The spatial distance rule in the moving and classical rubber hand illusions

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion in which participants perceive a model hand as part of their own body. Here, through the use of one questionnaire experiment and two proprioceptive drift experiments, we investigated the effect of distance (12, 27.5, and 43 cm) in the vertical plane on both the moving and classical RHI. In both versions of the illusion, we found an effect of distance on ownership of the rubber hand for both measures tested. Our results further suggested that the moving RHI might follow a narrower spatial rule. Finally, whereas ownership of the moving rubber hand was affected by distance, this was not the case for agency, which was present at all distances tested. In sum, the present results generalize the spatial distance rule in terms of ownership to the vertical plane of space and demonstrate that also the moving RHI obeys this rule.     

The rubber hand illusion in a mirror

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI) one’s hand is hidden, and a fake hand is visible. We explored the situation in which visual information was available indirectly in a mirror. In the mirror condition, compared to the standard condition (fake hand visible directly), we found no reduction of the RHI following synchronised stimulation, as measured by crossmanual pointing and by a questionnaire. We replicated the finding with a smaller mirror that prevented visibility of the face. The RHI was eliminated when a wooden block replaced the fake hand, or when the hand belonged to another person or mannequin. We conclude that awareness of the reflection is the critical variable, despite the distant visual localisation of the hand in a mirror and the third-person perspective. Stimuli seen in a mirror activate the same response as stimuli seen in peripersonal space, through knowledge that they are near one’s body.     

The rubber hand illusion depends on a congruent mapping between real and artificial fingers

The rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which a visible artificial hand is touched (or moves) synchronously with the participant's unseen own hand, indicates that body representations can undergo rapid changes. While several constraints for this illusion have been described, some reports highlight a remarkable flexibility of body representations, even contradicting a priori assumptions regarding body appearance and anatomy (e.g., the subjective embodiment of a third arm).     

Roughness perception during the rubber hand illusion

Watching a rubber hand being stroked by a paintbrush while feeling identical stroking of one’s own occluded hand can create a compelling illusion that the seen hand becomes part of one’s own body. It has been suggested that this so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI) does not simply reflect a bottom–up multisensory integration process but that the illusion is also modulated by top–down, cognitive factors. Here we investigated for the first time whether the conceptual interpretation of the sensory quality of the visuotactile stimulation in terms of roughness can influence the occurrence of the illusion and vice versa, whether the presence of the RHI can modulate the perceived sensory quality of a given tactile stimulus (i.e., in terms of roughness). We used a classical RHI paradigm in which participants watched a rubber hand being stroked by either a piece of soft or rough fabric while they received synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation that was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the sensory quality of the material touching the rubber hand. (In)congruencies between the visual and tactile stimulation did neither affect the RHI on an implicit level nor on an explicit level, and the experience of the RHI in turn did not cause any modulations of the felt sensory quality of touch on participant’s own hand. These findings first suggest that the RHI seems to be resistant to top–down knowledge in terms of a conceptual interpretation of tactile sensations. Second, they argue against the hypothesis that participants own hand tends to disappear during the illusion and that the rubber hand actively replaces it.     

Higher-order cognitive factors affect subjective but not proprioceptive aspects of self-representation in the rubber hand illusion

In the current study we look at whether subjective and proprioceptive aspects of selfrepresentation are separable components subserved by distinct systems of multisensory integration. We used the rubber hand illusion (RHI) to draw the location of the ‘self’ away from the body, towards extracorporeal space (Out Condition), thereby violating top-down information about the body location. This was compared with the traditional RHI which drew position of the ‘self’ towards the body (In Condition). We were successfully able to draw proprioceptive position of the limbs in and out from the body suggesting body perception is a purely bottom-up process, resistant to top-down effects. Conversely, we found subjective self-representation was altered by the violation of top-down body information – as the strong association of subjective and proprioceptive factors found in the In Condition became non-significant in the Out Condition. Interestingly, we also found evidence that subjective embodiment can modulate tactile perception.     

The role of agency for perceived ownership in the virtual hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion shows that people can perceive artificial effectors as part of their own body under suitable conditions, and the virtual hand illusion shows the same for virtual effectors. In this study, we compared a virtual version of the rubber-hand setup with a virtual-hand setup, and manipulated the synchrony between stimulation or movement of a virtual “effector” and stimulation or movement of people’s own hand, the similarity between virtual effector and people’s own hand, and the degree of agency (the degree to which the virtual effector could be controlled by people’s own movements). Synchrony-induced ownership illusion was strongly affected by agency but not similarity, which is inconsistent with top-down modulation approaches but consistent with bottom-up approaches to ownership. However, both agency and similarity induce a general bias towards perceiving an object as part of one’s body, suggesting that ownership judgments integrate various sources of information.     

The use of realistic and mechanical hands in the rubber hand illusion,and the relationship to hemispheric differences

Embodiment, as measured through the rubber-hand illusion (RHI), depends on the similarity between object to be embodied and part of the body it replaces. We compared a fake hand similar to a real hand, and one matched in size but made of wires (mechanical). Left and right versions were tested to investigate whether the effect of appearance was stronger in the left hand. We found that the mechanical hand induced embodiment, though to a reduced degree relative to the realistic hand (N = 120). Left and right versions of the mechanical hand did not differ in strength of the illusion. However, with the left realistic hand there was a stronger relationship between drift (an objective measure of the illusion) and agreement on the questionnaire (subjective experience). With the mechanical hand, objective and subjective measures were unrelated. We discuss the results in relation to factors that influence the RHI and hemispheric differences.     

Spatial limits on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the visual rubber hand illusion: Subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift

The nonvisual self-touch rubber hand paradigm elicits the compelling illusion that one is touching one’s own hand even though the two hands are not in contact. In four experiments, we investigated spatial limits of distance (15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, 60 cm) and alignment (0°, 90° anti-clockwise) on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the well-known visual rubber hand illusion. Common procedures (synchronous and asynchronous stimulation administered for 60 s with the prosthetic hand at body midline) and common assessment methods were used. Subjective experience of the illusion was assessed by agreement ratings for statements on a questionnaire and time of illusion onset. The nonvisual self-touch illusion was diminished though never abolished by distance and alignment manipulations, whereas the visual rubber hand illusion was more robust against these manipulations. We assessed proprioceptive drift, and implications of a double dissociation between subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift are discussed.     

Fake hand in movement: Visual motion cues from the rubber hand are processed for kinesthesia

The feeling that a fake (e.g. rubber) hand belongs to a person's own body can be elicited by synchronously stroking the fake hand and the real hand, with the latter hidden from view. Here, we sought to determine whether visual motion signals from that incorporated rubber hand would provide relevant cues for sensing movement (i.e. kinesthesia). After 180 s of visuo-tactile synchronous or asynchronous stroking, the fake hand was moved along the lateral or the sagittal axis. After synchronous stroking, movement of the rubber hand induced illusory movement of the static (real) hand in the same direction; the illusion was slightly more frequent and more intense when the fake hand was moved along the sagittal axis. We therefore conclude that visual signals of motion originating from the rubber hand are integrated for kinesthesia by the central nervous system just as visual signals from the real hand are.     

Synchronous stimulation in the rubber hand illusion task boosts the subsequent sense of ownership on the vicarious agency task

The relationship between sense of agency and sense of ownership remains unclear. Here we investigated this relationship by manipulating ownership using the rubber hand illusion and assessing the resulting impact on self-experiences during the vicarious agency illusion. We tested whether modulating ownership towards another limb using the rubber hand illusion would subsequently influence the illusory experience of ownership and agency towards a similar-looking limb in the vicarious agency task. Crucially, the vicarious agency task measures both sense of agency and sense of ownership at the same time, while removing the confounding influence of motor signals. Our results replicated the well-established effects of both paradigms. We also found that manipulating the sense of ownership with the rubber hand illusion influenced the subsequent vicarious experience of ownership but not the vicarious experience of agency. This supports the idea that sense of agency and sense of ownership are, at least partially, independent experiences.     

The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution

Watching a rubber hand being stroked, while one's own unseen hand is synchronously stroked, may cause the rubber hand to be attributed to one's own body, to "feel like it's my hand." A behavioral measure of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a drift of the perceived position of one's own hand toward the rubber hand. The authors investigated (a) the influence of general body scheme representations on the RHI in Experiments 1 and 2 and (b) the necessary conditions of visuotactile stimulation underlying the RHI in Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, the results suggest that at the level of the process underlying the build up of the RHI, bottom-up processes of visuotactile correlation drive the illusion as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Conversely, at the level of the phenomenological content, the illusion is modulated by top-down influences originating from the representation of one's own body.     

Self-consciousness impairments in schizophrenia with and without first rank symptoms using the moving rubber hand illusion

IntroductionThe moving rubber hand illusion allows the evaluation both the sense of body ownership and agency using visuo-motor stimulations.MethodsWe used the moving rubber hand illusion in anatomic congruence with explicit measures to compare active asynchronous and passive synchronous movements in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia with first rank symptoms (FRS) (n = 31) versus without FRS (n = 25).ResultsPatients with FRS are characterized by a lack of agency in active asynchronous condition. The two groups had no sense of ownership in synchronous passive condition. Using a multivariate regression model, we found an association between agency and body ownership measures in the active asynchronous condition in two groups (OR: 1.825, p < 0.001). In the passive condition, this association was only present in the group with first rank symptoms (OR: 2.04, p < 0.001).ConclusionTemporal proximity and sensorimotor information are essential in the understanding of self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia.     

The role of gamma band oscillations and synchrony on rubber hand illusion and crossmodal integration

The rubber hand illusion represents an illusory experience during the mislocalization of own hand when correlated visuotactile stimuli are presented to the actual and fake hands. The visuotactile integration process appears to cause this illusion; the corresponding brain activity was revealed in many studies. In this study, we investigated the effect of the rubber hand illusion on the crossmodal integration process by measuring EEG. The participants who experienced less intensive illusion showed greater congruency effect on reaction time (RT), greater power increase at the parietal zero electrode (Pz) and smaller interelectrode synchrony of the gamma band activity. On the other hand, the participants who experienced more intense illusion showed greater interelectrode synchrony. The results suggested that the gamma band activity in the parietal area reflects the visuotactile integration process and that its synchrony causes the illusory intensity.     

橡胶手错觉:拥有感研究的实验范式及其应用

橡胶手错觉是一种健康个体将非肉体的假手视为自己真实身体的一部分的体验, 这种错觉可以通过同时轻刷被试面前可见的橡胶手及其不可见的真手而产生.橡胶手错觉已成为一种研究身体拥有感的重要范式, 其产生机制可以分为“自下而上的认知匹配”与“自上而下的认知匹配”两种加工方式.前者涉及视觉与触觉刺激的同步性; 而后者涉及被试心中预存的身体意象与身体图式(包括真假手之间模态特征,位置空间的相似性).综合上述证据, 身体模型假说与个人边缘空间理论进一步为拥有感产生的复杂机制提供了整合两种加工方式的解释.橡胶手错觉范式已经被用于探索精神分裂症患者等特殊被试病理分析,错觉产生和心理特质之间的关系, 以及神经外科和术后恢复上.未来的研究应该更加重视范式本身的拓展, 应用虚拟现实技术来提高身体模态的仿真效果, 利用橡胶手拥有感的易感性作为筛选与预测身体意象障碍疾病的指标.     

A strange hand: On self-recognition and recognition of another

This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”. The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.

Two hands are better than one: a new assessment method and a new interpretation of the non-visual illusion of self-touch

A simple experimental paradigm creates the powerful illusion that one is touching one’s own hand even when the two hands are separated by 15 cm. The participant uses her right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner provides identical stimulation to the participant’s receptive left hand. Change in felt position of the receptive hand toward the prosthetic hand has previously led to the interpretation that the participant experiences self-touch at the location of the prosthetic hand, and experiences a sense of ownership of the prosthetic hand. Our results argue against this interpretation. We assessed change in felt position of the participant’s receptive hand but we also assessed change in felt position of the participant’s administering hand. Change in felt position of the administering hand was significantly greater than change in felt position of the receptive hand. Implications for theories of ownership are discussed.     

身体拥有感错觉对疼痛的影响及其作用机制

身体拥有感错觉以多通道的感官整合为基础,包括视觉-触觉、视觉-本体感觉、触觉-本体感觉、视觉-内感受的整合等。来自实验室急性痛以及慢性痛的大量结果表明拥有感错觉可产生镇痛作用。身体部位尺寸大小、肢体透明度等相关影响因素也逐渐得到揭示。拥有感错觉影响疼痛的机制与身体表征的改变有关,该过程可能涉及“身体网络”与“疼痛网络”间的连接,其中后顶叶皮层可能有重要作用。未来研究应更为深入地探索拥有感错觉范式以考察不同因素对疼痛的影响;在现有多感官整合的范式中重视内感受的作用;考察拥有感错觉改变疼痛的认知神经机制;区分急、慢性痛条件下以及不同慢性痛类型中拥有感错觉对疼痛的不同影响。     

I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to “ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis).     

Body ownership and beyond: Connections between cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology

During the past few decades, two disciplines that rarely come together—namely, cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology—have been generating remarkably similar results regarding the representational domain of personal possessions. Research in cognitive neuroscience indicates that although the core self is grounded in body ownership, the extended self encompasses a variety of noncorporeal possessions, especially those that play a key role in defining one’s identity. And research in linguistic typology indicates that many languages around the world contain a distinct grammatical construction for encoding what is commonly called “inalienable” possession—a category of owned objects that almost always includes body parts, but that also tends to include several other kinds of personally relevant entities. Both of these independent lines of investigation are summarized, and a number of interdisciplinary connections between them are discussed.