How do we know that we are unique?

This paper aims to examine the notion of uniqueness as one aspect of the self that is taken for granted in psychotherapy. This paper attempts to address the question 'how do we know that we are unique individuals?' and in so doing, points out some difficulties. One plausible, but not problem-free answer is the notion of privileged access. Some of the problems will be briefly outlined.     

Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know

A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

What do we know about psycholinguistic effects?

Identifying clear and unequivocal psycholinguistic effects for lexical retrieval tasks has been the aim of a significant proportion of recent research activity. Debates have erupted concerning the existence or otherwise of particular effects on particular lexical tasks. Here, it is suggested that the reason for these debates is that researchers exercise choice in what variables they consider in their analysis. It is further illustrated that methods that have been employed for comparing the size of these effects between tasks can only lead to inconclusive results. It is suggested that psycholinguistic data may be better analysed using structural equation modelling methodologies. An example of such an approach is presented.     

Familiarity and attention: Does what we know affect what we notice?

Previous work on the object and word superiority effects has demonstrated that activation from stored representations can facilitate identification of items in a visual display. We predicted that activation of this sort might exogenously attract visual attention toward items that have stored representations. To test this prediction, we presented a familiar (word) and an unfamiliar (nonword) item simultaneously at unpredictable locations, and after varying delays, moved one of the stimuli. In accord with our prediction, at the shortest intervals subjects were more efficient at discriminating motion of the familiar item. Control data demonstrated that this advantage was due to a competitive interaction and not to the familiarity of the items per se.     

What do we really know about witness preparation?

Witnesses often meet with an attorney or witness preparation specialist before trial to review, discuss, and sometimes modify the substance and delivery of their anticipated testimony. This process is commonly referred to as witness preparation. During witness preparation, witnesses are taught to use effective testimony delivery skills (e.g., verbal and nonverbal communication skills) so that they will be perceived as being credible and persuasive in the courtroom. Although social scientists know much about communication skills, credibility, and persuasion, few published studies have attempted to determine whether or not these factors can be modified through witness preparation training. The present article reviews the psychological literature pertaining to witness preparation and makes recommendations for needed witness preparation research.     

The development of arithmetic principle knowledge: How do we know what learners know?

This paper reviews research on learners’ knowledge of three arithmetic principles: Commutativity, Relation to Operands, and Inversion. Studies of arithmetic principle knowledge vary along several dimensions, including the age of the participants, the context in which the arithmetic is presented, and most importantly, the type of knowledge assessment (e.g., application of procedures, evaluation of examples). The vast majority of studies utilize single-faceted knowledge assessments, which can lead to incomplete or misleading views of learners’ knowledge. Both context and type of knowledge assessment can influence conclusions about learners’ arithmetic principle knowledge. However, relatively few studies directly address the possible effects of context or type of knowledge assessment on their results. To move the field forward, research that utilizes multifaceted knowledge assessments is needed.     

How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?

Those who aim to give an account of modal knowledge face two challenges: the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of giving a plausible account of how we could have evolved a reliable capacity to acquire modal knowledge. I argue that recent counterfactual and dispositional accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics, and certain other areas of philosophy. I argue, however, that both of these problems look insuperable only if we assume that metaphysical modal discourse serves a describing or tracking function. If we adopt instead a normativist approach to metaphysical modal discourse, which sees the basic function of modal discourse as giving us perspicuous ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules, the problems show up very differently. The modal normativist can give a plausible response to both of the classic problems of how we can come to know metaphysical modal truths.

     

Conceptualization in the pigeon: What do we know?

This article reviews studies on conceptual behaviour in the pigeon that have been conducted over the past four decades. These studies reveal a variety of definitions and procedures employed in the assessment of this behaviour, a reflection of its multifaceted nature. Overall, pigeons have been found capable of categorizing a wide variety of static and moving natural and artificial stimuli. They have also demonstrated learning of abstract or relational concepts, even though such concepts seem to be more challenging. More recently, pigeons have also been shown to be capable of conceptualization as reflected in the ability to form functional or contingency classes (Lea, 1984), and some preliminary findings point to the possibility that pigeons can exhibit the more demanding equivalence classes (Sidman, 1990) that manifest themselves in the formal properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity emerging from conditional discriminations, when adequate procedures are employed. Available evidence now seems to suggest that functional and equivalence classes are closely related, but more work is needed to specify the nature of this relationship. At this point, it seems safe to conclude that language may not be necessary for conceptualization, including equivalence learning. Taken together, the findings of this review reveal learning abilities in the pigeon far beyond simple discrimination or categorization, although it is not yet well understood how this learning is achieved. Memorization of individual stimuli, featural analysis, and formation of prototypes have all been suggested as strategies utilized by pigeons in perceptual categorization tasks, while abstraction has been posited in explaining pigeons' relational concept learning. The reinforcement contingency has more recently been offered as a possible mechanism underlying equivalence learning. More broadly, the review illustrates how a hybrid of psychological and biological approaches can be employed in animal experimentation to tackle complex questions and enhance our understanding of behaviour and cognition.     

When we like what we know – A parametric fMRI analysis of beauty and familiarity

This paper presents a neuroscientific study of aesthetic judgments on written texts. In an fMRI experiment participants read a number of proverbs without explicitly evaluating them. In a post-scan rating they rated each item for familiarity and beauty. These individual ratings were correlated with the functional data to investigate the neural correlates of implicit aesthetic judgments. We identified clusters in which BOLD activity was correlated with individual post-scan beauty ratings. This indicates that some spontaneous aesthetic evaluation takes place during reading, even if not required by the task. Positive correlations were found in the ventral striatum and in medial prefrontal cortex, likely reflecting the rewarding nature of sentences that are aesthetically pleasing. On the contrary, negative correlations were observed in the classic left frontotemporal reading network. Midline structures and bilateral temporo-parietal regions correlated positively with familiarity, suggesting a shift from the task-network towards the default network with increasing familiarity.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?

In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a free will denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of free will, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles.     

Evaluating evidence of psychological adaptation: how do we know one when we see one?

Evolutionary psychologists argue that human nature contains many discrete psychological adaptations. Each adaptation is theorized to have been functional in humans' ancestral past, and empirical evidence that an attribute is an adaptation can come from showing it possesses complexity, efficiency, universality, and other features of special design. In this article, we present a tutorial review of the evidentiary forms that evolutionary psychologists commonly use to document the existence of human adaptations. We also present a heuristic framework for integrating and evaluating cross-disciplinary evidence of adaptation. Pregnancy sickness, incest avoidance, men's desires for multiple sex partners, and an easily learned fear of snakes are evaluated as possible human adaptations using this framework. We conclude that future research and teaching in evolutionary psychology would benefit from more fully utilizing cross-disciplinary frameworks to evaluate evidence of human adaptation.     

Is cognitive therapy consistent with what we know about emotions?

The cognitive perspective has been a dominant force in psychology and psychotherapy since the 1970s. Cognitive therapies share an emphasis on the priority of changing cognition as the key to bringing about changes in patterns of dysfunctional emotional reactions and symptomatic behaviors. In this article, the author examined the basis for the assumptions of cognitive therapy in the context of recent evidence of the long-term effects of stressful experiences. This evidence contradicts the assumption of many cognitive therapists that changing cognition is prior to and necessary to changing emotional reactions. Neurobiological evidence indicates that emotions can be experienced without cortical interpretations of stimuli, and clinical evidence indicates that experiences can be stored as isolated affective fragments that function later to distort cognition. This suggests that cognitive therapies are based on a limited model of mental functions that sometimes must be supplemented by broader psychodynamic concepts if lasting changes are to occur.     

Children's response to community violence: What do we know?

This article presents a framework for understanding the developmental significance of violence-related trauma in the lives of young children. It emphasizes the importance of the distinction between acute and chronic trauma. Acute trauma is more readily dealt with through “psychological first aid” and a “therapy of reassurance.” Chronic trauma requires a more systematic reconstruction of the child's “social map” of the world. The socioeconomic and demographic correlates of violent trauma predict an accumulation of risk factors in the child's life that compounds the problem of developmental disability. The problem community violence poses for the child must be understood in the larger context of greater risk for family disruption (including less than secure attachment) as well as domestic violence, poverty, and minority group status. The increasing incidence and prevalence of community violence poses a major challenge to the mental health of children.