Benatar on the Badness of All Human Lives

Philosophia - This paper presents a critique of David Benatar’s arguments on the badness of all human lives. I argue that even if Benatar is right that there is an asymmetry between the good...     

Sick and Healthy: Benatar on the Logic of Value

Abstract

David Benatar, in Better Never to Have Been, sets out two arguments in support of the view that coming into existence is always a net harm. Remarkably, the first argument seems to imply that coming into existence would be a net harm even if the only bad we experienced in our lives were a ‘single pin-prick’. This argument hinges on a purported asymmetry: that whereas the absence of pains in non-existence is good, the absence of pleasures in non-existence is not bad (rather than bad). It also hinges on the non-badness at issue here being relative (no worse than the presence of pleasures in existence) rather than intrinsic (value neutral). To establish the crucial claim that the non-badness of absent pleasures in non-existence is relative rather than intrinsic, Benatar constructs an analogy involving two people, Sick and Healthy. In this paper, I show the inaptness of the analogy and also provide positive reason to doubt the soundness of the argument as it stands. What emerges from this critical analysis of the analogy is a plausible theory of value at odds with Benatar’s argument as a whole.     

The CIOMS's Distributive Justice Principle: A Reply to Dr Benatar

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

How Best to Prevent Future Persons From Suffering: A Reply to Benatar

Abstract

David Benatar claims that everyone was seriously harmed by coming into existence. To spare future persons from this suffering, we should cease having children, Benatar argues, with the result that humanity would gradually go extinct. Benatar’s claim of universal serious harm is baseless. Each year, an estimated 94% of children born throughout the world do not have a serious birth defect. Furthermore, studies show that most people do not experience chronic pain. Although nearly everyone experiences acute pain and discomforts, such as thirst, these experiences have instrumental value. For example, when a person picks up a hot object, in response to the pain, the person releases the object, thereby preventing serious harm. The standard that Benatar uses to evaluate the quality of our lives is arbitrary, as I will demonstrate. His proposal that we phase humanity out of existence by ceasing to have children is misguided and an overreaction to the problem of human suffering. The ‘threshold conception of harm’, which is a targeted approach for preventing future persons from suffering, is a more sensible approach.     

Afro-communitarianism and affirmative action in South Africa: A response to David Benatar

In a 2008 article “Justice, Diversity and Racial Preference: a Critique of Affirmative Action”, published in the South African Law Journal, David Benatar argues that affirmative action in South African higher education institutions cannot be justified. In response to this argument and the views expressed in his article, I show that his conclusions depend on an individualistic, decontextualised, and dehistoricised conception of the person. I argue that if we take an Afro-communitarian understanding of the person as our starting point, Benatar's arguments fail. An upshot of my argument is that affirmative action emerges as a useful and critical measure of restorative justice in the South African context.