately oriented to the left and right. The alternating orientations revealed strategies that the children used for grasping items. Younger children usually reached with their preferred hand, disregarding the item's orientation. In the case of the spoon, this strategy produced awkward grasps that had to be corrected later. Older children anticipated the problem, alternated the hand used, and achieved an efficient radial grip (i.e., handle grasped with base of thumb toward food or toy end) for both orientations. A model of the development of action-selection strategies is proposed to illustrate planning in children younger than 2 years.     

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of hypothetical thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning and judgment are facilitated by the formation of epistemic mental models that are generated one at a time (singularity principle) by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualize problems in such a way as to maximize relevance to current goals (relevance principle). Analytic processes evaluate these models but tend to accept them unless there is good reason to reject them (satisficing principle). At a minimum, analytic processing of models is required so as to generate inferences or judgments relevant to the task instructions, but more active intervention may result in modification or replacement of default models generated by the heuristic system. Evidence for this theory is provided by a review of a wide range of literature on thinking and reasoning.     

A transitive-chain theory of syllogistic reasoning

A new theory of syllogistic reasoning, called the transitive-chain theory, is presented. The transitive-chain theory proposes that information about set relations is represented in memory by pairs of informational components. The theory further proposes that information about set relations is integrated by applying a small set of rules to transitive chains of these set relations. The rules that are applied to these chains are specified in detail. The theory is cast in terms of information-processing models for variants of the syllogistic reasoning task, and then mathematical models that quantify each of these information-processing models are presented. In a series of five experiments, the transitive-chain theory provides a good account of the response-choice data for syllogisms with various types of content, quantifiers, and logical relations (categorical and conditional). The results of these experiments offer tentative answers to four issues in the theory of syllogistic reasoning: (a) representation of premise information; (b) combination of premise information; (c) sources of difficulty in syllogistic reasoning; and (d) generality of the processes used in syllogistic reasoning.     

Object representation and predictive action in infancy

Previous research has shown that 6‐month‐old infants extrapolate object motion on linear paths when they act predictively on fully visible moving objects but not when they observe partly occluded moving objects. The present research probed whether differences in the tasks presented to infants or in the visibility of the objects account for these findings, by investigating infants’ predictive head tracking of a visible object that moves behind a small occluder. Six‐month‐old infants were presented with an object that moved repeatedly on linear or nonlinear paths, with an occluder covering the place where all the paths intersected. The first time infants viewed an object’s motion, their head movements did not anticipate either linear or nonlinear motion, but they quickly learned to anticipate linear motion on successive trials. Infants also learned to anticipate nonlinear motion, but this learning was slower and less consistent. Learning in all cases concerned the trajectory of the object, not the specific locations at which the object appeared. These findings suggest that infants form object representations that are weakly biased toward inertial motion and that are influenced by learning. The findings accord with the thesis that a single system of representation underlies both predictive action and perception of object motion, and that occlusion reduces the precision of object representations.     

Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning.