Together we are strong: Explicit and implicit paranormal beliefs predict performance in a knowledge test of paranormal phenomena better than explicit beliefs alone

The belief in paranormal phenomena is a frequently studied topic. Studies predominantly assess explicit (i.e., conscious) parts of paranormal belief (PB) using questionnaire-based self-report measures which are prone to impression management and social desirability tendencies. In order to investigate the usefulness of measuring implicit (i.e., automatic) PB, we developed a PB Implicit Association Test (PB-IAT). Implicit PB was uncorrelated with explicit PB, but moderated the relationship between explicit PB and participants’ knowledge of paranormal phenomena. Participants with a weak implicit PB did not differ in their knowledge scores regardless of whether they had strong or weak explicit PB. But participants with strong implicit PB had higher scores when they also had strong explicit PB compared to participants with weak explicit PB. These results suggest that discrepant configurations of PB impair performance in a knowledge test about paranormal phenomena.     

Measuring superstitious belief: why lucky charms matter

A large body of research has attempted to develop theories about the function and origin of superstitious beliefs on the basis of the psychological correlates of such beliefs. Most of this work has measured superstitious belief using the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). However, this scale refers solely to negative superstitions (e.g., breaking a mirror will cause bad luck) and omits items referring to positive superstitions (e.g., carrying a lucky charm will bring good luck). The two studies reported here found significant interactions between belief in negative and positive superstitions, and several individual difference measures. These findings have important implications for theory development, demonstrate that the PBS is an incomplete measure of superstitious belief, and highlight the need for future measures to include items referring to positive superstitions.     

Critical thinking ability and belief in the paranormal

A study was conducted to assess the relationship between critical thinking and belief in the paranormal. 180 students from three departments (psychology, arts, computer science) completed one measure of reasoning, the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and a scale of paranormal experiences. Half of the subjects filled out the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millmann, 1985) and the Watson–Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), respectively. The results show no significant correlations between critical thinking and paranormal belief or experiences. Reasoning ability, however, had a significant effect on paranormal belief scores, but not on paranormal experiences. Subjects with lower reasoning ability scored higher on Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy than did subjects with higher reasoning abilities. Results suggest that those who have better reasoning abilities scrutinise to a greater extent whether their experiences are sufficient justification for belief in the reality of these phenomena.     

The relationship between working memory capacity and cortical activity during performance of a novel motor task

ObjectivesThis study assessed whether individual differences in working memory capacity influenced verbal-analytical processes when performing a novel motor skill.DesignParticipants performed a tennis-hitting task in two conditions: no pressure and high-pressure.MethodsEighteen young adults participated in the study. EEG coherence between the T3-F3 and T4-F4 regions in the Beta1 and Alpha2 frequencies was recorded during performance in each condition. Verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacity were assessed using the Automated Working Memory Assessment.ResultsNo differences were found between the two conditions for hitting performance and EEG activity. However, across both conditions, verbal and visuo-spatial working memory were significant predictors of EEG coherence between the T3-F3 and T4-F4 regions in the Beta1 and Alpha2 frequencies. Larger verbal working memory capacity was associated with greater coherence while the opposite trend was observed for visuo-spatial working memory capacity.ConclusionsThese results indicate that larger verbal working memory capacity is associated with a greater tendency to use explicit processes during motor performance, whereas larger visuo-spatial working memory capacity is associated more with implicit processes. The findings are discussed with relevance to the theory of implicit motor learning.     

Implicit processing of tactile information: evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm

People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon (implicit change detection) also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was significantly better than chance (i.e., implicit change detection was observed). Experiment 3 demonstrated that tactile change detection does not necessarily involve a shift of spatial attention toward the location of change, regardless of whether the change is explicitly detected. We conclude that tactile change detection likely results from comparing representations of the two displays, rather than by directing spatial attention to the location of the change.     

Implicit learning for probable changes in a visual change detection task

Previous research demonstrates that implicitly learned probability information can guide visual attention. We examined whether the probability of an object changing can be implicitly learned and then used to improve change detection performance. In a series of six experiments, participants completed 120–130 training change detection trials. In four of the experiments the object that changed color was the same shape (trained shape) on every trial. Participants were not explicitly aware of this change probability manipulation and change detection performance was not improved for the trained shape versus untrained shapes. In two of the experiments, the object that changed color was always in the same general location (trained location). Although participants were not explicitly aware of the change probability, implicit knowledge of it did improve change detection performance in the trained location. These results indicate that improved change detection performance through implicitly learned change probability occurs for location but not shape.     

Gradations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task

We argue performance in the serial reaction time (SRT) task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. (1993b). Taking phenomenology seriously: the “fringe” and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89–108, Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741–759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval (RSI) on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. (2006). Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 723–760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness.     

Cognitive biases explain religious belief,paranormal belief,and belief in life’s purpose

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.     

The relationship between susceptibility to false memories, dissociativity, and paranormal belief and experience

One hundred participants completed a News Coverage Questionnaire concerning personal memories of where they were, what they were doing and who they were with when footage of dramatic news events was first shown on television, as well as asking them to recall details of the footage itself. These news items included four events that are known to have been captured on film and one item concerning non-existent footage of the bombing of a nightclub in Bali. Overall, 36% of respondents reported false memories of the alleged footage of the Bali bombing. Participants reporting false memories were found to score significantly higher than those who did not report such memories on the Australian Sheep–Goat Scale, on various subscales of the Anomalous Experiences Inventory (Belief, Experience and Ability) and on the Dissociative Experiences Scale, supporting the hypothesis that believers in the paranormal may be more susceptible to false memories than non-believers.     

Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.     

Skepticism: Genuine unbelief or implicit beliefs in the supernatural?

We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N = 57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics’ (or believers’) afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1 = 33, n2 = 31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect “supernatural” with “imaginary”. Study 3 (N = 63) investigated whether participants’ supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics’ ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.     

Differential effect of distractor timing on localizing versus identifying visual changes

When visual changes are accompanied by visual transients, such as in the case of saccades, eye blinks, and brief flickers, they often go unnoticed; this phenomenon is called change blindness (Rensink, R. A. (2002). Change detection. Annual Review of Psychology 53, 245; Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1, 261). Change blindness occurs even when the position of visual transients does not cover the location of the change (as in the 'mudsplash' paradigm) (O'Regan, J. K., Rensink, R. A., & Clark, J. J. (1999). Nature 398, 34). By using a simplified mudsplash display, the present study investigated whether change blindness depends on (a). the timing of visual transients, and (b). the task that observers perform. Eight Gabor elements with random orientations were presented. One element (target) was rotated 45 degrees clockwise or counterclockwise without a temporal gap. High contrast visual transients, not overlapping with the elements, appeared at various times with respect to the target change. Observers reported where the change was (change localization), or in which direction the target rotated (change identification). Change localization was impaired primarily when the onset of the transient was at or after the change. In contrast, change identification was impaired mainly when the transient preceded the change. These results suggest that change localization and change identification are mediated in part by different mechanisms.